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SRINAGAR  
THE

# HISTORY

OF THE

## BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.

BY

EDWARD THORNTON, Esq.,

AUTHOR OF "INDIA, ITS STATE AND PROSPECTS," &c. &c.

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VOLUME III.

PRATAP COLLEGE  
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OF

## VOLUME III.



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# HISTORY

OF THE

## BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA.

### CHAPTER XV.

SOME hesitation occurred in providing for the vacancy occasioned by the retirement of Lord Teignmouth. The Governor of Madras, Lord Hobart, had expected to succeed to the chief place in the government of Bengal; but the expectation was disappointed by the selection of Lord Cornwallis to re-assume the duties which a few years before he had relinquished. This appointment was notified to India, but never carried into effect, his lordship being subsequently named lord-lieutenant of Ireland. The choice of the home authorities ultimately fell upon the Earl of Mornington, who previously stood appointed to the government of Madras, and he quitted England late in the year 1797. The new governor-general had established for himself the reputation of a distinguished scholar, a brilliant parlia-

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A.D. 1797.

CHAP. XV. — mentary speaker, and an able man of business. His attention had for a series of years been sedulously devoted to the acquisition of such information as was calculated to fit him for the office which he had now attained. His pursuit of this branch of knowledge was, in all probability, the result of inclination rather than of any other motive; as the probability of success to any aspirant to an office so honourable and so highly remunerated as that of governor-general must be regarded as small. But whatever the motives, the result was most happy. The Earl of Mornington proceeded to his destination prepared for his duties by as perfect an acquaintance with the history and circumstances of British India as the most assiduous inquiries could secure. In addition to the fruits of his private studies, he had derived some advantage from having served as a junior member of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India. At the Cape of Good Hope he met with Major Kirkpatrick, an officer who had filled the office of British resident at more than one of the native courts; and the information derived from him, added to that which had already been accumulated by reading and official observation, enabled the governor-general to enter upon his office with a confidence which in his case was well warranted, but which, with inferior opportunities, no one would be justified in entertaining.

The position of the British government in India at this time was not inaccurately described by Lord Teignmouth as “respectable.” The Company pos-

sessed a considerable, but not a compact territory. Beyond their own dominions they exercised a certain influence, which might have been much greater had its extension been encouraged instead of being checked. But still the political prospects of the British in India were far from being bright. In various quarters the elements of danger were gathering into heavy masses, which the most supine observer of the times could scarcely overlook; and the policy which for some years had been pursued threatened to leave the British government to brave the storm without assistance. The probability, indeed, seemed to be, that, in the event of its being attacked by any native power, it would find in almost every other an enemy. Statesmen, whose views entirely moulded upon European experience, were incapable of adapting themselves to a state of society so widely different as that existing in India, had determined that if ever the British government should emerge from the passive acquiescence to which it was usually doomed, it should be for the purpose of maintaining a principle which had long been regarded as the conservator of the peace of Europe—the balance of power. The attempt to preserve the peace of India upon any such principle must now appear, to every one acquainted with the subject, not only idle, but ludicrous. But at the period under review, the hope, wild as it was, found harbour in the breasts of statesmen of high reputation; and the new governor-general was earnestly enjoined to maintain the ba-

CHAP. XV. — lance of power as established by the treaty of Seringapatam. That balance, however, such as it was, had been destroyed; and the apathy or bad faith of the British government had contributed to accelerate its destruction. The dominions and resources of the Nizam had been left to be partitioned by the Mahrattas at their pleasure; and though the dissensions of the conquerors had relieved the conquered party from a portion of the humiliation and loss incurred by his defeat, he had, notwithstanding, suffered greatly both in honour and power. The means for preserving any portion of either, which had been forced upon him by the policy of the British government, afforded, as has been seen, additional cause for alarm to that government. The main strength of his army was under French control; and as, in states constituted like that of the Nizam, the influence of the army is far greater than in those wherein the due subordination of military to civil authority is understood and maintained, the councils of that prince were in a great degree swayed by those who held the power of the sword. The danger of the British government from the continued maintenance of such a force in the service of the Nizam was sufficiently obvious. No hope of effective assistance from that prince, against Tippoo or any other enemy, could be looked for; and even his neutrality could not safely be relied upon. This was not the only evil, perhaps not the greatest evil, resulting from the unfortunate course of policy which had been pursued. The hostile feelings with

which the English and French regarded each other were known throughout India; and the knowledge that the star of French fortune was in the ascendant, while the interest of the English was declining, was eminently calculated to give confidence to the enemies of the latter nation, and even to add to the number of their enemies by deciding the wavering against them.

On turning from the Nizam to the Mahrattas, there was little to relieve the gloom created by a contemplation of the unprosperous state of the British interests at the court of Hyderabad. The course of events had greatly diminished the power and influence of the Peishwa, and there was little probability that the inferior chiefs would hold themselves bound by engagements entered into by their nominal leader to co-operate vigorously in any common object. The predominant influence at Poona was that of Scindia, who was not believed to have any good-will towards the British government. Such were the altered circumstances of the two states who had co-operated with the English in reducing the power of Mysore. Arcot and Tanjore remained, as they had long been, sources of weakness rather than of strength. The new Nabob of Arcot, following the example of his predecessor, gave up his country an unprotected prey to the rapacity of usurers. The state of Tanjore was in this respect little better; and there an intricate question of disputed succession furnished additional cause of embarrassment.

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In the north, the extraordinary scenes which had recently taken place in Oude were yet fresh in the memory of all, and the new government which Lord Teignmouth had been compelled by duty to establish, though in strict accordance with public feeling, had not yet acquired any portion of the confidence which is the growth of time. It was apprehended that Almas would resist it by arms, and fears were entertained of an insurrection of the Rohilla chiefs, a hardy and warlike race, never slow to draw the sword when an opportunity presented itself for asserting their independence. Zemaun Shah, the ruler of Caubul, who had on several occasions disturbed the peace of India, might, it was thought, deem the existing combination of circumstances favourable to a renewal of his attempts. This belief did not rest on mere conjecture. It was known that Zemaun Shah had been in communication with the bitter and irreconcilable enemy of the British power, Tippoo Sultan, and the mention of this prince leads to the consideration of the chief danger which the Company's government had to apprehend. The untameable hostility of Tippoo, a feeling as active as it was intense, had led him, ever since the conclusion of the peace negotiated by Lord Cornwallis, to seek in every quarter the means of regaining his lost power and influence, and of humbling the strangers who had inflicted such deep and painful wounds on his ambitious mind. His intercourse with Zemaun Shah was directed to these objects. An invasion

of the north of India from Caubul would have facilitated any hostile measures taken by Tippoo in the south by distracting the attention of the British government and dividing its force. At Poona, Tippoo had laboured assiduously to counteract British influence, and to engage the Mahratta chiefs in his views. At Hyderabad he had ventured to pursue the same course, and here he found his purposes answered by the co-operation of the French officers in the service of the Nizam. It was not in this quarter only that Tippoo sought aid from the national feeling of hostility so long existing between the French and the English people. During a period of many years he had employed all the means which suggested themselves for inducing the French to lend him efficient assistance in driving their rivals from India. An embassy sent by him to Constantinople had been intended to proceed from thence to Paris;\* but circumstances changed the determination, and another embassy, consisting of three persons, was subsequently dispatched direct to France, proceeding by sea from Pondicherry. It arrived while the unfortunate Louis XVI. still sate on the throne of his ancestors, and was received most graciously; but its object was unattained. The French government, then tottering to its foundations, was in no condition to render assistance to a despot separated from France by thousands of miles, and whose only claim to support was founded on his hatred of the English nation. It has been

\* See vol. ii. page 442.

CHAP. XV. — said, too, that there was little disposition on the part of the French King to listen to the overtures of Tippoo—that his experience of the bitter fruits of French interference in the disputes between England and her colonies in America, which had taught those who for centuries had received the word of the sovereign as law the doctrines of the natural equality of men and the supremacy of the popular will, had rendered him cautious of embarking in wars which had no better justification than the desire of injuring a neighbouring nation by cutting off its distant dependencies. Certain it is, however, that the mission failed, and the meanness of the presents which Tippoo had thought worthy to be offered to the monarch of one of the most powerful nations in the world afforded abundant room for those sportive effusions of wit and ridicule which even the obvious approach of the moral earthquake which was to shake all the thrones of Europe could not banish from the French court. The ambassadors, too, quarrelled among themselves as to the apportionment of certain presents which the liberality of the French King bestowed on them ; and on their return, without effecting any thing for the purposes of the mission, one, who had been slighted by his colleagues on account of his having previously been in the position of a menial servant, revenged himself by accusing them of participating in indulgences forbidden by the Prophet. Tippoo, not unprepared to feel displeasure at the unsatisfactory termination of an attempt which had been the cause of consider-

able expense, soothed his feelings by disgracing the ambassadors.\* But he did not thus easily relinquish an object so near his heart. The fearful changes which swept over France shortly after the departure of Tippoo's ministers from that country made no alteration in his views or conduct. He was attached to no particular school of political philosophy, and, beyond the limits of his own dominions, he cared not what form of government prevailed provided it were not such as to interfere with any of his interests or wishes. The red cap of the Jacobins was, in his eyes, as respectable as the crown of Saint Louis, and he sought the countenance and support of the successive revolutionary governments as assiduously as he had implored similar marks of favour from the monarch whose dethronement and murder had made way for such numerous experiments in the art of governing a great people—experiments commenced and relinquished with a levity that shed a ludicrous colouring over the horrors by which they were attended, and caused the whole to resemble rather a shadowy exhibition of the wild buffoonery of frantic demons, than a series of acts of most grave and important character performed by beings pretending to sanity and to the ordinary feelings of human nature. Through the agency of the government of the Mauritius various communications were made by Tippoo, in all of which he professed the strongest attachment to the French people, and attributed to

\* See Colonel Wilks's Sketches, vol. iii.

CHAP. XV. — this cause the hostility of the English, and the misfortunes to which he had in consequence been subjected. Well disposed as were those who administered the government of France to enter into any project for giving annoyance to Great Britain— anxious as they were to vindicate the national glory in India, where the flag of France had so often been lowered in submission to the rival nation, the state of affairs in Europe long rendered it impracticable for the French to bestow much of attention and any portion of assistance upon a suppliant from a distant part of the world. Tippoo, however, was too ardently bent upon his object to abandon it in despair; though the apparent indifference of the great nation must have annoyed, it did not discourage him, and some time in the year 1797 a circumstance occurred which re-animated his hopes. A privateer from the Mauritius arrived at Mangalore dismasted, and the commander solicited the means of repair. The officer exercising the chief naval authority at Mangalore, possessing a slight acquaintance with the French language, entered into conversation with the master of the disabled vessel, and reported, as the result, that this person represented himself as the second in command at the Mauritius, and stated that he had been specially instructed to touch at Mangalore for the purpose of ascertaining the Sultan's views regarding the co-operation of a French force which was ready to be employed in the expulsion from India of the common enemy, the English. Nothing could be more

gratifying to the Sultan than such an overture ; the master of the privateer was promptly admitted to the royal presence, and honoured with long and frequent conferences. The result was an arrangement, by which the master of the vessel, though recognized in his high character of an envoy, was, for the sake of concealment, to be ostensibly received into the service of Tippoo ; the vessel was to be purchased on the part of that prince, and to be laden with merchandize for the Mauritius ; and confidential agents of the Sultan were to proceed in her for the purpose of concerting all that related to the proposed armament.

The servants of Tippoo were less credulous than their master. They had conversed with some of the crew of the privateer, and discovered that the rank and mission of the commander were fictitious. The result of their inquiries was communicated to the Sultan, together with a representation of the danger which he would incur by disclosing his views to the English without any prospect of timely or adequate succour from the French. But Tippoo was too anxious that the Frenchman's assertions should be true to allow him to entertain a doubt of them. He met the warnings of his ministers by a reference to the doctrine of predestination, by which a sincere Mussulman consoles himself under all calamities, and excuses his want of exertion to avert them. The purchase of the vessel was arranged, but as the master was to remain in Mysore, the money was entrusted to one of his countrymen to make the

CHAP. XV. required payment on its arrival at the Mauritius. This person absconded with the amount thus obtained, and his subsequent fate is unknown.

His unexpected flight disconcerted in some degree the Sultan's plans, and even shook his confidence in the representations of the pretended French envoy, who was placed under personal restraint, on suspicion of being in collusion with the defaulter. Considerable delay took place before Tippoo could determine what course to pursue; but ultimately it was resolved to restore the vessel to the master, on his giving bond for the amount entrusted to his countryman, and to allow him to proceed to the Mauritius, conveying with him two servants of Tippoo, as ambassadors to the government of that island, with letters from their sovereign. The suspicion with which the commander of the vessel had been regarded probably generated a similar feeling in his mind; and, before he had been long at sea, he demanded to examine the letters in charge of Tippoo's ambassadors, threatening that, if refused, he would proceed on a privateering expedition, instead of making for the Mauritius. Some altercation took place, which was ended by the Frenchman adopting the short and effective course of forcibly seizing and opening the objects of his curiosity. The perusal of the letters seems to have removed his distrust, and he steered without hesitation to the Mauritius, where he arrived in January, 1798.

A. D. 1798.

The ambassadors were received by the French governor with distinguished honour; but the pub-

licity thus given to their arrival, however flattering, was altogether inconsistent with the secrecy which it was intended should be preserved with regard to their mission. Their despatches being opened, were found to express the great anxiety of Tippoo for the co-operation of the French in a plan which was laid down for the conquest of the English and Portuguese possessions in India, and of the territories of their native allies. The answer was most courteous, but little satisfactory. The fallaciousness of the expectations which had brought Tippoo's ambassadors to the Mauritius, and the falsehood of the statements which had induced the Sultan to send them, were illustrated by the declaration of the French authorities, that they had not at their disposal any adequate means of aiding the Sultan's views, but that his proposals should be transmitted to the government of France, who, it was not doubted, would joyfully comply with his wishes. The letters of the Sultan were accordingly transferred to France in duplicate; but as a long period would necessarily elapse before the determination of the government there could be known, the governor of the island, General Malartic, resolved to manifest his sympathy with the cause of Tippoo by issuing a proclamation, recounting the proposal of the Sultan to form an alliance with the French; and his avowal that he only waited the moment when that nation should come to his assistance to declare war against the English, whom it was his ardent desire to expel from India. The proclamation then ad-

CHAP. XV. — verted to the impracticability of the island government sparing any portion of its regular troops for such service; and concluded with inviting citizens, both white and black, to enrol themselves under the Sultan's flag, assuring those who might be disposed to volunteer of good pay, the amount of which was to be fixed with the ambassadors, and of being permitted to return to their own country whenever they might desire. Little could be hoped from this measure; and it seems impossible to assign any reasonable motive for thus, without necessity, and without any prospect of advantage, giving publicity to that which it was most important to conceal. The success of the experiment was commensurate with its wisdom. Tippoo's servants re-embarked with a mere handful of followers, and they for the most part the refuse of the island rabble.\* With this precious addition to the strength of the Sultan, they

A. D. 1798. landed at Mangalore in April.

As Tippoo had expected to receive from the French islands a large and effective force, he must have felt some disappointment on the arrival of the extraordinary group which accompanied his ambassadors on their return. Though few in number and low in character, they had at least one recommendation to the favour of the Sultan—they shared in his hatred of

\* Their numbers are differently stated. The governor-general, in a minute recorded 12th August, 1798, concludes that they did not exceed two hundred. Colonel Wilks, who had the opportunity of consulting Mysorean authorities, states the number to have been exactly ninety-nine.

the English; and though their feelings, with regard to the respective rights of sovereigns and people, were not such as could well be reconciled with the service of a despot, this circumstance seems to have given no concern either to them or their employer. Burning with zeal for those principles, the propagation of which had deluged Europe with blood, they made no attempt to conceal their opinions; and—a fact still more extraordinary—the Sultan, so far from manifesting any dislike of their views, ostensibly gave them the advantage of his sanction and patronage. One of the earliest measures of Tippoo's new friends was to organize a Jacobin club on those principles of national equality and universal fraternization which formed the creed of their countrymen at home. This association was not merely tolerated by the Sultan—it was honoured by his special approbation, and he even condescended to become a member of it. Whether or not he submitted to the fraternal embrace is uncertain; but it is beyond a doubt that he was enrolled among these assertors of liberty and equality, and added to the titles which he previously bore another, which, in the East, had at least the charm of novelty: the Sultan of Mysore became Citizen Tippoo. The tree of liberty was planted, and the cap of equality elevated. The citizen adventurers met in primary assembly; “instructed each other,” says Colonel Wilks, “in the enforcement of their new rights, and the abandonment of their old duties;” the emblems of royalty were publicly

CHAP. XV. — burnt, and an oath of hatred to that antiquated institution publicly administered and taken; and these ceremonies took place in a country where one man held at his disposal the lives, liberty, and property of all others—that man, moreover, though not only a despot, but a tyrant, witnessing these republican rites with approving eyes, and giving to them importance by his countenance and support. In truth, the whole life of Tippoo was an exemplification of the force of frenzied passion; and no part of it more strongly attests his total want of ordinary prudence and self-control than his conduct towards the men whom his silly embassy to the Mauritius had brought from thence, to preach under his auspices doctrines which, if practically followed out, would have levelled the most imperious of princes with the most wretched slave whom he oppressed. The champions of the new opinions hated those whom the Sultan also most intensely hated; and this was sufficient, not only to atone for all their extravagance, but to recommend their opinions to especial favour.

A. D. 1798. The Earl of Mornington arrived at Madras in April, and at the seat of his government in Bengal in May, 1798. Shortly afterwards, a copy of the proclamation issued at the Mauritius, announcing the designs of Tippoo, and inviting French citizens to join his standard, appeared in Calcutta. It necessarily attracted the attention of the governor-general, whose first impression was to doubt its authenticity. The actual existence of so wild a scheme, so wildly pursued, was not, indeed, to be believed

upon slight grounds. "It seemed incredible," said the governor-general, in recording his views on the subject, "that if the French really entertained a design of furnishing aid to Tippoo, they would publicly declare that design, when no other apparent end could be answered by such a declaration, excepting that of exposing the project in its infancy to the observation of our governments both at home and in India, and of preparing both for a timely and effectual resistance. It did not appear more probable that Tippoo (whatever might be his secret design) would have risked so public and unguarded an avowal of his hostility."\* The governor-general, however, deemed it proper to guard against the dangers of rash and obstinate disbelief, no less than against the inconveniences that might result from over-hasty credence. He forthwith instituted such inquiries as might lead to the determination of the question whether or not such a proclamation had been issued; and to be prepared for whatever measures might become necessary, he directed the governor of Madras, General Harris,† to turn his attention to the collection of a force on the coast to meet any emergency.

The authenticity of the proclamation was soon ascertained; but another doubt occurred—whether the step might not have been taken by M. Malartic without the concurrence of Tippoo, and for the pro-

\* Minute recorded on Bengal Government Consultations, 12th August, 1798.

† Lord Hobart had departed in October, 1797.

CHAP. XV. — motion of some object of the French government unconnected with his interests and unauthorized by his consent. The investigation which followed developed all the facts that have been related as to the embassy dispatched by Tippoo to the Mauritius, its flattering reception, the previous absence of any view on the part of the French authorities of aiding Tippoo in any manner, and the subsequent proceedings, down to the embarkation of the motley band of volunteers, their landing at Mangalore, and their admission into the Sultan's service. The feelings of Tippoo towards the British nation and government were previously no secret ; but had a doubt existed on the subject, it must have been removed by the information elicited by the inquiries of the governor-general. It was shewn not only that Tippoo would gladly avail himself of any opportunity that might offer for the recovery of his former power, but that he was not disposed to wait till fortune might throw the means in his way ; that he was collecting strength for his meditated task of driving the English from India ; and that as soon as he should be in a situation to commence war with a probability of success, his revengeful spirit would be released from the restraints to which, for a time, it had most reluctantly and most painfully been subjected. His application for French assistance had thus far failed ; but the failure was not attributable to any unwillingness on the part of those addressed to afford the Sultan all he wanted. The French government at home—its representatives abroad—would

alike have rejoiced in an opportunity of striking a blow at the power of Great Britain in India. The feeling had been manifested by the mode in which the demands of Tippoo had been met. Though what was yielded to his request was but a mockery of his wants, it was all that the island government could afford ; and in raising and dispatching to Mangalore the miserable band of adventurers who followed Tippoo's ministers, the desire to annoy the British government was not less strongly manifested than the want of ability to render annoyance effective. The feeling of hostility would certainly continue, and the means of effectively gratifying it might in time be found.

With the aid of allies, the British government had not found the conquest of Tippoo an easy task. The probability now was, that at no distant period the same labour must be undertaken without allies, with a French force acting in conjunction with the sovereign of Mysore, and with every native power of strength or importance united with those inveterate enemies of the English in the common object of driving them out of India.

It was for the governor-general to determine whether he would afford Tippoo further time to mature his plans, and to gain strength for carrying them into effect, or whether he would strike while the enemy was comparatively unprepared. He preferred the latter course, and the reasons by which his judgment was determined cannot be more fairly or more powerfully given than in his own

CHAP. XV. — words:—"If," said his lordship, "the conduct of Tippoo Sultan had been of a nature which could be termed ambiguous or suspicious: if he had merely increased his force beyond his ordinary establishment, or had stationed it in some position of our confines, or on those of our allies, which might justify jealousy or alarm; if he had renewed his secret intrigues at the courts of Hyderabad, Poonah, and Caubul; or even if he had entered into any negotiation with France, of which the object was at all obscure; it might be our duty to resort, in the first instance, to his construction of proceedings, which, being of a doubtful character, might admit of a satisfactory explanation. But where there is no doubt there can be no matter for explanation. The act of Tippoo's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country, is a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration or act of war, aggravated by an avowal that the object of the war is neither explanation, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British government in India. To affect to misunderstand an insult and injury of such a complexion, would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear. No state in India can misconstrue the conduct of Tippoo; the correspondence of our residents at Hyderabad and Poonah sufficiently manifests the construction which it bears at both of those courts; and in so clear and plain a case our demand of explanation would be justly attributed

either to a defect of spirit or of power; the result of such a demand would therefore be the disgrace of our character, and the diminution of our influence and consideration in the eyes of our allies and of every power in India. If the moment should appear favourable to the execution of Tippoo's declared design, he would answer such a demand by an immediate attack; if, on the other hand, his preparations should not be sufficiently advanced, he would deny the existence of his engagements with France; would persist in the denial until he had reaped the full benefit of them; and finally, after having completed the improvement of his own army, and received the accession of an additional French force, he would turn the combined strength of both against our possessions with an alacrity and confidence inspired by our inaction, and with advantages redoubled by our delay. In the present case, the idea, therefore, of demanding explanation must be rejected, as being disgraceful in its principle and frivolous in its object. The demand of reparation, in the strict sense of the term, cannot properly be applied to cases of intended injury, excepting in those instances where the nature of the reparation demanded may be essentially connected with security against the injurious intention. Where a state has unjustly seized the property, or invaded the territory, or violated the rights of another, reparation may be made by restoring what has been unjustly taken, or by a subsequent acknowledgment of the right which has been infringed; but the cause of our complaint against Tippoo Sultan is not that he

CHAP. XV. — has seized a portion of our property which he might restore, or invaded a part of our territory which he might again cede, or violated a right which he might hereafter acknowledge—we complain that, professing the most amicable disposition, bound by subsisting treaties of peace and friendship, and unprovoked by any offence on our part, he has manifested a design to effect our total destruction; he has prepared the means and instruments of a war of extermination against us; he has solicited and received the aid of our inveterate enemy for the declared purpose of annihilating our empire; and he only waits the arrival of a more effectual succour to strike a blow against our existence. That he has not yet received the effectual succour which he has solicited may be ascribed either to the weakness of the government of Mauritius, or to their want of zeal in his cause, or to the rashness and imbecility of his own councils: but neither the measure of his hostility, nor of our right to restrain it, nor of our danger from it, are to be estimated by the amount of the force which he has actually obtained; for we know that his demands of military assistance were unlimited; we know that they were addressed not merely to the government of Mauritius, but to that of France; and we cannot ascertain how soon they may be satisfied to the full extent of his acknowledged expectations. This, therefore, is not merely the case of an injury to be repaired, but of the public safety to be secured against the present and future designs of an irreconcilable, desperate, and treacherous enemy. Against an enemy of this description no

effectual security can be obtained otherwise than by such a reduction of his power as shall not only defeat his actual preparations, but establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence. To this species of security our right is unquestionable, upon the grounds already stated: but it cannot be supposed that Tippoo Sultan will voluntarily concede to us a security of this nature against the effects of his own resentment, treachery, and ambition, and against the success of the most favourite project of his mind. Since, therefore, the principles of justice, and of the law of nations, entitle us to such a security, and since we cannot possibly obtain it by the voluntary concession of Tippoo Sultan, it is the right of the Company to compel him to yield it; and it is equally my duty to use that compulsion without delay, provided the interests of the Company committed to my charge be not more endangered by the attempt than by the unrestrained progress of his preparations for war.”\*

Under the influence of the views thus expounded, the Earl of Mornington meditated a series of bold and extended operations against Mysore. It was in the south that the blow was to be struck, and it therefore became of importance to ascertain what probability existed of the speedy assemblage of a powerful army on the coast of Coromandel. The communications from Madras were discouraging. The resources of that presidency were represented as exhausted; the equipment of an army, it

\* Minute of governor-general, 12th August, 1798.

CHAP. XV. — was alleged, could not take place within such a period as would admit of its acting with effect; and some of the more influential of the servants of the government even suggested the danger of making any preparation for war, lest Tippoo should take alarm, and invade the Carnatic before the English were in a condition to resist him.\* Before the receipt of these representations, the governor-general had been led to conclude that it would be necessary to postpone the execution of his plan for an immediate attack upon Tippoo. The advices from Madras confirmed this view; but as the attack was only to be deferred, not relinquished, and as moreover, under any circumstances, it would be necessary to place the British territory under the government of Fort St. George in a state of defence, directions were given to extricate the army of that presidency from the wretched condition of inefficiency to which it had been reduced by the enforcement of a blind and indiscriminating frugality. The Earl of Mornington was not deterred from this course by the fear of alarming Tippoo into action. “At what moment,” said the governor-general, “he may think fit to strike the blow which he has openly menaced must always be a matter of conjecture. The interests and wishes of France are decidedly in his favour;

\* This point was strongly urged by Mr. Webbe, secretary to the government of Fort St. George, a servant of great experience, and who enjoyed a high reputation for ability as well as integrity; but whose fears on this occasion seem entirely to have mastered his judgment.

the precise period of time when she may be able to afford him assistance must be uncertain; it is equally uncertain whether the impetuosity of his temper will suffer him to wait for that assistance. Various events in India might offer opportunities which he might deem (and perhaps with reason) favourable to the success of his hostile projects, and without pretending to estimate the considerations which may govern his conduct, it is evident that while we remain without a soldier prepared to take the field in the Carnatic, and without an ally to assist our operations, we yield to this implacable adversary the decided advantage of selecting the time and mode of his long meditated attack against our defenceless possessions. Under these circumstances, I have never considered that the option between temporary peace and immediate war resided in our own hands. The motionless condition of our army on the coast, contrasted with the advanced state of Tippoo's preparations, places in his hands not only that option, but the choice of the moment of conquest; for, in our present weakness, his first assault must be successful, whatever might afterwards be regained by our perseverance and resolution. The true state of the question therefore is, whether by continuing unarmed and unallied we shall abandon the issues of peace, war, and certain victory, to the discretion of a vindictive enemy, or whether, by resuming the power of meeting him in the field, we shall place in our hands the advantages now possessed by him. With this view of the subject, the

CHAP. XV. assembling our forces, and the placing ourselves in a state of preparation for war, at least equal to that of the enemy, appeared to me, from the first moment of the authentication of the proclamation, to be measures not of choice but of irresistible necessity and of indispensable duty." After stating that his views had extended beyond mere defensive operations, and adverting to the reasons which had led him to defer acting upon them, the governor-general thus triumphantly disposed of the suggestion to make no improvement in the means of defence, lest Tippoo should thereby be provoked to an attack:—"If the fear of an attack from him in the early stage of our preparations is absolutely to preclude us from making them, we are indeed upon most unequal terms with him, and we must then at once determine to leave our fate at his disposal. For it will then appear that we dare not take the common precautions of defence, while he, with impunity, enters into an offensive alliance with the French for the declared purpose of expelling the British nation from India."\*

The sound and judicious views thus expressed were carried out with characteristic promptitude and vigour. The government of Madras was instructed to reform its military establishment in such a man-

\* Letter from the Earl of Mornington to General Harris, acting governor of Madras, 18th July, 1798. This letter will be found in Mr. Lushington's interesting account of the life and services of Lord Harris, p. 290, and in that incomparable series of state papers, entitled the Despatches, Minutes, and Correspondence of the Marquis Wellesley, vol. i. page 135.

ner as should remedy the existing grounds of complaint;\* and, in the meantime, the negotiations in

\* The nature of the defects in the Madras establishment, the cause from which they had arisen, and the necessity of removing them, are ably pointed out in a minute recorded by the governor-general, 20th July, 1798. The accuracy and importance of the general principles laid down therein would amply justify its quotation in the text but for the interruption which would thus be given to the progress of the narrative. The reader, however, will not be displeased by the insertion of a short extract in a note. "My inquiries have naturally been directed to ascertain the causes which occasioned so alarming a difference between the state of our army upon the coast and that of Tippoo with relation to their respective powers of moving at a short notice. The result of the consideration which I have given to this subject leads me to believe that the radical defects in the constitution of the army on the coast, which must always retard its equipment for the field, are these :—the want of a permanent establishment of draft bullocks ; the want of a regular system for the speedy collection of carriage bullocks from the country ; the want of established stores of grain and of other supplies necessary for the provision of an army in the field ; the want of proper regulations for providing camp equipage ; and, lastly, the want of a regularly established train of artillery with all its proper equipments.

"The motives which prevented government from providing the army upon the coast with the several establishments in which it is now deficient have certainly proceeded from an anxiety to limit the military charges of the presidency of Fort St. George.

"It cannot be denied that any effectual improvement of these deficient establishments would necessarily be attended with a very heavy expense ; but it is equally certain that until that expense be incurred, the army on the coast never can possess the power of making a forward movement at a short notice. Under these circumstances, it is a most improvident system of economy to submit to the expense of maintaining so large an army while we withhold the necessary means of putting a proportion of it in motion upon any sudden emergency.

"The policy has been quite different in Bengal, where the part

CHAP. XV. progress at the courts of Hyderabad and Poonah were continued with reference to the great objects in view—the annihilation of French influence in India, and the increased security of the British dominions in that country by humbling the chief enemy which the English had to dread, Tippoo Sultan.

The Nizam had long been anxious for a closer connection with the British government than that which subsisted between them; but so far from any approach having been made to gratify his wishes in this respect, opportunities for attaching him more intimately to English interests had been positively neglected, much to the detriment of those interests, and to the advancement of those of the French. To the Earl of Mornington fell the task of correcting the errors of those who had preceded him. A new subsidiary treaty, consisting of ten articles, was con-

of the force destined for the immediate protection of the country is always considered as actually in the field, and is equipped for undertaking at the shortest warning any operations either offensive or defensive; yet Bengal is undoubtedly the part of our possessions in India the least exposed to any sudden attack.

“The nature of our establishment in India, and the rapid changes which arise in the political situations of the native powers, have been generally acknowledged to require that we should constantly be in a state of preparation for war; this acknowledged principle has evidently formed the basis of the whole system of our military establishments in India, which it has been our fixed policy to maintain upon a scale in point of numbers greatly exceeding a peace establishment.

“The same principle necessarily demands that a large proportion of our army should be always in readiness for active service.”

cluded with the Nizam. The first five regulated the pay and duties of the subsidiary force, the number of which was fixed at six thousand. The sixth was a most important article. It pronounced that, immediately upon the arrival of the force at Hyderabad, the whole of the officers and serjeants of the French party were to be dismissed, and the troops under them "so dispersed and disorganized, that no trace of the former establishment shall remain." It was further stipulated, that thenceforward no Frenchman should be entertained in the service of the Nizam, or of any of his chiefs or dependents; that no Frenchman should be suffered to remain in any part of that prince's dominions, nor any European whatever be admitted into the service of the Nizam, or permitted to reside within his territories, without the knowledge and consent of the Company's government. By other articles, the British government pledged their endeavours to obtain the insertion, in a new treaty contemplated between the Company, the Nizam, and the Peishwa, of such a clause as should place each of the two latter at ease with regard to the other. Should the Peishwa refuse, the British government undertook to mediate in any differences that might arise. The Nizam bound himself to refrain from aggression on the government of Poonah, and to acquiesce in the decisions of his British ally. No correspondence on affairs of importance was to be carried on with the Mahratta states, either by the Nizam or the English, without the mutual consent and privity of both.

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The French corps\* in the service of the Nizam had been raised before the commencement of the war in which that prince was engaged, in conjunction with the English and the Peishwa, against Tippoo Sultan, but its original strength did not exceed fifteen hundred. In a few years it had increased to eleven thousand, and, at the period of the arrival of the Earl of Mornington in India, it consisted of thirteen regiments of two battalions each, amounting in the whole to upwards of fourteen thousand men. Its discipline, which had been regarded as very defective, had been greatly improved; and although deemed by military judges inferior in this respect to the English army, it was far superior to the ordinary infantry of the native powers. Besides field-pieces to each regiment, there was attached to the corps a park of forty pieces of ordnance, chiefly brass, from twelve to thirty-six pounders, with a well-trained body of artillerymen, many of whom were Europeans. A design existed of raising a body of cavalry to act with the corps, and a commencement had been made. The national spirit manifested by its officers, and the zeal and activity which they displayed in advancing the interests of their own country and undermining those of the English, have been already noticed.† The death of its commander, M. Raymond, which had occurred a short time before the period under consideration, did not appear

\* The word "French" must be understood as applying only to the principal officers; the men were generally sepoys.

† See vol. ii. pp. 554, 555.

materially to have diminished French influence. Raymond was an accomplished master of intrigue, and a successful practitioner of all the arts of crooked policy, but he enjoyed little reputation for military skill. His successor, M. Peron, was a more active and enterprising man than Raymond, his political feelings were more violent, and he was far better acquainted with the principles of the military art. The second in command, an officer named Baptiste, though inferior to Peron in military endowments, compensated for the deficiency by a burning hatred of the English, and a degree of cunning which rendered him a most useful instrument for carrying on the designs in which the French party had for years been engaged.

But this corps, so long in a constant state of increase, and so long the source of annoyance and apprehension to the British government, was now sentenced to dispersion, and the talents of its officers, whether for war or intrigue, were unable to arrest its fate. The governor-general had directed the government of Madras to make a detachment for the purpose of co-operating with the British troops already at Hyderabad against the French force at that place. The despondency which on former occasions had operated so injuriously at Madras, had on this nearly paralyzed the arm of the British government, when raised to strike at a most formidable and most insidious source of danger. Objections were raised, and, but for the firmness and public spirit of General Harris, the governor, they would have

CHAP. XV. — been fatal. He met them by declaring that he was prepared to take the responsibility of the measure upon himself; and that, if no public money could be had, he would furnish from his private funds the sum necessary to put the troops in motion. The required detachment was accordingly made, and placed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Roberts. Some little delay occurred in its quitting the Company's territories; but it arrived at Hyderabad on the 10th of October, and joined the British force previously at that place.

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On the arrival of the detachment, Captain J. A. Kirkpatrick, the acting British resident, demanded the full execution of that article of the treaty which related to the French corps. But intrigue was at work to procure its postponement, and the Nizam hesitated. His minister, though well inclined to the English, recoiled from a measure so vigorous as that called for by the British resident, and was desirous that resort to extremities should be delayed, and, if possible, altogether avoided.\* The resident endeavoured to put an end to the vacillation of the court of Hyderabad by a powerful remonstrance, concluding with an avowal of his intention to act without the authority of the Nizam, if that authority continued to be withheld. The effect of this was

\* Sir John Malcolm, who was assistant to the British resident, speaking, in his *Sketch of the Political History of India*, of the character of the minister, describes it as very timid. In a private letter written at the time, and published in the *Life of Lord Harris*, he speaks more strongly, and declares the minister to be "the most timid of cowards."

assisted by a movement of the British force to the ground which commanded the French lines. There was now no longer any room for evasion—the Nizam and his minister were compelled to make choice between the English and the French; and, as was to be expected, they determined in favour of the former. A body of two thousand horse was sent to the support of the British force, and a mutiny which broke out in the French camp aided the views of those who sought its dispersion. The object was speedily effected, and without the loss of a single life. The French officers surrendered themselves as prisoners, not reluctant thus to escape the fury of their men; and the sepoys, after some parleying, laid down their arms. The whole affair occupied but a few hours. The total number of men disarmed was about eleven thousand, part of the corps being absent on detachment. Means were taken for the arrest of the officers commanding the detached force; and the whole were ordered to be sent to Calcutta, from thence to be transported to England; the governor-general engaging that, on their arrival there, they should not be treated as prisoners of war, but be immediately restored to their own country, without suffering any detention for exchange. The property of the captured officers was carefully preserved for their use, and their pecuniary claims on the Nizam duly settled, through the influence of the British resident.

It had been the desire of the governor-general to

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conclude with the Peishwa a treaty similar to that which had been entered into with the Nizam; but the object was not attained. Though the relations between the Peishwa and the English government were professedly friendly, there was perhaps not a Mahratta chief who would have viewed the humiliation, or even the destruction, of the British power without delight; and amid the complicated intrigues of which a Mahratta durbar is ever the scene, the attempts of the Earl of Mornington to restore the triple alliance to a state of efficiency were defeated.

In the meantime the preparations against Tippoo proceeded. The objects of the governor-general, as explained by himself, were, by obtaining the whole maritime territory remaining in the possession of Tippoo Sultan below the Ghauts on the coast of Malabar, to preclude him from all future communication by sea with his French allies—to compel him to defray the entire expenses of the war, thus securing reimbursement of the outlay rendered necessary by his hostility, and by crippling his resources, increasing the probability of future security—to prevail on him to admit permanent residents at his court from the English and their allies, and to procure the expulsion of all the natives of France in his service, together with an engagement for the perpetual exclusion of all Frenchmen both from his army and dominions. Before hostilities commenced, however, the Sultan was allowed time to avert them by timely concession. Some doubt had arisen whe-

ther or not the district of Wynaad were included in the cessions made to the English at the peace, and their claim to it was abandoned. Disputes had arisen between Tippoo and the Rajah of Coorg, whom he cordially hated, and these it was proposed to refer to the decision of commissioners. In November, news arrived in India of the invasion of Egypt by the French, and of the victory obtained over the fleet of that nation by Lord Nelson. This intelligence was communicated to Tippoo, with such remarks as the subject and the known views of the Sultan naturally suggested. During the same month, another letter was addressed by the governor-general to Tippoo, adverting to the transactions between that prince and the French government of the Mauritius, and proposing to send an English officer to Tippoo for the purpose of communicating the views of the Company and their allies. Another letter was subsequently dispatched, calling attention to the former; and to be prepared either to lend vigour to the operations of war, or to facilitate the progress of negotiation, the governor-general determined to proceed to Madras, where he arrived on the 31st of December. Here he received an answer from Tippoo to the two letters which he had last addressed to that prince. A ridiculous attempt was made to explain away the embassy to the Mauritius, and its consequences. In all other respects the communication was vague, almost beyond the ordinary measure of Oriental deficiency of meaning. The proposal to dispatch a British officer

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CHAP. XV. — to the court of the Sultan might be regarded as declined, Tippoo saying, that he would inform the governor-general at what time and place it would be convenient to receive him, but neither time nor place being named. The answer of the Earl of Mornington contained an able and indignant exposure of the conduct of the Sultan; but the door for negotiation was still kept open, and acceptance of the proposal previously made strenuously pressed upon Tippoo's consideration.

A.D. 1799. A few days later another communication was made, repeating the proposal, and enclosing a letter from the Grand Seignor to Tippoo, denouncing the conduct of the French in Egypt, and calling upon the Sultan to co-operate against them. Throughout January, and a considerable part of the succeeding month, the letters remained unanswered. Of the state of affairs in Egypt nothing satisfactory was known: the arrival of a French fleet in the Arabian Gulf was apprehended, and it was ascertained that while Tippoo either neglected to answer the communications of the British government, or answered them with studied evasion, an embassy from him to the executive Directory of France was about to take its departure from the Danish settlement of Tranquebar.\* Overtures for peaceful arrangements of differences were obviously wasted on such a man, and the governor-general properly deter-

\* The embassy sailed early in February. The Earl of Mornington dispatched a vessel for the purpose of intercepting it, but the object was not accomplished.

mined “to suspend all negotiation with the Sultan until the united force of the arms of the Company and of their allies” should “have made such an impression on his territories” as might “give full effect to the just representations of the allied powers.”\* Before the despatch, however, containing the report of this intention was closed, a letter was received from Tippoo, singularly brief and frivolous,† but which conveyed the Sultan’s assent, so often requested, to the mission of a British officer to his court. The decision of the Earl of Mornington on this occasion was marked by his usual judgment:—The “design,” said he, “is evidently to gain time until a change of circumstances and of season shall enable him to avail himself of the assistance of France. I shall endeavour to frustrate this design ; and although

\* Letter from the governor-general to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 13th February, 1799.

† To shew that the letter is not improperly characterized, a copy of it is submitted :—“ I have been much gratified by the agreeable receipt of your lordship’s two friendly letters, the first brought by a camelman, the last by hircarrahs, and understood their contents. The letter of the prince in station like Jumsheid, with angels as his guards, with troops numerous as the stars, the sun illumining the world of the heaven of empire and dominion, the luminary giving splendour to the universe of the firmament of glory and power, the sultan of the sea and the land, the King of Rome [*i. e.* the Grand Seignor], be his empire and his power perpetual! addressed to me, which reached you through the British envoy, and which you transmitted, has arrived. Being frequently disposed to make excursions and hunt, I am accordingly proceeding upon a hunting excursion. You will be pleased to dispatch Major Doveton (about whose coming your friendly pen has repeatedly written) slightly attended (or unattended). Always continue to gratify me by friendly letters notifying your welfare.”

CHAP. XV. I shall not decline even this tardy and insidious acceptance of my repeated propositions for opening a negotiation, I shall accompany the negotiation by the movement of the army, for the purpose of enforcing such terms of peace as shall give effectual security to the Company's possessions against any hostile consequences of the Sultan's alliance with the French."

The command of the army of the Carnatic had been intended for Sir Alured Clarke, the commander-in-chief of the forces of Bengal; but the apprehension of an invasion of the north of India by Zemaun Shah suggested the necessity of retaining that officer at Calcutta, where he was appointed to exercise the chief functions of government during the absence of the Earl of Mornington. The command thus vacated was bestowed on General Harris, who with singular disinterestedness, when the alarm on account of Zemaun Shah had been dispelled by the retrograde march of that sovereign, suggested the re-appointment of Sir Alured Clarke in supercession of himself.\* The command, however, was retained by General Harris at the express desire of the governor-general, and he accordingly joined the army, which consisted of two thousand six hundred cavalry (nearly a thousand of whom were Europeans), between five and six hundred European artillerymen, four thousand six hundred European infantry, eleven thousand native infantry, and two thousand seven hundred gun-lascars and pioneers; forming altogether a force of about twenty-one thousand.

\* See *Life and Times of General Harris*, pp. 242, 243.

The army was accompanied by sixty field-pieces, and was well supplied with stores. A corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Read, was to collect, arrange, and eventually escort supplies of provisions to this army during its advance. A similar corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, was appointed to the discharge of similar service in Coimbatore.

Another army, consisting of six thousand men, assembled on the coast of Malabar, under the command of General Stuart, ascended into Coorg. It was against this army that the first effort of Tippoo was directed. On the 2nd of March, a brigade of three native battalions, under Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor, took post at Sedasseer, distant a few miles from Periapatam. On the morning of the 5th, an encampment was unexpectedly observed to be in progress of formation near the latter place. Before the evening it had assumed a formidable appearance ; several hundred tents were counted, and one of them being green, seemed to mark the presence of the Sultan. The most recent information, however, was opposed to the belief that the tent was designed to shelter Tippoo, it being represented that he had marched to meet the Madras army, and that a detachment, under Mahomed Reza, was the only force left in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam. In this state of uncertainty, General Stuart resolved to strengthen the brigade of Colonel Montresor by an additional battalion of sepoy, and wait for further intelligence to determine his future course. At break of day on the 6th, General Hartley, the

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CHAP. XV. — second in command, advanced to reconnoitre. He could discern that the whole of the enemy's army was in motion, but the thick jungle which covered the country and the haziness of the atmosphere rendered it impossible to ascertain the object of the movement. Uncertainty was removed soon after nine o'clock by an attack on the British line. The front and rear were assailed almost at the same moment, and the advance of the enemy had been conducted with such secrecy and expedition, that the junction of the battalion destined to reinforce Colonel Montresor was prevented. His brigade was completely surrounded, and for several hours had to sustain the attack of the enemy under the disadvantage of great disparity of numbers. General Stuart, on receiving intelligence of the attack, marched with a strong body of Europeans, and encountering the division of the enemy which was acting on the rear of the English brigade, put them to flight after a smart engagement of about half an hour's duration. The attack in the front still continued, and on reaching it General Stuart found the men nearly exhausted with fatigue, and almost destitute of ammunition; but the fortune of the day was decided, and the enemy retreated in all directions.

Notwithstanding the reports of the Sultan having advanced to oppose General Harris, this attack was made under his personal command, and he was probably encouraged to it by the recollection of the success which some years before had followed an attempt not very dissimilar in the destruction of the

force under Colonel Baillie. The Sultan, however, in this instance, gained neither honour nor advantage. His loss has been estimated as high as two thousand, while that of the English fell short of a hundred and fifty.\* The discovery thus made of the unexpected proximity of Tippoo induced General Stuart to change the disposition of his force, and to abandon the post occupied at Sedasseer. This circumstance enabled the Sultan, with his usual veracity, to claim a victory. It was apprehended that he might hazard another attack, but, after remaining several days on the spot which he had first occupied, he retired without attempting again to disturb the English force under General Stuart. His efforts were now directed to resist the advance of General Harris, who, having been joined by the contingent of Hyderabad and the troops of Nizam Ali, had crossed the Mysorean frontier, with an army about thirty-seven thousand strong, on the day on which Tippoo had encamped near Periapatam. His march was attended with many difficulties, but they were surmounted by care and perseverance, and on the 27th of March the army of the Carnatic had advanced to Mallavelly, within forty miles of Serin- A. D. 1799.

\* The Rajah of Coorg, who was with General Stuart on this occasion, in a letter to the governor-general, thus related his impressions:—"To describe the battle which General Stuart fought with these two regiments of Europeans, the discipline, valour, strength, and magnanimity of the troops—the courageous attack upon the army of Tippoo, surpasses all example in the world. In our Shasters and Purânas, the battles fought by Akered and Makarul are much celebrated, but they are unequal to this battle."

CHAP. XV. gapatam. Here the enemy occupied some heights, from which they opened a cannonade upon the English force. A general action followed, in which Tippoo was defeated with severe loss. He retired, and his subsequent movement was designed to place his army in the rear of that of General Harris, who he expected would advance towards Seringapatam by the route taken by Lord Cornwallis. On that route Tippoo had taken his usual precaution of destroying all the forage. But the Sultan was disappointed of the success which he had anticipated. At an early period of the march, General Harris had formed the design of crossing the Cauvery at a ford some distance below Seringapatam. The motives to this deviation from the usual route were various: one object was to mislead the enemy, another to facilitate communication with the army of Malabar and with the corps under Colonel Brown and Colonel Read. Besides these inducements, the ford was said to be easy, the country was believed to have escaped the operation of the devastating policy of Tippoo, and the southern part of Seringapatam was regarded as the least defensible. The detour was effected so secretly, that the army, with its park and ordnance, had crossed the river and encamped near the fort of Soorilly before Tippoo was aware of the movement. When, too late, he became apprized of it, he is said to have exclaimed, "We have arrived at the last stage," and to have solemnly demanded of his principal officers what was their determination. They answered by professing their readiness

to die with him, and henceforward every act of resistance or defence was performed under the chilling influence of despondency. CHAP. XV.

The advance of the British army, after crossing the Cauvery, to the position intended to be taken up before Seringapatam was slow. The distance was only twenty-eight miles; but though undisturbed by the enemy, such was the exhausted state of the draught cattle, that five days were consumed in performing it. The deficiency of these animals had seriously impeded the progress of the army from its commencement. It had been a source of complaint from the time of Sir Eyre Coote, if not from an earlier period; but no measures had been taken to guard against the inconvenience. The neglect perhaps was encouraged, if it were not originated, by the sanguine belief which was so widely entertained that every war in which the English happened to be engaged in India was to be the last. At length the capital of Tippoo was within view, and the English general issued an order at once brief and inspiring. It ran thus:—"The commander-in-chief takes this opportunity of expressing his deep sense of the general exertions of the troops throughout a long and tedious march in the enemy's country with the largest equipment ever known to move with any army in India. He congratulates officers and men on the sight of Seringapatam. A continuance of the same exertions will shortly put an end to their labours, and place the British colours in triumph on its walls."

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The operations of the British army were promptly commenced. On the night of its arrival at its position, an attempt was made upon the enemy's advanced posts. It partially failed; but the attack being renewed on the following morning, was completely successful. On that day, General Floyd was dispatched with a considerable body of infantry and cavalry, and twenty field-pieces, to join General Stuart. Tippoo made a large detachment to intercept them; but all attempts failed, and the united bodies joined General Harris in safety at Seringapatam. Before their arrival, Tippoo had addressed a letter to General Harris, the first that he had forwarded to any English authority for a considerable period. Its purport was to declare that the writer had adhered firmly to treaties, and to demand the meaning of the advance of the English armies, and the occasion of hostilities. The English commander answered by directing the Sultan's attention to the letters of the governor-general for explanation.

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The preparations of the siege continued to be carried on, and much was effected of great importance, the relation of which would be tedious. On the 17th of April an attempt made by the enemy to establish a redoubt on the northern bank of the river was defeated by a force under Colonel Vaughan Hart, though exposed to a heavy cannonade from the fort. The post thus gained by the English was connected with others previously established, with a view to the future operations of the siege.

The 20th of April was marked by a tardy overture from Tippoo to negotiate. The governor-general had prepared General Harris to enter on this task by transmitting with his final instructions, on the opening of the campaign, drafts of two treaties, either of which he was authorized to adopt under certain specified circumstances. After consulting the commissioners appointed to assist the general in political arrangements,\* he determined, in reply to the Sultan's advance, to transmit a draft of preliminaries, embodying the conditions of the less favourable of the two proposed treaties between which he had to choose. This, as it appeared from a despatch addressed by the governor-general to General Harris three days after the date of the overture, and when, consequently, the former was not aware of its having been made, was in perfect accordance with his views of the course proper to be taken under the state of circumstances which then existed.† The articles thus proposed to Tippoo provided for the reception at his court of an ambassador from each of the allies; for the immediate dismissal of all foreigners, being natives of countries at war with

\* The functions of these commissioners bore no resemblance to those of the officers who, under a similar name, had sometimes been authorized to destroy the effect of military arrangements, however well concerted. They were subordinate to the commander-in-chief; their duties were confined to political and diplomatic affairs; and even in these they could only advise, not control. The object of their appointment was to relieve the general, and allow of his devoting his full attention to his military duties.

† The despatch of the governor-general was dated the 23rd of April.

CHAP. XV. — Great Britain; for the renunciation by the Sultan of his connection with the French, and for the perpetual exclusion of that people from his service and dominions; for the cession to the allies of one-half the dominions of which he stood possessed at the commencement of war; for the relinquishment of the claims of Tippoo to any districts in dispute with the allies or the Rajah of Coorg; for the payment to the allies of two crores of sicca rupees, one-half immediately, and the remainder within six months; for the release of prisoners; and for the delivery of hostages as security for the due fulfilment of the previous stipulations. These conditions were severe, but not more severe than justice and necessity warranted. While Tippoo retained the power of being mischievous, it was certain he would never cease to afford cause for alarm. So intense was his hatred of the English, and so perfidious his character, that, instead of allowing him the choice of retaining a diminished share of dominion and influence, or of losing all, the British authorities would have been justified in declaring, like the great powers of Europe at a later date, with regard to another enemy,\* that they “would no more treat with him, nor with any member of his family.”

General Harris required an answer to be sent within forty-eight hours, together with the required hostages and the first crore of rupees, under pain of extending his demand to the surrender of Seringapatam. No answer arrived, and the labours of the

\* Napoleon.

besiegers went briskly on. They were only suspended when an attack from the enemy required to be repelled; and in these conflicts success invariably rested with the English. On the 26th of April it became necessary to dislodge the enemy from their last exterior entrenchment, distant something less than four hundred yards from the fort, covered on the right by a redoubt, and on the left by a small circular work open in the rear. The duty was entrusted to Colonel Wellesley,\* who commanded in the trenches. It was a service of difficulty; but, in the course of the night and of the following morning, was successfully performed, though not without considerable loss. This achievement seems to have been deeply felt by Tippoo; and, shaking off the lethargy or the disdain which had hitherto withheld him from replying to General Harris's proposals, he dispatched another letter, acknowledging their transmission, but alleging that, as the points in question were weighty, and without the intervention of ambassadors could not be brought to a conclusion, he was about to send two persons for the purpose of conference and explanation. General Harris, in his answer, offered Tippoo once more the advantage of the proposals formerly transmitted, without an addition to the demands therein made; but declined

\* It is scarcely necessary to observe that this officer was the brother of the governor-general, who, after establishing a brilliant military reputation in India, vanquished in succession the great generals whose talents had given fame and dominion to republican and imperial France, including that extraordinary man at whose name all Europe had quailed.

CHAP. XV. to receive vakeels, unless they were accompanied by the required hostages and specie, in recognition of the terms being accepted.\* The Sultan's determination was demanded by three o'clock on the following day. No reply was forwarded by him; and from the moment in which he received this communication from General Harris, he is represented as passing rapidly through an agony of grief into a silent stupor, from which he seldom awoke except for the purpose of professing a confidence which he could not feel, that his capital would be successfully defended.

A. D. 1799. On the 30th of April the fire of the English batteries was opened for the important operation of breaching; and on the evening of the 3rd of May the breach was considered practicable. Before day-break on the 4th the troops destined for the assault were stationed in the trenches. They consisted of nearly two thousand four hundred European, and about eighteen hundred native infantry. The command was entrusted to Major-General Baird. The instructions of the commander-in-chief to this officer were to make the capture of the rampart his first object. For this purpose General Baird divided the force under his command into two columns; one

\* The object of Tippoo in all these advances was delay; and his character appears to have been perfectly understood by General Harris. Writing to a friend soon after his entering on the command, the general says—"You are for negotiation, so am I. But the rascal [Tippoo] would humbug me, and make me lose the game, if he could once get me to listen to him."—Life of Lord Harris, page 259.

commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, the other by Colonel Sherbrook. The assault was to take place at one o'clock; and at a few minutes past that hour, General Baird, having completed all his arrangements, stepped out of the trench, and drawing his sword, exclaimed, "Now, my brave fellows, follow me, and prove yourselves worthy of the name of British soldiers!" In an instant both columns rushed from the trenches, and entered the bed of the river under cover of the fire from the batteries. They were instantly discovered by the enemy, and assailed by a heavy fire of rockets and musketry. On the previous night the river had been examined by two officers named Farquar and Lalor, and sticks had been set up to indicate the most convenient place for fording. Both the attacking parties ascended the glacis and the breaches in the *fausse-braye* together. On the slope of the breach the forlorn-hope was encountered by a body of the enemy, and the greater portion of those engaged fell in the struggle; but the assailants pressed on, and within seven minutes after they had issued from their trenches the British flag was waving from the summit of the breach.

As soon as sufficient force was collected, the two parties filed off right and left, according to the plan proposed by General Baird. The party detached for the right marched rapidly forward on the southern rampart, under Colonel Sherbrook. The gallantry of Captain Molle, commanding the grenadiers of the Scotch brigade, was eminently conspicuous and ser-

CHAP. XV. viceable. Running forward almost singly, he pursued the enemy till he reached a mud cavalier, where he planted a flag and displayed his hat on the point of his sword. His men soon collected around him, and being joined by the rest of the troops engaged in this attack, they advanced rapidly, the enemy retreating before their bayonets. The remaining cavaliers were carried in succession, and in less than an hour after ascending the breach, the party, after occupying the whole of the southern ramparts, arrived at that portion of them surmounting the eastern gateway.

The progress of the column which had proceeded to the left was not quite so rapid. Colonel Dunlop, by whom it was commanded, had been wounded in the conflict at the summit of the breach; and just as the party began to advance from that point, the resistance in front was powerfully aided by the flanking musketry of the inner ramparts. All the leading officers being either killed or disabled, Lieutenant Farquar placed himself at the head of the party, but instantly fell dead. Captain Lambton, brigade-major to General Baird, now assumed the command; and the column, though not without sometimes being brought to a stand, pushed forward, killing many of the enemy and driving the rest before them, till they reached a point where the approach of the right column was perceptible. Here the enemy were thrown into the utmost confusion, and the slaughter became dreadful. The operations of this column were ably supported by a detachment under Captain Goodall, which,

having effected a passage over the ditch between the exterior and interior ramparts, took the enemy in flank and rear. The result of these combined attacks was, that when both divisions of the British force met on the eastern rampart the whole of the works were in their possession. The only remaining objects of anxiety were the palace and person of the Sultan.

With regard to the Sultan the greatest uncertainty prevailed. Whether or not he had perished in the conflict, and, if he still survived, whether he had effected his escape, or remained to fall with his capital into the hands of the victors, were questions to which no satisfactory answer could be obtained. Three officers of the general staff, Majors Dallas, Allan, and Beatson, passing along the ramparts, discovered three men desperately wounded and apparently dead.\* Two of these, from their dress and other circumstances, appeared persons of distinction; and one, upon examination, manifesting signs of remaining life, was raised by the British officers. It was not the Sultan, as had been conjectured, but one of his most distinguished officers named Syed Saib. He was recognized by Major Dallas, who addressed him by his name. He had previously appeared excited and

\* This is the account given by Major Beatson, one of the parties present. Colonel Wilks says that the officers discovered *two* men, *one* of whom seemed of distinction. The statement of an eye-witness has been preferred to that of an author who had not the same advantage. At the same time it would be wrong to omit the opportunity of bearing testimony to the general accuracy and precision of Colonel Wilks's statements.

CHAP. XV. — alarmed; but the kind bearing of the British officers, and the recognition of his person by one of them, seemed to divest him of fear, and he became instantly composed and tranquil. He raised Major Dallas's hand to his forehead and embraced his knees, but was unable to speak. On partaking of some water, his power of speech returned, and he inquired how Major Dallas came to know him. Being informed that he was the officer commanding the escort of the commissioners at Mangalore many years before, Syed Saib at once recollected him. A surgeon passing was called by the officers to the assistance of the wounded man, but having with him neither instruments nor dressings, he was unable to afford any. The palanquin of Syed Saib was then sent for to convey him to camp, and the opportunity was taken to inquire if the Sultan was in the fort. Syed answered that he was in the palace. The attention of the British officers was now called off by a firing of musketry occasioned by a sally of the enemy, and they left Syed Saib in the charge of two sepoy. But their kindness was unavailing. Soon after the departure of those who had endeavoured to rescue him from death, the unfortunate man attempted to rise, but staggering from the weakness occasioned by his wound, he fell into the inner ditch.

The firing which interrupted the attentions shewn by the three officers to Syed Saib having ceased, they proceeded to a spot where they could obtain a distinct view of part of the interior of the palace.

There they could perceive a number of persons assembled as in durbar, one or two being seated, and others approaching them with great respect. They then sought General Baird, to communicate to that officer what they had heard, and what they had observed. The general had previously received information of similar import, and had halted his troops for refreshment before he proceeded to summon the palace. The men being somewhat recovered, and the necessary preparations made for attack should the summons be disregarded, Major Allan was despatched to offer protection to the Sultan and every person within the palace on immediate and unconditional surrender. Having fastened a white cloth on a sergeant's pike, he proceeded with some European and native troops to execute his mission. He found part of the 33rd regiment drawn up before the palace, and several of Tippoo's servants in the balcony apparently in great consternation. Major Allan made the communication with which he was charged, and desired that immediate intimation of it might be given to the Sultan. In a short time the killadar and another officer came over the terrace of the front building and descended by an unfinished part of the wall. They evidently laboured under great embarrassment, but not to such an extent as to prevent the exercise of their ingenuity in endeavouring to procure delay, with a view, as Major Allan thought, with great appearance of probability, of effecting their escape under cover of the night. To these

CHAP. XV. — functionaries Major Allan repeated the substance of his message ; pointed out the danger of neglecting it ; urged the necessity of immediate determination ; pledged himself for the due performance of the promise which he bore ; and, finally, required to be admitted into the palace, that he might repeat his assurances of safety to the Sultan himself. To this proposal Tippoo's servants manifested great dislike, but Major Allan insisted, and called upon two English officers, one of whom spoke the native language with extraordinary fluency, to accompany him. The party ascended by the broken wall, and from thence lowered themselves down on a terrace where a large body of armed men were assembled. It was forthwith explained to these persons, that the flag borne by Major Allan was a pledge of security to them provided no resistance were offered, and a singular step was taken in order to induce them to give credit to the assertion. With a degree of confidence which can only be characterized as imprudent and rash, Major Allan took off his sword, and placed it in charge of Tippoo's officers. The situation of the Sultan was still unascertained. The killadar and other persons affirmed that he was not in the palace, though his family were. The oriental fondness for delay was still indulged, and the killadar seemed not to know in what manner to act. After a further repetition of the assurances and the warnings which had been already given, the latter being enforced by reference to the feelings of the troops before the palace, which the

killadar was apprized could not be restrained without difficulty, that personage and his companions left the British officers, who now began to feel their position critical. A number of persons continued to move hurriedly backwards and forwards within the palace, and of the object of these movements Major Allan and his colleagues were necessarily ignorant. He hesitated whether he should not resume his sword; but, with more prudence than he had displayed in divesting himself of the means of defence, he resolved to abide by the choice which he had made, lest by an appearance of distrust he should precipitate some dreadful act. The people on the terrace, however, appeared to be anxious for the success of the British mission, and to feel great alarm at the possibility of its failure. They entreated that the flag might be held in a conspicuous position, in order at once to give confidence to the inmates of the palace, and prevent the English troops from forcing the gates. At length the forbearance of Major Allan became exhausted, and he sent a message to the sons of Tippoo, who were admitted to be in the palace, urging upon them once more the necessity of decision, and informing them that his time was limited. They answered that they would receive him as soon as a carpet could be spread for the purpose, and shortly afterwards the killadar re-appeared to conduct him to their presence.

He was introduced to two of the princes, one of whom he recollected from having witnessed his delivery, with another brother, into the charge of

CHAP. XV. Lord Cornwallis, as a hostage for the due performance of the treaty concluded by that nobleman with their father. Painful and humiliating as was that scene to the house of Tippoo, it was exceeded in bitterness of calamity by the spectacle which Major Allan now witnessed. The sons of Tippoo were then to be temporary residents with the English till the territorial cessions could be effected, and the pecuniary payments made, by which their father had agreed to purchase the privilege of retaining his place among sovereign princes. They had now before them nothing but unconditional submission to a foreign power, which held possession of the capital of their country; which could dispose at pleasure of every vestige of territory which yet owned Tippoo as its lord, and to whose humanity himself and his family would owe their lives should they be spared. The feelings of despondency and fear resulting from these disastrous circumstances were strongly depicted on the features and indicated by the manner of the princes, notwithstanding their efforts to suppress their exhibition. Major Allan having endeavoured to give them confidence by referring to the objects of his mission, represented the impossibility of their father's escape, and entreated them, as the only way of preserving his life, to discover the place of his concealment. They answered, that he was not in the palace. Major Allan then proposed that the gates should be opened to the English. This renewed the alarm which the courteous bearing and pacific assurances of the British officer had, in

some degree, calmed, and they expressed a disinclination to take so important a step without the authority of the Sultan. The necessity of yielding being, however, again strongly pressed, and Major Allan having promised to post a guard of their own sepoy within the palace, and a party of Europeans without, to suffer no person to enter without his own special authority, and to return and remain with the princes till General Baird arrived, they consented, and the palace gates opened to admit as conquerors that people whose utter expulsion from India had been meditated by its master.

Before the gates was General Baird, and Major Allan was ordered to bring the princes to the general's presence. Alarmed and reluctant, they raised various objections to quitting the palace, but at length they allowed themselves to be led to the gate. The moment was not the most favourable for their introduction, for General Baird had not long before received information of Tippoo, in strict accordance with his character, having murdered a number of English prisoners who had fallen into his hands. His indignation was highly excited, and to a feeling natural and even laudable in itself, may perhaps be ascribed the harshness which in one respect he seems to have manifested towards the captive sons of Tippoo. He in the first instance hesitated to confirm the conditions made with them by Major Allan, unless they would inform him where their father was. The attempt to procure the desired information failed, and the general finally assured the princes of pro-

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tection and safety.\* It is not to be supposed that General Baird had any serious intention of violating a promise solemnly made by one of his officers under instructions from himself, and by virtue of which possession of the palace had been obtained; but it is to be lamented that the glory earned by the capture of Seringapatam should have been shaded by even the appearance of want of generosity or good faith. Apart, indeed, from all reference to the special obligation which the British authorities had incurred, the attempt to extort from the terror of the sons an exposure of the retreat of the father must be condemned, as at variance with some of the holier feelings of the human heart. There was no proof that the young men, who were now the prisoners of the British general, had participated in the guilt arising from the murder of his soldiers; and they ought not to have been subjected to moral torture for the purpose of discovering the retreat of the criminal, he being their father. The cruelty of Tippoo merited the severest retribution which could be inflicted, but if even he had been found within the palace, he must have shared the safety promised to all beneath its roof, or the honour of the British nation would have been irreparably tarnished.

\* As this part of the narrative rests solely on official papers, it would be unnecessary to authenticate the statement in the text more particularly, were not the fact related almost incredible. It is right, therefore, to state, that it is attested by General Baird himself in his report to General Harris.

A minute search throughout the palace was ordered, with a view to securing the person of the Sultan, who, notwithstanding the denial of his followers, was yet believed to be within its walls. The zenana was exempted from scrutiny, but a guard was placed round it sufficient to prevent the escape of Tippoo if he were concealed there. The search was unavailing, and information was next sought by acting on the fears of the killadar. This officer, upon being threatened,\* placed his hands on the hilt of Major Allan's sword, and solemnly repeated his former protestation, that the Sultan was not in the palace; adding, however, and as it seems for the first time, that he lay wounded at a distant part of the fort. To the spot which he named he offered to conduct the British officers, and professed himself ready to submit to any punishment which the general might be pleased to inflict, if he were found to have deceived him. The place to which the killadar led was a gateway on the north side of the fort. Here hundreds of dead bodies were piled one upon another, and the darkness rendered it almost impossible to distinguish either form or features. Lights were procured, and an examination of the fallen victims of ambition was commenced. The discovery of the Sultan's palanquin, and of a wounded person lying under it, seemed to indicate that the object of the search was attained; but the man whose position in this scene of death and carnage

\* Major Beatson says, "severely threatened." General Baird, indeed, seems to have entertained no dislike to strong measures.

CHAP. XV. appeared to mark him out as the Sultan was only one of his confidential servants who had attended him throughout the day. But the necessity for further search was at an end. The wounded servant pointed to the spot where his master had fallen ; and a body dragged from the accumulated mass above and around it was recognized by the killadar as that of the Sultan. Being placed in a palanquin, it was conveyed to the palace, where multiplied testimonies to its identity removed all ground for doubt.

Tippoo had fallen, but his fall was scarcely known, and it certainly contributed nothing towards the result of the day. During the last fourteen days of the siege he had fixed his abode at a place formerly occupied by a water-gate, which Tippoo had some years before closed. Here he erected a small stone choultry, enclosed by curtains, and four small tents were fixed for his servants and luggage. Overwhelmed with despondency, he sought consolation in those miserable dogmas, half common-place, half paradox, which have so often passed current as sound philosophy,\* and struggled to renovate hope by the delusions of judicial astrology. A rigid Mahometan, he did not in the hour of his distress disdain the knowledge which the bramins were reputed to possess, and their art was invoked for the Sultan's information. Either from the effect of chance, or from observation of the circumstances of

\* It is recorded that one of the apothegms most frequently on the Sultan's lips during this time was the standing sophism, that as a man can die only once, the period is of little consequence.

the siege, both Mahometan and Hindoo astrologers declared the 4th of May a day of danger. To avert the threatened calamity, the bramins recommended an oblation, and the fears of the Sultan induced him to bestow the means of making it. On the morning of the day on which peril was apprehended he proceeded to the palace, bathed, and, Mussulman as he was, presented, through a bramin of high reputation for sanctity, the required oblation with all the customary formalities. A jar of oil formed part of the offering; and, in compliance with a Hindoo custom, the Sultan endeavoured to ascertain the aspect of fate from the form of his face as reflected from the surface of the oil. Whether the exhibition indicated good or evil is not known; but, as Colonel Wilks observes, the result depends on mechanical causes, and “the reflection of any face may be formed to any fortune.” About noon the Sultan had completed the ceremonies which despair had led him to practise at the expense of his consistency as a believer in Mahomet, and he repaired to the choultry to partake of his mid-day repast. On his way he was informed by two spies that the besiegers were preparing to storm. He remarked, that an assault by day was not probable. An officer who commanded near the breach also apprized him that there appeared to be an unusual number of men in the trenches, and recommended that orders should be issued for the troops to be on the alert. Tippoo again expressed his belief that the attempt to assault would not be made by day; and coolly added, that if

CHAP. XV. — it should, the attack must be repelled. The next intelligence that reached him was calamitous. It announced the death, by a cannon-ball, of the man from whom he had received the last communication, and who was one of his chief officers. The Sultan was agitated, but gave the orders necessary for the occasion, and sate down to his repast. It was yet unfinished when he received a report that the storm had commenced, and he hastened to the northern rampart.\*

He found that the English had surmounted the breach, and placing himself behind one of the traverses of the rampart, he fired seven or eight times on the assailants, and, as was believed by those who attended him, killed several Europeans. The flight of his troops before the victorious besiegers compelled him to retire; though whenever an opportunity offered for making a stand, he is stated to have embraced it. But no efforts which he was able to make could turn the current of success. He had received a slight wound, and the exertions which he was unavailingly making rendered painful the lameness under which he laboured. Finding a

\* Major Beatson reverses the order of the two accounts here noticed—the receipt of the news of the officer's death and that of the assault. The account furnished in the text is that of Colonel Wilks, whose opportunities of access to Mysorean sources of information, written and oral, afford a presumption of his accuracy in regard to the personal history of Tippoo. Major Beatson, too, represents the death of Tippoo's officer as having occurred about half an hour before the assault, which is perfectly consistent with Colonel Wilks's account, but scarcely with his own.

horse, he mounted and rode towards the gate of the interior work, with what object does not appear. Here he received a wound in the right side from a musket-ball. He rode forward a few paces, when he received another ball in his left breast, and his horse was at the same moment brought down. The faithful servant who had accompanied him through the day, and who survived to point to his conquerors the place where the tyrant had fallen, urged him to discover himself to the English soldiers who were pressing forward, as the most probable means of preserving his life. But the instinct of guilt forbade this course. Tippoo remembered that he had recently murdered some of their comrades with circumstances of great barbarity, and he apprehended that by discovering who he was he should but accelerate the fate which his zealous adherent thus proposed to avert. He accordingly checked the imprudent suggestion, as to him it appeared, by passionately exclaiming, "Are you mad?—be silent." But silence, though it concealed his rank, availed not to preserve his life. Tippoo was placed by his follower in his palanquin under an arch on one side of the gateway. A grenadier entering attempted to seize the Sultan's sword-belt, which was very rich. Had he submitted to the loss without resistance, the man would probably have pushed on; but, though fainting with the loss of blood, Tippoo seized, with a feeble grasp, a sword which was near him, and made a stroke at the soldier who had thus com-

CHAP. XV. — menced the work of plunder, by whom he was immediately shot through the temple. The circumstances attending the discovery and recognition of his body have been already detailed.

On the morning after the capture of Seringapatam, an English officer having gone towards the river with a party of sepoy, perceived on the opposite side a few horsemen, one of whom waved a white flag. The officer advancing to the bank, was met by one of the horsemen, who informed him that Abdul Khalik was desirous of throwing himself on the protection of the English, provided his personal safety were secured and his honour preserved. This candidate for British clemency was the second son of Tippoo, and the elder of the two princes who had formerly been received by the English governor-general as hostages for their father's good faith. The required promise of security and honourable treatment was immediately given, and the prince surrendered himself to the British party. In the evening the remains of the deceased Sultan were deposited in the mausoleum erected by Hyder Ali, with all the pomp which could be bestowed. The arrangements were under the superintendence of the principal Mahometan authorities; the chiefs of the Nizam's army joined with the followers of the Sultan in the solemn procession which followed his remains, and the military honours with which it is the custom of Europe to grace the soldier's obsequies aided the solemnity of

the scene. The evening closed with a dreadful storm, by which several persons were killed and many more severely hurt. Seringapatam is subject to such visitations, and there was nothing remarkable in the storm which succeeded the funeral rites of Tippoo, except its extraordinary violence. Yet the imagination cannot fail to be impressed by the fact, that the consignment of the body of Tippoo to its resting-place was followed by a desolating convulsion not incongruous with his perturbed and mischievous life.

The conquest of Seringapatam was not achieved without a considerable sacrifice, but the loss of the British army was less severe than might have been expected. The total amount of killed, wounded, and missing, in the whole of the operations throughout the siege, fell short of fifteen hundred. The loss of the enemy cannot be ascertained with precision; but it has been estimated that, in the assault alone, eight thousand fell. Dreadful as it is to reflect on such slaughter, it is gratifying to know that scarcely any of the unarmed inhabitants were injured. A few unavoidably suffered from random shot; but the assault being made by daylight, ensured the power of discrimination, and it was exercised to the utmost practicable extent.

The capture of Seringapatam placed in possession of the victors guns, stores, and treasure to a large amount. Nine hundred and twenty-nine pieces of ordnance of various descriptions were found within the fort, two hundred and eighty-seven of them being

CHAP. XV. mounted on the fortifications. Nearly a hundred thousand muskets and carbines were also found, a great number of swords and accoutrements, a considerable weight of shot and powder, and specie and jewels exceeding eleven hundred thousand pounds in value. The library of the Sultan was not the least remarkable portion of the property transferred by the result of the siege. The books were of small value; but the private collection of state papers was of incalculable interest and importance, as they contributed to render the evidence of Tippoo's hatred of the English, and the extent of his intrigues against them, too strong to be denied or doubted by the most determined advocates of a policy undeviatingly pacific. The history of his negotiation with the government of Mauritius, and of its consequences, was illustrated by copies of all the correspondence which arose out of those proceedings. Other documents were found relating to his missions to Turkey and France. Others, again, developed his intrigues at the court of the Nizam; and among these were copies of correspondence passing between Tippoo and certain chiefs of the Nizam's army during the first campaign of Lord Cornwallis. The evidence of his endeavours to engage the Mahrattas against the English was in like manner confirmed; and it was further shewn, that it was not merely the greater powers of India that Tippoo sought to unite against the object of his hatred—he had descended to solicit many who might have been thought too unimportant for their friendship to

be desired or their indifference deprecated, and had addressed others who might have been supposed too distant to attract the Sultan's attention. "This correspondence," says Colonel Kirkpatrick, by whom it was examined, "proves Tippoo to have been extremely active in his endeavours to open and establish an interest even with princes whose names might be supposed to have hardly reached him." The intensity of his hatred extended the boundaries of his observation, which in Asia were not determined even by the limits of India. His correspondence was extended to Persia, and to the petty sovereigns of Arabia; and its single and invariable object was the destruction of the British power in the East. England has had enemies more able and more formidable than Tippoo, but never one more bitter or more implacable. Yet even he, but for the discoveries made at Seringapatam, might have found apologists among those who can discern nothing of good in the policy of their own country, and nothing of evil in the character of its enemies. The recesses of the Sultan's cabinet furnished proof which set at defiance all the arts of sophistry and misrepresentation; and which as amply vindicated the sagacity which had penetrated the views of Tippoo, as the result of the war attested the wisdom and energy by which those views had been counteracted.

The permanent command of Seringapatam was entrusted to Colonel Wellesley,\* who exerted him-

\* This appointment, as well as the appointment of the same officer to the command of the Nizam's contingent, led to some

CHAP. XV. — self vigorously, as General Baird had previously done, to restrain excess, and restore order, tranquillity, and confidence. The inhabitants who had quitted the city soon began to return, the exercise of the arts of industry revived, and the daily commerce incidental to a populous town recovered its wonted activity. “In a few days,” says Major Beatson, “the bazars were stored with all sorts of provisions and merchandize, for which there was a ready and advantageous sale. The main street of Seringapatam, three days after the fort was taken, was so much crowded, as to be almost impassable, and exhibited more the appearance of a fair than that of a town taken by assault.” The same period of time was sufficient to convince the military chiefs that their best course was to bow to the authority which had succeeded that of their master. On the

unfounded and calumnious statements in the *Life of Sir David Baird*, compiled by Mr. Theodore E. Hook. Those statements have been amply and decisively refuted, especially by the author of the “*Life of Lord Harris* ;” and they are noticed here only lest it might be suspected that they were designedly passed over. It is greatly to be lamented that the record of the services of Sir David Baird should have been made so frequently the instrument of maligning the character of the great man whom all the sound-hearted among his countrymen delight to honour. The prudence of such a course, on such an occasion, is not greater than its justice or its generosity. Sir David Baird was an able, and in many respects an excellent officer ; but if his conduct in some cases is to be taken as an index to his opinions, it must be believed that he thought but lightly of the great military duty of subordination. Mr. Hook’s work has given publicity to facts and documents which the best friends of Sir David Baird must have desired should never see the light.

7th of May, Ali Reza, one of the vakeels who had accompanied Tippoo's son to the camp of Lord Cornwallis, arrived at Seringapatam with a message from Kummer-oo-Deen, the purport of which was, to acquaint General Harris that as fate had disposed of Tippoo Sultan, and transferred his power to the hands of the English, he begged to be admitted to a conference, and in the meantime he had sent Ali Reza to announce that four thousand men under his command were at the disposal of the British general, and ready to obey his orders. Within five days more all the chiefs who continued to hold military command, including Futteh Hyder, the eldest son of the deceased Sultan, had personally tendered their submission to General Harris, and the example of the chiefs was promptly followed by the whole of the troops. On the 13th of May, General Stuart, with the army of Bombay, marched from Seringapatam on its return to Malabar by way of Coorg. A detachment from that army was made for the occupation of Canara. The powerful fortresses in that province, and in other parts of Mysore, surrendered to the conquerors; the cultivators of the soil pursued their occupation as though no change had taken place, and a general disposition was manifested to submit to the good fortune of those whom Tippoo, in the insanity of unreasoning passion, had destined to disgraceful flight from the shores of India. The fall of his capital and his own death had put an end to all exercise of authority in the name of the Sultan of Mysore.

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The occupation of the conquered country being

CHAP. XV. — provided for, the next point calling for decision was its ultimate disposal. The governor-general had furnished General Harris with instructions for concluding a preliminary treaty with Tippoo, under certain circumstances; but the infatuated obstinacy of the Sultan, and the extraordinary success which had thence resulted to the British army, had given rise to a state of things different from any which had been contemplated in framing those instructions. The governor-general, in consequence, reserved the final arrangements for the settlement of the country to himself. His first measure was to call for information on all points respecting the country of Mysore, and the possible candidates for its government, and for the views of the commissioners upon the subject. In conveying to them his orders on these points, the governor-general took occasion to state certain principles as fundamental, and requiring attention in any mode of settlement that might be adopted. These were, that the mode of settlement to be preferred was that which would unite the most speedy restoration of peace and order with the greatest practicable degree of security for the continuance of both; that with this view not only the interests of the Company, but those of the Nizam, of the Mahrattas, and of the leading chieftains in Mysore, were to be regarded; that the military power of Mysore must be broken, or absolutely identified with that of the Company; that Seringapatam must be in effect a British garrison, under whatever nominal authority it might be

placed, and that the Company must retain the whole of the Sultan's territory in Malabar, as well as in Coimbatore and Daraporam, with the heads of all the passes on the table-land. Some of these points, it will be remembered, were propounded by the governor-general as indispensable conditions of peace at an earlier period.

The views of the governor-general were distinguished not less by moderation than by wisdom. The justice of the war against Tippoo could be denied by none but those who were deficient either in intellect or candour; its success was as little open to dispute; and the Company and the Nizam consequently enjoyed the fullest right, in accordance with the received principles which regulate the conduct of nations towards each other, to divide between themselves the territory which their swords drawn in a lawful cause had won. Clemency or state policy might urge the abandonment of some portion of their claim, but their right to reap the full advantage of their successes was evident. To the free and unchecked exercise of their right the state of the country offered no impediment. The people appeared to render willing obedience to the new authority. There was nothing to indicate the probability of any outbreak of popular feeling in favour of the former government, nor of any attempt by the military chiefs in favour of the house of Tippoo. It had been the policy of the deceased Sultan to discourage and reduce all power founded on hereditary right, established office, or territorial

CHAP. XV. — possession, and to concentrate all authority, and as much as was practicable of administrative function, in himself. Many of the military chiefs had fallen in the war, and those who survived had yielded to the victors. There was no reason, therefore, to apprehend that any disposition of the country which might be made by those who had conquered it would give rise to formidable opposition either from the people or the servants of the late Sultan.

But there were reasons against the apportionment of the whole between the Company and the Nizam, arising from the relative position of those powers towards each other and towards other states. Such a distribution would have excited the jealousy of the Mahrattas, and given them ground for discontent, however unreasonable. It would, at the same time, have increased the power of the Nizam to a dangerous extent. It would have transferred to his hands many of the fortresses on the northern frontier of Mysore, while it would have left the British frontier in that quarter exposed. The increase of the strength of the British government would thus have borne no proportion to the extension of its dominions. The Mahrattas would have found fresh cause of enmity both towards the Company and the Nizam. The Nizam, from a useful ally of the Company, might have been converted into a dangerous enemy. The partition of Mysore between the two powers who united their arms against Tippoo thus promised little for the permanent peace of India.

Some of these evils might have been averted by

admitting the Mahrattas to an equal participation with the Company and the Nizam, but others, not inferior, would have thereby been introduced. An evil lesson would have been afforded to those on whose aid the British government might in future have claims. If the Mahrattas, without an effort in the common cause, were to be admitted to share in the advantages secured by the efforts of their allies, there could be little doubt, from the dilatory habits and unprincipled character of oriental potentates, that others would be encouraged to adopt a similar course in the hope of similar good fortune. Further, it was not desirable to add to the strength of a state perfidious to a proverb, and never so formidable as when bent on purposes of mischief. An equal partition between the three powers must also have transferred to the Mahrattas those fortresses on the northern frontier which were not occupied by the Nizam, and thus have greatly increased the facilities of these freebooters for exercising, at the expense of the English, that predatory warfare which constituted their chief employment. Still, as it was expedient to preserve as near an approach to a good understanding with the Mahrattas as the character of the people admitted, the governor-general, after much consideration, determined on adopting a plan of distribution, which, assigning to the Peishwa a small portion of the territories of Tippoo, gave a larger to the Company and to the Nizam, the shares of the two latter powers being of equal value; while, to guard against some of the

CHAP. XV. — inconveniences which he perceived to be attached to the complete dismemberment of Mysore, he resolved on forming a part of the country into a separate state. It is to be observed that the boon proposed for the Peishwa was not to be given unconditionally, but was intended to form the basis of a new treaty with the Mahratta empire.

This mode of distributing the conquered dominions having been resolved upon, questions of great interest and importance remained for determination. Who was to be the ruler of the renovated state of Mysore? Should it be one of the sons of Tippoo? Reared in the principles which had brought that prince to destruction—accustomed from the moment when reason dawned to regard the English with intense hatred, could a son of the deceased Sultan ever become an efficient or even a safe ally of the British government? Would his hereditary antipathy not be influenced by the recollection that those to whom he owed his elevation were the invaders of his country, and the subverters of the power which he had expected to inherit in undiminished fulness, but of which he was permitted to retain only a small share? Would not his resentment, on account of that which he had lost, be a stronger and more active feeling than his gratitude for the forbearance which had kept him in the rank of a sovereign prince? Would he not brood incessantly over his humiliation as Tippoo had done?—like him be tempted to place in hazard that which he possessed, in the hope of regaining that which he had lost — and like him

call an English army into the heart of his dominions? Should this result ensue, who could predict the event? Who could tell whether the British force put into action by the ambition of Tippoo's successor should retire—with honour indeed, but without advantage, as did Lord Cornwallis from his first attempt against Tippoo's capital—or whether its effects would be prematurely terminated by hasty negotiation, as happened in that nobleman's second attempt—or whether Mysore should be again the scene of a series of splendid triumphs to the British arms—or (for this could not be excluded from the category of possibility) whether they were there to be overtaken by disaster and defeat? These were momentous inquiries. They were so felt by the governor-general. He was reluctant to subject the children of Tippoo, "born in the state of royalty, and educated with the proudest and most exalted notions of sovereignty and power," to the sudden disappointment of all their splendid prospects; it would, he declared, have been more grateful to his mind to have restored the family of Tippoo Sultan to the throne, than to have transferred it to another, if the restoration could have been accomplished without exposing Mysore to the perpetual hazard of internal commotion and foreign war, and without endangering the stability of "the interests of the Company and their allies in that part of India." The character of the governor-general attests the sincerity of the declaration; but he could not gratify his feelings without defying his convic-

CHAP. XV. — tions and betraying his duty. He therefore determined to set aside the house of Tippoo; and his reasons were thus stated. "In the most narrow view of the subject," said he, "it must be admitted that the son of Tippoo Sultan must have felt a perpetual interest in the subversion of any settlement of Mysore founded on a partition of his father's dominions, and on a limitation of his own independence. If, therefore, a prince of this race had been placed on the throne of Mysore, the foundations of the new settlement would have been laid in the very principles of its own dissolution. With such a prince, no sincere alliance, no concord of sentiments or union of views, could ever have been established; the appearances of amity or attachment must have been delusive; even his submission must have been reluctant, if not treacherous; while all his interests, his habits, his prejudices and passions, his vices, and even his virtues, must have concurred to cherish an irreconcilable aversion to our name and power, and an eager desire to abet the cause, to exasperate the animosity, and to receive the aid of every enemy of the British nation. Whatever degree of influence or strength might have been left to the native government of Mysore, in such hands would always have been thrown into the scale opposed to" our "interests. The hostile power of Mysore would have been weakened, but not destroyed; an enemy would still have remained in the centre of" our "possessions, watching every occasion to repair the misfortunes of his family at" our "expense, and forming a point

of union for the machinations of every discontented faction in India, and for the intrigues of every emissary of France. Under these circumstances, the same anxiety for the security and repose of” our “possessions which originally compelled me to reduce the power of Tippoo Sultan, now appeared to require that I should provide against the renewal of any degree of a similar danger in the person of his son.”\*

Sound policy thus forbidding the restoration of the house of Tippoo, the governor-general naturally turned to the representative of the ancient royal family of Mysore, whose rights had been usurped by Hyder Ali. The heir was an infant only five years of age. The intentions of the governor-general were signified through Purneah, a bramin, whose talents as an accountant had led to his retention in high office by Tippoo, but who was quite ready to transfer his services to the new prince. The communication was followed by a visit of ceremony to

\* Letter from the governor-general to the Court of Directors, 3rd August, 1799. It may be proper to remark, that in the extract quoted a slight departure from the original is occasionally made, by a change of the possessive pronoun. The letter being addressed to the Court of Directors, their interests and possessions intrusted to the care of the governor-general were spoken of as “your interests,” and “your possessions.” To have retained the precise phraseology would have rendered the meaning obscure without explanation, which could not conveniently be given in the text. It is just to state, that for the substance of the chief argument against the restoration of Tippoo’s family, which the author has adduced in his own person, he is indebted to the papers recorded by the Marquis Wellesley.

CHAP. XV. the infant Rajah from the commissioners who had been appointed to conduct the arrangements for the settlement of the country. They found the family of Hyder Ali's master in a state of great poverty and humiliation. The ancient palace of Mysore, though suffered by the usurpers gradually to fall to decay, had for some years afforded a miserable shelter to those whom they had supplanted. The privilege of occupying even the ruins of the building which had once been the seat of their power was at length thought too great. The palace was converted to a store-house, and the Mysorean family provided with another residence of very humble pretensions. In a mean apartment of this house the commissioners were received. A portion of the room was secluded by a curtain, behind which were the rana and the female relations of the family. The males surrounded the person of the Rajah. A formal communication of the design of the British government was made; and the rana, through one of her attendants, acknowledged in strong terms of gratitude the generosity of the British nation in rescuing her family from the degradation and misery in which they had been so long enthralled, and raising the heir of the house to the rank and distinction of a sovereign. A few days afterwards the infant prince was solemnly placed on the throne. The ceremony took place in the old town of Mysore. The palace was now incapable of affording accommodation to its master; and so complete had been the progress of ruin within the city, that it

contained no building in which the ceremony of enthronement could be performed. To supply the deficiency, a temporary shed was erected; and though architectural grandeur was necessarily wanting, there were several circumstances calculated to gratify the Mysorean family and their adherents. It was on the very spot which had been the seat of the power exercised by the ancestors of the young Rajah that his title was solemnly recognized; and the musnud on which he sat was the same which former princes had occupied on similar occasions of state.\* The British commissioners, with the commander-in-chief at their head, waited the arrival of the Rajah. Meer Allum, the chief officer of the Nizam, and his son, Meer Dowra, accompanied them; and the presence of a large escort of horse and foot gave to the depopulated town an appearance of gaiety and splendour to which for many years it had been unaccustomed. The prince was attended by all the male part of his family, and followed by a vast concourse of people. At the entrance of the building erected for the occasion he was met by General Harris and Meer Allum, each of whom took his hand. He was thus conducted to the musnud and placed upon it, under a royal salute from the fort, and three volleys of musketry from the troops present on the occasion.

While the family of the late Sultan were thus excluded from political power, their welfare was con-

\* The throne formerly used by the rajahs of Mysore had been found at Seringapatam.

CHAP. XV. sulted to the full extent that political prudence would permit. The governor-general resolved to assign to them a more ample maintenance than they had enjoyed under the rule of Tippoo, and if there were any error in his arrangements, it was in the disproportionate magnificence with which the relations of the fallen prince were provided for. The failing, however, had its origin in generous and noble feelings. Under the influence of similar feelings the necessary proceedings for the restoration of the ancient dynasty had been deferred until after the departure of Tippoo's sons from Mysore. It was thought a point of policy, not less than of generosity, to conciliate the principal chiefs and officers of the late government by a liberal provision, and to exercise similar consideration with regard to the families of those who had fallen in the war. This principle was extensively acted upon, and in some instances its application drew from the persons in whose favour it was exercised expressions not only of gratitude but of wonder, at the beneficence manifested by the Company's government. Kummer-oo-Deen received a jaghire from the Nizam, and another from the Company.

The changes which have been noticed were effected under two treaties, the earlier of which, called the partition treaty of Mysore, was concluded between the Company and the Nizam. The first article assigned to the Company a certain portion of the territories of Tippoo, out of which provision was to be made for his family and for that

of his father. The principal of these acquisitions were Canara, Coimbatore, and Wynaad. The second article determined the districts to be added to the territories of the Nizam, which were selected from those adjacent to his former dominions, and recognized the claim of Kummer-oo-Deen to a personal jaghire from the revenues of those districts. The third, after reciting that for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, and for the general security on the foundations then established by the contracting parties, it was expedient that the fortress of Seringapatam should be subject to the Company, transferred that fortress, and the island on which it was situated, together with a smaller island lying to the westward, to the Company, "in full right and sovereignty for ever." The fourth provided for the establishment of the new government of Mysore ; and the fifth prescribed the cessions to be made for its establishment. The sixth reserved to the Company the right to reduce the amount of its payments to the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo on the death of any member of the families ; and in the event of any hostile attempt against the Company, the Nizam, or the Rajah of Mysore, to suspend the issue of the whole or of any part of such stipulated payments. The seventh article related to the reserve of territory made for the Peishwa in accordance with the governor-general's views as they have been already explained. This addition to the dominions of the Peishwa was made dependant on his accession to the treaty within one month after it should

CHAP. XV. — be formally notified to him, and also upon his giving satisfaction to the Company and the Nizam on such points of difference as existed between himself and either of those parties. By the eighth article, if the Peishwa should refuse to accede to the treaty, and give satisfaction to the original parties to it, the territory intended for him was to revert to the joint disposal of the Company and the Nizam. The ninth article provided for the reception of an English subsidiary force by the Rajah of Mysore, under a separate treaty to be subsequently concluded between the Company and that prince. By the tenth article the negotiators undertook for the ratification of the treaty by their respective governments. There were two additional articles, by the first of which the two parties were exempted from accountability to each other in consequence of any diminution of the stipends payable to the families of Hyder Ali and Tip-poo Sultan by the Company, or of the personal jaghire of Kummer-oo-Deen from the Nizam. Its operation was thus reciprocal; but the object of introducing it was a prudent desire on the part of the British government to exclude the Nizam from interfering in the arrangements connected with the maintenance of the exiled families. The second additional article was an explanation of the eighth in the treaty, and was framed in contemplation of the possible refusal of the Peishwa to avail himself of the advantages to be proffered for his acceptance. In that case, it was provided that two-thirds of the reserved territories should fall to the Nizam, and

the remaining one-third to the Company. The reason of this unequal distribution was, that if the Peishwa should accede to the conditions annexed to his claim to the additional territory, one of these conditions being the satisfactory settlement of certain points of difference between him and the Nizam, the latter power would thereby derive considerable benefit; and the design of the article was to afford him ample indemnification in the event of the disappointment of his expectations at Poonah.

Under the fourth and fifth articles of the partition treaty, the new state of Mysore was established in the manner which has been seen. In conformity with the provision of the ninth, a subsidiary treaty was concluded with the government thus called into existence. For reasons already assigned, the governor-general had deemed it more advisable to erect a new state on the ruins of the old government of Mysore than to divide the entire country between the conquerors; but he had never contemplated this state except as a barrier to the Company's interests; in fact, it was to be British in all things but the name. This intention was never concealed from those who were interested in being acquainted with it. A stipulation for the defence of Mysore by an English subsidiary force, which virtually gave to the English the entire command of the country, was inserted in the treaty with the Nizam, and the terms on which the infant Rajah was to ascend the throne were at an early period indicated to his advisers. The subsidiary treaty

CHAP. XV. concluded on his behalf consisted of sixteen articles. The first declared that the friends and enemies of either of the two contracting parties should be considered as the friends and enemies of both. By the second, the Company undertook to maintain, and the Rajah agreed to receive, a military force for the defence and security of his dominions, in consideration of which he was to pay seven lacs of star pagodas, the disposal of which sum, together with the arrangement and employment of the troops, were to be left entirely to the Company. The third article was important. Towards the increased expense incurred by the prosecution of war for the defence of the territories of the two parties, or of either of them, or by necessary preparation for the commencement of hostilities, the Rajah was to contribute in a just and reasonable proportion to his actual net revenues, the amount to be determined after attentive consideration by the governor-general in council. The fourth article was directed to making provision against any failure in the funds destined to defray either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace, or the extraordinary expenses incurred during war, or in preparation for war. For this purpose the British government, whenever they might have reason to apprehend failure, were empowered to introduce such regulations as might be deemed expedient for the management and collection of the revenues, or for the better ordering of any other department of the government; or they might assume and bring under the management of the servants of the Com-

pany any part of the territory of Mysore. The fifth provided for the due execution of the fourth article. Whenever the governor-general in council should signify to the Rajah that it had become necessary to bring that article into operation, the Rajah was to issue orders either for giving effect to the prescribed regulations or for placing the required territories under English management. If such orders were delayed for ten days after formal application for them, the governor-general in council might, of his own authority, take the necessary measures. But in all cases where possession was taken of any part of the Rajah's territories, an account was to be rendered, and the income of the Rajah was in no case to fall short of one lac of star pagodas, increased by one-fifth of the net revenues of the whole of the territory ceded to him by the partition treaty, the payment of which sum the Company guaranteed. These comprehensive articles secured to the British government all the advantages that could be derived from the establishment of the new state. They carried out the avowed objects of the governor-general in a manner not less creditable to his character for manly and straightforward dealing than for political ability. His own explanation of his views, and his justification of their unreserved exhibition, cannot fail to be interesting. "In framing this engagement," said the governor-general, "it was my determination to establish the most unqualified community of interests between the government of Mysore and the Company, and to render the Rajah's frontier, in effect, a powerful line of our

CHAP. XV. defence. With this view I have engaged to undertake the protection of this country in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas; but, recollecting the inconveniences and embarrassments which have arisen to all parties concerned under the double governments and conflicting authorities unfortunately established in Oude, the Carnatic, and Tanjore, I resolved to reserve to the Company the most extensive and indisputable powers of interposition in the affairs of Mysore, as well as an unlimited right of assuming the direct management of the country (whenever such a step might appear necessary for the security of the funds destined to the subsidy), and of requiring extraordinary aid beyond the amount of the fixed subsidy, either in time of war, or of preparation for hostility. Under this arrangement, I trust, I shall be enabled to command the whole resources of the Rajah's territory, to improve its cultivation, to extend its commerce, and to secure the welfare of its inhabitants. It appeared to me a more candid and liberal, as well as a more wise policy, to apprize the Rajah distinctly, at the moment of his accession, of the exact nature of his dependance on the Company, than to leave any matter for future doubt or discussion. The right of the Company to establish such an arrangement, either as affecting the Rajah or the allies, has been already stated.\*"

\* Letter to the Court of Directors, 3rd August, 1799. There is no part of the admirable letter from which the passage in the text is extracted which will not repay an attentive perusal, and the reader will not be sorry to learn that it is published

Before referring to the remaining provisions of the treaty, it may not be improper to advert to a plausible and popular objection urged against all engagements of the like kind. It is said that they place the acknowledged sovereign in a state of dependance and pupilage. The objection is not without a foundation in truth. But the dependant position of the sovereign is not produced by such engagements—it exists independently of them. Except in cases where the prince manifests a degree of ability and energy seldom exhibited among the potentates of the East, but by those who have raised their own fortunes on the basis of usurpation, the sovereign is invariably in a state of dependance. A minister implicitly trusted, or too powerful to be shaken off, is usually the master of the weak and inexperienced person to whom he owns nominal obedience. Is it better that the power of control should be exercised by private, and, for the most part, unprincipled persons, whose influence, dependant on the intrigues of the durbar or the zenana, will generally be used for private objects, or that it should be wielded by a great and enlightened government, hav-

in the second volume of the Dispatches of the Marquis Wellesley. The whole of the papers collected under that title should be studied by every one whose duties are connected with British India, or whose inclinations lead him to take an interest in that country. By the statesman, whatever his sphere of action, the work should be resorted to as a manual of political wisdom. The judgment of the East-India Company on its merits has been shewn by their purchase of a large number of copies for the use of their servants under the different presidencies.

CHAP. XV. ing no end to advance but the mutual benefit of the two states—that which protects, and that which is protected? It is true that the former—the protecting state—may, in many cases, be unable to do much for the general happiness of the country which it is bound to defend, and that the military force destined to support the native prince may be sometimes called upon to act against his own subjects where they have just ground for complaint; but these facts, so far from proving that the protecting government has too much power, only prove that it has not enough. The same evils, or evils of equal magnitude, would exist whether the inferior state were dependant or not. If independent, and the sovereign were powerful, obedience to his will, or to that of his minister, would be enforced. If he were weak, oppression would be succeeded by anarchy, and the probability is, that the interests of justice and humanity would gain little. However objectionable the double governments of India, they seem a necessary step in the transition to a better disposition of political power. It may be that most of the subsidiary states would be more prosperous, and the people under them far more happy, were the entire authority, civil as well as military, in the hands of the British government. But that government could not grasp at universal dominion without exciting a degree of alarm throughout India, which would be dangerous, if not fatal, to its interests; while the excitement among the declaimers at home against European aggression in India would be in-

flamed to fury. The Earl of Mornington, therefore, acted wisely in not making Mysore ostensibly a British possession. He acted no less wisely in making it substantially so, and claiming for his own government as large a share of power as was consistent with the maintenance of the appearance of a separate state. The power for which he stipulated was to be exercised for the good of Mysore, as well as for the interests of the British government; and the influence of that government—its undisguised authority, if necessary—was to be employed for the improvement of the Rajah's territory, the extension of its commerce, and the promotion of the welfare of its inhabitants. The governor-general thus effected a great improvement upon all former plans of divided authority. The opportunity was a rare one, and he did not suffer it to escape him. In this case there were no previous engagements, no established institutions, to embarrass him. The Rajah could claim nothing—all that he received was a dispensation of pure bounty. The governor-general raised him from poverty to affluence—from degradation to honour; but he did not forget the just claims of his own country, nor those of the people over whom he had established the Rajah's authority. The beacons afforded by Oude, Arcot, and Tanjore, were neither unobserved nor disregarded; and the operation of the causes which had placed those countries among the most wretched even of native states was excluded from Mysore.

The articles of the treaty which succeeded the

CHAP. XV. — important ones already explained must now be briefly noticed. The Rajah was bound to abstain from any interference in the affairs of the allies of the Company, or of any other state; and precluded from holding any communication or correspondence with any foreign state whatever, without the previous knowledge and sanction of the Company. Like other allies of the British government, he was restricted from employing Europeans without the concurrence of the Company, or suffering them to reside in his dominions. This article was framed with unusual strength. The Rajah engaged to apprehend and deliver to the Company's government all Europeans of whatever description who should be found within his territories without regular passports from the English government; "it being his highness's determined resolution not to suffer, even for a day, any European foreigner to remain within the territories now subject to his authority, unless by consent of the Company." Another point, which the governor-general had justly regarded as important, was provided for by an article giving to the Company the power of determining what fortresses and strong places should be placed in their charge, and thereupon of garrisoning such places in whatever manner they might think proper. The Company's government were to be the sole judges of the propriety of dismantling and destroying any forts, or of strengthening and repairing them; and the charges incurred by any such operations were to be borne in equal proportions by the two parties to

the treaty. If the employment of the regular troops of the Company should become necessary to the maintenance of the Rajah's authority, their aid, upon formal application being made, was to be afforded in such manner as the Company's government might see fit; but they were not to be employed in ordinary revenue transactions. The Rajah was to provide the funds for pensioning the Mahometan officers whom it had been thought politic to conciliate; but he incurred no charge on account of the late Sultan's family, who were to be supported by the British government, nor of Kummer-oo-Deen, who was provided for by assignments of jaghire. It was stipulated, that provisions and other necessaries for the use of the garrison of Seringapatam should be allowed to enter that place, from any part of the Rajah's dominions, free from duty, tax, or impediment; that a commercial treaty should be concluded between the two governments; that the Rajah should at all times pay the utmost attention to such advice as the English government should judge it necessary to offer, "with a view to the economy of his finances, the better collection of his revenues, the administration of justice, the extension of commerce, the encouragement of trade, agriculture, and industry, or any other objects connected with the advancement of his highness's interests, the happiness of his people, and the mutual welfare of both states." With a view to the proper connection of the respective lines of frontier, provision was made for an exchange of territory between the Company and

CHAP. XV. the Rajah, or for an adjustment by such other means as should be suited to the occasion, in case it should be found that any districts assigned to either party by the partition treaty of Mysore were inconveniently situated. Such was the substance of the articles from the sixth to the fifteenth; the sixteenth and last providing for the ratification of the treaty by the governor-general.

Thus did the uncontrollable enmity of Tippoo Sultan to the English nation result in a vast acquisition of territory, power, and influence by the people whom he hated, and whom it had been the labour of his life to circumvent. The means taken by him to effect their destruction ended in his own; and, as if to render the retribution more striking, the officer who dealt the final blow, to which Tippoo owed his dethronement and death, had been one of the victims of his tyranny. General Baird had fallen into his hands after the fatal defeat of Colonel Baillie's detachment, and for several years had been subjected to the sufferings and horrors by which imprisonment under Tippoo Sultan was accompanied.

In the new settlement of Mysore, some difficulty was apprehended from the attempts of the poligars, who had been dispossessed by Hyder Ali and Tippoo, to re-establish their claims. It had been endeavoured to guard against this by the mode in which the change was effected. The investment of the Rajah with the character of a sovereign was treated not as the restoration of the old government but the creation of a new one, and the anti-

cipated difficulty was scarcely felt. Some of the commandants of fortresses were anxious to sell their fidelity at a good price; and others, who had collected plunder, delayed surrender to gain time for securing it; but the hostile demonstrations thus rendered necessary were not of sufficient interest to merit recital. The only impediment of importance occurred in the province of Bednore, where an adventurer named Dhoondia gave some disturbance, requiring the dispatch of a force for its suppression. Dhoondia was a patan, who had incurred the resentment of Tippoo by committing depredations on the Sultan's territories. He was at length secured, and the pious zeal of the prince being gratified by the compulsory conversion of his prisoner to the Mahometan faith, Dhoondia made such progress in Tippoo's favour as to be trusted by him with military employment. But his good fortune was of short duration, and for some time before the commencement of the war the convert had been confined in irons. On the fall of Seringapatam the humanity of the conquerors set him at liberty, and Dhoondia availed himself of his newly-gained freedom by an early flight from the place of his imprisonment, a movement to which his liberators would be likely to attach little importance. Resuming his old habits, Dhoondia, on the disbanding of Tippoo's army, collected a few cavalry, with whom he took the direction of Bednore. The state of the country was not unfavourable for gathering recruits, and he soon found his band of followers considerably

CHAP. XV. — increased by men anxious for service of some kind, and not troubled with any acute sensibility of conscience in relation to its character. By the influence of motives which it is not easy to explain, certain killadars were prevailed upon to betray their trusts to him, and in this manner some of the principal places in the province fell into his hands, before it was in the power of General Harris to detach from the army a sufficient force to act against him with effect. In the meanwhile Dhoondia made the best use of the time thus afforded him; he levied heavy contributions on the rich country which lay at his mercy, enforced these exactions by the most unrelenting cruelty, and filled the province with acts of rapine and murder. To stop his career, a light corps of cavalry and native infantry, under the command of Colonel James Dalrymple, moved from Chittledroog, as soon as their services could be spared. They soon fell in with a party of the banditti, consisting of about two hundred and fifty horse and four hundred infantry, which they completely destroyed. The capture by the English force of a fort on the east bank of the river Tungbuddra followed, and not long afterwards another on the west bank was taken. While Colonel Dalrymple was thus engaged, Colonel Stevenson was advancing into Bednore, by another direction, at the head of a light force, composed also of cavalry and native infantry. Simoga was attacked by this force, and carried by assault. On the 17th of August Dhoondia was attacked near Shikar-

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poor, and his cavalry, after sustaining considerable loss, were driven into a river which was situated in their rear. The fort of Shikarpoor at the same time fell into the hands of the English. Dhoondia escaped by crossing the river in a boat, which had been procured for the occasion. He was closely pursued, and compelled to take refuge in the Mahratta territory, where he encamped with the remnant of his followers. There would have been no difficulty in taking or destroying him, had the British force been at liberty to pass beyond the Mahratta boundary; but this the governor-general had forbidden, and Colonel Stevenson accordingly halted his detachment.

But Dhoondia was not in a position where he could calculate on either safety or repose. A robber and a murderer by profession, he had limited the exercise of his occupations to no particular districts. Wherever his foot had pressed he left records of his presence in acts of violence and blood. The Mahrattas, it appeared, had some accounts of this character against him, and they proceeded very summarily to administer a degree of punishment, which, if inadequate to the crimes of Dhoondia, was quite in accordance with the temper and habits of the people among whom he sojourned. A chief, commanding a division of the Peishwa's army, paid the wanderer a visit within a few hours after he had pitched his camp within the Mahratta borders, and relieved him of every thing which was necessary either to the future exercise of his trade of plunder, or to the sup-

CHAP. XV.        ply of the wants of the passing day. It would be too much to ascribe this visitation to the operation of the moral sense in those who made it. Had the character of Dhoondia been as pure as it was depraved, his fate, under the circumstances of his situation, would have been the same. It was his helplessness, not his crimes, which invited the infliction to which he was subjected; and it would be an injustice to Mahratta ingenuity to suppose that if the Peishwa's servants had been without experience of Dhoondia's acts they would have wanted a pretence for plundering him. But, whatever their motives, they rendered a useful service to the English which the latter power could not itself perform.

A. D. 1799. The great work which had brought the governor-general to Madras having been completed, the necessity for his presence there had ceased, and he returned to Bengal in September. At both presidencies enthusiastic congratulations flowed in upon him, which, as soon as the news of his success could be disseminated, were echoed from every part of the world where an Englishman or a friend of England was to be found.

## CHAPTER XVI.

THE remarkable promptitude and energy which the governor-general had displayed in counteracting the designs of Tippoo Sultan might lead to the belief that the accomplishment of this object had occupied his undivided attention. But such was far from being the fact. Other affairs of weighty importance pressed on his consideration, and among these were the succession to the throne of Tanjore, and the necessary measures for settling the government of that country in a manner which should relieve the people from the oppression to which they had long been subjected. CHAP. XVI.

Some years before the arrival of the Earl of Mornington in India, the Rajah of Tanjore, having been deprived by death of all his legitimate children, provided for the succession in a manner not unfrequent in the East, by adopting a son. The guardianship of the child, and the care of the government during his minority, were assigned by the Rajah to his brother, Ameer Singh; but the views of that personage extended beyond the exercise of a delegated and temporary authority. The death of the Rajah, which occurred soon after the act of

CHAP. XVI. — adoption, gave opportunity for the ambition of Ameer Singh to display itself: the title of the youthful successor was forthwith disputed, and the validity of the act under which he claimed denied. Various objections were raised, and the support of the British government being invoked on both sides, the questions at issue were referred by that authority to the decision of a council of pundits learned in Hindoo lore, specially summoned for the occasion. In taking this course, the Company's government had no object in view but to do justice. Nothing had occurred which could lead them to entertain any feeling of partiality or prejudice with regard to either of the candidates for the musnud, and the answer to the questions upon which the decision of the conflicting claims depended was awaited both at Madras and Bengal with perfect indifference. Unhappily the desire of the British authorities to do justice was not aided by the knowledge necessary for its guidance; and in resorting to the advice of native expounders of the law, they had done little to guard themselves from error. The contest between a child and a man of mature age was an unequal one; and the decision of the learned pundits was in favour of the party who had the better means of maintaining his claim and the readier opportunity of rewarding their services. The British government presumed not to understand the Hindoo law better than its recognized expositors, and the brother of the deceased Rajah was declared the lawful successor to the musnud, to the exclusion of the adopted child. The

former was accordingly placed on the throne, but not without a distinct intimation of the expectation entertained by the British government that the excluded infant would be protected and maintained in a manner suitable to the hopes which he had been led to cherish. Nothing could be more easy, nothing more natural, than to promise compliance with the wishes of those who had the power of bestowing or withholding a kingdom; and, as far as professions were concerned, Ameer Singh gave to his patrons full satisfaction. But he went no farther. Complaints of the treatment received by his infant rival soon became loud and frequent. He was subjected to rigorous confinement in a dark and unhealthy place, and his mind was left unimproved even by the narrow measure of instruction usually accorded to oriental youth. The governor of Madras at length felt called upon to address to Ameer Singh a letter, suggesting the necessity of taking proper care of the health and education of the boy. By this time Ameer Singh had become impressed with a full sense of his own dignity, and the receipt of the letter filled him with indignation. He had promised, indeed, to comply with the wishes of the English government on the subject, but he now treated its mediation as an improper interference with his domestic arrangements. He alleged that, during the reign of his brother, his own situation had been worse than that of the person in whose behalf he was addressed, and that the British government had never interfered in his favour. Such,

CHAP. XVI. indeed, was the spirit in which the communication was received, that it was found necessary immediately to follow it up by another of more decisive tone. Ameer Singh was called upon, in terms somewhat peremptory, but sufficiently warranted by the circumstances of the case, to extend to the adopted son of his brother certain specified indulgences; and with a view to some better security than oriental promises for the fulfilment of the desire of the British government, it was intimated that a small guard of Company's sepoy's had been directed to attend on his person. After various attempts on the part of the British resident to induce Ameer Singh to yield compliance to the wishes of the British government, they were ultimately carried into effect almost by force. It could not be expected that the hatred borne by Ameer Singh to his rival would thereby be abated; and he continued to manifest it by all the means in his power. Further measures for the protection of the persecuted youth became obviously necessary; and a wish which he had expressed to be removed to Madras was gratified. The widows of the deceased Rajah, who had been grievously oppressed by his successor, likewise found a refuge in the Company's territories. One object of their removal was to assist by their influence in forcing upon the British government a reconsideration of its decision in regard to the title of the reigning prince of Tanjore. It was represented, and with great appearance of probability, that the pundits to whose opinion he owed his elevation had been bribed, and the

judgment which they had delivered was challenged. CHAP. XVI.  
The British government thereupon deemed it necessary to enter upon a formal examination of the title in dispute. The objections taken to the claim of the adopted son of the former Rajah were three:—First, that at the time the act of adoption was performed the Rajah was in such a state of mental and bodily infirmity as rendered him incapable of duly executing so important a function. The second and third related to points of Hindoo law. It was represented that the boy being an only son, his adoption was on that ground invalid; and that his age exceeded that to which the law restricted the exercise of the privilege. The alleged incapacity of the Rajah was amply disproved. On the remaining questions a number of braminical opinions were obtained, all of them favourable to the claim of the youth whom the deceased prince had destined to succeed him. The adoption of an only son, though admitted to be reprehensible, was declared not to be invalid; it was an act which ought not to be done, but which when done could not lawfully be set aside. The question of age was determined unequivocally and without reserve in favour of the rival of Amcer Singh. And these opinions were not confined to the expounders of Hindoo law in the south of India; they were confirmed by the judgment of their brethren in Bengal, and at the great depository of braminical learning, Benares. The ignorance or the corruption of the pundits, upon whose

CHAP. XVI. sentence the adopted son had been passed by, thus became evident, and it was but just to retract the false step which had formerly been made. These events and inquiries extended through several years, during which Lord Cornwallis and Lord Teignmouth exercised the powers of governor-general, and a series of governors, commencing with Sir Archibald Campbell and ending with Lord Hobart, presided at Madras. There appears throughout to have been a strong leaning on the part of the British authorities in favour of Ameer Singh, and against his youthful competitor. The succession of a brother is undoubtedly more consonant to European feelings than that of a distant relative capriciously invested with a stronger title; but Hindoo feeling is different: and in this case, moreover, the claim of Ameer Singh was vitiated by the fact of his being illegitimate.

The right to the throne of Tanjore had ceased to be matter of doubt when the Earl of Mornington arrived in India. The Court of Directors had resolved to uphold the claims of the lawful candidate, and it only remained to determine the time and mode of carrying their decision into effect. The Earl of Mornington determined that no delay should take place. There was, indeed, no pretence for delay; but had there been any, the reasons in favour of the course resolved upon by the governor-general were amply sufficient to justify its adoption. The causes of the miserable condition of Tanjore required a searching investigation, and it was in contemplation to issue a commission to examine

and report. The governor-general at once perceived that to take such a step while Ameer Singh remained on the musnud would be but a mockery of inquiry. It could not be expected that he would promote research, which, if successful, would have the effect of exposing his own misgovernment; and his continuance on the throne would enable him to throw impediments in the way of the commissioners. He would have had the power not only of protracting their labours, but of rendering them vain. The adopted heir of the deceased Rajah was accordingly placed on the throne. This was comparatively easy; but, in effecting a satisfactory settlement of the country the governor-general experienced difficulties incalculable and almost insurmountable. These did not in any degree arise from the character of the new Rajah, which was amiable and generous, but from the accumulation of abuses under former governments, which had gathered strength proportioned to the time during which they had existed, and the numerous interests which were connected with their preservation. The energy of the governor-general ultimately triumphed over all the obstacles that stood in the way of a settlement; and the result was, that, with the free consent of all parties interested, the British government assumed the entire civil and military administration of Tanjore, a splendid provision being reserved for the Rajah. This arrangement was undoubtedly beneficial to the interests of Great Britain; but it is no exaggeration to say that it was far more beneficial to the people

CHAP. XVI. of Tanjore. It delivered them from the effects of native oppression and European cupidity. It gave them what they had never before possessed—the security derived from the administration of justice. The Rajah, who owed to the British government his previous emancipation from thralldom, insult, and personal danger, was now indebted to the same power for his elevation to a degree of state and splendour which must have fulfilled all his expectations. It was necessary for the purposes of good government that he should retain little of actual power; but in the enjoyment of a splendid revenue, and of a limited degree of military authority, his situation was brightly contrasted with that in which his earlier years were passed. The treaty was concluded on the 25th of October, 1799, and ratified by the governor-general in council on the 29th of November following.

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A change, similar to that made at Tanjore, was effected with regard to the principality of Surat. The city of Surat was one of the first in India in point of commercial importance. There also flocked in vast numbers the pious votaries of the Arabian prophet, in search of the means of transport to the city which every good Mussulman is anxious to behold; and Surat thus came to be spoken of as one of the gates of Mecca. The English at an early period had established a factory at Surat, and about the middle of the seventeenth century had bravely defended not only the Company's factory, but a large part of the town, against an attack of the Mahrattas

under Sevajee. For this service they received the thanks of the Mogul commander. Nearly a century afterwards, the English were invited by the inhabitants to take possession of the castle and the fleet. They hesitated, from an apprehension of incurring the resentment of the Mahrattas, who some years before had subjugated a large portion of the province of Surat, and, more recently, by taking advantage of disputes carried on for the government of the remainder, had established, with respect to the city and the districts attached to it, a claim for chout. Some outrages committed upon the English by those against whom they had been invited to act finally induced the government of Bombay to interfere. The government of the town had long been separated from the command of the castle and of the fleet, and the person who exercised the first agreed to assist the English in obtaining possession of the two latter on condition of being protected in his authority. The government of Bombay had previously been in correspondence with a rival candidate for the civil government, the reigning Nabob being connected with the party whom the English desired to dispossess. But the view of the person to whom the musnud was to have been transferred not being favoured by the influential part of the inhabitants, a compromise was effected, under which the Nabob was to retain his office, and his rival was to be invested with the character of naib or chief manager. Little difficulty was found in carrying this arrangement into effect. The English took

CHAP. XVI. possession of the castle and the fleet, and their assumption of the command was afterwards solemnly confirmed by the imperial court of Delhi. All who had ever exercised any description of authority at Surat, excepting the Mahrattas, had professed to act in the name and under the appointment of the Mogul Emperor. The firman of the Emperor transferred the charge of the castle and the fleet to the English; the Mogul flag consequently continued to float from the castle, and was hoisted at the mast-head of the Company's chief cruizer on the Surat station. The acquisition which the Company had made appears, indeed, to have wanted scarcely any conceivable ground of justification. The movement which they had headed was strictly a popular one; the people of Surat had sought the interference of the government of Bombay, and rejoiced in the change which had taken place. The Emperor of Delhi, who claimed the sovereignty, acquiesced, and appointed the Company his vicegerent. The Nabob professed to be the servant of the Emperor, and could not consistently object to yield obedience to his commands; and he had, moreover, become voluntarily a party to the transfer of the military and naval power to the English. It seems, therefore, that little exception can be taken to the step by which the English first obtained the public and recognized exercise of authority in Surat.

It is not to be believed that the Bombay government, in undertaking the defence of Surat, were actuated solely by a desire to benefit the people, or

to maintain the honour of the Mogul state. They had undoubtedly views both to political influence and commercial advantage, and it is enough that in gratifying those views they invaded no authority that was founded on right, while they relieved the people of Surat by employing for their defence powers which had previously been exercised for their oppression. As in other cases, the course of events aided the aggrandizement of the Company; and at Surat, while they ostensibly possessed only a portion of the authority of the state, it soon became almost inevitable that they should make provision for the exercise of the whole. This was in truth conceded by the Nabob, when he recognized their right to appoint a naib while he was acknowledged as the chief civil authority. The total wreck of the Mogul empire contributed to increase the power of the Company, and to render it more firm. The Nabob of Surat was unable to maintain himself in his position without their assistance. He had, indeed, no rights but what he derived from the Emperor of Delhi: he was the servant of that monarch, and his fortunes were to be regarded as dependent on those of his master. It is true that, in various cases, the vassals of the Mogul empire took advantage of the fallen state of their superior to establish themselves as independent sovereigns. They thus acted even in the better days of the empire whenever an opportunity offered. But it is obvious that such an usurpation of sovereignty could claim no respect beyond that which the strength of the new

CHAP. XVI. — state might be able to command. As to Surat, indeed, the situation of the Company was the same as that of the Nabob. Power was divided between them, and both claimed to hold it under the same sanction. The destruction of the superior, recognized by both, effected, however, a change in their position. They had no longer a common superior; they might continue to acknowledge as their chief a man who was sometimes an outcast and sometimes a prisoner; but, substantially, the two authorities had become independent. The bond, too, which had united them was severed. It was scarcely possible that disputes should be avoided, and who should decide them? None but the parties themselves, by negotiation or by the sword. In cases like that of Surat, where a sovereign becomes permanently unable to protect his dominions, those dominions must be regarded as falling into the state of territory which has never been appropriated, or which, having been appropriated, has been abandoned. Those on the spot will have the best opportunities of securing its possession, and their right is at least as good as that of strangers. The English and the Nabob of Surat were in this case the parties most likely to establish themselves as masters of the place. Their claims on the ground of right were equal. Each had possession of a share of power; but it was impossible that they could continue to use their respective shares on a footing of perfect equality. Though each might abstain from invading the province of the other, the weaker could not fail to feel that he

was dependent on the will of the stronger. The more powerful might concede to the feebler a given portion of power, but the act would be a concession, and the relative position of the parties would be no longer that of equals, accountable even in imagination to a common superior. The stronger would be the lord, the weaker the dependent. In this manner, by the ordinary operation of events, did the English become invested with the dominant power at Surat. They might indeed have renounced it, but only by two modes. They might have withdrawn from Surat altogether, abandoning the commercial advantages arising from their connection with that place, which were then very considerable, or they might have been content to be dependents upon the Nabob. They were not so weak as to choose either. It was impossible to preserve equality, and they chose supremacy rather than dependence. From the time when the English obtained the military command, the succession to the seat of civil government was regulated by them. The office of naib was after a time abolished; but this was an act of favour towards the Nabob, grounded on reasons of expediency on the part of those who conferred it. The Nabobs of Surat were then more strictly dependent upon the English than in the later days of the empire they had even been upon their nominal chief.

When the British government undertook the charge of the defence of Surat, revenue was assigned for defraying the expenses of the duty. It proved insufficient, and it could not be expected

CHAP. XVI. — that the Company's government should burden other portions of territory with the charge of preserving Surat from danger. This gave rise to various disputes and negotiations. Other grounds of difference were furnished by the gross mismanagement of that portion of power which had been committed to the Nabob. With the abuses existing under an independent government that of the Company would have possessed no right to interfere; but the intimate connection which subsisted between the English and the Nabob—the nature of that connection, which could be concealed from no one, and the circumstances under which the power of the Company in Surat had been acquired, rendered it an incumbent duty to exercise that power, not only for the advantage of those who held it, but for the promotion, also, to the widest possible extent, of the prosperity and happiness of the people.

With regard both to its own claims and those of the people of Surat, the British government long entertained feelings of dissatisfaction towards the Nabob. The insufficiency of the means placed at their disposal for the defence of the place, and the abuses of the civil administration, had alike furnished grounds of protracted discontent before the arrival of the Earl of Mornington in India. With much reluctance, the reigning Nabob agreed to make some addition to the payment secured to the Company for the defence of the place; but before the arrangement was concluded he died, leaving an infant son, who survived but a short time, and

whose death afforded an opening for the claim of an uncle to succeed to the office. The opportunity was a favourable one for effecting those changes which were indispensably necessary to the good government of the place. The British authorities had long exercised the power of disposing of the office of Nabob at their discretion, as the Mogul Emperor had formerly done ; and though the claims of relationship had been respected, they had never been regarded as conferring a right to the succession. They were still respected, but not to the extent of subjecting the inhabitants of Surat to the evils which they had long endured under native rule. The candidate for the nabobship was unwilling to comply with the requisitions made of him, and the British government determined to assume the entire civil and military administration — a change in which the people of Surat had far greater reason to rejoice than even those by whom it was effected. The person whose claim to the exercise of power was thus set aside was indulged by being elevated to the rank to which he aspired. An ample provision was made for him and the family to which he belonged ; and the only obstacle to improvement being thus removed, the reformation of the wretched institutions of Surat was commenced with promptitude and vigour. Never had there existed greater necessity for such a labour. It was truly stated that “ the frauds, exactions, and mismanagement in the collection of the revenue, the avowed corruption in the administration of justice, and the entire ineffi-

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ciency of the police, as manifested in the different tumults which" had "occurred in the city, particularly that excited in 1795," afforded "abundant evidence that the Nabobs were as incompetent to conduct the internal government of the city as to provide for its external defence."\* The riot above adverted to was caused by the rival fanaticism of the Mahomedan and Hindoo inhabitants of the city, and was attended with the perpetration of many acts of atrocious barbarity. The Bombay government had given the Nabob some good advice on this occasion, but had not felt at liberty to do more, although the British resident at Surat had strongly urged them to take some decisive measures for the preservation of good order in the city. The Hindoo inhabitants complained loudly of their want of security, alleging that the trade and population of the city entirely depended on the protection of the English. This protection, however, they remarked, had been only nominal since the abolition of the office of naib. While this office was maintained, the person holding it was especially entrusted with the charge of the police of the city, and he was accountable to the British government for the exercise of this as well as of all other powers with which he was invested. The abolition of the office had deprived the Company's government of all power of efficient control, and committed the peace of the city to those who were either unable or unwilling to

\* Letter of governor-general in council to government of Bombay, 10th March, 1800.

maintain it. The moral bearings of the question are exhibited forcibly and tersely in two short passages of a dispatch on this subject addressed by the government of Bengal to that of Bombay: The “right,” say they, “of disposing of the office of Nabob is accompanied by an indispensable duty of providing a just, wise, and efficient administration for the affairs of Surat; the lapse of the powers of government having left no other party, excepting the Company, in a state to protect the persons and property of the inhabitants of that city.”\* And, after adverting to the objects to which the power of the Nabobs ought to have been directed, but which they had signally failed to accomplish, the dispatch continues: “It is obvious that these important objects can only be attained by the Company taking the entire civil and military government of the city into their own hands; and, consequently, it is their duty as well as their right to have recourse to that measure.”†

This is a just view of the case; and Surat affords one instance among many, in which territory and power have been, by the mere force of circumstances, transferred from native hands to those of the East-India Company. The commercial importance of Surat rendered the preservation of peace and order an object of great interest to the Company, which had long maintained there one of its principal stations for the purposes of trade. This led to the interference of the government of Bombay, an interference which, it will be remem-

\* Letter, *ut supra*.

† Ibid.

CHAP. XVI. bered, was invited by the principal inhabitants, who knew the value of a British connection, and who reposed a degree of confidence in the power and good intentions of the Company's servants which the representatives of no other government could inspire. The Mogul Emperor confirmed to the Company the powers of which they had assumed the exercise; the remaining powers of the state were, by the consent of the Nabob, entrusted to a deputy, whom the Company were to name. The Mogul dynasty fell into irretrievable ruin, and the privilege of nominating the Nabob of Surat passed by natural consequence into the hands of those who had the means of maintaining their appointment. But this privilege they did not abuse. So far from seeking to increase their power, they voluntarily relinquished a portion of it which they might, without an effort, have retained. The office of naib was abolished, and the Nabob invested with the uncurtailed exercise of those functions which were vested in his office. The results were, that the administration of affairs fell into utter disorder, and that neither the state nor the persons and property of individuals were secure. Then, and not before, the Company undertook the duties previously assigned to the Nabob; and, as far as the people were concerned, the only ground for regret was, that this step had not been sooner taken. One good effect, indeed, attended the delay: the moderation and forbearance of the Company's government were amply attested. The new arrangements at Surat were embodied in a

treaty, which was signed by the parties interested on the 13th of May, 1800.

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A.D. 1800.

About the time of the settlement of the government of Surat, it became necessary to take measures for the preservation of the Mysore frontier from predatory attacks. The danger arose from Dhoondia Waugh, who had found means to repair the damage which he had sustained from the Mah-rattas, and to place himself in a condition to resume the exercise of his occupation. The necessity of putting down this adventurer was urgent, with a view not only to the actual inconvenience occasioned by his ravages, but also to the possible consequences of allowing them to be perpetrated with impunity. Dhoondia was endeavouring to raise himself from the position of a vulgar robber to that of the head of a political confederacy. The discontented within the Company's territories and those of their allies were invited, by letters written in his name, to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by his invasion of Mysore, and rise simultaneously against the objects of their hate. Dhoondia, though in himself, as he was justly termed by Colonel Wellesley, "a despicable enemy,"\* thus became a formidable one; and both his character and his attempt may be regarded as having gained something of dignity from the fact of the greatest general of modern times having taken the field against him.

Dhoondia having established himself in the ter-

\* Letter to the Earl of Mornington; Duke of Wellington's Despatches, vol. i. page 53.

CHAP. XVI. ritories of the Peishwa, where he had seized and garrisoned several forts, it became necessary to obtain the consent of the Mahratta chief to the passage of the British troops over the boundaries in search of the freebooter. This was at first refused, under pretence that orders had been given for his expulsion. Subsequently an attempt was made to limit the number of troops to be employed against Dhoondia, by a promise that a Mahratta force should co-operate with them. Finally, and with reluctance, the required permission for the entrance of any number of British troops that might be necessary for the proposed object was accorded.

A. D. 1800. Colonel Wellesley entered upon the duty which devolved on him with characteristic energy; and after driving the enemy before him for some weeks, and capturing several places which had been occupied by Dhoondia, succeeded on the 30th July in surprising a division of his army while encamped on the right bank of the Malpoorba. The attack was crowned by the most complete success. Not a man within the camp escaped; and a quantity of baggage, elephants, camels, horses, and bullocks, became the prey of the assailants.

After the destruction of this portion of his army, Dhoondia retired with the remainder to the opposite side of the Malpoorba. This operation was not effected without much difficulty. Being without boats, he had made his way through jungles to the sources of the river, round which he had passed. The transport of the guns and stores of the English

army by such a route would have been extremely inconvenient: it was deemed preferable to wait the construction of boats; but in the mean time a detachment, lightly equipped, was dispatched to harass Dhoondia's rear, and endeavour to cut off part of his baggage. A brigade was also dispatched to occupy the passes of the river most likely to be fordable, and thus to guard against Dhoondia recrossing with any considerable number of followers. This force in its progress gained possession of several forts which were held by parties in the interest of the adventurer. At one of these places, named Sirhitty, an extraordinary instance of cool and determined bravery occurred. The outer gate of the fort was attacked and carried. The inner gate was next to be gained, but the passage was found too narrow to admit a gun-carriage. This difficulty, however, was not suffered to check the progress of the assailants: the gun was instantly taken off the carriage, and, under a very heavy fire from the fort, transported by a body of artillerymen, led by Sir John Sinclair, to the gate, which was very shortly burst open.

The precautions which had been taken to prevent Dhoondia crossing the river were rendered unavailing by its sudden fall, which enabled the adventurer to enter the territories of the Nizam. Thither he was followed by Colonel Wellesley, with as much speed as was consistent with the difficulties attending the movement and the arrangements necessary for effecting the junction of the various portions of the army. The campaign was now approaching to

CHAP. XVI. a close. On the 10th of September Colonel Wel-  
A.D. 1800. lesley encountered Dhoondia's army at a place called Conahgull. He was strongly posted, his rear and flank being covered by a village and a rock; but one impetuous charge put his troops to the rout, the whole body dispersed, and were scattered in small parties over the face of the country. Many were killed, and among the number was the author of the mischief, Dhoondia himself. Part of the enemy's baggage was taken in his camp, and another portion, with two guns, all that remained to him, in the pursuit. Thus terminated the career of Dhoondia Waugh, a man whose views were directed to higher fortunes than he was fated to attain. He assumed the title of king of the two worlds, and elevated some of his officers to the rank of azoffs and nabobs. From beginnings not more respectable, states and dynasties had previously sprung up in India; and Dhoondia Waugh might have been a second Hyder Ali, had his progress not received a timely check. Sir Thomas Munro, writing to Colonel Wellesley, on his fall, said:—"A campaign of two months finished his empire, and one of the same duration has put an end to the earthly grandeur, at least, of the sovereign of the two worlds. Had you and your regicide army been out of the way, Dhoondia would undoubtedly have become an independent and powerful prince, and the founder of a new dynasty of cruel and treacherous sultans."\*

\* Gleig's *Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, vol. iii. pp. 149, 150.

The news from Europe at this time was highly unfavourable. The triumphs of the French there would, it was expected, leave them at liberty to direct their arms to more distant quarters; and India or Egypt, it was apprehended, would be among the points selected. To be prepared for danger, wherever it might occur, the governor-general (now, by the well-merited favour of the Crown, the Marquis Wellesley) proposed to concentrate the strength of his Majesty's squadron in the Indian seas, together with such an amount of military force as India could spare, at some point whence they might be able to proceed with promptitude and facility to any place where their services might be wanted. The point chosen was Trincomalee; and three European regiments, a thousand Bengal volunteers, with details of European and native infantry, were dispatched thither; while Admiral Rainier, who commanded the squadron, was earnestly requested to co-operate in the arrangement, by proceeding to Trincomalee without delay. The employment of the force thus assembled was to be determined by circumstances. It was to proceed either up the Red Sea, to co-operate with any British force that might be employed in Egypt from the side of the Mediterranean; to advance to any point in India menaced by the French, should they dispatch a force thither; or to be directed to the reduction of the Mauritius. This latter object was one which the information of the governor-general led him to believe might be undertaken with the best prospects of

CHAP. XVI. success, and it was one of which the importance would fully justify the attempt. In every war between Great Britain and France, from the time when the two countries became rivals in the East, the possessions of the latter in the Indian seas had furnished abundant means for annoying the trade of the former. Numerous privateers, fitted out at the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, swept the ocean and enriched their owners, at the expense alike of the East-India Company and of those engaged in the local trade. While Lord Hobart administered the government of Madras, the dispatch of an expedition from that presidency for an attack on the Mauritius was contemplated; but the delicate state of the British interest in India rendered it a point of prudence to relinquish the design at that time. The object, however, was steadily kept in view by the Marquis Wellesley; and the Mauritius would most probably have been attacked but for the refusal of Admiral Rainier to co-operate. This refusal appeared at first to be grounded on an opinion that it would be injudicious to employ any considerable portion of the land and sea forces on distant objects of enterprize; but ultimately another reason was permitted to transpire. The admiral held, or professed to hold, the extraordinary principle that the expedition could not be undertaken without the express command of the King, signified in the usual official form to the British government in India and to the commanders of his Majesty's forces. Admiral Rainier, it seems, expected that

the governor-general would dissent from his view; and the expectation was most just and reasonable. That so monstrous a principle should have been gravely maintained is sufficiently startling; that it should have been regarded as sound and true by any human being, whose education and habits qualified him to form an opinion on such a subject, is utterly incredible. Admiral Rainier, however, professed so to regard it; and the governor-general therefore condescended to honour the objection with an elaborate answer. "If," said he, "the ground of your excellency's dissent from the proposed expedition to the Isle of France be admitted as a general rule to govern the conduct of the military and naval service in these distant possessions during the existence of war, I apprehend that the greatest advantage must result from thence to the cause of the enemy. It is an established maxim of state, as well as an unqualified principle of public duty, that in time of war all public officers should employ their utmost endeavours to reduce the power and resources of the common enemy of the state, and should avail themselves of every advantage which circumstances may present for the advancement of the interests of their country by the vigorous prosecution of hostilities. In remote possessions the exigency of this duty increases in proportion to the distance from the parent state, and to the consequent difficulty of obtaining from home express and precise orders applicable to the various emergencies

CHAP. XVI. that must arise in the course of war. If no advantage can ever be taken of the temporary or accidental weakness of the enemy's possessions in India without express orders from England, signified through the usual official channels, not only to the government of India but to the commanders of his Majesty's land and sea forces, it is evident that opportunities of reducing the enemy's power and resources must frequently be lost, without the hope of recovery, by reference for formal commands to the source of sovereign authority at home. In the present instance, an extraordinary and fortunate accident had disclosed to me the weak and almost defenceless state of the most important possessions remaining to France in this quarter of the globe. In my judgment, I should have failed in my duty towards my King and country if I had waited for his Majesty's express commands, or for his orders signified through the official channels established by Parliament for the government of India, before I had proceeded to take the necessary steps for availing myself of the critical posture of the French interests within the reach of the force entrusted to my control." After some observations on the powers and responsibility of the governor-general in India, the marquis appeals to his own conduct under similar circumstances, and its results. "Of the rule," says he, "which I assert I have furnished an example in my own practice; and if the principle which your excellency has adopted had governed

my conduct, the conquest of Mysore would not have been achieved.”\* CHAP. XVI.

Some time before this dispute, the attention of the governor-general had been turned towards Batavia. He had direct instructions from the King for bringing this settlement under the protection of the British crown, on terms similar to those which had been granted to the Dutch colonies of Demerara, Berbice, and Surinam. It was proposed to effect this by negotiation, and Admiral Rainier was to undertake the task, aided by such an amount of sea and land force as would be sufficient to give weight to his representations. The probability that the required force could be employed more advantageously elsewhere led to the postponement of the attempt; but when the project for attacking the Mauritius was defeated by the perverseness of Admiral Rainier, the views of the governor-general were again turned to Batavia. But the Dutch colony was to enjoy a further period of repose. Soon after the fall of Seringapatam, the Marquis Wellesley had suggested to the ministers at home the practicability of employing a force from India, to co-operate with any that might be dispatched from Great Britain, against the French in Egypt; and it has been seen that the assemblage of troops at Trincomalee was made with reference to this among other objects. The suggestion was adopted; and the governor-general was instructed to dispatch

\* The governor-general to Vice-Admiral Rainier, Feb. 5, 1801.

CHAP. XVI. to Egypt, by way of the Red Sea, a force of about a thousand Europeans and two thousand native infantry, under the command of an active and intelligent officer. These instructions were immediately acted upon. The force at Ceylon, strengthened by sixteen hundred native infantry which had been assembled at Bombay for foreign service, was entrusted to the command of General Baird, and the whole embarked with all practicable expedition. A squadron of Company's cruizers, under Admiral Blankett, with a small body of troops, had sailed for Egypt some time before. General Baird and his army, after performing a march of extraordinary peril and difficulty across the desert, proceeded down the Nile to Rhonda, from whence they advanced to Rosetta. But the fate of the French attempt upon Egypt had been previously decided; and the Indian reinforcement enjoyed no opportunity of gaining distinction, except by its patient and cheerful submission to hardships and toils, and the ready surrender by the native portion of the troops of their prejudices to their sense of military duty.

A. D. 1801. The expedition to Egypt was dispatched early in the year 1801. In the month of July, in the same year, a change took place in the affairs of the Carnatic, which will require reference to a series of events of prior occurrence connected with that division of the south of India. The death of Mahomet Ali during the administration of Sir John Shore, and the dispute between the British authorities to which it gave rise, have been noticed. Maho-

met Ali was succeeded by his son, Omdut-ul-Omrah, who, from the commencement of his reign, manifested a disposition to pursue the same ruinous policy which had marked that of his father. The Marquis Wellesley, on his arrival from England, occupied a considerable portion of the time which he spent at Madras in vain attempts to obtain the prince's consent to the arrangements necessary for extricating himself and his subjects from the wretchedness in which both were involved. The Nabob was obstinately bent on resisting all change, and the governor-general left Madras with a conviction that negotiation was useless. It was, however, obvious that, without the adoption of some new arrangements, it would be impossible to secure the Company from loss, to save the Nabob from ruin, or to rescue the oppressed inhabitants of the country from the intensity of misery in which they were involved.

The war with Tippoo commenced, and with it the necessity for all the aid which the Nabob could afford to his British ally. At this period the conduct of the Nabob's officers, with regard to the collecting of supplies for the use of the British army, indicated a total absence of friendly feeling on the part of the prince, if the acts of the servants were to be viewed as furnishing any evidence of the wishes of their master. They were for the most part inactive. Those who made any exertions directed them to obstruct, not to facilitate, the supply of the wants of the British government. The Nabob was

CHAP. XVI. not sparing in professions of friendship, and he even agreed to advance a considerable sum of money for the use of the army, on specified conditions. The conditions were assented to, but the money was not forthcoming, and but for the opportune arrival of treasure from Bengal, the consequences of the disappointment might have been seriously inconvenient.

After Lord Macartney's plan for exercising the administration of the Carnatic territory had been abandoned, an attempt was made to adjust the claims of the Company and the Nabob by a treaty concluded by Sir Archibald Campbell; but the execution of its provisions was soon found to be impracticable, and its securities worthless. A new treaty, more indulgent to the Nabob, was concluded by Lord Cornwallis: one article of which treaty gave to the Company, in the event of war breaking out in the Carnatic or the contiguous countries, a right to the exercise of full authority within the Nabob's dominions, except with respect to certain jaghires. This treaty was in force at the period under notice; and on commencing the war with Tippoo, the governor-general, by virtue of that article, might at once have assumed the entire control of the affairs of the Carnatic. With great moderation he abstained from the immediate exercise of this undoubted right, and only took advantage of the occasion to endeavour to gain the Nabob's assent to arrangements at least as beneficial to himself as to the Company. The governor-general addressed

to him a despatch of considerable length, adverting to the dislike entertained by the Nabob and his father to the assumption of the administration of the Carnatic by the Company, and to the desire of the British government to shew respect for their feelings to the utmost extent consistent with security; pointing out mildly, but distinctly and forcibly, the vices of the Nabob's administration, and the general ruin that could not fail to follow; and complaining of the violation of the treaty of Lord Cornwallis, more especially by a practice which had notoriously prevailed, of granting assignments of revenue on the districts which formed the security for the Nabob's payments to the Company—a practice not only inconsistent with the purpose for which they had been pledged, but in contravention of an express provision of the treaty, that no such assignments should be granted. The governor-general referred to the moderation shewn in relaxing the provisions of the treaty concluded by Sir Archibald Campbell, and placing the Nabob in the more favourable position secured to him by the later treaty, urging that, as the Company's government then waived an undeniable right under a subsisting treaty, and consented to a new arrangement at the solicitation of the Nabob, and for his benefit, that government had a just claim to expect that, in representing the necessity of further modification, its views and intentions should be judged with the same liberality which Lord Cornwallis exercised towards those of Mahomet Ali. These points being

CHAP. XVI. sufficiently pressed, the governor-general proceeded to enumerate the principles of the proposed arrangement. It was designed to extend to every branch of the Nabob's affairs connected with his relation to the Company, and by this comprehensiveness to guard, as far as precaution could effect such an object, against future misunderstanding; to provide to the utmost practicable extent against the necessity for any further change, and to relieve the Carnatic from the inconveniences of a divided government or of a fluctuating or precarious authority.

An enumeration of details followed, and the points believed to be most interesting to the Nabob were first noticed—the adjustment of his debt with the Company and of certain claims on his part of a pecuniary nature, arising from various sources. Modes of arranging these having been suggested, the governor-general declared himself ready to relinquish the right of the Company to assume the entire government of the Carnatic during the existing war, or any that might thereafter occur, on condition of a territory equal to securing the amount of the monthly payments to the Company for which the Nabob was liable, being placed in perpetuity under the exclusive management and authority of the Company. If the required territory should produce more than the amount of revenue anticipated from it, the surplus was to be paid over to the Nabob, while, on the other hand, if from an unfavourable season or any other casualty a deficiency were to arise, the Company were to bear the loss,

and the Nabob to be entirely exonerated from charge on this account. The proposal included other points of detail relating to the defence of the country and the satisfaction of the private debts of the Nabob, some of which were reserved for consideration at a more advanced period of discussion.

The answer of the Nabob was long, but little satisfactory. Its tone was somewhat lofty. The Nabob positively refused to consent to any modification of the treaty of 1792. This might have been contemplated from his previous conduct; but his refusal was associated with an application which certainly could not have been looked for. His letter was written after the fall of Seringapatam, and the consequent transfer of the dominions of Tippoo. The Nabob availed himself of these events to set up a claim to share in the distribution of the conquered countries. He who was unable to govern his actual possessions was desirous of adding to them, and of extending more widely the wretchedness which overshadowed the dominions which already acknowledged him as their master. This will not appear very extraordinary. Ambition seeks its gratification, far more commonly, in subjecting extended territories to the miseries of a bad government, than in bestowing within narrower limits the blessings of peace, order, and security. The happiness of the governed enters not into the calculations of grasping despotism. But the reasonableness and decency of the request of the Nabob at the time when it was preferred were eminently illustrated by

CHAP. XVI. the fact, that within the recesses of Seringapatam, opened to the view of the conquerors by the success which attended their efforts, was found evidence most satisfactorily convicting the Nabob Omdut-ul-Omrah and his father, Mahomet Ali, of having perfidiously violated their engagements with the British government by intriguing with Tippoo Sultan against that power. This evidence was contained in a voluminous correspondence between Tippoo and two of his vakeels, named Gholaum Ali Khan and Reza Ali Khan, who accompanied the hostages to Madras at the close of the war undertaken by Lord Cornwallis.

The subject was taken up soon after the arrival of the vakeels at Madras. In an early letter they gave their master an account of an interview which had taken place between the Nabob, Mahomet Ali, the two princes, and themselves. On that occasion the Nabob was represented not only to have professed the warmest attachment to Tippoo, which might have been the effect of hollow courtesy, but to have reprobated the war then just concluded, and to have declared that it had been undertaken by the allied powers for the subversion of the Mahometan religion. This charge was not very probable, seeing that the Nizam was a party to the war; but while it could not fail to be agreeable to Tippoo by leading him to regard himself as a martyr in the cause of the prophet, it also gratified the malignant feelings which Mahomet Ali had long entertained towards his British

protectors. The praise of Tippoo was enhanced by contrasting with his conduct that of the Nizam, whose future retribution for aiding in the destruction of religion was darkly shadowed forth. According to the vakeels, Mahomet Ali did not confine himself to general expressions of sympathy with the Sultan and his cause. At the first and the last meetings he expressed the most earnest wishes for the establishment of relations of friendship and harmony between himself and Tippoo, on the ground of community of religious belief, and with a view to the maintenance of the faith of Mahomet. Tippoo, as may be supposed, was pleased with these manifestations, and directed his vakeels to give them all encouragement; and in two letters, which some months later he addressed respectively to Mahomet Ali and Omdut-ul-Omrah, he professed the most entire confidence in their exertions in the common cause.

These discourses and communications would be sufficient to establish the state of feeling with which the Nabob and his son regarded the various parties concerned in the war with Tippoo; but they might have been considered nothing more than the purposeless overflowings of uncontrollable hate, had not the acts of the two princes corresponded with their professions. Mahomet Ali maintained secret emissaries in Bengal, to collect information for his use. From these persons he learned that the British resident at Poonah had apprized his government that Tippoo was intriguing with the Mahrattas. This

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article of intelligence was duly communicated to one of the vakeels of Tippoo, accompanied by a friendly intimation of the impolicy of the course which his master was pursuing, and an urgent admonition to discontinue it until a more favourable time, which was judged not to be far distant. Lord Cornwallis, it was represented, would soon go to Europe, the hostage princes would return to their father, and the payments of Tippoo would be completed. "After his lordship's departure, the liquidation of the kists and other points, whatever" might be "his highness's pleasure," would, it was declared, "be right and proper." It is impossible to ascribe this advice to any friendly feeling towards the British government. It is true, that it was desirable for that government that Tippoo's intrigues should be defeated; but the communication to that prince of the fact that his operations were known and observed could only have the effect of putting him on his guard, and inducing him not to relinquish his designs, but to postpone their execution till a more convenient time. Such, indeed, is the tone of the Nabob's advice. He did not tell his friend that he was doing wrong in intriguing against the British government, but that he was incurring danger. His language is not—relinquish altogether your designs at Poonah; but, defer them till the man by whom you have been vanquished has left the country, till the English have been lulled into quiescence by the liquidation of their pecuniary claims, till your sons are out of their power, and then take your own course. Well did

the Nabob know what that course would be, and cordially did he approve it. CHAP. XVI.

This was not the only instance in which the Nabob gave the Sultan intelligence and advice. He communicated to him the intended march of British troops against Pondicherry, on the commencement of war between the English and the French, and warned the Sultan to be cautious as to the manner in which he carried on his intercourse with the latter people—not to discontinue it, but to avoid written communications—there being no objection, as the Nabob is reported to have stated, to verbal communications in case of necessity. As the Nabob had before cautioned Tippoo against connecting himself with native powers, he now exercised the same friendly office with regard to the European enemies of the English. Was the Nabob apprehensive that Tippoo's consultations with the French would cause harm to his English ally? He knew it, under the circumstances, to be impossible. It was for the safety of Tippoo—it was to prevent his prematurely risking the vengeance of the British government that the admonition was given. To Tippoo he looked as the chief support of a future great Mahometan confederacy to drive the strangers from India, and he feared that the success of this magnificent plan might be endangered by the imprudence of the person who was, at a proper season, to undertake its management.

To a certain extent the evidence of the criminal intercourse carried on by Mahomet Ali and his son

CHAP. XVI. — with Tippoo Sultan depends on the credibility of Tippoo's vakeels : they might invent, or they might exaggerate. The possibility, however, of their having had recourse to either mode of deception applies only to the general expressions of friendship attributed by them to the Nabob—the more material parts of the evidence are unaffected. In apprizing Tippoo that his intrigues at Poona were known to the British Government—in informing him of the meditated attempt of the English upon Pondicherry, is it conceivable that if they were not indebted to the Nabob for the knowledge which they communicated, they should, for no apparent purpose, have given him a degree of credit which they might have claimed for their own wariness and activity? Would they not have been glad to have added to their claims upon the Sultan's favour, by shewing him how zealously they watched over his interests, and what admirable means they possessed of becoming acquainted with the counsels of his enemies? The innocence of the Nabob and his son, therefore, cannot be inferred, without giving credit to veteran diplomatists, and those oriental diplomatists, for a degree of disregard to their own reputation and interest, as extraordinary as it would be devoid of motive or rational end. If the representations of the vakeels, as to the share of the Nabob in these communications, were false, their proceedings would be too absurd for criticism or conjecture.

There is thus no reasonable mode of evading the conclusion, that the more important portions of the

reports of the vakeels to their master were true, and those reports clearly establish the hostile feelings of the Nabob towards the English. It should be remembered, that by the subsisting treaty between the English and that prince, he was restrained from carrying on any negotiation or correspondence with any state, European or native, without the consent of the Company. His intercourse with Tippoo, whatever its aim or nature, was consequently a breach of his engagements—an offence greatly aggravated by its obviously hostile tendency. To facilitate the purposes of this unlawful correspondence, a cipher of names was prepared, the key to which was found in Seringapatam. This paper appears to have been drawn up by Omdut-ul-Omrah, who during the life of his father was deeply engaged in the intrigue with Tippoo, and who seems to have continued after the death of his parent to maintain for some time his illicit intercourse with that prince.

The discovery of the documents relating to these transactions suggested the propriety of endeavouring to elucidate them by an examination of some of the servants of Tippoo. Among these were the two vakeels, whose temporary residence at Madras had afforded opportunity for opening a correspondence between Tippoo and Mahomet Ali. The duty of conducting the examination was entrusted to two experienced servants of the Company, Mr. Webbe and Colonel Close. Gholaum Ali Khan endeavoured to evade the objects of the inquiry, by affecting to

CHAP. XVI. have fallen into a state of dotage and imbecility. Ali Reza Khan was more candid and communicative, but little of importance was elicited. It was represented, however, that a marriage between the two houses had been one of the subjects of negotiation; and the vakeels endeavoured to shew that all the secret communications which had taken place related to this subject. But they did not agree as to the party from whom the overture came; and if such an engagement really formed a subject of discussion, it was certainly not the only one, nor was it of such a nature as to require the protection of a secret cipher, which cipher, too, was obviously framed for application to political purposes. Further, if the overture, as one of the vakeels affirmed, came from Arcot, the desire there manifested to form an alliance with the bitter and implacable enemy of the English could only be regarded as an additional evidence of hostility to that people.

The investigation of the evidence of the Nabob's treachery required time; and, when completed, it was obviously desirable, in a matter so delicate and so liable to misrepresentation, to avoid acting without due deliberation and a full consideration of consequences. There were also motives connected with a pending negotiation with the Nizam for some delay. At length, on the 28th May, 1801, the Marquis Wellesley addressed to the governor of Fort St. George, Lord Clive,\* a despatch, commu-

\* Son of the distinguished founder of the Anglo-Indian empire.

nicating his determination as to the final adjustment of the affairs of the Carnatic. It was clear, that if the perfidy of Mahomet Ali had been discovered during his life, the British government would have been justified in inflicting punishment on its treacherous dependent, and providing for itself security. Omdut-ul-Omrah had, on the part of his father, negotiated the treaty with Lord Cornwallis: he had also been confederate with his father in the machinations carried on against his British ally. Omdut-ul-Omrah was, indeed, substantially a party to the treaty; for it secured to him the right of succession under the same conditions and obligations which attached to the right of his father. The treaty had been violated by Mahomet Ali—it had been violated by Omdut-ul-Omrah both before the death of his father and subsequently to that event. No confidence could be reposed in one who had afforded so many proofs of hostility and treachery—no safety could be ensured without the annihilation of his power. The British government, released by the acts of the other contracting parties from the obligations of Lord Cornwallis's treaty, was bound to look solely to its own defence and security. It had, by the default of the Nabob and his father, acquired a clear right to establish any system for the administration of the civil and military government of the Carnatic which might appear advisable: all the impediments which respect for the rights or feelings of the Nabob had previously opposed to improvement had vanished before the discoveries

CHAP. XVI. made at Seringapatam. How was the discretion thus placed in the hands of the Company's government to be exercised? Experience had but too well proved that power in the hands of the Nabob was but an engine of mischief. It had constantly been employed by him to the detriment of the Company, of his people, and of himself. Justice to the first, charity to the two latter, alike required that the Nabob should be divested of the authority which, if the future were to be judged by the past, he would be certain to abuse. The governor-general decided that the Company should assume the government of the Carnatic, and that the Nabob should become a stipendiary upon its revenues. He could not decide otherwise, without betraying the interests which he was sworn to protect.

The despatch addressed by the Marquis Wellesley to Lord Clive was accompanied by a letter to Omdut-ul-Omrah, which, after adverting to the long suspension of all communication on the part of the governor-general beyond the transmission of ordinary compliments, explained the cause to be the discoveries made at Seringapatam, and referred the Nabob to Lord Clive for information as to the steps about to be taken in consequence of those discoveries. Motives of humanity prevented this letter from reaching the Nabob. On its arrival at Madras the prince was labouring under mortal disease; and from an apprehension that the communication might aggravate his complaint and accelerate its fatal termination, all knowledge of the intentions of the

British government was withheld. But it being understood that some members of his family had introduced armed men into the palace, with the view of advancing their own objects on the occurrence of the death of the prince, if not before, Lord Clive deemed it expedient to dispatch a party of the Company's troops to take possession of the principal gateway. This was effected without resistance; and it being explained to Omdut-ul-Omrah that the object of the movement was the preservation of order, he was perfectly satisfied. On the 15th July he died. Mr. Webbe and Colonel Close immediately proceeded to the palace, where they were met by some of the deceased Nabob's officers. It was stated that the Nabob had left a will, but some difficulty was raised in the way of producing it. The British deputies, however, insisting on its being brought forward, it was at length exhibited. On being read, it appeared that Omdut-ul-Omrah had appointed a reputed son, known as Ali Hussein, to succeed him in the possession of all his rights, possessions, and property, including the government of the Carnatic. The British deputies then requested a private conference with two confidential khans, who stood high in the confidence of the late Nabob, and who were nominated in his will as advisers of his heir in the administration of affairs. To these functionaries the deputies stated the nature of the discoveries made at Seringapatam. The khans received the communication with the appearance of great surprise, and endeavoured to explain away the

A. D. 1801.

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evidence on which the charges against the late Nabob and his father rested. The strong professions of friendship for Tippoo were declared not to pass the bounds of ordinary civility. The cipher offered greater difficulty; and the khans had no better excuse to bring forward than the very probable suggestion that the paper containing the key had been placed in the archives of Tippoo by some enemy of Omdut-ul-Omrah, with the view of prejudicing that prince in the estimation of the British authorities.

The object of the khans was obviously to obtain a protracted discussion of the question, in the hope that some favourable chance might suspend the resentment of the British government. This was seen and frustrated by the deputies, who, after referring to the intention entertained of demanding from Omdut-ul-Omrah satisfaction and security, and explaining why it had not previously been acted upon, demanded to know whether the khans, on the part of the reputed son of the deceased Nabob, were disposed to an adjustment of the claims of the British government by an amicable negotiation. They answered by making abundant professions of respect for the British government, declaring the family of Omdut-ul-Omrah dependent on its protection, and dwelling on the impossibility of their resorting to any other than amicable means of settlement; but avoided any direct answer to the question proposed to them. The day was now considerably advanced, and the khans heartily tired of

the conference. To cut it short, they urged the necessity of their attending to the funeral of the departed Nabob, and to the preparations requisite for transferring his remains to Trichinopoly. This being pressed, on the grounds of public decorum and regard for the feelings of the Nabob's family, the deputies did not feel at liberty to resist the desire of the khans, and the conference terminated without any positive answer being given to the proposal made on behalf of the British government. It was renewed on the following day, when the deputies distinctly explained, that the only basis on which the British government could recognize the reputed son of the Nabob, was the entire transfer of the civil and military administration of the Carnatic to the Company. The khans made the obvious answer, that such a transfer would be a virtual annihilation of the office of Nabob. The deputies replied, that the power of assuming the government in certain cases had been secured to the Company by the existing treaty, and that which preceded it; that the power had actually been exercised, and yet that the rank and dignity of the Nabob had never been impugned. This interview was long, and much of it was occupied by desultory conversation, the khans evincing great anxiety to divert attention from the main points at issue, and great tact in effecting their object. Ultimately they requested a postponement of the discussion for a day, to allow of their consulting the various branches of the Nabob's family; and the British deputies yielded

CHAP. XVI. — their assent, with an intimation that, at the time specified, they should expect a determinate answer.

The answer given at the ensuing meeting was not such as the deputies had required—a simple acceptance or rejection of the proposal made by the British government. The khans stated that the entire family of the late Nabob, as well as his ministers, having been assembled to consider the proposal, the result of their deliberations was, a conviction that, notwithstanding the decided language in which it was submitted, the British government would be disposed to consent to a modification of the terms required for its security in the Carnatic; and they accordingly produced a counter-proposal, which they desired might be transmitted to Lord Clive. The deputies reiterated the assurance which they had already given, that they had full power of rejecting any proposal inconsistent with the principle previously laid down by them as the basis of adjustment, and that no other could be admitted. They warned the khans of the consequences which must follow the rejection of their plan; and finally intimated that, in a question which related exclusively to the interests of the late Nabob's reputed son, they were desirous of receiving from himself the answer which was to determine his future situation. The khans manifested great dislike to this proposal. They urged as objections the youth of the heir—though he was nearly eighteen years of age—his inexperience, the fear of his mother, and the recent occurrence of his father's death. But

the deputies were persevering, and a conference with Ali Hussein was at length fixed for the following day. During this discussion, the khans stated that the subject of the evidence discovered at Seringapatam had been agitated in the durbar for more than twelve months, and that measures had been taken for justifying the conduct of Omdut-ul-Omrah. An instructive commentary was thus afforded on the surprise expressed by the khans when the discoveries were first mentioned to them by the British deputies; and a most satisfactory test of the degree of credit to be attached to any thing they might state, or leave to be inferred from their deportment. Indeed it was incredible that the discovery should be unknown in the court of Omdut-ul-Omrah. Waiving all argument derived from his knowledge of the probability of such discovery, inasmuch as any such argument must proceed upon an assumption of his guilt, it was not to be believed that a subject which the British authorities had been for months employed in investigating, which had given rise to the appointment of a special commission for the examination of witnesses, that had not only entered upon its duties but had concluded them and reported the result, should never have attracted the attention of the person most interested in it, or of any of his servants. The exhibition of such extreme ignorance and apathy by any court in the world could not be credited. The improbability is greatly increased when the court in which this state of things is supposed to exist is an oriental

CHAP. XVI. one. It is increased to the highest degree when it is recollected that it is the court of Arcot, where intrigue and espionage had long been carried to an extent which, if proficiency in those arts conferred an honourable distinction, might shame by its example every court with which it could be brought into comparison.

At the appointed time the British deputies repaired to the palace, and being first introduced to the khans, they demanded of those officers whether further consideration had wrought any change in their sentiments. They were answered that it was not the intention of Ali Hussein to recede from the terms of the counter project presented at the previous interview. The heir then entered, in conformity with the arrangement made on his behalf, and, in reply to a question from the deputies, declared that he considered the khans to have been appointed by his father for the purpose of assisting him, and that the object of his own councils was not separated from theirs. The deputies thereupon made a communication, which they had been instructed to deliver, of the intention of Lord Clive to hold a personal conference with Ali Hussein previously to carrying into effect the measures in contemplation. This took the khans by surprise, and appeared greatly to alarm them. Various modes of evading the proposed conference were resorted to ; but the deputies insisting that the governor's orders admitted no excuse or delay, the khans retired to make preparations, and Ali Hussein took advantage of their absence to

declare, in a low tone of voice, that he had been deceived by them. On their return, the whole party assembled proceeded to the tent of the officer commanding the Company's troops at the palace, where they were met by Lord Clive. The ceremonies of introduction being over, the attendants of Ali Hussein were required to withdraw, and the conference was conducted by him and the British governor. Before the latter had fully explained his views, he was interrupted by Ali Hussein, who, after expressing his sense of the governor's consideration, voluntarily proceeded to state that the conferences had been conducted by the khans without his participation, and that he disapproved of the result which had followed. In consequence of this avowal, the entire substance of the conferences was recapitulated to Ali Hussein, the proofs of the violation of the engagements of the late Nabob with the British government were distinctly enumerated, and the extent of the security required by the latter concisely explained. Ali Hussein then declared himself willing to agree to the terms proposed: and after some conversation on matters of secondary importance, he suggested that a treaty should be prepared, vesting the entire civil and military authority in the Company, which he observed he would be ready to execute, with or without the consent of the khans, at another separate conference which was appointed to be held on the following day within the British lines. On that day the deputies proceeded to the palace, to conduct the heir of Omdut-ul-Omrah to the place of meet-

CHAP. XVI. ing; but a change had passed over his mind, and he announced, that as the two khans had been appointed by his father's will to assist his councils, he could not adopt a line of conduct inconsistent with their advice, and that consequently no further interview with the governor was necessary. He was urged, notwithstanding his new determination, to keep the appointment which had been made, and he consented. The conference with Lord Clive, like the former, took place without the presence of the khans; but Ali Hussein maintained the same tone which had marked his previous communication to the deputies. Being requested to give some explanation, he said that he was aware that the sentiments which he now expressed differed entirely from those which he had avowed on the preceding day, but that the change was the result of reflection: that the whole family had been assembled to deliberate on his affairs—that he had, in consequence, given the subject better consideration, and that he now considered it to be totally incompatible with his interest and his honour to accede to the proposal to which he had previously given his consent. He was reminded of his admission that the khans had practised deception on him—the consequences of persisting in his new course were pointed out, and assurances were given of protection from any insult or danger that he might apprehend from an adherence to his former decision; but all these topics were urged in vain. A suspicion was then intimated to Ali Hussein that he had been encouraged by inte-

rested persons to adopt the fatal course on which he had entered—that their representations had induced him to disbelieve the existence of orders from the governor-general warranting the proposal which had been made to him, and the terms on which its acceptance had been urged. He admitted that he had been spoken to on the subject, but denied that he was influenced by any distrust of the nature of the governor-general's orders.

This point was one which the British negotiators felt it indispensable to render perfectly clear. They knew the delusions to which a person in the situation of Ali Hussein was exposed, and they were anxious to dispel them. It was, therefore, explained, that the allusion to the interested persons had reference to those who held tuncas and other claims on the Carnatic territory. These persons had strong motives for opposing the settlement of the affairs of the country in the way proposed, as in the event of its being placed under the control of the Company they could have no hope of enforcing those claims. It was added, that “the principles of persons of that description encouraged every expectation that they would be desirous of sacrificing the permanent interests and honour of” the Nabob’s “family to the attainment of their immediate advantage.”\* What was meant by “the principles” of the persons here alluded to is not easy to conjecture. They were

\* Report of Mr. Webbe and Colonel Close. It will be found in a series of papers relating to the Carnatic, presented to the House of Commons, and ordered to be printed in June, 1802.

CHAP. XVI. shameless and remorseless plunderers, without the slightest pretence even to those relaxed and undefined principles by which too many are guided, or those corrupted ones which have sometimes led men in sincerity and honesty to perpetrate crimes, in the belief that they were fulfilling the demands of duty. The men referred to had no more claim to principle than have the minor practitioners of the arts of acquisition by chicane or violence. These men plied on a large scale the occupation which their humbler brethren are compelled to follow on a small one. Wisely and humanely was the youthful candidate for the musnud of Arcot warned against their machinations. Most justly was it stated to him, that the oppressors of the Carnatic, with the general body of his father's creditors, would feel an interest in persuading him to reject the proposal which had been made to him, and to cherish a belief that the measures of the local government would be disapproved in England and reversed by the authorities there. The history of Arcot at that time afforded record of the successful practice of similar delusions—successful as to the object proposed, that of enriching unprincipled adventurers. Since that period the practice has not been totally discontinued, and instances of more recent date might be quoted, in which the interests of native princes have been sacrificed, that fortunes might be accumulated by strangers. Against the mischievous deceptions believed to be employed to mislead him, Ali Hussein was warned repeatedly though unavail-

ingly. He was apprized that, if he entertained any hope that what might be done by the government of Fort St. George would be undone by a superior authority, he deceived himself. He was assured, not only that the orders of the governor-general were peremptory to carry into effect the plan which had been submitted for his concurrence, but that the same views were entertained by the government at home, and that, consequently, all expectation of revision in that quarter must be vain. Nothing was neglected that could be supposed likely to lead the infatuated youth from the danger prepared for him by those who called themselves his friends; but all endeavours were vain. According to oriental views, he might be regarded as fated to relinquish rank and wealth with all their attractions and conveniences, for the sake of preserving to some worthless natives and equally worthless Europeans the means of unhallowed gain—an object which, after all, was not attained. The conference concluded on the part of Lord Clive by representing to Ali Hussein that no pains had been spared to guard him against the consequences which he was about to incur; that the duties of humanity towards him, and of attention to the honour of the British name, had been satisfied; that his position in society had been determined by himself, and that his future situation would be that of a private person, regarded as hostile to the British interests, and dependent for support on the voluntary bounty of the Company. Ali Hussein listened to the governor's parting address with composure, and retired

CHAP. XVI. from the place of audience without offering any observation on it.

The endeavours which were made to prevail upon Ali Hussein to accept the offer of the British government were prompted by a desire to carry into effect the wishes of Omdut-ul-Omrah. Ali Hussein was the son of a woman of low station, who certainly never was the legal wife of the deceased Nabob. He had, however, been recognized by him as his heir, and in deference to this recognition the British government had offered to acknowledge him. The right to demand from him the same conditions which it had been resolved to claim from Omdut-ul-Omrah does not admit of question. That prince had been engaged in a series of intrigues directed against the power to which he owed his maintenance on the throne. It was justly held that he had forfeited the rights to which under treaty he had been entitled, so long as he continued to respect the conditions attached to them, and a new arrangement was contemplated, the completion of which was deferred by the dangerous state of the Nabob's health. Passing by the objections that might be taken to Ali Hussein's title, on the ground of illegitimacy—granting that his father's will entitled him to the right of inheritance, it is evident that he could claim to inherit no more than his father had the power to convey to him. Had Omdut-ul-Omrah recovered his health, the same representations which were made to Ali Hussein would have been made to

him, the same terms would have been required as CHAP. XVI.  
conditions of his retaining the rank and title of Nabob, and if refused, Omdut-ul-Omrah must have been content to descend to a private station. Had he consented, his heir would have been admitted to succeed him on the same terms with himself—had he refused, the son, like the father, would have been an obscure pensioner.

The accidental postponement of the intended measures of the British government, caused by the illness of Omdut-ul-Omrah, could make no difference in the rights of any party. If a new arrangement had been made during the life of Omdut-ul-Omrah, his death would not have revived, in favour of his heir, the rights secured by Lord Cornwallis's treaty; and it would be absurd to maintain that the humane consideration of the British government, in abstaining from pressing its just and reasonable claims upon a dying man, should deprive them of the power of enforcing them against his successor. Omdut-ul-Omrah had, indeed, been previously engaged in undermining the British interests, and Ali Hussein had not; but if the authority of the latter might properly have been subjected to limitations established during the life of his father, there could be no injustice in establishing the same limitations from the period of his father's death. The restrictions were not capriciously imposed; they were necessary, as experience had shewn, to the security of the British government. They were further necessary to the improvement of the country and the

CHAP. XVI. happiness of the people. On these grounds, the British government had long been anxious for change; they had been withheld from making it solely from a regard to the preservation of good faith. They had now an opportunity of rescuing the country from oppression without bringing any imputation upon the national honour; and none could condemn them for using it, except those who preferred the interests of a knot of reckless usurers to the happiness of those whose industry was exerted in drawing forth the riches of the earth.

The pestilent influence which had long been exerted to counteract all good government in the Carnatic was employed in endeavouring to paralyze the arm of the British government when raised to strike at the sources of oppression. The hope of success could have been but small, but it was resolved to risk the event. Ali Hussein, like his father and grandfather, was surrounded by men intent only on their own advantage, but accustomed to cloak their selfish designs under the guise of promoting the honour and interests of the prince. The counter project, presented by the khans on rejecting the overture of the British government, was obviously not of Asiatic manufacture. It bears indubitable marks of western origin.\* It was manifest to the British deputies (and the fact is noticed in their report), that it had been translated from an European language; and no one who reads it in

\* It will be found in the Collection of Carnatic Papers previously referred to.

English can doubt that it has been subjected to the process of double translation. Something more was manifest on the face of this paper. Great care was taken to exclude the executive government in India from any share in the management of the funds allotted to the liquidation of the consolidated debts of Mahomet Ali; it was, therefore, to be legitimately inferred that those who drew up the project were interested in the proposed exclusion. Into the hands of such persons had the youthful son of Omdut-ul-Omrah fallen. Through similar agency, Mahomet Ali had passed a life of misery and dishonour—hated by his subjects, distrusted by his allies, and flattered only by those who meant to profit by his weakness. His son inherited his throne and his incumbrances—his universal unpopularity and his miserable folly; but his reign, like that of his father, was wretched to himself, mischievous to his subjects, and useful to none save those whom it was infamy to serve; but it was far more brief, and with him the rampant ascendancy of usury and extortion passed away.

Omdut-ul-Omrah appears to have left no legitimate offspring; and it had been determined, should his testamentary heir reject the throne on the modified terms on which it was in future to be held, to tender it to the acceptance of Azim-ul-Dowlah. This prince was the only legitimate son of Ameer-ul-Omrah, the second son of Mahomet Ali. The ordinary principles of succession would thus be little violated; and except with reference to the

CHAP. XVI. testamentary disposition of the throne by Omdut-ul-Omrah, they would not be violated at all. It was, however, in this case far more easy to determine than to carry the determination into effect. Azim-ul-Dowlah was in the power of those who supported the pretensions of his cousin. Opportunity was sought for making a private communication to him; but so strictly was he watched, that it was found impracticable. A negotiation might have been commenced openly; but this, there was reason to apprehend, might involve the prince, in the fate which in the East so often overtakes those who enjoy the dangerous distinction of royal birth without the means of self-defence. Before the question of how to communicate with Azim was solved, it was ascertained that the rival party were displaying much activity, and no inconsiderable share of audacity. The khans had privately, but formally, placed Ali Hussein on the musnud of Arcot, and a public ceremony of the like nature was to take place without delay. As such an investiture would be the signal for civil war, Lord Clive felt it necessary to resort to vigorous measures to prevent it. The officer commanding the British detachment in charge of the palace gateway was ordered to take possession of the entire building, and to remove the guards of the late Nabob, who had hitherto been suffered to continue at their posts. This being effected, the difficulty of communicating with Azim-ul-Dowlah was removed; a party of the Company's troops being substituted at the place

which he inhabited for the guards of the late Nabob who were previously stationed there. The prince was surprised by the change, and his surprise appears to have been not unmixed with alarm. It was explained to him that the movement was intended for his more effectual protection, and he was satisfied. Although he could not be aware of the precise views of the British government, he could at least place confidence in its honour, and must have felt certain that no change of guard could involve him in greater danger than that which previously surrounded him.

On the morning after the change the prince was visited by Colonel MacNeil, the officer in command, who intimated that, if he felt any desire of representing the state of his affairs to the British government, the means of doing so were now open to him without danger. The offer was embraced, and Azim was soon admitted to an interview with Lord Clive. He appeared to entertain no ambitious designs, and he probably did not anticipate the possibility of his elevation to the dignity which Ali Hussein had renounced. He complained of injuries and hardships, of poverty and its inconveniences, and requested with great earnestness that, in any settlement that might be made of the affairs of the Carnatic, his claims might be considered; but he appeared to limit his expectation to the provision of more suitable accommodation for his family. He was assured that his wishes would be regarded, and the conference closed without any intimation that his expectations were likely to be exceeded. Another interview took

CHAP. XVI. place on the following day, when the views of the British government were gradually unfolded. These being understood, there remained little to impede the progress of negotiation. Azim acknowledged the right acquired by the Company by the perfidy of Mahomet Ali and Omdut-ul-Omrah, and expressed himself willing to accept the office tendered him, with all the conditions attached to it by the British government. Within a few days a treaty was drawn up and signed, by which the respective rights of Azim and the Company were defined and settled on the basis previously determined on; a proclamation was issued by the governor of Fort St. George, setting forth the grounds upon which the British government had acted, and thus the long-vexed territories of Arcot passed easily and tranquilly into the possession of the East-India Company. The statesman under whose auspices this great and happy change was effected was amply justified in declaring the settlement of the Carnatic to be "perhaps the most salutary and useful measure which has been adopted since the acquisition of the dewanny of Bengal."\*

It has been mentioned, that the necessary measures for the settlement of the Carnatic were deferred partly with a view to the previous completion of some negotiations pending with the Nizam. These ended in the conclusion of a new treaty with that prince, under which provision was made for an

\* Letter from the Marquis Wellesley to Mr. Hiley Addington. Despatches, vol. iii. page 675.

increase of the subsidiary force maintained by the Company for the defence of his dominions, and the payments accruing on account of the whole were commuted for assignments of territory. For this purpose the whole of the territory acquired by the Nizam under the treaties of Seringapatam and Mysore was, by an article of the new treaty, transferred in perpetuity to the English ; but as some of the districts lay inconveniently for their occupation, arrangements were made by a subsequent article for the exchange of those districts for others, which, though of somewhat less value, were more favourably situated with regard to British possession.

The Marquis Wellesley thus secured for his country the full benefit of the conquest of Mysore, and this without invading the just rights of the only ally who had taken part in the conquest. A portion of the acquisitions of that ally was, it is true, now surrendered to the English, and a further cession of territory was made in exchange for the remainder ; but for these advantages an ample equivalent was offered, in relieving the Nizam from the subsidiary payments to which he must otherwise have been liable. The Nizam was thus exempted not merely from the necessity of payment, but from the harassing vexations which Eastern princes never fail to experience when money is to be disbursed. His people had reason to rejoice that one excuse for extortion was removed, while the inhabitants of the ceded territory had still greater cause for

CHAP. XVI. — congratulation in the change of rulers. To the British government the new treaty gave security for the expense incurred on account of the Nizam, an improved frontier, and all the power and respect resulting from a considerable extension of territory. All parties were thus benefited, and the governor-general had the satisfaction of feeling that, while he was raising the position of his own government among the states of India, he was indirectly contributing to the peace and happiness of others. The course and connection of public events is the province of history rather than the personal character of the actors in them; yet it has ever been esteemed one, at least, of its secondary functions, to exhibit for admiration or for scorn the remarkable traits of good or of evil manifested by those who have occupied conspicuous places on the great stage of human affairs. If this view be correct, it would here be unjust to pass without notice one part of the conduct of the Marquis Wellesley, in the progress of the negotiation with the Nizam. The resident at Hyderabad, under the influence of excessive zeal for the conclusion of an arrangement which he believed to be important, had somewhat exceeded his powers by agreeing to articles with regard to the commutation of subsidiary payments by territorial cession, which did not clearly define the respective rights of the Company and the Nizam; and he had sought to justify the proceeding in a manner which, though not unprecedented among diploma-

tists, drew from the governor-general a severe censure. "Any expression in the grant," writes the Marquis Wellesley, "calculated to raise a doubt of its permanence, or to limit the power of the Company's internal government of the country, or to favour the Nizam's right of resumption, would evidently prevent us from concluding any settlement worthy of our character, or advantageous to our interests. In paragraph four of your despatch of the 26th of May, you plainly admit that the court of Hyderabad understands the fourth and fifth articles to have secured to the Nizam an arbitrary right of resuming the districts subsequently to the intended assignment, and you endeavour to remove this insurmountable objection to those articles by alleging your construction of their exposition to be different from that maintained by the Nizam and his ministers. It is painful to me to be compelled to remark that your argument in this paragraph is founded on principles incompatible with the maintenance of public faith, and exploded by the wisdom, justice, and integrity of the law of nations. To introduce ambiguous phrases into formal instruments, designed to constitute the basis of public obligations between great states, is a practice repugnant to the policy, honour, and dignity of the British nation. The perspicuity of our expressions in all acts of obligation upon our national faith should be as manifest as the superiority of our power." Such were the lofty and generous principles which then guided the adminis-

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tration of the government of British India. The passage immediately following that which has been quoted carries forward the discussion of the question, but places the determination on different grounds—those of an extended and enlightened prudence. “If it were possible for me,” continues the governor-general, “to afford my countenance to a contrary system, common discretion would preclude me from such a course in the present case, when you distinctly avow that the ambiguous phrases on which you propose to rest the future claim of the British government against its ally are at this moment, previously to the ratification of the treaty, construed by that ally in a sense directly contradictory to that which you desire to maintain. Your further arguments on the article under consideration serve only to prove that the Nizam might be embarrassed in the exercise of the right which he intended to reserve to himself. If your reasoning on this part of the question be admitted, the result would be not an amicable, firm alliance, founded on clear, distinct, and indisputable principles, but an ill-defined state of perpetual jealousy, controversy, and animosity, of doubtful claims and of incompatible rights.”\* No right-minded Englishman can read these remarks without wishing that his countrymen in India had always been actuated by the sentiments which they express. It is unnecessary to refer to instances in

\* Letter from Marquis Wellesley to resident at Hyderabad, 15th April, 1800. See Despatches, vol. ii. pp. 278, 279.

which such was too obviously not the fact—the CHAP. XVI.  
memory of him who has read the earlier portions  
of this work will supply them. No blots of this  
description darken the career of the Marquis  
Wellesley. Its purity is not less striking than  
its splendour.

## CHAPTER XVII.

CHAP. XVII. — ATTENTION must now be carried back to the commencement of the Marquis Wellesley's administration, and diverted from the southern to the northern parts of India. In Oude the rightful sovereign had been placed on the musnud; but in other respects, all was embarrassment and disorder. The British subsidy was always in arrear, while the most frightful extortion was practised in the realization of the revenue. Justice was unknown; the army was a disorderly mass, formidable only to the power whom it professed to serve. These evils of native growth were aggravated by the presence of an extraordinary number of European adventurers, most of whom were as destitute of character and principle as they were of property. It is worthy of remark, that an ill-governed Indian state is precisely the place which a disreputable class of Europeans find the most suitable to the exercise of their talents. To all these points, as well as to the extraordinary degree of power, far too great for a subject, possessed by Almas,\* the attention of the governor-general was turned soon after his arrival, and his

\* The power and influence of this person have been noticed in chapter xiv. See vol. ii.

views were thus explained in a letter dated a few months after that event, and addressed to the resident at Lucknow. “The necessity of providing for the defence of the Carnatic, and for the early revival of our alliances in the peninsula, as well as for the seasonable reduction of the growing influence of France in India, has not admitted either of my visiting Oude, or of my turning my undivided attention to the reform of the Vizier’s affairs. There are, however, two or three leading considerations in the state of Oude to which I wish to direct your particular notice, intending at an early period to enter fully into the arrangements in which they must terminate. Whenever the death of Almas shall happen, an opportunity will offer of securing the benefits of Lord Teignmouth’s treaty, by provisions which seem necessary for the purpose of realizing the subsidy under all contingencies. The Company ought to succeed to the power of Almas, and the management, if not the sovereignty, of that part of the Doab which he now rents ought to be placed in our hands, a proportionate reduction being made from the subsidy. The effect of such an arrangement would not be confined to the improvement of our security for the subsidy; the strength of our north-western frontier would also be greatly increased. On the other hand, in the event of Almas’s death, we shall have to apprehend either the dangerous power of a successor equal to him in talents and activity, or the weakness of one inferior in both, or the division of the country among a variety of renters. In the first case we

CHAP. XVII. — should risk internal commotion, in the two latter the frontier of Oude would be considerably weakened against the attacks either of the Abdalli or any other invader. The only remedy for these evils will be the possession of the Doab, fixed in the hands of our government. The state of the Vizier's own troops is another most pressing evil. To you I need not enlarge on their inefficiency and insubordination. My intention is to persuade his excellency at a proper season to disband the whole of his army, with the exception of such part of it as may be necessary for the purposes of state, or of the collection of the revenue. Some expedient must be devised for providing a maintenance for such leaders and officers as from their birth or habits cannot easily be divested of their military pretensions (I do not say military character, for I do not believe that any such description of men exist at Lucknow). In the place of the armed rabble which now alarms the Vizier and invites his enemies, I propose to substitute an increased number of the Company's regiments of infantry and cavalry, to be relieved from time to time, and to be paid by his excellency.\* This communication shews that it was no part of the governor-general's policy to leave the determination of great state questions to accident, nor to postpone the formation of a plan for meeting contingencies until the contingencies had actually occurred. The remedies proposed for existing evils were as vigorous as their suggestion was timely, but they were not more vigorous than was required by the inveterate diseases which they were

\* Letter to J. Lumsden, Esq., 23rd December, 1798.

designed to eradicate. In addition to the measures CHAP. XVII.  
noticed in the above extract, the governor-general meditated the relief of the country from the host of Europeans who had fixed upon it as their prey. These he proposed to disperse by as summary a process of ejection as should be consistent with humanity.

Before these designs could be put in course of execution, a tragical occurrence, arising out of the disputed claim to the musnud of Oude, displayed without disguise the character of the pretender, who had been dispossessed by Lord Teignmouth. Vizier Ali had been allowed to reside at Benares, a place singularly ill-chosen with reference to his pretensions and character, and from which the new governor-general, with sufficient reason, determined to remove him. His numerous retinue had more than once disturbed the peace of the city; and the ordinary military force stationed there was not deemed sufficient to guard against the danger either of commotion or escape. It was also understood that Vizier Ali had dispatched a vakeel with presents to the Affghan prince, Zemaun Shah; and it was justly inferred that he would not fail to turn to his advantage any opportunity that might be afforded by the approach of the Shah, and the consequent employment of the British troops at a distance. Saadut Ali had applied for his removal; and, independently of this, such a step was obviously called for by sound policy. Mr. Cherry, the British agent, was accordingly instructed to signify to Vizier Ali

CHAP. XVII. the governor-general's intention that he should transfer his residence to the vicinity of Calcutta; at the same time assuring him that no diminution of his allowances or appointments would be attempted, and that at his new abode he would neither be subjected to any additional restraint, nor denied any indulgence which he had been accustomed to enjoy at Benares. When this communication was made, Vizier Ali expressed great reluctance to the required change. This had been expected; but in a short time his feelings appeared to have undergone great alteration. He ceased to manifest any dislike to removal, and seemed perfectly satisfied with the assurances which he had received of continued attention and indulgence. The conduct of Mr. Cherry towards Vizier Ali is represented to have been kind, delicate, and conciliatory; and the latter, so far from affording any ground for suspicion, had uniformly professed to entertain towards the British agent feelings of affectionate gratitude. But the part which Mr. Cherry's official duty had imposed on him, in relation to the deposition of Vizier Ali, had fixed in the mind of that person the deepest hatred. Mr. Cherry was warned of this, but unhappily the warning was disregarded. Prudence and the orders of government alike counselled precaution, but none was taken. A visit which Vizier Ali made, accompanied by his suite, to the British agent, afforded the means of accomplishing the meditated revenge. He had engaged himself to breakfast with Mr. Cherry, and the parties met in apparent amity. The usual

compliments were exchanged. Vizier Ali then CHAP. XVII.  
began to expatiate on his wrongs, and having pursued this subject for some time, he suddenly rose with his attendants, and put to death Mr. Cherry and Captain Conway, an English officer who happened to be present. The assassins then rushed out, and meeting another Englishman named Graham, they added him to the list of their victims. They proceeded to the house of Mr. Davis, judge and magistrate, who had just time to remove his family to an upper terrace, which could only be reached by a very narrow staircase. At the top of this staircase Mr. Davis, armed with a spear, took his post, and so successfully did he defend it, that the assailants, after several attempts to dislodge him, were compelled to retire without effecting their object. The benefit derived from the resistance of this intrepid man extended beyond his own family: the delay thereby occasioned afforded to the rest of the English inhabitants opportunity of escaping to the place where the troops stationed for the protection of the city were encamped. General Erskine, on learning what had occurred, dispatched a party to the relief of Mr. Davis, and Vizier Ali thereupon retired to his own residence. This, after some resistance, was forced, but not until its master had made his escape, with most of his principal adherents. No further measures seem to have been taken till the following morning, when a party of cavalry was dispatched after him; but the rapidity of his movements, and the advantage which he had gained

CHAP. XVII. by the delay of pursuit, rendered the attempt to overtake him ineffectual.

The miscreant found refuge in the territories of the Rajah of Bhotwul, a chief tributary both to the Vizier and the Rajah of Nepaul, at which latter place the Rajah of Bhotwul was at the time in durance. By his representatives, however, Vizier Ali was hospitably received, and allowed to take means for considerably increasing the number of his followers. The British government remonstrated with the Rajah of Nepaul against this conduct of the Rajah of Bhotwul's dependents, and the remonstrance produced such demonstrations on the part of the person to whom it was addressed, as led Vizier Ali to conclude that Bhotwul was no longer an eligible place of residence. The strength which he had acquired enabled him to display a bold front, and he advanced into Goruckpore, whither a detachment of the Company's troops had marched. With these a skirmish took place, to the disadvantage of Vizier Ali. His followers then began to drop off, and he would probably have been taken, but for the treachery of a body of the Vizier's troops who had been stationed to intercept him. Passing along the foot of the northern hills, he succeeded in reaching Jyneghur, where he was received, but placed under restraint. It being suggested by Captain Collins, the British resident with Scindia, that the Rajah of Jyneghur might be induced, by the offer of a considerable reward, to surrender his visitor, that officer was in-

structed to open a negotiation for the purpose. The task was not unattended with difficulty. The law of honour, as understood at Jyneghur, stood in the way of giving up to his pursuers even a murderer. On the other hand, the Rajah's appetite for wealth was violently stimulated by the large sum offered by Colonel Collins as the price of the transfer of the person of Vizier Ali into his keeping. A compromise was at length effected. Vizier Ali was given up, on condition that his life should be spared, and that his limbs should not be disgraced by chains. Some of his accomplices had previously suffered the punishment due to their crimes. The great criminal escaped through the scruples of the Rajah of Jyneghur. Those scruples, however, did not prevent his relieving his guest of the charge of a quantity of jewels. This acquisition, with the sum obtained from the English, probably consoled the Rajah for the slight taint which his honour had incurred.

The views which the governor-general had previously propounded to the resident at Lucknow were subsequently directed to be pressed upon the attention of the Vizier. It was justly urged that the alarm created by the recent approach of Zemaun Shah ought to operate as an inducement to employ the season of repose afforded by his retirement in providing such effectual means of resistance as might be sufficient to avert the apprehension of future danger. The military establishment of the Vizier was admitted, by himself, to be useless for the purpose of defence. It was worse than useless; for at the moment when the presence of the British force had

CHAP. XVII. been required to make a formidable demonstration on the frontier, it had been found necessary to retain a part of it in the capital to protect the person and authority of the prince from the excesses of his own disaffected and disorderly troops. The conclusion which this state of things suggested to the governor-general was unanswerable. "The inference to be drawn from these events," said he, "is obviously that the defence of his excellency's dominions against foreign attack, as well as their internal tranquillity, can only be secured by a reduction of his own useless, if not dangerous, troops, and by a proportionate augmentation of the British force in his pay."

A change which not long afterwards took place in the office of resident at Lucknow caused some delay in the communication of the governor-general's views to the Vizier. Mr. Lumsden was succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, who bore a letter from Sir Alured Clarke, then holding the office of vice-president in Bengal, calling attention to the necessity of military reform. A favourable opportunity for presenting the letter was offered by the Vizier's complaints of the turbulent and disorderly state of some of his battalions. Of this Colonel Scott took advantage; and the prince, on reading the letter, declared his thorough concurrence in the sentiments which it contained. The resident thereupon pressed an early consideration of the subject, and requested that the result might be communicated to him as soon as possible. He, at the same time, suggested the propriety of

preparing certain statements of the number and expense of the troops of every description employed by the Vizier. CHAP. XVII.

More than twenty days passed without any satisfactory notice of this communication. The resident then pressed for the appointment of a day for the discussion of the subject, and a day was fixed. On its arrival, however, nothing could be drawn from the Vizier but the most vague and dark intimations of his views and feelings. He observed, that the measure proposed was not impracticable, but such as he hoped might be accomplished; but he added, that he had a proposal to make, connected with his own ease, the prosperity of his government, and the happiness of his subjects, and which, in its operation, could be prejudicial to no one; but all intimation of its nature or character he deferred till an expected visit of the governor-general to Lucknow, or till the execution of the projected measure was committed to the resident. No representations could induce him to explain; but he promised to visit the resident on a future day, and dictate a memorandum. He came, but the matter dictated for report to the governor-general proved to be nothing more than a repetition of what he had stated on the former day. The resident entered into arguments to shew the propriety of separating the two projects, as the reform of the military department must be greatly protracted if it were made dependant on the acceptance of the Vizier's unexplained proposal. On that proposal it was urged no determination could

CHAP. XVII. be formed for a considerable time, inasmuch as the governor-general's presence at Lucknow could not be immediate, and it was not to be expected that he would delegate powers for the conclusion of an arrangement with the nature and object of which he was totally unacquainted. But the Vizier was unmoved, and the conference terminated without any progress having been made in the negotiation.

From the mysterious deportment of the Vizier nothing could be distinctly known of his wishes or intentions. All was left to conjecture. The resident believed that he was anxious to annihilate the functions of the ministers, who were the ordinary organs of communication with the resident, and to become the sole executor of his own purposes. What those purposes were, and in what manner they were carried on, was manifest from the whole course of the government since its assumption by Saadut Ali. The appropriation of the profits of oppression had been in a great degree changed, but no change had taken place for the benefit of the people. The same abuse and mismanagement, the same frightful extortions which disgraced the revenue collections under the former government, continued to prevail undiminished in extent or atrocity, under that of Saadut Ali. The only difference was, that the entire fruits went into the private treasury of the sovereign, and, as parsimony was a striking feature in his character, were carefully hoarded by him. Formerly, a large portion was appropriated by those

who stood between the prince and the people, and the part which reached the royal coffers was quickly dissipated in wild and thoughtless profusion. “I cannot but feel,” said Colonel Scott, “that the ruin of the country, commenced in a reign of profusion and indolence, will progressively proceed in a reign of parsimony and diligence.”

No experienced statesman indulges a vision so Utopian, as the hope of silencing calumny or securing universal approbation. The folly of such an expectation, if it existed, could scarcely be more strikingly illustrated than by reference to the opinions which have been at various times expressed on the mode of dealing adopted by the British government of India with the states in subsidiary alliance with it. If the unrestrained exercise of the civil government—that is, the unrestrained power of grinding to the dust the mass of the people, and drying up the sources of prosperity—be left in the hands of the native prince and his minions, the British government is accused of supporting by its authority abuses which it has the means of suppressing. When it is supposed to entertain an inclination to restrain, however cautiously and moderately, the power of oppression, it is accused of violating treaties and invading the rights of independent princes. No statesman who feels confident in his own integrity will regard the clamour on either side; but those who live on the breath of popular applause, and apart from it find no satisfaction in the consciousness of performing their duty, cannot fail to see

CHAP. XVII. in the management of the subsidiary states difficulties, through which it is impossible for them to pass without incurring the loss of the element by which they live.

The governor-general of India, at the time under consideration, was not of this latter class. He was resolved to take the measures which appeared to him, under the surrounding circumstances, the best, undeterred alike by fear of the reproaches of those who might choose to think, or to affect to think, that he did either too little or too much. His answer to the representations of the resident was to the effect, that the present condition of the government appeared to preclude the acquisition of the information necessary to the first step in the proposed reforms; that it was to be hoped an application addressed to the Vizier by the governor-general, simultaneously with his communication to Colonel Scott, would remove all difficulty, and establish the resident in the degree of influence and consideration which it was necessary he should enjoy; but if this expectation should be disappointed, the resident was to insist, in the name of his superior, on the Vizier placing his government in such a state as should afford the requisite means of information, as well as of carrying the necessary military reforms completely and speedily into effect. The nominal minister, Hussein Reza Khan, was supposed to offer a bar to these results. His master withheld from him confidence, consideration, and power. His talents were not such as to make it desirable to retain

him in opposition to the wishes of the Vizier, and the governor-general was ready to assent to his removal, due provision being made for his support and safety, provided that his successor should be a person unequivocally well disposed to cultivate and improve the existing connection between the state of Oude and the Company. The proposed military reform, however, was declared to be the great and immediate object of the governor-general's solicitude. This point was to be pressed with unremitted earnestness, and the Vizier's acquiescence in the necessary measures was expected to be totally unqualified by any conditions not necessarily connected with it.

The occurrence about this time of a dispute between the Vizier and part of his troops afforded such striking illustration of the character of the prince, and of the relation subsisting between him and his army, that on this account it deserves notice. One of his battalions, stationed at Lucknow, refused to march to a part of the country where its services were required until a portion of its arrears of pay were discharged; for Saadut Ali scrupulously observed the good old native custom of keeping soldiers' pay heavily in arrear, and never indulging his troops with the luxury of money till it was absolutely impossible to withhold it. On this occasion the Vizier was so disgusted with the presumption of the request for the issue of pay long over due, that he declared his intention of actually complying with the demand of the clamorous battalion, and then

CHAP. XVII. disbanding it. The resident approved of the determination; first, because the troops had shewn some symptoms of disaffection; and, secondly, because the gradual dismissal of the Vizier's battalions, when occasion might arise, seemed a desirable mode of preparing for the introduction of a general reform of the military establishment of Oude in the manner desired by the governor-general. But a settlement of accounts is, in the East, always a matter of difficulty; and the arrangement of the claims of the Vizier's discontented battalions was not destined to form an exception from a rule, the extent of which is all but universal. According to the Vizier, only three months' pay was due—the battalion claimed five. This point was adjusted, when another impediment arose. The Vizier required that the different companies should proceed to the treasury of the palace, there to receive payment and deliver up their arms and accoutrements. The men apprehended deception, and required that the money should be sent to their encampment, or that a hostage should remain there as security for the due performance of their sovereign's engagements. The British resident having found, by an inspection of the accounts, that the proposed mode of adjustment was equitable, and having also ascertained that the men refused to proceed to the place appointed for their payment and discharge, was disposed to support the authority of the Vizier by the employment of one of the Company's regiments.

But he was not thoroughly satisfied of the honest intentions of the prince; and the discontented men, reposing confidence in him which they withheld from their master, sent a deputation to explain to him their situation and wishes. It was stated on their behalf, that the want of pay had produced real distress; that there was no commandant or head of the battalion through whom they could regularly apply to the Vizier; and that the feeling of distrust, which deterred them from going to the palace in conformity with the orders of the prince, was amply justified by the non-fulfilment of former promises. The resident took pains to satisfy the minds of the applicants, and they appeared disposed to submit. The existence of this disposition being communicated to the Vizier, he, too, expressed himself satisfied. A deprecatory petition from the malcontents was presented to the prince through the British resident, who, partaking of the feeling of distrust which pervaded not only the battalion in question, but all ranks and orders of men at Lucknow, gave the weight of his own recommendation to the course which he deemed most advisable—that the Vizier should accept the submission of the battalion, settle the arrears of pay in the manner proposed, and follow up the settlement by dismissal. The Vizier consented with a graciousness worthy of his elevated station; and promised that arrangements should be made for carrying into effect on a specified day the

CHAP. XVII. plan supported by Colonel Scott. The ready acquiescence of the prince seems to have lulled the suspicions of the British resident, though his experience of the value of the royal word might have been supposed sufficient to keep them awake. His account of his feelings, of the change effected in them, and of the cause of that change, shall be given in his own words. "I had no apprehension," says he, "that he (the Vizier) would depart from his engagements, or that any obstruction on his side would be thrown in the way of a final conclusion. How great, then, was my astonishment, to find that the persons employed to adjust the accounts had commanded the attendance at the palace of four of the native officers by name, for the purpose of settling a demand of several thousand rupees, which they said had been brought forward by the former commandant of the battalion, who has been ten months in confinement, which sum was to be deducted from the aggregate amount of pay due to the battalion. I sent a message to the Nawaub (Vizier), remonstrating against this new and unreasonable demand, which, if justly formed, ought to have been included in the account originally furnished for my inspection. The Nawaub (Vizier), under the most solemn assurances, and with many solid arguments on the policy of good faith, declared his firm resolution of adhering to the settlement; but his excellency went out this morning to a garden of Almas's, about eight miles from the city, without leaving any instructions for the adjustment of ac-

counts or payment of arrears.”\* Against this scandalous breach of honesty Colonel Scott remonstrated, and, ultimately, through his exertions, the troops received their pay. CHAP. XVII.

This preliminary being over, they deposited their arms and dispersed without tumult or disorder. The conduct of the resident throughout these proceedings scarcely seems to require apology. If any be necessary, it is furnished in his own appeal to the governor-general for an indulgent construction. “If,” said he, “in the course of this transaction any part of the conduct pursued by me should appear to your lordship exceptionable, I trust to your lordship’s liberal consideration of the embarrassments a man must labour under where artifice is opposed to plain dealing, where the crimes of the accused originate in the faults of the government, and where, under the mask of vigour, attempts are made to draw me into a participation of a measure of cruel and unjust severity for the gratification of avarice.”

Such was the situation of Colonel Scott—such has been and still is the situation of those holding appointments similar to his. Surrounded on every side by temptations to err, the most inflexible determination and the most cautious discretion are indispensable to the creditable discharge of their onerous duties.

But it is time to return to the progress of the

\* Letter of Colonel Scott to governor-general, 4th October, 1799, published in Parliamentary Papers.

CHAP. XVII. negotiation for carrying into effect the governor-general's views of military reform. In answer to a letter from the governor-general already referred to, the Vizier declared that the advantages, both immediate and future, of a reform in his military establishment were more strongly impressed on his own mind than on that of his illustrious correspondent, and that he would, without a moment's delay, consult with Colonel Scott upon what was practicable, and communicate the result of their joint deliberations. This promise was fulfilled in the manner usual with the Vizier—it is unnecessary to explain that, in point of fact, it was not fulfilled at all. Colonel Scott described the character and habits of this prince with equal truth and brevity. "His excellency," said he, "is a man inconceivably difficult to deal with under an observance of the common forms due to respect and decorum. His ready and thorough acquiescence in the propriety of almost every measure proposed to him precludes discussion, but the execution is neglected by a total disregard of promise, or evaded by a flimsy subterfuge." The promised communication of the Vizier's sentiments not arriving, the governor-general again addressed a letter to him, representing the obligation of the Company to defend the prince's dominions; the insufficiency for the purpose of the number of British troops ordinarily stationed within them; the danger impending from the intentions of Zemaun Shah, and possibly from other sources; the necessity of an augmentation of the British force, and the ready

means of providing for the cost by disbanding the disorderly battalions, which were a source not of strength but of weakness. The letter concluded by intimating that the British troops in Oude would be immediately reinforced by a portion of the proposed augmentation; the remainder were to follow at a future period. CHAP. XVII.

The justice of this measure must be determined by the conditions of the treaty under which the relative claims of the Vizier and the British government arose—its expediency, by the circumstances under which it was resorted to.

The treaty was that concluded by Lord Teignmouth and Saadut Ali on placing that prince upon the throne. This instrument formally recognized the obligation incurred by the East-India Company under former treaties, of defending the dominions of the Vizier against all enemies; it bound the Vizier to pay a specified amount of subsidy for an English force to be continually stationed in his territories, which force was never to be less than ten thousand strong; “and if at any time it should become necessary to augment the troops of the Company in Oude beyond the number of thirteen thousand men, including Europeans and natives, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, the Nawaub Saadut Ali Khan,” agreed “to pay the actual difference occasioned by the excess above that number.”\* The possible augmentation of the force beyond thirteen thousand is here clearly contemplated and provided for. A question arises, who was

\* Seventh article of treaty.

CHAP. XVII. to judge of the necessity? and to this the treaty gives no answer. If the Vizier, it might happen that a prince, who, like Saadut Ali, was at once under the influence of an extreme love of money and a headstrong will, might, with a view to the gratification of his passions, deny the necessity, when its existence was clear to every one else; and if his denial were to determine the question, the country might be overrun by enemies, whose subsequent expulsion might occasion to the Company an amount of trouble and of loss which better provision would have averted. The Company, it is to be remembered, were bound not merely to assist the Vizier with specified amount of force for the defence of his dominions—they were bound efficiently to defend them; and to require them to do this, with a force inadequate to the exigencies of the case, would be altogether unreasonable and absurd. The obligation to defend the territory of Oude involved the obligation of allotting a sufficient force for the duty: if thirteen thousand men were insufficient, they were bound to employ more, for the country was to be defended absolutely and unreservedly. The obligation which the Company had undertaken was therefore accompanied by the right of determining upon the necessity for an increase of force. If the right rested with any other party, the result would be, that the Company might be lawfully called upon to perform an impossibility.

Some misapprehension may have arisen from the manner in which the operation of the seventh article of Lord Teignmouth's treaty is adverted to in

the letter to the Vizier. It is said, "The seventh article of the treaty concluded with your excellency by Sir John Shore, provides for the occasional augmentation of the Company's troops in your excellency's dominions." This is not strictly accurate; the words of the treaty are, "if, at any time, it should become necessary to augment the troops of the Company in Oude;" the provision is general—it refers not to the augmentation being either occasional or permanent. Indeed, the paragraph of the letter preceding that in which occurs the reference to the power of augmentation as only occasional must have satisfied the Vizier that that which was proposed was designed to be permanent. "It might not be in the power of the British government," it is said, "on a sudden emergency to reinforce the troops in your excellency's country with sufficient expedition; my firm opinion therefore is, that the Company can in no other manner fulfil effectually their engagement to 'defend the dominions of your excellency against all enemies,' than by maintaining constantly in those dominions such a force as shall at all times be adequate to your effectual protection, independently of any reinforcement which the exigency might otherwise require, but which might not be disposable in proper season." The views of the governor-general were thus most clearly and distinctly explained.

Should it be said, that if the above construction of the treaty be correct, the Vizier, as to the expense of supporting the British force, was altoge-

CHAP. XVII. ther at the mercy of the British government—this is quite true. He placed himself at their mercy by delegating to them the defence of his dominions. His weakness required support—he consented to receive it from a powerful neighbour. He had placed himself in a condition of dependence, and having agreed to purchase certain advantages upon certain terms, he had no right to object to those terms being enforced. The right of the English government was not indeed to be pressed to its full extent without reason; but if reason existed, he could not justly question its exercise.

This leads to the second point of inquiry—whether at the time it was expedient to call upon the Vizier to entertain an increased number of British troops? and this admits of a very ready answer. Oude was menaced by Zemaun Shah, who had not only threatened invasion, but advanced to Lahore to carry his design into effect. True it was, that, alarmed for the safety of his power at home, he had suddenly retreated; but his return at a convenient season was fairly to be expected. Scindia, too, was believed to cherish designs unfavourable to the peace of Oude. The Rohillas, always turbulent and discontented, were ready to embark in the occupation they loved, and every part of the Vizier's dominions was overrun with disorder, crime, misery, and disaffection. The state of the Vizier's army has been already noticed, but it may not be improper to quote a few remarks on this subject from communications written a few months before this period by Sir

James Craig, who commanded the British force in CHAP. XVII.  
Oude. “As to the Nawaub’s troops,” he said, “it  
is impossible for me to convey to your lordship a  
more decided opinion as to their nullity than I have  
already had the honour of communicating to your  
lordship. With the view, however, of drawing from  
them the only service which it seemed possible to  
hope for, I pressed strongly for the appointment of  
General Martine to the command of those stationed  
in Rohilcund, which the Nawaub has acceded to.”  
He adds shortly afterwards, “it is extremely diffi-  
cult to combat the obstacles which arise from the  
extreme pusillanimity and sordid avarice of the  
Nawaub.” And in illustration of this position Sir  
James Craig adds: “I am well assured that the Na-  
waub’s troops are neither armed nor clothed, nor is  
there a gun in the district which is put under Gene-  
ral Martine’s command that can be made use of. In  
consequence of our representations he has promised  
to send some guns; but he declares that he has  
neither arms nor clothing beyond what he must fur-  
nish to the battalions that he keeps near his person.”  
But though these troops were in a state which would  
have rendered them valueless against an enemy,  
they were not without the power of producing in-  
ternal mischief. In another letter Sir James Craig  
says: “I know not what to say with respect to the Na-  
waub’s troops. I would be content that they should  
be useless, but I dread their being dangerous, unless  
some step is taken with regard to them. I should  
be almost as unwilling to leave them behind me as I

CHAP. XVII. should be to leave a fortress of the enemy. The Nawaub is highly unpopular, and of all his subjects, I believe he would least expect attachment from his army.\* Now in the face of all these sources of danger to the state which the East-India Company were bound to protect from all enemies—with the prospect of invasion by a prince who had recently traversed, without much difficulty, a considerable portion of the countries between his own and that of the Vizier, and whose future progress through the remainder could not be regarded as impracticable—with cause for distrusting the pacific disposition of a powerful and treacherous Mahratta chief on the very borders of Oude—with these perils without, and with an oppressed people and a disorderly mob, called by courtesy an army, within, would the governor-general have been justified in congratulating himself, that in the north-west, at least, all was quiet, and in the exercise of this soothing belief, leaving that part of India without additional defence? He might have delayed strengthening the British force in Oude till Scindia was in the Doab, and Zemaun Shah at Delhi, proclaiming from thence the restoration of the Mahometan empire of India, the Rohilla chiefs in arms, and the rabble soldiery of Saadut Ali seeking their fortunes in the best way that the universal confusion might offer; he might have awakened from a dream of security to learn that one, or several, or all of these events had taken place,

\* The two letters from which these extracts are taken will be found in 1st volume of the Wellesley Despatches.

and then have proceeded to express to the home go- CHAP. XVII.  
vernment his regret for the misfortunes that had occurred, his astonishment and sorrow at the infatuation of the Vizier, and his earnest determination to do all within his power to retrieve the disasters which he might have assumed no human foresight could have anticipated ; but the Earl of Mornington was not a man to fold his arms in supineness, and cast the responsibility of ill success upon fortune—events found him prepared for their arrival. In preparing for them, though he steadily kept in view the great principles of justice and moderation, he despised that affected regard for them which seeks temporary popularity by the sacrifice of important interests. He could not but know, that in interposing to save the Vizier from the consequences of his own folly, he should incur some obloquy from the prejudiced, the inconsiderate, the ignorant, or the base ; but this consideration weighed not against a regard for the peace of India, and for the honour and security of the British name and dominion. He saw that a regard to these objects called for a certain course of policy—that such a course was at the same time calculated to benefit the ruler and people of Oude, though the former, blinded by his passions, saw it not ; and, being satisfied on these great points, he kept on his way, undismayed by difficulties, and undeterred by the fear of misrepresentation.

A new scene was now about to open at Lucknow. The Vizier had for some time been in the

CHAP. XVII. habit of dwelling, in his conversations with the British resident, on the impossibility of his conducting the affairs of the country. So frequently had this occurred, that the resident stated he had been led to conjecture that the prince had it in contemplation to retire from the cares and fatigues of government. This surmise he had never communicated to the governor-general, and he imputes his silence to various causes—the apparent absurdity of the expectation, and the countenance afforded to a contrary belief by the conduct of the Vizier, in meditating state regulations, projecting buildings, and making household arrangements, implying the intention of permanently residing at Lucknow. If, however, the resident had ever been led to form the conjecture referred to, it was his duty to have intimated it to the authority which he served; not, indeed, as a matter deserving much attention, but as the occasional result produced upon his mind by the conversation of the Vizier. It is a primary duty of such an officer to keep his government advised, not only of every thing of political interest that occurs at the scene of his duties, but of his own impressions, whether fixed or variable, with regard to them.

The time, however, arrived when Colonel Scott had something more than his own conjectures to communicate. The Vizier made a formal avowal of his desire and resolution to relinquish a government which he declared himself unable to manage either with satisfaction to himself or—and in this respect the admission was certainly as literally true as it

was apparently candid—with advantage to his sub-CHAP. XVII.  
jects. Colonel Scott made some remarks tending to shew that, by following his advice, the affairs of the country might be administered for the benefit of the people, and at the same time with ease and reputation to the prince. The Vizier replied that this might be so, but it was impossible for one person to judge of the feelings of another; that his mind was not disposed to the cares and fatigues of government; that he was firmly resolved to retire from them; and that, as one of his sons would be raised to the musnud, his name would remain. At a subsequent period of the conference, he added, that in relinquishing the government he renounced every thought of interfering in its concerns, or of residing within its limits; that the money he possessed was sufficient for his own support, and for the attainment of every gratification in a private station—which was certainly the fact; but he desired to stipulate for a due provision being made for his sons, and for the other branches of his family, whom he meant to leave at Lucknow.

In reporting to the governor-general the intention of the Vizier, together with the substance of several conversations held with him on the subject, Colonel Scott suggested certain points for consideration. One of these was, whether it would not be more advisable, if the Vizier's consent could be obtained, that the abdication, instead of being confined to his own person, should also extend to his posterity. In connection with this suggestion, it is

CHAP. XVII. right to state, that though the Vizier had sons, none of them were legitimate. Another question raised by the resident related to the disposal of the treasure left by the former Vizier. This had been removed by Saadut Ali from the public treasury to the female apartments of his palace, and it was conjectured that this step might have been taken in contemplation of the design of relinquishing the government. The debts of the Vizier's brother, to whose place and treasure Saadut Ali had succeeded, were considerable, and no part of them had been paid. Salaries were due to public servants, and a considerable amount of allowances to pensioners. All these claims it was probable Saadut Ali meant to evade. Colonel Scott had recommended that the Vizier should himself write to the governor-general. This he declined, on the ground that there was no one about him to whom he could confide so delicate an affair; and he desired the resident to draw up a paper in Persian, embodying the views of the prince as previously explained, for transmission to the governor-general, which was accordingly done. It is unnecessary to trace minutely the proceedings which followed. It will be sufficient to state that, in reference to the various communications which he had received, the governor-general transmitted a series of instructions to the resident, a draft of a proposed treaty, and a paper explanatory of the views of the British government, specially intended for the perusal of the Vizier. The tendency of these documents was rather to

discourage the meditated step of abdication than otherwise. The governor-general saw that many advantages would result from it, if the entire administration of the government, civil and military, were transferred to the Company; but he saw also that the realization of those advantages would be greatly impeded if the abdication of Saadut Ali was to be followed by the establishment of a successor. The certainty that the evils by which the country was afflicted would be continued under such an arrangement, and the possible inconveniences to Saadut Ali himself, were pointed out, and the representation was fatal to the Vizier's resolution. He rejected the condition proposed to be attached to his retirement, and declared that, as the appointment of a successor was objected to, he was ready to abandon his design, and retain the charge of the government. Whether he had ever entertained any sincere intention of relinquishing it, is a question on which it is impossible to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion.

The delivery of the letter to the Vizier, announcing the march of a body of the Company's troops to augment the British force in Oude, had been deferred pending the proceedings arising out of the Vizier's professed desire to abdicate. When that project was abandoned, the letter was presented. The proposed reinforcement also marched without further delay, and after multiplied subterfuges and evasions on the part of the Vizier, the process of disbanding his disorderly battalions commenced. The accom-

CHAP. XVII. — plishment of this necessary measure required much care to avert dangerous consequences ; but the requisite care was not wanting, and the British authorities taking an interest in the inspection of the accounts, and the due discharge of arrears, the business proceeded with less difficulty than could have been anticipated, and without any disturbance of serious character.

While some progress was thus making in reforming the military affairs of Oude, its civil government remained in the same wretched circumstances by which it had ever been characterized. The Vizier took advantage of this to intimate the probability of an approaching failure of his engagements with the British government. This step accelerated a measure really necessary and important, but which the Vizier was most especially anxious to postpone—an inquiry into the cause of that misery and disorder which was universally spread over the fertile country subject to his administration. That cause, as pointed out by the governor-general, was the government. Adverting to the communication from the Vizier, the governor-general, in addressing Colonel Scott, says : “ Had the territories of Oude been subject to the frequent or occasional devastations of an enemy—had they been visited by unfavourable seasons, or by other calamities which impair the public prosperity, the rapid decline of the Vizier’s revenues might be imputed to other causes than a defective administration. But no such calamitous visita-

tions have afflicted the province of Oude, while, in consequence of the protection which it derives from the presence of the British forces, it has been maintained, together with all the Company's possessions on this side of India, in the uninterrupted enjoyment of peace. A defective administration of the government is therefore the only cause which can have produced so marked a difference between the state of his excellency's dominions and that of the contiguous territories of the Company. While the territories of the Company have been advancing progressively during the last ten years in prosperity, population, and opulence, the dominions of the Vizier, though enjoying equal advantages of tranquillity and security, have rapidly and progressively declined.\* A detail of particulars would amply bear out the general remarks above quoted. "I have repeatedly represented to your excellency," said the governor-general, addressing the Vizier, "the effects of the ruinous expedient of anticipating the collections—the destructive practice of realizing them by force of arms—the annual diminution of the jumma† of the country—the precarious tenure by which the aumils and farmers hold their possessions—the misery of the lower classes of the people, absolutely excluded from the protection of the government—and the utter insecurity of life and pro-

\* Letter from governor-general to Colonel Scott, 22nd January, 1801.

† The rental or assessment.

CHAP. XVII. perty throughout the province of Oude.”\* These positions are illustrated by reference to facts then of recent occurrence; and the representation being addressed to the Vizier, the truth of the alleged facts would have been impugned had it been possible. The Vizier, indeed, had admitted the miserable condition of his revenue administration; and all authorities concur in exhibiting the state of his dominions as little removed from complete anarchy. Under these circumstances the continued payment of the British subsidy could not reasonably be relied upon; and the Vizier himself had, by his own suggestions, lent encouragement to those apprehensions which, on other grounds, there was abundant reason to entertain.

It has been seen that, at an early period of his administration, the Marquis Wellesley had been impressed with the necessity of obtaining territorial security for a part, at least, of the Vizier's pecuniary engagements with the British government.† The desire of abdication, which at one time the Vizier entertained or affected to entertain, suggested another mode of arrangement, which the governor-general now instructed the resident at Lucknow to press upon the consideration of the prince. This was the entire transfer of the government of the country, civil as well as military, to the Company, under suitable provisions for the main-

\* Letter from governor-general to Vizier, 8th April, 1801.

† See page 163.

tenance of the Vizier and his family. Colonel Scott CHAP. XVII.  
was directed to prepare the draft of a treaty for this  
purpose, on the model of the treaty concluded with  
the Rajah of Tanjore and that proposed to the  
Vizier at the period of his meditated abdication.  
In framing such a treaty, the resident was instructed  
to keep in view its primary objects—the abolition  
of abuses, and the substitution of “a wise and bene-  
volent plan of government, calculated to inspire the  
people with confidence in the security of property  
and of life; to encourage industry; to protect the  
fruits of honest labour, and to establish order and  
submission to the just authority of the state, on the  
solid foundations of gratitude for benefits received  
and expectation of continued security:” but he was,  
at the same time, to defer to the inclinations and  
prejudices of the Vizier, as far as might be com-  
patible with the attainment of the main objects of  
the treaty. The draft, when prepared, was to be  
submitted to the Vizier. If on receiving it he might  
manifest any disposition to accede to its general prin-  
ciples, but should desire some particular modifica-  
tions, his suggestions were to be reserved for the  
decision of the governor-general. But as it was  
obviously more probable that he would reject the  
proposal altogether, this result was provided for.  
In that case the resident was to fall back on the  
plan which the governor-general had entertained  
from the moment of his entering on the duties of  
his office, and probably from an earlier period. The  
Vizier was to be informed that the funds for the

CHAP. XVII. regular payment of the subsidy must be placed without delay beyond the hazard of failure, and for this purpose the cession of territory of adequate extent was to be required. The Doab, including the tribute from Furruckabad, was to form part of the territory to be thus demanded, and Rohileund was pointed out as an eligible addition. The possession of these provinces by the English would tend to remove the Vizier from foreign connections and foreign sources of danger; and it was suggested that their transfer would be less mortifying to him than that of any other portions of his dominions, inasmuch as they were not part of the more ancient possessions of his house, but had been acquired for it by the British arms.

The absence of the Vizier on a hunting excursion, and the subsequent celebration of a Mahometan festival, delayed for some time the execution of the orders of the governor-general. When the draft of the proposed treaty was at length submitted to the Vizier, his deportment was such as afforded no clue to his probable decision. He received the draft, with a letter addressed to him by the governor-general, without any manifestation of emotion, and engaged to communicate with Colonel Scott on the subject as soon as he should have fully considered it. Two days afterwards a second conference took place, when the Vizier, though he did not positively reject the first proposal—that of the total relinquishment of the government of Oude to the Company—displayed a strong repugnance to it.

Colonel Scott endeavoured to reconcile him to the arrangement by an appeal to his patriotic feelings, but the attempt was a failure. The resident having suggested that the sacrifice of feeling on the part of the Vizier would be compensated by the satisfaction which he would derive from witnessing the increasing prosperity of the country and the happiness of the people under the management of the British government, the prince answered with great candour, that, under the circumstances in which he should be placed, the contemplation of these things would not afford him the smallest gratification. He referred to a letter of advice addressed to his predecessor by Lord Cornwallis, which, though it contained strong recommendations for the introduction of various reforms in the different branches of government, left the execution of the proposed measures to the hands of the Vizier and his ministers. To this there was an obvious answer. Lord Cornwallis quitted India in August, 1793: the conversation in which his advice was thus referred to took place on the 26th February, 1801. The interval was little less than eight years, and not one step had been taken, either by the reigning Vizier or his predecessor, towards carrying into effect any portion of the salutary suggestions offered to them. This, as the resident argued, shewed either that the advice was disregarded, or that the power of acting upon it was wanting, the latter supposition being countenanced by the desire which the Vizier had some time before professed to abdicate. The Vizier

CHAP. XVII.  
A. D. 1801.

CHAP. XVII. further represented that his own payments of subsidy had been punctual, while those of his predecessor had been irregular; and he urged that it would be time enough to demand security when failure actually took place. To this it was answered, that if that period were waited for, it would then not be within the reach of human wisdom or power to retrieve the affairs of an exhausted and depopulated country. The Vizier might have been reminded of his own expressed apprehension of its approach.\*

After making some remarks on the proposed establishment of courts of justice, to which the prince seemed to entertain great dislike, he requested to be furnished, on a future day, with some account of the second proposal—that which was confined to the demand of territory as a security for the claims of the British government, which was afforded. Being now in possession of the

\* The violence and oppression exercised in realizing the revenue have been adverted to; but it is further to be observed, that the Vizier seems to have strained his claim for the credit of punctuality quite as far as circumstances warranted. Though no actual default had occurred, there had been considerable hesitation in making payment, as appears from a passage in a letter from the governor-general to Mr. Lumsden, Colonel Scott's predecessor. "I wish," said his lordship, "the Nawaub could see that it would be a more dignified course to pay his subsidy without giving me the trouble of importuning him. He regularly falls into arrear, and as regularly pays up the arrear whenever he learns from me that it has attracted my notice. Would it not be more for his honour, and for my ease, if he would not wait for my application, but pay punctually as the subsidy becomes due?"

entire views of the governor-general, the Vizier CHAP. XVII.  
formally and distinctly rejected both branches of  
the alternative submitted to him. He could not, he  
said, with his own hands, exclude himself from his  
patrimonial dominions, "for," he naively asked,  
"what advantage should I derive from so doing?"—  
nor could he consent to any positive territorial ces-  
sion by way of security for the British subsidy; and  
the reason assigned for this refusal is truly wonder-  
ful, when considered in relation to the character and  
conduct of the Vizier. "I expect," said he, "to  
derive the most substantial profits from bringing  
into a flourishing condition this country, which has  
so long been in a state of waste and ruin; by a  
separation of territory my hopes of these substantial  
profits would be entirely cut off." How lamentable  
was it that the Vizier's good intentions had so long  
slumbered—how extraordinary that they should  
awaken just at the moment when security for his  
engagements was demanded. He had occupied the  
musnud for several years, and during that period,  
either from inability or indisposition, he had done  
nothing to rescue the country from that state of  
"waste and ruin" into which it had fallen; but the  
pleasure of continuing to be acknowledged lord of  
this "heritage of woe" was not to be relinquished,  
and in the hope of retaining it he had recourse to  
representations to which no person of sound mind  
could give even a qualified belief. They received  
far more attention than they merited. The gover-  
nor-general addressed a letter to the Vizier, tender-

CHAP. XVII. ing again the two proposals for acceptance, and answering at great length the objections of the prince, shewing that there was no hope for the abolition of the mass of abuses by which the country was overrun but in its transfer to the British government; and whether this desirable event should take place or not, exhibiting the right of that government to demand adequate security that its interests should not be involved in the general ruin. "It would be vain and fruitless," said the governor-general, "to attempt this arduous task"—that of thorough and effectual reformation—"by partial interference, or by imperfect modifications of a system of which every principle is founded in error and impolicy, and every instrument tainted with injustice and corruption. After long and mature deliberation," he continued, "I offer to your excellency a renewal of my former declaration, that the province of Oude cannot otherwise be preserved than by the gradual and regular operation of a system of administration founded on principles of substantial justice and of comprehensive policy, and enforced by all the power and energy of the English government." After illustrating some of the advantages of this plan, he added, "but whatever may be your excellency's sentiments with regard to the first proposition, the right of the Company to demand a cession of territory adequate to the security of the funds necessary for defraying the expense of our defensive engagements with your excellency is indisputable." That right was rested

principally upon the notorious facts, that the evils and abuses of the existing system of administration had greatly impaired the resources of the state, and the well-grounded inference that the causes of decay would continue to operate with increased and accelerated effect, until ultimately the prince should become unable to fulfil his engagements with the Company. The pretended expectations of the Vizier were justly met by an inquiry, whether he could reasonably hope to induce the governor-general, by this unsupported assertion, to rest the interests of the Company in the province of Oude on a foundation so precarious and insecure as the expectation of an improvement obstructed by the whole system of the Vizier's government, and by every relative circumstance in the state of his affairs. CHAP. XVII.

The Vizier continued to withhold his assent to either proposal, and to endeavour, by a resort to all possible arts of evasion and delay, to defer the final settlement of the questions at issue between the British government and himself. At last he determined on a list of conditions or stipulations, to which he desired the assent of the governor-general before agreeing to the required cession of territory. They were in number eighteen, and related to a great variety of subjects. The first was a very characteristic one. It referred to the payment of the debts of Azoff-al-Dowlah, for which the Vizier congratulated himself he was not accountable, and, moreover, avowed that he was unable to provide; and, referring to the non-responsibility of the Company, seemed

CHAP. XVII. to infer that their government would confirm the exemption which he claimed for himself. Other of the Vizier's demands pointed in the same direction. The fourth would appear, on a cursory reading, to be little more than idle verbiage ; but it had a deep and important meaning. It ran thus :—" Whatever hereditary rights of this state descended to the late Nawaub Azoff-al-Dowlah now devolve upon me his successor ; let me enjoy such rights exclusively, and let all the inheritances of my ancestors and the whole of the rights attached to my family centre in me, and let no person interfere in or assume them." Colonel Scott was sufficiently acquainted with native diplomacy, and with the character of the Vizier, to be induced to suspect that more was meant than met the eye. He imagined that it might be intended to recognize the right of the Vizier to appropriate the property of the Bho Begum, and, with some hesitation, this construction was acknowledged by a moulavy retained by the Vizier to be the correct one.

This was, therefore, an indication of a design on the part of the prince to resort to the same means of enriching his treasury which had been practised by his predecessor under the patronage of Warren Hastings. It was believed that, in addition to the strong appetite for accumulation which the Vizier manifested at all times and under all circumstances, there was a peculiar reason for the attention which he thus bestowed on the reputed wealth of the begum. With the view, probably, of securing,

during her own life, the enjoyment of that wealth, she had proposed to the British government to make the Company her heir. The imprudence of the begum, or of some of her dependants, had, it was supposed, suffered the secret to reach the ears of the Vizier, and the mysterious article by which he sought to fortify his claims to succeed to all that was enjoyed or inherited by his predecessor was apprehended to have been the result. The resident very fairly took occasion to contrast this article with the first, in which he disclaimed the debts of the prince whom he succeeded. He claimed all the property which his predecessor possessed, or to which he was entitled, but he would have nothing to do with that prince's liabilities. Colonel Scott inquired by what rule of equity the debtor and creditor sides of the account were to be thus separated, but it does not appear that he received any answer. The fifth article was not dissimilar in its object from that by which it was preceded. It was wide and sweeping in its range:—"Should any person," it ran, "have obtained, or hereafter obtain, by breach of trust or other means, possession of specie or property belonging to this circar, let no one obstruct my taking back such property or specie." Ostensibly this was not open to objection. No one could properly desire to protect the possession of property fraudulently obtained; but the effect of the provision would have been to secure to the Vizier the power of subjecting whom he pleased to those means of pressure by which Oriental potentates are

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CHAP. XVII. accustomed to relieve wealthy subjects of a portion of their treasure. During the confusion that succeeded the death of Azoff-al-Dowlah, and continued through the short reign of Vizier Ali, it was suspected that much valuable property had been carried away from the private treasury, jewel-office, and wardrobe; and the suspicion was probably well founded. The British authorities did not wish to give impunity to these thefts, nor to screen from punishment those by whom it was merited; but neither did they wish to let loose on every person whom the Vizier might think a fit subject for experiment, the processes by which are tested the possession of property, and the degree in which the possessor is endued with the power of tenacity. Colonel Scott desired that the suspected persons might be pointed out, but he condemned the design of involving every person about the court in vexatious accusations. The thirteenth of the required stipulations was not less mysterious than some of those which had preceded it. It commenced with this recital:—"Some arrangement among the servants of the circar (state) calculated to diminish my expenses will become indispensable; and to obviate disturbances, it will become necessary to return such numbers only as can be paid monthly and regularly." These premises were followed by a very peremptory conclusion and a very sweeping demand:—"This arrangement can only be effected by dismissal, and I desire that no intercession be made for any person whatever." Who

were the persons destined for dismissal, and thus excluded from the benefit of intercession? Whomsoever the Vizier pleased—his brothers—the begum—the family of the deceased Vizier—the public servants of the state, and all persons holding jaghires or enjoying pensions. These provisions were intended to afford the Vizier a field for plunder. There were others, designed to secure to him the privilege of misgoverning his dominions without let or molestation. It was required that all correspondence should in future be carried on directly between the governor-general or the resident on the one part, and the Vizier on the other, to the exclusion of the ministers of the latter—“since the present practice,” said the prince, “is apt to render such people contumacious.” The resident was to shut his ears to every thing but what the Vizier chose should enter them: “Let the resident,” he said, “cordially and with sincerity uniting with me, pay no sort of attention to the representations of event-searching, self-interested persons.” Further it was demanded, that the British troops to be paid by the Vizier should remain permanently in the ceded countries, and that no interference, except in the way of advice, should take place in “any one” of the affairs—such were the Vizier’s words—of his government. Some of the proposed conditions would seem almost to have been framed with the intention of offering personal offence to the governor-general. The imputations conveyed in the following passages could not be misunder-  
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CHAP. XVII. stood :—“ When the matters now under discussion shall have been finally adjusted, according to what his lordship has written, let no fresh claims, of whatever sort, be advanced; let no increase be demanded.” And again—“ Let the engagements entered into between his lordship and this circar be firm and permanent, and let such a treaty be now drawn up, that no governor-general, who shall hereafter be appointed to the charge of the Company’s affairs, may have it in his power to alter, change, or infringe the said treaty.” Of the affronts thus offered to himself the governor-general took no notice; but he rejected the whole of the proposed conditions, partly on the ground that the demand made on behalf of the Company being a matter of right, compliance ought to be unshackled with any conditions, even though they should be unobjectionable, and partly because the conditions proposed, so far from being of this character, were calculated to bring disgrace on the British name, and ruin to the honour of the Vizier, the dignity and security of his relations, and the happiness of his subjects. Adverting to the articles which manifested more especially the Vizier’s dislike of British interference, the governor-general said : “ From these articles it appears that the Nawaub Vizier has already forgotten that the safety of his person and the existence of his government have been maintained exclusively by the British power, and by the presence of British troops. His excellency now seems disposed to gratify his unwarrantable suspicions at the hazard of

the continuance of his authority over his subjects, and even of his personal safety, by removing the British forces from his territories, and by confiding his government and his life to those whose treason had repeatedly endangered both." Passing on to the articles which were designed to gratify the Vizier's avarice, the governor-general thus expressed his opinion with regard to them: "The object of those articles appears to be, under the shelter of the British name, to cancel all the public debts of the state of Oude; to defraud and plunder the ancient and venerable remains of the family and household of Shoojah-ad-Dowlah, together with whatever is respectable among the surviving relations and friends of the late Nawaub Azoff-al-Dowlah; to involve the whole nobility and gentry of Oude in vexatious accusations and extensive proscriptions; to deprive the established dependants and pensioners of the state of the means of subsistence; to frustrate every institution founded in the piety, munificence, or charity of preceding governments, and to spread over the whole country a general system of rapacious confiscation, arbitrary imprisonment, and cruel banishment."

The negotiation continued to drag on for several months without apparently making any progress. The Vizier, on being apprized of the determination of the governor-general in respect to the proposed stipulations, declared that without their concession on the part of the British government he would not yield his assent to either of the plans which had

CHAP. XVII. been submitted to him ; but while thus refusing to be a party to the separation of his dominions, he affected a spirit of meek and patient resignation, declared that he had neither inclination nor strength to resist, and expressed a desire to proceed on a pilgrimage. During his absence he proposed that one of his sons should be invested with the office of deputy, and be empowered to carry into effect the territorial cession, as well as to complete the yet imperfect measure of reducing the Vizier's military force.

Before this scheme was brought to the knowledge of the governor-general he had determined to dispatch his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley,\* a gentleman endowed with singular talents for diplomacy, to co-operate with Colonel Scott in endeavouring to bring the British relations with the Vizier into a more satisfactory state. One motive to this step was the belief that the presence of one so nearly allied to the governor-general would have the effect of accelerating the Vizier's determination, and it was further intended to put an end to a hope which the Vizier was believed to entertain of procrastinating his decision till the arrival of the Marquis Wellesley on a visit, which he had long meditated, to the northern parts of India. To put an end to this hope, it was distinctly intimated that the governor-general was resolved not to hold any personal intercourse with the Vizier while the points in dispute remained undecided. Before Mr. Wellesley arrived, a premature intimation given by the resident to cer-

\* Subsequently created Lord Cowley.

tain aumils as to the payment in the coming year of the revenues for which they were responsible, gave the Vizier a pretence for withholding payment of the kists actually due. There appears in this case something to blame on both sides. The Vizier ought not to have withheld payments actually secured by treaty, unless he proposed to put an end to the treaty and was able to maintain his intention by force. At the same time, as there was no immediate necessity for the intimation given by Colonel Scott, it was an outrage upon the feelings of the Vizier which might well have been spared. It was more especially imprudent and reprehensible, as the deputation of Mr. Henry Wellesley to a diplomatic mission at the court of the Vizier had been announced. Although this appointment did not relieve Colonel Scott from the duty of watching the conduct of the Vizier and his officers, nor preclude him from bringing the negotiations in the mean time to a favourable issue if it were within his power, it ought to have suggested a careful abstinence from any measure, not absolutely necessary, which was calculated to give offence, and thus to embarrass a discussion in the management of which another was soon to have a principal share.\* The Vizier required that, as some reparation, the resident should call upon the aumils to pay their respects at the

\* The Marquis Wellesley had issued instructions to suspend for a time all proceedings towards establishing the Company's authority in the districts the cession of which was denied; but Colonel Scott had not received them.

CHAP. XVII. prince's durbar as usual. This it appeared they had never ceased to do, and the resident, feeling that any such intimation from him would seem to indicate that the British government faltered in its determination, refused to give it. Eventually the Vizier made the necessary payments, to prevent, as he said, the Company's affairs from being embarrassed by his withholding them.

A. D. 1801. Mr. Wellesley arrived at Lucknow on the 3rd of September. On the 5th he presented to the Vizier a memorial, recounting the motives which had led to his mission, and referring to the determination of the governor-general to avoid a personal interview with the Vizier under the existing state of circumstances; warning him that no change in the British councils at home would affect the general tenor of the policy of the British government in India,\* and that no relaxation would take place in pursuing the measures previously deemed necessary for the peace and prosperity of Oude and the security of the Company's dominions. The memorial

\* Mr. Pitt and his chief supporters, Lord Grenville, Lord Spencer, Lord Camden, Mr. Windham, and Mr. Dundas, had resigned office in consequence of the conscientious scruples of George III. to the proposed removal of the disabilities to which the Roman Catholics of Ireland were at that time subjected. Vague and incorrect reports of change had reached India some months before Mr. Wellesley's arrival at Lucknow (see a letter from the Marquis Wellesley to Colonel Scott, 21st June, 1801, contained in the Oude papers, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, 25th and 28th of June, 1805), and it was uncertain what the Vizier might have heard, or what effect the intelligence might have had upon him.

concluded by calling the Vizier's attention to the first of the two proposals which had been submitted to him, and inviting a discussion of its terms. The Vizier engaged to consider the subject, and after several days delivered his answer, declining, as on previous occasions, to agree to any arrangement which might involve the sacrifice of his sovereignty. The British negotiators sought to shake this determination, but in vain. The Vizier was peremptory in avowing his rejection of the plan, and declared it to be unqualified. The discussion of the second proposal made to the Vizier by the governor-general was then resumed; and after several days had been consumed in profitless disputation, the prince signified his readiness to assent to it on certain conditions. These conditions were, that he should be permitted to depart on a pilgrimage; that his authority during his absence should be exercised by one of his sons, the right of resuming the government on his return being reserved to the Vizier, in the event of his being disposed to avail himself of it. The British negotiators felt some doubt as to the course which it would be expedient for them to pursue, but finally they determined to accept the Vizier's consent thus qualified. But a new difficulty was immediately interposed, by a demand from the prince for the introduction of an article, providing that as the territories to be ceded were to be entirely under the management and control of the Company, so those to be retained by him should be exclusively under his own, or that of his heirs and successors.

CHAP. XVII. This was so directly at variance with the views avowed on the part of the British authorities throughout the negotiations, and with one main object of the proposed new arrangement, that the Vizier must have known it could not be entertained. The presumption is, that the attempt to revive discussion upon a question long before set at rest was only made for the purpose of delay. Other expedients for procrastination were found with the facility usual with Oriental diplomatists on such occasions; but at length a treaty was concluded, A.D. 1801. which on the 14th of November received the ratification of the governor-general. By this engagement the Vizier bound himself to cede territory yielding a revenue of one crore thirty-five thousand lacs, including expenses of collection, in commutation of all claims on the part of the British government, and he in return was released from all future demands on account of the protection of Oude or its dependencies. The engagement on the part of the Company to defend the Vizier from foreign and domestic enemies was repeated and confirmed, and the prince was restricted to the retention of a limited number of troops for purposes of state and revenue. A detachment of British troops, accompanied by a proportion of artillery, was to be at all times attached to the Vizier's person; the remainder were to be stationed in such parts of his dominions as might seem fit to the British government. The territories not ceded to the English were formally guaranteed to the Vizier, the guarantee being

accompanied by one of those provisions which the prince had been most anxious to avert—that in the exercise of his authority he was in all cases to be guided by the advice of the officers of the Company.

The proceedings, which have thus been reported at considerable length, must now be submitted to that examination to which all the acts of statesmen are justly subject. The right of increasing the number of troops stationed for the defence of Oude has been already discussed. It remains to consider whether the British government was justified in demanding either the entire surrender of the government of Oude, or the cession of so much territory as should cover the just claims of the Company, the latter part of the alternative being saddled with a condition, giving to the British authorities the power of interfering in the civil government of the remainder to an undefined extent.

The question whether it were lawful to propose to the Vizier to transfer his dominions entirely to the Company need give little trouble. The circumstances under which it was made are such as to deprive objectors of all reasonable and almost of all plausible ground of exception. There is no rule of morals which can preclude any individual or any community, any private person or any state, from inquiring whether any other individual, community, or state, be willing, upon certain conditions, or without any conditions, to surrender any thing which the party applied to may happen to possess. If a refusal

CHAP. XVII. be given, it is certain that in many cases it would be highly criminal to endeavour to obtain the object sought by violence; but a mere application, unsupported by force, is free from all imputation of moral delinquency, even though the object of it be unreasonable or extravagant. But the proposal to the Vizier to surrender his dominions was neither unreasonable nor extravagant. He was unable to defend them, and the trust had been committed to another power. He was equally unable to administer their internal government, the whole country being overrun by abuse and crime. He had himself acknowledged his incompetency to perform the duties of a sovereign, either with satisfaction to himself or benefit to his people; he had himself proposed to abdicate his throne, and it is to be recollected that by abdicating in favour of the Company he would have surrendered no rights but his own. His sons, by the accident of their birth, were deprived of all claims but what their father might choose to give them; and though it would have been unnatural and unjust to withhold from them the means of comfortable subsistence, he might without reproach withhold from any, or from all of them, the dangerous power of sovereignty, to which, except by his favour, they had no pretension. As to the effect of the suggested transfer upon the people, no one will be hardy enough to aver that the change would have been for the worse. Some indeed would have complained—the great renters and revenue contractors, who exercised without restraint the power to

pillage and oppress—all indeed who profited by the enormous mass of evil which existed in the dominions of the Vizier would have thought themselves aggrieved; but the people at large would have been immediately relieved from a portion of their sufferings; and though, in a country so long subjected to misgovernment, the progress of improvement must have been slow, it would, under the English authority, have been steady, had zeal in the good cause not outstript discretion. At all events, some improvement would have been certain. It appears, therefore, that in proposing the entire transfer of the dominions of the Vizier to the East-India Company, the governor-general proposed nothing that would have interfered with the rights of any one—nothing that, under the circumstances, could be believed to be disagreeable to the Vizier himself—while the advantages would not have been confined to the power which the Marquis Wellesley represented, but would have reached to the numerous and oppressed population which the Vizier professed to govern. The right to make the proposal being evident, and its rejection not having been followed by the employment of force, it would be unnecessary to say more on the subject, did not justice require the admission that the negotiators, to whom the care of the British interests at Oude was entrusted, do not appear on every occasion to have maintained that direct and straightforward course which the honour of their country demanded. This is a common error of diplomacy, and the instances

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CHAP. XVII. in which the British agents fell into it were not numerous ; but one glaring fallacy which they sought to impose on the Vizier must not be passed without notice. The Vizier had drawn up a paper, in which he had avowed very strongly his aversion to surrender his throne. On the ground that every point in it had before been thoroughly argued, the negotiators very reasonably deemed a fresh discussion a useless waste of time : but, in communicating this impression to the governor-general, they added, “ there was, however, one part of it which it was necessary to notice. His excellency reasoned upon the first proposition”—that which suggested the entire transfer of his dominions to the Company—“ as if the execution of it deprived him of the possession of the musnud ; whereas the true extent and meaning of it, and indeed the primary object, was to establish himself and posterity more firmly and securely on the musnud, with all the state, dignity, and affluence, appertaining to his exalted situation. His excellency,” the negotiators add, made “ no reply to the above observation,”\* and it certainly deserved none. In ordinary language, the throne indicates the exercise of sovereign power. To possess the musnud of Oude was not merely to occupy a certain seat, or to be addressed by a certain title : it involved the exercise of some, at least, of the functions of government. “ State, dignity, and affluence,” might, as promised, have awaited Saadut Ali on his descent. He might have given audience in royal

\* Letter to governor-general, 17th September, 1801.

state; troops of dependants might have bent in CHAP. XVII.  
homage before him; he and his successors might  
have borne the name of Vizier, in like manner as  
the potentate from whom he derived the title, and  
whose servant he professed to be, continued under  
circumstances far more humiliating to maintain the  
title of Emperor; wealth might have poured into  
his cup all that could enchant the senses or corrupt  
the heart; but it would be idle to represent this ag-  
glomeration of the elements of pomp, and pride,  
and pleasure as constituting what is meant when  
sovereign power is shadowed forth under the name  
of that which is its seat and symbol. Though the  
forms of sovereignty would have remained to Saadut  
Ali, its substance would have been gone. The  
change, indeed, would have been happy for his  
country, and not unfortunate for himself, but such  
would have been its extent; and it was beneath the  
character of British negotiators to represent it as  
that which it was not.

It remains to be ascertained whether, on the re-  
jection of his first proposal, the governor-general  
was justifiable in demanding a cession of territory  
of sufficient extent to secure the discharge of the  
Vizier's engagements to the East-India Company,  
and further, in demanding the recognition of the  
right of the British government to interfere in the  
administration of those territories which were not  
ceded. The determination of the former of these  
points must rest partly on the general rights of  
creditors, and partly on the positive provisions of

CHAP. XVII. the treaty concluded with Saadut Ali on his elevation to the throne. A creditor who, at the time of concluding an engagement, may be satisfied with the mere promise of payment, may, at a future period, see cause to require some security. Should this occur, there is nothing wrong in his demanding it; and if his apprehensions be reasonable, there is nothing harsh in the demand. The British government had undertaken a certain duty in consideration of certain payments to reimburse the charges attending the performance of it. They had cause to apprehend the failure of payment—no less cause than the representations of the party from whom payment was to proceed. Did, then, the representative of the British government justly incur blame for requiring some security for the fulfilment of engagements which he who was bound by them declared to be in danger of failure? There was but one other course open to him—to withdraw from the protection of Oude, and leave the country to its fate. He must take an extraordinary view of the rights, duties, and policy of nations who would maintain that this step should have been taken. The East-India Company were not mercenary brokers in the trade of defending nations—they did not hire out their troops to the best bidder, to be retained so long as the hirer might want or could pay for them—nor was their connection with Oude intended to be temporary. It was deliberately formed and solemnly confirmed by various treaties. The object of the rulers had been to save the

country from falling a prey to its neighbours, which CHAP. XVII.  
would undoubtedly have been its fate but for the  
protection of the British government; and that  
object had been attained. But it is not to be sup-  
posed that the Company's government were moved  
to what they had done by the desire of preserving  
dominion to a succession of ambitious vassals of the  
Mogul Emperor—they had views to the security of  
the British possessions, and those views would have  
been disappointed had Oude become a province of  
any neighbouring state. All the links of the chain  
by which Oude had been bound to the British go-  
vernment might not be of the purest or the brightest  
metal, but with this the governor-general of 1801  
had nothing to do. He found a certain connection  
subsisting; that connection was beneficial to the  
country which he represented, and it was his duty  
to maintain it. It was his duty also to see that the  
conditions attached to it were performed, and if  
there were danger of their being evaded, he was  
bound to obtain security.

Thus far upon general principles. Turning to  
the treaty with Saadut Ali, it will be found that the  
eleventh article runs thus:—"As the payment of  
the Company's troops in Oude depends upon the  
regular discharge of the subsidy stated in the second  
and third articles of the treaty, the said Nawaub  
engages to exert his utmost endeavours to discharge  
the stipulated kists\* with punctuality; but if, con-  
trary to the sincere intentions and exertions of the

\* Instalments.

CHAP. XVII. — said Nawaub, the payment of the kists should fall into arrears, the said Nawaub Saadut Ali engages and promises that he will then give such security to the Company for the discharge of the existing arrears and the future regular payment of the kists as shall be deemed satisfactory." Here is a distinct provision for security in case of failure of payment. Saadut Ali had discharged his kists, but not without pressing. They had been continually in arrear, but remonstrance had not yet failed to procure a clearance. The occurrence of an arrear was, however, sufficient to bring the provision of the treaty into operation; although to act upon this construction would have been harsh, had there been reason to conclude that the future would not be marked by any greater deviations from punctuality than had occurred in the past. But this was not so. It has already been seen that the statements of the Vizier himself tended to excite the expectation of very different results. On the occurrence of the contingency for which the eleventh article of the treaty provided, he was to give security not only for existing arrears, but for future regular payment, and this security was to be such as should be deemed satisfactory. It would be ridiculous to ask, satisfactory to whom? It was certainly not intended that the Vizier should determine the point—a very slight security would satisfy him. If the provision have any meaning, that meaning must be that the security should be satisfactory to the Company's government. When necessary to enforce it, the head of

that government thought the cession of territory CHAP. XVII.  
the only adequate security, and he thought justly.  
What other could be given? The only question that could arise was, whether the cession should be temporary or permanent; and this might be answered by reference to the nature of the claim. It was not for a single sum, which, once paid, would put an end to all future demand; it was a claim of periodical occurrence, and of perpetual duration; it was the remuneration of an important service of unceasing necessity; and it was fitting, therefore, that the security should be permanent as was the claim and the service out of which it arose. This view is warranted by the terms of the article—security was, if necessary, to be given for “the future regular payment of the kists.”

The course taken by the governor-general, in demanding security for the payments accruing from the Vizier to the British government, is thus defensible, both on general grounds and under the terms of the treaty. Was he justified in carrying his views beyond this, and demanding such power of interference in the administration of the Vizier's reserved dominions as might be sufficient to abate part of the monstrous evils which prevailed in them? This question may be considered with reference to the ordinary rights and duties of nations towards each other, or with regard to the peculiar and unprecedented nature of the connection which exists between the British government in India and its subsidiary allies. To fix the limits of the right of one independent

CHAP. XVII. — state to interfere in the internal affairs of another is a task of much difficulty and delicacy; but the practice of the most civilized nations seems conclusive as to the existence of the right. Various instances might be adduced of its exercise by European governments within the last half-century; and the right of intervention seems clear, when the course of events in an adjacent country is such as obviously tends towards confusion and anarchy. Every state is interested in the preservation of peace and order in neighbouring states, and the right of interference to maintain them is but part of the right of self-defence. Oude was rapidly passing—it would perhaps be more correct to say it had actually passed—into that state of barbarism in which the forms of government are all that remain, the power being altogether lost. The law had no force either to uphold civil rights or to punish crimes, and no man thought of invoking its aid. Within the palace of Lucknow sate one whose duty it was to restrain injustice and maintain right; but the people only knew of his existence by the heavy demands made on them in his name. They knew him only as the fountain and origin of oppression—never as the source of protection. Labouring under all the evils which follow when government is perverted altogether from its purpose, and when even the appearance of justice is disregarded, Oude was in a fearful condition with regard to itself, and not less so with regard to its neighbours; and it may safely be affirmed that, if ever a case existed in which one

state might properly interfere to introduce into an- CHAP. XVII.  
 other some approach to order, it was afforded by  
 Oude. The interference was justified by the danger  
 to the British dominions. Whether it would have  
 been justified on another ground which might be  
 taken—that of relieving the oppressed people of  
 Oude—without reference to the interests of the  
 British government, may be more doubtful; but  
 the affirmative of this question is maintained by  
 eminent jurists.\*

\* Among others, by Grotius, who argues, that if it were granted that subjects ought not, even under the most pressing necessity, to take up arms against their prince, we should not thence be obliged to conclude that others might not do it for them. "For wherever," says he, "the obstacle to any action arises from the person and not the thing, then what one is not allowed to do for himself another may do for him, supposing the case be such as one may be serviceable in it to another. Thus, for instance, a guardian or any other may carry on a suit of law for a minor, because he is not capable of doing it himself; and any one may, without order or commission, plead for a person absent. [This is said in reference to the office of *defensor*, under the Roman law, as opposed to *procurator*.] Now, what prohibits a subject to resist, does not at all proceed from a cause which is the same in a subject as in him who is not so, but from the quality and circumstances of the person, which quality does not pass to others. And therefore, according to Seneca, I may make war upon a man, though he and I are of different nations, if he disturb or molest his own country." In laying down this doctrine, Grotius was aware that it was very liable to be abused; and he goes on to argue, that the evil use of any thing by wicked men does not preclude its lawful employment with an honest intent; concluding with the significant remark—that "pirates sail on the seas and thieves draw swords as well as others."—*De Jure Belli et Pacis*, book ii., chap. 25. It may be remarked that the attempts of Great Britain to prevent foreign nations engaging in the slave-trade must be justified on principles not very dissimilar from those taken by Grotius.

CHAP. XVII. — But although to those whose sympathies with princes are strong, when those princes are the enemies of their country, it may be convenient to represent Oude as an independent state entitled to negotiate on terms of equality with the British government, no representation can be further from the truth. Oude had never been independent. It was a portion of the Mahometan empire of India, whose ruler acknowledged dependence upon the court of Delhi, and professed to have no right to govern but that which he derived from its pleasure. The measure of his obedience was, indeed, as happens in all such cases, proportioned to the degree of strength with which obedience could be enforced; but, theoretically, the position of Oude was that which has been stated. The weakness and ultimate disruption of the empire enabled the Emperor's deputy in Oude to take higher ground. He might have made a stand for the sovereignty on the plea of actual possession; but ambition led him to seek the extension of his dominions at the expense of his British neighbours, and by them he was vanquished. The series of events that followed continued to place him more and more within their power, until at length they came to exercise the highest possible act of superiority—that of determining the succession to the throne. This indeed was an inevitable consequence of their undertaking the military defence of the country. The power of the sword carries with it every other power. It does not give those who wield it the right of acting as they please—it does not relieve them from the ob-

ligations of justice and good faith, but it enables them to decide, without appeal, what justice and good faith demand. They are bound to decide according to right as far as their judgment enables them to discern right, and their responsibility is seriously increased by the fact that, whatever may be their decision, it cannot be effectually disputed, since they have at their command the power of enforcing it.

It is necessary to bear in mind that the relation of two states, one of which undertakes the sole military defence of another, is totally different from the relation subsisting between an army and the civil power of the state to which it belongs. In the latter case the army is the creature of the civil power—it exists only by its will and for its purposes. So long as it is maintained, it is to execute the orders of the chief civil authority without hesitation and without question; and if required by the same authority to lay down its arms, it is bound to obey with equal promptness and decision. Not so when a state incurs the obligations imposed upon the British government by its connection with Oude, and another, like the latter, consents to transfer to a neighbour the right of defending it. The engagement, in such a case, is not between a civil and a military authority, but between two civil authorities—those of the contracting states, the one of which undertakes to employ, in subordination to itself, a portion of its military force in a prescribed service, while the other agrees to dispossess itself, wholly or in part, of

CHAP. XVII. its military power and trust for protection to its ally.

From the moment that such a treaty is concluded, the one state is superior and the other dependent. The superiority is consequent on the maintenance of a military force, but it is not a superiority of military over civil power. The civil authority of the protecting state is pre-eminent, and employs an army as the instrument of maintaining its position and fulfilling its obligations. Such is the relation of the British government to the subsidiary states of India—such was its relation to Oude. Oude, therefore, was not independent—it was, in a certain sense, a portion of the British Indian empire—more properly so, perhaps, than it had ever been a portion of the Mahometan empire. In this view, could the British government be blamed for endeavouring to mitigate the oppressions under which the people groaned? Would it not, by neglecting this duty, have become a participator in the guilt of those to whom the ruin of the country was attributable? “The authority of the Nawaub of Oude,” said the Marquis Wellesley, addressing the Secret Committee, “was sustained exclusively by his connection with the Company’s government; and the reputation and honour of the British nation in India were deeply involved in the operation of that authority on the welfare and happiness of those countries over which it was upholden by the terror of our name, or exercised by the immediate force of our arms.”\* If it be criminal to oppress, it is

\* Letter to Secret Committee, 14th November, 1801.

criminal to lend to oppression countenance or support—this being granted, the right of the British government to interfere in the internal administration of the affairs of Oude is established. The policy pursued by the Marquis Wellesley towards Oude was not suggested, as had been some acts of his predecessors, by a desire to replenish an exhausted treasury—it had no connection, like the acts of others, with motives of private advantage—the grounds of it may be clearly stated in very few words. The increase of the British military force in Oude was necessary, and being necessary, the treaty with Saadut Ali provided for it. The demand of security for the payments accruing on account of this force was also necessary, in consequence of the indisputable, and indeed undisputed, fact, that without great change ruin must soon overwhelm all the resources of the country; and no adequate security could be afforded except in the way of territorial cession. In the territories retained by the Vizier, the British government had a right to interfere to protect the people; it had the power of interfering effectually; and having the right and the power, interference became a duty.\*

\* The policy pursued with regard to Oude was attacked in parliament soon after the return of the Marquis Wellesley to his own country; but no respectable party joined in the attack, and scarcely a respectable individual. It was headed by an obscure adventurer named Paull, who was under deep obligations to the nobleman whom he accused. These he repaid by endeavouring to subject his lordship to the expense, vexation, and anxiety, attending a parliamentary impeachment. At page 387, vol. ii., of Auber's

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When the treaty with the Vizier was ratified, the governor-general was on a progress through the

“ Rise and Progress of the British Power in India,” a curious letter is given, addressed by Mr. Paull, from Lucknow, to Sir John Malcolm, then Major Malcolm, and secretary to the governor-general. From this it appears, that Mr. Paull was engaged in some commercial business in Oude, which rendered his presence there necessary, but that the Vizier, who had taken some dislike to him, forbade it. By the intervention of the British government the objection was removed, and Mr. Paull not only took up his residence in Oude, but, as he states, lived “ mostly with Colonel Scott,” the British resident. In acknowledging the favour that had been shewn him, he says, “ As the most pernicious consequences must have attended a compliance with the very unjust request of his highness, I feel a proportionable degree of obligation to you, and a sense of gratitude that nothing can diminish.” Having acquitted his conscience towards the secretary, Mr. Paull proceeds, in due time, to discharge the same duty towards the governor-general. He had, it seems, addressed a paper to the marquis, complaining of some alleged grievances to which his commercial pursuits were still subjected, and this paper he feared, having been transmitted in an unusual mode, might not be well received. “ I sincerely hope and trust,” said he, “ that I have not offended his excellency in the mode I adopted of transmitting my address to his lordship. Colonel Scott, to whom I submitted it, thought it out of his department; and my friend Sydenham acquainted me that direct communication with Lord Wellesley was best. If, therefore, I have offended, it was most unintentional; *for sensibly do I feel the obligations I am under to his excellency, for whom I have only sentiments of gratitude and profound respect.*” In the same letter, Mr. Paull declared the Vizier to be a very dangerous, and, in his belief, a very bad man. The date of the letter is the 9th of February, 1803. On the 25th of June, 1805, Mr. Paull, having in the interim returned to England, and obtained a seat in parliament, moved for papers, on which he proposed to found charges of gross delinquency against the Marquis Wellesley, towards whom, a few months before, he had professed to entertain the feelings described in the passage above quoted—the transactions out of

northern provinces, undertaken with the view of CHAP. XVII.  
 informing himself of their state more particularly  
 than could be effected at Calcutta, of stimulating  
 by his presence the zeal of the Company's civil and  
 military servants, and ultimately of proceeding to  
 Lucknow to complete the arrangements which had  
 been begun and carried forward to a certain point  
 by others. On the 10th of January, 1802, he was A. D. 1802.  
 met at Cawnpore by the Vizier, who proceeded from  
 his capital for the express purpose of conduct-  
 ing the governor-general to Lucknow. Conclud-  
 ing that the mind of the prince could not fail  
 to be sore, from the effects of the long course of

which the charges arose having taken place some time before  
 Mr. Paull's letter was written, and under his own immediate ob-  
 servation. It is unnecessary to ask, could such an accuser be an  
 honest one? If it be said, that private feelings should not be  
 allowed to interfere with the discharge of a public duty, the  
 answer is, that a man should not accept of favours which he  
 means to return with blows. But it is to be observed, that Mr.  
 Paull's acknowledgments were not confined to the expression of  
 gratitude—he avows also his “respect”—respect for a man  
 whom he meditated bringing to the bar of the House of Lords,  
 on charges of high crimes and misdemeanors! But it is idle to  
 waste time in discussing the character of such an accusation,  
 or of such an accuser. It will be enough to mention, that  
 the Marquis Wellesley, though invited by the King to accept  
 office, on the dissolution of the Grenville administration in 1807,  
 declined it, on the ground of the charges pending against him.  
 The obstacle was of brief duration. The unhappy man by  
 whom the charges were brought involved himself, by a series of  
 reckless imprudences, in difficulties of every kind, and in quarrels  
 with every respectable person from whom he had ever met with  
 countenance or support. His own hand terminated his life, and  
 with him fell for ever the charges against his protector, the  
 Marquis Wellesley.

CHAP. XVII. attrition which preceded the conclusion of the treaty, the governor-general judiciously resolved to defer all reference to the object of his visit till, by the interchange of personal civilities, opportunity might be afforded of softening any feelings of asperity that might find place in the Vizier's heart, and disposing him to some measure of cordiality and confidence. The attention of the governor-general was assiduously directed to this purpose, and as he was endowed in an eminent degree with those qualities which are calculated to win for their possessor the esteem and affection of those towards whom they are exercised, his hope of succeeding was reasonable. Soon after arriving at Lucknow, the governor-general had a private conference with the Vizier, in which the attention of the prince was directed to various points of considerable importance both to the English government and that of the Vizier. One of these was the necessity of immediately taking measures for introducing an improved system of administration into the Vizier's reserved dominions, in conformity with the treaty. This was further pressed at a subsequent interview, when the Vizier returned to that system of evasion which was habitual to him, and which was never relinquished but under the pressure of necessity, and then only for a very brief period. He admitted the existence of the abuses and evils pointed out, and acknowledged the propriety of the remedial measures proposed, but accompanied these admissions by mysterious complaints of his want of sufficient authority to check

the evils or enforce the remedies. All attempts to draw from him any explanation of the nature of the impediments thus darkly alluded to were vain; but a paper which he soon afterwards delivered shewed the point towards which his objections were directed. The master grievance was the check interposed by the presence and counsel of the British resident. It would be idle to expect that the existence of such a check could ever be rendered agreeable or even tolerable to a prince who loves the exercise of power. If, moreover, the love of power be accompanied by a desire to exercise it for bad purposes—for purposes which an honest British functionary must feel it his bounden duty to resist—the irksomeness of the restraint will be greatly increased. The hatred of restraint will thus become greater in proportion to the necessity for imposing it. Saadut Ali loved power; but still more did he love that which power enabled him to obtain. He had contracted an unconquerable aversion to Colonel Scott, but he stated his views in general terms, and without any apparent reference to that officer. It has been seen that the Vizier was much disposed to be his own minister; and he demanded that whatever advice the resident might have to give should be communicated to him, in the first instance, without the presence of any other person; and further, that the resident should not hold any communication with the Vizier's subjects, except through his intervention. This second demand was most properly rejected. In answering it, the governor-general laid

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Among the cessions made by the Vizier to the British government was that of the tribute paid to the former by the Nabob of Furruckabad. The arrangement between these two princes was not unlike those between the British government and its subsidiary dependents. The Nabob of Furruckabad was restricted from maintaining more troops than were requisite for purposes of state, and the

Vizier was charged with the defence of the province both from internal and external enemies. The Nabob with whom the engagement was concluded, Muzuffer Jung, was murdered by his eldest son. The parricide escaped the severity of punishment which he well merited. His life was spared ; but he was carried to Lucknow and there confined by order of the Vizier. Consequent upon the conviction of the elder son, the inheritance was transferred to the second son of the murdered prince ; but he being a minor, it was necessary to appoint a manager. A person named Khirudmund Khan was selected for the office ; but having powerful enemies, who hoped to obtain an ascendancy in the new government for themselves, he refused to undertake it without the fullest assurance of support and protection from the British government. This was given, and the manager entered upon his office under the joint protection of that government and the Vizier.

The promise of support which Khirudmund Khan had required, the British government was, on various occasions, called on to fulfil. The enemies of the manager succeeded in establishing an unbounded influence over the mind of the young Nabob, and about the time of the changes at Oude, the Nabob, whose minority was nearly at an end, laid claim to the privilege of taking into his own hands the administration of affairs. Khirudmund Khan was equally anxious, or affected to be equally anxious, to be relieved from his charge, and to retire upon a

CHAP. XVII. provision which had been secured to him on the occurrence of such an event. The making some arrangement for conducting the affairs of Furruckabad was thus imperatively pressed upon the British government.

There was some difficulty in determining what that arrangement should be. According to Khirud-mund Khan, the disposition of the young Nabob was bad, and his natural propensities to evil had been aggravated by the advice and example of his associates. This representation, indeed, was to be received with caution, for the Nabob bore no good-will to the man by whom it was made, and the associates whom he charged with encouraging and multiplying the Nabob's vices were his own enemies, and had been competitors for the power which he exercised. He, too, was accused by the Nabob of abusing his office. On neither side do the accusations seem to have been substantiated; but on neither side were they destitute of probability. It is not incredible that an Oriental guardian should endeavour to profit unduly by his office—it is not incredible that an Oriental prince should find evil advisers and listen to them. In both cases the presumption lies against the parties accused.

The solution of the question, in what manner the government of Furruckabad should in future be administered, was entrusted by the governor-general to his brother, Mr. Henry Wellesley, who had been placed at the head of a commission for the settlement of the ceded provinces with the title of lieu-

tenant-governor. Mr. Wellesley commenced his task by calling upon Khirudmund Khan to communicate his views with regard to the future government of the province. The manager displayed a truly eastern reluctance to any direct avowal of opinion; but with some difficulty he was brought to state that three different modes suggested themselves to his mind:—that the administration of affairs should be continued in the same hands by which it had been carried on during the Nabob's minority; that the Nabob, on the attainment of the proper age, should be allowed to assume the government; or that the entire civil and military administration should be transferred to the British government. The first would probably have been the most agreeable to the manager: the last, he might expect, would be the most acceptable to his auditor; but the wary officer contented himself with suggestion, and presumed not to say which of the suggested plans was the best. Mr. Wellesley did not conceal his own leaning in favour of the transfer of all power to the government which he represented, and Khirudmund Khan professed himself ready to promote his views; but it is worthy of remark, that he never took a single step in furtherance of them. A proposal for the entire transfer of the Nabob's dominions to the Company was, however, made by Mr. Wellesley to the Nabob. The latter was very unwilling to relinquish the power to the enjoyment of which his hopes had so long been directed; but he reluctantly yielded. The province of Fur-

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The transfer of Furruckabad to the Company was made under circumstances differing in some degree from those of any similar transaction under the same administration. At Tanjore the prince owed every thing to the British government. By its power he was rescued from danger and degradation, and raised to a state of high rank and dignity. The numerous evils existing in Tanjore had long called for searching remedies. Circumstances enabled the British government to apply them in the most effectual manner, and with the free consent of the rightful successor to the throne. In the Carnatic, the perfidy of Mahomet Ali and his son gave to the Company the right of exercising, in any manner necessary for their own security, the power which they wielded. Here, too, monstrous abuses were to be repressed, and the criminal folly of the Nabobs afforded opportunity for repressing them. In Oude, again, there was abundant cause for the interposition of some powerful authority to deliver the country from the oppression which weighed it down. In Oude, too, the prince, as in Tanjore, owed his elevation to the British government; but his right to the exercise of sovereignty having been recognized, was respected. It would have been very desirable that his dominions should have been trans-

ferred to the Company—desirable, not merely for them, but for the sake of humanity. The transfer was asked, and being refused, another arrangement was adopted. It was desirable, also, that Furruckabad should pass altogether under the power of the Company. Great reforms were necessary; more especially as to the maintenance of civil rights, the prevention of crime, and the preservation of the public peace. Courts of justice seem to have been regarded as unnecessary instruments of luxury; robberies and murders were acts of constant occurrence, and no means were taken either to prevent or to punish them. Furruckabad was thus at once unhappy in itself and a source of alarm to its neighbours. It had previously been dependent—the dependent of a dependent—an appendage to the dominions of the Vizier, himself the creature of the British government. The Nabob, like his master, had given up the power and the right of defending himself, and retained only those functions of government which rendered him formidable to his own subjects. It cannot be doubted that the interference of the British government was warranted, and that it might lawfully have insisted on exercising the same power of supervision which had been obtained in Oude. Such a plan seems, from the following passage of a letter from Mr. Henry Wellesley to the governor-general, to have been meditated. “I should be unwilling,” said he, “to assume the management of the province of Furruckabad without the Nabob’s concurrence; but should he persist in

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— have certainly a well-founded claim to a portion of territory equal to the amount of the tribute, and to the expenses of collecting the amount. In the event, therefore, of his rejection of the proposal of transferring the whole province to the authority of the British government, it is my intention to demand the cession of a portion of territory equal to the amount of the tribute, and to the expenses of collection. I shall likewise insist upon the establishment of civil and criminal courts of justice throughout the province of Furruckabad, and upon security being given for the regular payment of the several stipends and pensions.\* It does not, however, appear that the alternative offered to the Vizier was tendered to the Nabob of Furruckabad. The only plan suggested to him was the transfer of his entire authority to the Company. He objected, but his opposition was offered with the deference natural to a weak power when contending with a strong one. He claimed the same degree of indulgence which had been extended by the Company to other dependent princes, but in vain; and the governor-general's representative seems to have displayed great anxiety to bring the affair to a conclusion, lest a necessity should arise either for allowing the Nabob to succeed to some limited exercise of dominion, or of forcibly dispossessing him of that which he claimed to retain. Whether the Nabob would have been benefited by being entrusted with power may reasonably

\* Letter to governor-general, 4th May, 1802.

admit of doubt; that it was for the advantage of his country to pass under British dominion is open to none. Still it is to be wished that the transfer had been effected in a less summary manner. It is the only transaction of the time in which the most scrupulous judgment, if honest and enlightened, can discover any thing to detract from the feeling of perfect satisfaction. CHAP. XVII.

The duty of settling the provinces acquired from the Vizier was performed by Mr. Henry Wellesley in a manner which secured for him the approbation of all to whom he was responsible. Some overgrown zemindars, who were disaffected to the new government because it tended to restrain the power which they had been long accustomed to abuse, offered resistance, which in a few instances was formidable; but they were ultimately subdued, and the entire country submitted peaceably to the British authority. Mr. Wellesley, on the close of his duties in the ceded provinces, departed for Europe, having established the reputation of an able public servant.\*

\* The appointment of Mr. Henry Wellesley was condemned by the Court of Directors as an interference with the rights of their civil service, and at variance with the provisions of the law. The Board of Commissioners, on the other hand, were disposed to defend the conduct of the governor-general. Perhaps neither the governor-general nor the Court incurred much of just reproach by the different views which they took of the subject. The Court were undoubtedly right to this extent—on all ordinary occasions the exercise of high office under the Indian government should be restricted to the covenanted servants of the Company. If this rule were frequently violated, the just expectations of the service would be defeated, and not less the purposes designed in

CHAP. XVII. the maintenance of such a service. But it does not appear that the appointment in question was liable to the charge of illegality. The Court referred to the 33 Geo. 3, cap. 52, sec. 57; but if the construction which they sought to give this act be correct, no member of the military service could ever be appointed to a civil office. It will hereafter be seen that an attempt was made to extend the interpretation of the law thus far. It is needless to say that such a construction of the law is not the usual one, the instances of military men being appointed to civil offices being too numerous to require or to permit of reference. Still the members of the civil service have undoubtedly the best claims to civil office, and it is only under peculiar circumstances that any other should be appointed. In the case of Mr. Henry Wellesley peculiar circumstances existed. He was nominated to conduct the negotiation with the Vizier, not only because he was a man of great ability, but because his near relationship to the governor-general was calculated to secure for him an extraordinary degree of attention and influence. His subsequent appointment to settle the ceded districts resulted from the former; and the title attached to his office indicated that it was of an extraordinary character. The governor-general ought not to be blamed for taking the best means—the best, apart from all considerations of comparative ability—for attaining the object which he had in view; nor should the Court of Directors be censured for evincing a jealousy of even an apparent invasion of the rights of their servants.

The following passage from a letter addressed by the Board of Commissioners to the Court of Directors, in reference to some representation from the latter on the subject, distinctly shews the disinterested character of the transaction:—"We have the less hesitation in recommending this course of proceeding [the suspension of any expression of opinion on the subject] as it appears by the advices from Bengal, received subsequent to the paragraph in question being approved by the Court [a paragraph disapproving of the appointment, and directing Mr. Wellesley's removal], that Mr. Henry Wellesley receives no emoluments whatever from the late appointment beyond those which he before enjoyed, under the special authority of the Court of Directors, as private secretary to the governor-general. This is a circumstance which we are satisfied the Court, regard being had to the importance and responsibility

of the trust, will not only consider as peculiarly honourable to CHAP. XVII.  
Mr. Wellesley, but also as furnishing in itself, as far as the pre-  
sent proceedings might in future be hazardous as a precedent, no  
inconsiderable security against such a danger; especially as we  
may at all times safely rely on the vigilance and authority with  
which the Court will be prepared to enforce the regulations of  
its own service, whenever it shall appear to them that they have  
been unwisely or unnecessarily infringed." See, on this subject,  
Despatches, vol. v. pages 71 to 81.

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ON the 1st of January, 1802, at a time when his policy was everywhere throughout India crowned with the most brilliant success, the Marquis Wellesley addressed to the Court of Directors a despatch, intimating his desire to resign his office at the close of that year or the commencement of the succeeding one. The desire of the governor-general to be thus early relieved from an office in which he had rendered to his country such splendid service, and acquired for himself so much honour, would be inexplicable without reference to the feelings with which he was regarded at home. In his official despatch he did not enter into the reasons which led to the tender of his resignation, but other documents supply the deficiency.\* He had not the confidence of the Court of Directors, and he felt it. They had, on various occasions, issued orders which the governor-general felt as

\* Especially a letter to Mr. Addington, dated ten days after the despatch referred to in the text, and contained in vol. ii. of the Despatches.

offensive to himself, and others which he viewed as dangerous to the public service.

Among these was a peremptory order to reduce the army, especially in the peninsula. This arrived at a time when it could not be obeyed without putting in hazard not only recent conquests, but the entire fabric of the British empire in India. The governor-general suspended its execution, and, as will hereafter be seen, subsequent events amply justified the exercise of this discretion. As the increase of the army had been the act of the governor-general, he considered the order for its reduction to have been framed in a spirit of personal hostility; but it was probably only the offspring of a blind economy. Some other instances of frugality would seem to be more open to the suspicion of personal aim. Colonel Wellesley, who held the chief command in Mysore, was by the nature of his duties subjected to heavy expenses; his allowances were consequently fixed by the government of Madras on a liberal scale. The home authorities thought them too great. On this subject his lordship expressed himself in the language of indignant remonstrance. After stating that, though the duty of fixing the allowances of Colonel Wellesley was part of the ordinary detail of the government of Madras, with which the governor-general did not interfere except in cases of exigency, it must yet be reasonably supposed that he was cognizant of the subject, and had exercised his judgment with regard to it, although no record of such judgment might exist, the marquis demands,

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“Can the Court of Directors suppose that I am capable of permitting the government of Fort St. George to grant an extravagant allowance to my brother, and that my brother is capable of accepting such an allowance? If such be the opinion of the Court, it ought to remove Colonel Wellesley from his command and me from my government.”\* He continues: “The fact is, that the allowance is scarcely equal to the unavoidable expenses of Colonel Wellesley’s situation, which is known to be of a very peculiar nature, involving the necessity of a great establishment and of other charges requisite for the maintenance of our interest in that recently conquered kingdom.” After dwelling upon the affront offered to his brother, and its possible effect, the governor-general adds: “It cannot be denied that the Court, by reducing the established allowances of Colonel Wellesley, has offered me the most direct, marked, and disgusting personal indignity which could be devised. The effect of this order must be, to inculcate an opinion that I have suffered my brother to derive emoluments beyond the limits of justice and propriety; and that I have exhibited an example of profusion and extravagance in an allowance granted to my nearest connection. I have already stated that the ground of the order is as unjust and unwarranted in point of fact, as its operation is calculated to be injurious and humiliating to my reputation and

\* Letter to Mr. Addington, *ut supra*.

honour. If the Court of Directors really was of opinion that Colonel Wellesley's allowances were too high, the respectful and decorous course would have been to have referred the question to my consideration; nor can it be imagined that the Court would have omitted so indispensable a precaution of delicacy and justice, unless the Court acted under a strong sense of displeasure and discontent at the general tenor of my administration, and under the influence of an unconquerable jealousy of my intentions."

This passage affords a clue to some of the acts of which the governor-general complained. There was at home a strong feeling "of displeasure and discontent at the general tenor of" the Marquis Wellesley's "administration," and "an unconquerable jealousy of" his "intentions." He had added greatly to the British dominions in India, and had still more widely extended British influence. This, in the eyes of the politicians who had been educated in the school which flourished for thirty years from the time of Warren Hastings, was an offence not to be expiated. As neither defence nor conquest can be effected without armies, and the maintenance and equipment of armies require money, the great designs which had been promoted with unparalleled vigour and success had necessarily given rise to an increased military expenditure. The views of France had been counteracted; Tippoo, the old and irreconcilable enemy of England, had been subdued; and the British government in India,

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in place of being at best a second-rate power, as the Marquis Wellesley had found it, was now in a position to give law to the varied nations diffused over Hindostan and the Deccan. The policy which had led to these results was not that which had so long formed a standing topic for the advocacy of frothy orators and wordy pamphleteers—it was not that which had been embodied in every form that folly, under the guise of prudence, or of generosity or of justice, could assume—which had even found a solemn recognition of its truth in the resolutions of parliament and on the statute-book of the country—it was not the policy which the Marquis Cornwallis, both a good and an able man, had upheld in words, while, with marvellous inconsistency, he departed from it in deeds, but which his successor had followed with greater single-mindedness, and with a steady adherence which, pursued a few years more, would have brought the British settlements to that state in which Clive found Bengal when he undertook its deliverance—far above this soared the policy of the Marquis Wellesley—far above the understanding of those puny politicians who had been accustomed to talk fluently about the government of India, in ignorance alike of the circumstances of the country, of the great principles of general polity, and of the lessons which history affords to those who will profit by them. A body popularly elected must always partake, in a great degree, of the feelings and prejudices of those whom they represent. The views of those who

looked to India, not to consider how we should maintain our power there, but rather how we should get rid of it, or at least prevent its increase, formed part of the popular creed on the subject, and of natural consequence those views found their way into the Court of Directors. It is true that they could hardly be avowed there or anywhere else. The subjugation of Tippoo Sultan was so complete; the glory which attended it was so brilliant; the war was withal so obviously necessary, that it was scarcely possible to impugn it. None did impugn it. The enthusiasm with which the news of the conquest of Mysore was received in England—the unanimous admiration which was awarded to its author, were probably aided by the consideration that the conquest of Tippoo was virtually a defeat of the French; for though the English people at that period found it hard to conceive that lawful occasion for war could ever arise in India, they were quite alive to the existence of dangers nearer home. When between themselves and a powerful and deadly enemy a narrow channel only intervened, a blow at that enemy was welcome even though it were struck in India. Still beneath the stream of gratulation called forth by the fall of Seringapatam and its master, there was an under-current of long-established prejudice flowing in an opposite direction, which, as the former subsided, appeared once more on the surface, and carried with it that numerous class of light and wandering minds, who, having no

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opinions of their own, readily adopt those which happen from any cause to be generally received—and thus, ere long, the services of the Marquis Wellesley came to be associated with the returning recollection that they had been performed without respect to established prejudices, although those prejudices were sanctioned by the wisdom of parliament.

Then, too, though the Marquis Wellesley had effected great objects—though he had given safety, coherence, stability, and grandeur, to the tottering fabric which had been committed to his keeping, one thing was wanting—he had not performed the miracle of moving large armies, conquering formidable enemies, and defending a vast extent of country, without a considerable outlay of money. To that spirit which looks at the cost rather than the value of any measure, this could not fail to be offensive. Nations have been ruined by profusion, but this has been when wealth has been lavished in ministering to the sensual delights of their rulers—in enriching parasites and flatterers—in heaping on the unworthy and the base those treasures which should have been devoted to objects of national importance. No nation was ever ruined—no nation was ever impoverished, by keeping its fleets and armies in such a state of efficiency as should render it secure at home and respected abroad; but neglect of these precautions may be fatal, and the ruin that may ensue will not be alleviated, nor those involved in

it consoled, by the recollection that the neglect had its origin in a motive very laudable in its place—the desire of diminishing the burdens of the state.

These feelings—the morbid sentiment, which, while it allowed Englishmen in all parts of the world except India to keep their foes at a distance, called upon them there to wait till the matchlock was presented, or the scimitar raised; and that spirit of thriftless parsimony which sees no evil but the expenditure of money, had tended to produce what the Marquis Wellesley describes as “a strong sense of displeasure and discontent at the general tenor of” his “administration.” But this was not all: he believed, and not without reason, that those by whom he was thwarted acted “under the influence of an unconquerable jealousy of” his “intentions.” They augured of the future from the past. They had found the Marquis Wellesley a very different governor-general from his predecessor—they had learned, that while the reins of power were in his hands, no one throughout India would be permitted with impunity to offer to the British government either injury or insult. The man whose name had so long been a terror in India had fallen before him. The governor-general had braved Tippoo Sultan in his lair, and the name and dynasty of that prince had disappeared. Some other enemy might call for chastisement, and the same results might follow. The governor-general had so distributed the domi-

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nions of the conquered despot that a large portion of them had become British in name, and nearly the whole British in fact. If just cause of provocation should arise in other cases, what was to prevent a repetition of this course? and if it should be repeated, what would become of all the virtuous denunciations of extended dominion in which individual philanthropists had indulged, and of the prohibitions by which parliament had sought to limit the glory, power, and resources of the British empire? what of the numerous prophecies which had been uttered, of ruin to Great Britain from the enlargement of her Eastern empire? If ruin did not follow, and the prophecies were thus falsified, what, above all, was to become of the credit of the prophets? Where such views and such fears were entertained, how could confidence be reposed in the Marquis Wellesley? How could those who cherished them regard his intentions with any feeling but that of jealousy? Every ship that arrived might be expected to bring intelligence of some fresh act by which, in the exercise of an enlightened and manly policy, he had again offered violence to the petty and impracticable rules by which the legislature had sentenced India to be governed. Some new outbreak of patriotic feeling—some new triumph bearing witness to the governor-general's sagacity and decision, and crushing to dust the miserable theories laid down for his guidance, might constantly be apprehended. The opponents of the

Marquis Wellesley were thus not only dissatisfied with his past acts, but they looked to the future with dismay. He who in so short a time had changed the face of India, might change it still more—might make the British power still greater, and more irresistible, than he had made it. On these grounds, those who differed from his views entertained “an unconquerable jealousy of” his “intentions.”

It must not be supposed that all who felt this jealousy were insensible to their country's honour or adverse to its interests. Circumstances had led men to reason with regard to India as they would not reason with regard to any other spot of the habitable earth. The opinions once so current concerning India—opinions which, had they been acted upon, would long ago have relieved the English people from the labour of considering how their Oriental empire should be governed—have not been applied elsewhere. Men who contended in blood against the separation from Great Britain of her transatlantic possessions, have been willing to leave British India a prey to either native adventurers or European enemies. Men who would rather have seen Britain engulfed in the ocean which surrounds her, than yield her claim to the rock of Gibraltar, have deemed the most magnificent empire ever held in dependence as scarcely worth the keeping. It would be tedious to discuss at length the causes of these hallucinations. They exist, and all statesmen whose views have been free from such delusions have re-

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ceived very annoying evidence of their existence. The Marquis Wellesley, it has been seen, did not escape this fate.

But darkness of political vision and undue parsimony were not the only sources of the hostility directed against the Marquis Wellesley. A body of men, who at that time exercised a very powerful interest in the councils of the Company, conceived that their interests were injuriously affected by some measures adopted by the governor-general with regard to trade. The Company's monopoly had a few years before been relaxed, by an enactment requiring them to provide a certain amount of tonnage annually for the use of private merchants. As far as the export trade from Great Britain was concerned, the extent of the provision was probably sufficient, as at that time there was little demand in India for British manufactures; but it was not sufficient for the return trade. There was throughout Europe a considerable demand for various articles which India could furnish, and the supply of this opened a convenient mode of remittance to persons who had acquired fortunes in that country which they proposed to invest and enjoy at home. From this state of things a large portion of the exports of India found their way to Europe in foreign shipping, though the trade was supported and carried on by British capital—the accumulations of the servants of the East-India Company. For this state of things there was no remedy but the employment of India-built shipping, to an extent which

might supply the deficiency in the Company's tonnage; thus diverting a valuable and increasing department of trade from foreign to British ships. Though in England extraordinary delicacy of feeling had been manifested with regard to Indian princes, though the exercise of the right of self-defence has been almost proscribed in their favour, little sympathy has ever been displayed towards the people at large. Subjected to British rule, they had been treated as aliens, and denied rights enjoyed by every other class of British subjects. The London ship-builders chose to consider the extension of justice to India as an act of injustice to them. Some time before the departure of the Marquis Wellesley they remonstrated against it, and though it was obvious that the employment of India-built ships would displace not British but foreign tonnage, they demanded its prohibition. The degree of justice attending this demand is accurately and forcibly depicted in a communication from Mr. Dundas, then President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, to the chairman of the committee of ship-builders. "The injustice of the proposition," says he, "consists in depriving a great description of the subjects of Great Britain of a right undoubtedly belonging to them. The British territories in India are under the sovereignty of Great Britain, and the ships built there are equally entitled to all the privileges of British-built shipping as those built in the West Indies, or Canada, or any other foreign dependency

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of the empire; and I have never heard that the ship-builders in Great Britain have set up a claim to prohibit any of the shipping in those quarters from bringing home the produce of those territories in ships of their own building, if they found it convenient to do so; and yet it is obvious that the same plea of interest and supposed injury would equally apply.\* Having vindicated the rights of the people of India to be regarded as British subjects—a right seldom thought of by the declaimers on Indian wrongs, the writer proceeded to shew that the view taken by those whom he was addressing, of their own interests and those of the British nation, were erroneous, observing:—"They (the ship-builders) conceive that the prohibition of Indian-built ships coming to Great Britain would make a proportionate degree of room for the shipping of the East-India Company. It would have no such effect. It would have no other effect than that which it has always had, of driving those ships, with their cargoes, into foreign ports, and thereby establishing in foreign countries an Asiatic commerce, founded on British capital, which, by a contrary policy, ought, in the first place, to centre in the river Thames, and be from thence re-exported for the supply of other European nations." Sound as were these views, they failed to satisfy the shipping interest, which continued to employ its vast influence in the

\* Letter from the Right Honourable Henry Dundas to John Perry, Esq., 1st July, 1797. It will be found in vol. v. of the Wellesley Despatches.

courts of the East-India Company to withhold from the shipping of India all participation in the trade carried on between that country and Great Britain.

The necessity, however, of providing some extent of extra tonnage was so apparent, that it was impossible to resist it. Accordingly, authority was given to the government of Bengal to take up a limited amount of tonnage on account of the Company, and relet it to the merchants of Calcutta. The Marquis Wellesley, on his arrival at that place, had been assailed by representations from the mercantile community in favour of the employment of India-built ships, and in carrying into effect the orders from home, he made some changes calculated to divest the authorized measure of some incumbrances which tended to impede its beneficial operation. He took the same course at a subsequent period, and thus at once earned the gratitude of the mercantile interest of India, and the relentless enmity of the ship-builders of the port of London. Between the two periods of granting indulgence to India-built ships a year had intervened, during which it had not been resorted to; and the experience of that year was stated by the governor-general to have attested the expediency of restoring it. “Goods to a large amount,” he said, “originally intended for the port of London, were sold to foreigners in the port of Calcutta, and thus diverted to the channel of the foreign trade.”\* This result

\* Letter to Court of Directors, 30th September, 1800.

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appeared to the governor-general to justify a return to the position of the preceding year. "The rapid growth," said he, "of the foreign trade during the last season urgently demanded the immediate interference of your government on the spot. The number of foreign ships actually in the port of Calcutta, the alacrity, enterprize, and skill of the foreign agents now assiduously employed in providing cargoes, and the necessary inaction and languor of the British private trade, embarrassed by the restraints of the existing law, created a serious apprehension in my mind, that any further delay in the decision of this momentous question might occasion evils of which the remedy might hereafter become considerably difficult, if not absolutely impracticable. The unrestrained progress of the foreign trade in the present season, added to its great increase during the last, might have established its predominance over the private trade of British subjects, to an extent which no future regulation might have proved sufficient to limit or restrain. The difficulty of diverting this lucrative commerce from the channel into which it had been forced would naturally be aggravated, in proportion to the length of time during which the trade should continue to flow in that course." Such were the views, or rather such was the necessity, under which the governor-general acted. It is a case in which it is impossible to assign to his conduct any motive but a sense of public duty. He did not desire the responsibility which circumstances forced upon him, but was anxious to be relieved

from it. He complained, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, that the private tonnage had given him great trouble; and adds—"I shall endeavour to proceed at least so far as to prevent the trade from taking a bent towards foreign European markets this year; and you ought, in justice to my situation, to decide the question at home."\* Yet, while thus suspending for a season the operation of measures which he felt to be just, wise, and necessary; while seeking to be relieved from the painful duty of upholding them on his own responsibility, he incurred the resentment of those who supposed themselves injured by those measures, and thus added another active ingredient to the elements of opposition which were fermenting at home.

After tracing to their sources the hostile feelings manifested towards one who had exercised the powers entrusted to him with an ability and success unequalled by any of his predecessors, it will be proper to advert briefly to such manifestations of those feelings as have not hitherto been noticed. The orders to reduce the army have been mentioned, as well as those relating to the allowances of Colonel Wellesley. The Court had, in other instances, animadverted on measures of policy in a manner which the governor-general regarded as offensive. On some of these points he appears to have felt a degree of indignation which, at this distance of time, seems scarcely warranted by the occasion. But high genius is ever associated with

\* See Wellesley Despatches, vol. ii. page 203.

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strong sensibility. The Marquis Wellesley knew his own purity; he knew also the feelings with which he was regarded at home; and it need excite no surprise, if, irritated by annoyances which he thought an ungracious return for his eminent services, he should have alluded to some of them with more impatience than they now seem calculated to excite.

The attacks from home were not confined to the emoluments of those in whom the governor-general reposed confidence: in various instances their removal from the offices which they enjoyed was directed, and the appointment of other persons, specially named, enjoined. He who studies the history of British India cannot fail to be gratified as he advances, by finding that matters merely personal became of less frequent recurrence and of less prominent interest. For a long period personal disputes occupy a very large portion of the scene: these are, after a time, almost entirely superseded by questions of higher interest. Amidst the great events which mark the administration of the Marquis Wellesley, it would be wrong to pause for the purpose of discussing the merits of the servants of the government, except so far as they were connected with those important facts which it is more especially the province of history to record. A very brief notice of the acts of the Court, in displacing certain servants from office and appointing others, must therefore suffice. The governor-general had appointed Colonel Kirkpatrick secretary in the political depart-

ment. The Court ordered the appointment to be rescinded, on the ground that his military commission disqualified him for civil office. This was a new construction of the law, and certainly had the appearance of having been specially devised for the occasion. The Marquis Wellesley was not the first governor-general who had nominated military men to political or civil duties. He found the practice to a certain extent existing; and it is not inapplicable to remark, that it has never been entirely discontinued. The general rule, undoubtedly, should be to distribute civil appointments among the members of the civil service; but, with reference to the peculiar delicacy and difficulty of the political offices under the governor-general, it may sometimes become necessary to dispense with the rule. Where a military officer possesses a pre-eminent degree of fitness for such an appointment, it is obviously not for the benefit of the public service to pass him by. On the same principle which was applied to Colonel Kirkpatrick, orders were given to revise the appointment of Colonel Scott at Lucknow, with a view to rescind it. This was certainly an ungracious step towards both the governor-general and Colonel Scott. A most important negotiation had been brought to a successful conclusion—that which had been done was formally approved from home—yet discouragement, and, indirectly, blame, were cast both on him who had devised the plan and on him by whom it had been carried into effect. In other instances, both at Bengal and Madras, the Court had directed

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changes having no reference to the principle applicable to those above noticed, or to any other that can now be discovered. The home authorities rarely interfere in the exercise of the local patronage of India, but in the way of check and control. The advantage derived from the power of superintendence and revision would, it is clear, be lost, if the Court were to dispose, in the first instance, of the offices of the Indian government: they have accordingly, for a long series of years, exercised great caution in interfering with the distribution of office in India. Where an officer has been unjustly removed, the power of the Court may properly be exerted to restore him; but in ordinary cases, it is certain that the assumption by the home authorities of the right of dispensing the local patronage would be subject to great suspicion, and might possibly give rise to great abuse.\* The Marquis Wellesley believed that the extraordinary interference from home was intended to give personal annoyance to himself and Lord Clive. The latter nobleman entertained the same impression. He had entered cordially and zealously into the policy of the Marquis Wellesley, and the hostility displayed towards the governor-general was believed for this reason to be extended to the governor of Fort St. George.

There was one further ground of difference between the Court of Directors and their governor-general, which, although it had not been fully developed, it will be convenient to notice here, to avoid

\* Sec. 81 of 53 Geo. 3, cap. 155, was specially designed to meet this evil.

interrupting the progress of the narrative hereafter. The altered situation of the Company had not at this time produced any alteration in the mode of selecting their servants, or of preparing them for their duties. The Marquis Wellesley saw the evil, and determined on providing a remedy. In a minute of great length and ability,\* he adverted to the vast changes which had taken place since Great Britain first obtained a settlement in India, to the extent of the Company's dominions, the important duties devolving on their servants, and to the qualifications which they ought to possess. After dwelling upon these points in detail, he thus summed up his views:—"The civil servants of the English East-India Company, therefore, can no longer be considered as the agents of a commercial concern. They are, in fact, the ministers and officers of a powerful sovereign; they must now be viewed in that capacity, with reference not to their nominal but to their real occupations. They are required to discharge the functions of magistrates, judges, ambassadors, and governors of provinces, in all the complicated and extensive relations of those sacred trusts and exalted stations, and under peculiar circumstances, which greatly enhance the solemnity of every public obligation, and aggravate the difficulty of every public charge. Their duties are those of statesmen in every other part of the world, with no other characteristic differences than the obstacles opposed by an unfavourable climate, by a foreign language,

\* Recorded 10th July, 1800.

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by the peculiar usages and laws of India, and by the manners of its inhabitants. Their studies, the discipline of their education, their habits of life, their manners and morals, should therefore be so ordered and regulated as to establish a just conformity between their personal consideration and the dignity and importance of their public stations, and to maintain a sufficient correspondence between their qualifications and their duties. Their education should be founded in a general knowledge of those branches of literature and science which form the basis of the education of persons destined to similar occupations in Europe. To this foundation should be added an intimate acquaintance with the history, languages, customs, and manners of the people of India, with the Mahometan and Hindoo codes of law and religion, and with the political and commercial interests of Great Britain in Asia. They should be regularly instructed in the principles and system which constitute the foundation of that wise code of regulations and laws enacted by the governor-general in council, for the purpose of securing to the people of this empire the benefit of the ancient and accustomed laws of the country, administered in the spirit of the British constitution. They should be well informed of the true and sound principles of the British constitution, and sufficiently grounded in the general principles of ethics, civil jurisprudence, the law of nations, and general history, in order that they may be enabled to discriminate the charac-

teristic differences of the several codes of law administered within the British empire in India, and practically to combine the spirit of each in the dispensation of justice and in the maintenance of order and good government. Finally, their early habits should be so formed as to establish in their minds such solid foundations of industry, prudence, integrity, and religion, as should effectually guard them against those temptations and corruptions with which the nature of this climate and the peculiar depravity of the people of India will surround and assail them in every station, especially on their first arrival in India. The early discipline of the service should be calculated to counteract the defects of the climate and the vices of the people, and to form a natural barrier against habitual indolence, dissipation, and licentious indulgence; the spirit of emulation in honourable and useful pursuits should be kindled and kept alive, by the continual prospect of distinction and reward, of profit and honour; nor should any precaution be relaxed in India which is deemed necessary in England, to furnish a sufficient supply of men qualified to fill the high offices of the state with credit to themselves and with advantage to the public. Without such a constant succession of men in the several branches and departments of this government, the wisdom and benevolence of the law must prove vain and inefficient. Whatever course and system of study may be deemed requisite in England to secure an abundant and pure source for the efficient

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supply of the public service, the peculiar nature of our establishments in the East, so far from admitting any relaxation of those wise and salutary rules and restraints, demands that they should be enforced with a degree of additional vigilance and care, proportioned to the aggravated difficulties of civil service, and to the numerous hazards surrounding the entrance to public life in India.”

Such were the views entertained by the Marquis Wellesley as to the importance of due preparation for the discharge of the important duties of the civil service of India. He proceeded to shew that the minds of the young men annually arriving at the presidencies in the capacity of writers had rarely undergone any adequate preparation—that from some, all instruction in liberal learning had been withheld, while in others, the course of study had been interrupted precisely at the period when it might have been pursued with increased advantage—that in India they had no opportunities of acquiring even the technical knowledge requisite to fit them for civil office—knowledge of the languages and customs of the natives; of the regulations and laws; or of the details of the established system of revenue—that the well-disposed and industrious were bewildered for want of a guide, while others, devoting themselves wholly to luxury and sensual enjoyment, remained sunk in indolence, until their standing in the service rendered them eligible to some office of trust, for which, however, they were incapable, from want of preparation, and from the

difficulty of suddenly breaking long-indulged habits of idleness and dissipation. There were not wanting, indeed, instances of application to study and habitual propriety of conduct; but all the merits of the civil servants, it was urged, were to be ascribed to themselves, while their defects were to be attributed to the constitution and practice of the service, which had not been accommodated to the progressive changes of our situation in India—had not kept pace with the growth of the empire, or with the increasing extent and importance of the functions and duties of the Company's servants. To remedy the existing evils, the governor-general proposed to establish a college in Calcutta, for the reception of writers for the three presidencies, who were there, for a limited period, to be subjected to the restraints of academic discipline, and trained in such studies as might fit them for their future duties. These were to be pursued under the superintendence of two clergymen, chaplains in the Company's service;\* for the native languages moonshees were to be provided. The expense of the institution was to be provided for in a manner which should not in the first instance subject the Company to any additional charge; but the governor-general expressed a hope that the liberality of the Court of Directors would in due time be extended to it. It was established without previous reference home, and the

\* Mr. Brown, the senior chaplain, and Mr. Buchanan, afterwards so well known by his meritorious exertions to direct attention to the ecclesiastical condition of India.

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— following grounds were assigned for the omission: a conviction of the great immediate benefit to be derived from the early commencement even of the partial operation of the plan—the experience of the advantages which had already in some instances been derived from the systematic study of the native languages—the anxiety felt by the governor-general to impart to the young men arrived from Europe within the three preceding years a share of the anticipated benefits of the institution, and a solicitude, perfectly natural in its projector, to superintend the foundation of the college, and to accelerate and witness its first effects.

It will be judged, from the rapidity with which the design was carried into execution, that the establishment of the College of Fort William was a favourite object with the Marquis Wellesley. It was not so fortunate as to meet equal favour in Great Britain. The Court of Directors, prepared to look with suspicion on any proposal originating with the governor-general, feeling perhaps some displeasure, not altogether unwarranted, that the plan had been actually carried into effect without their concurrence, and anticipating a charge upon their finances of heavy and undefinable extent, withheld their approval of the magnificent establishment which had been devised, but voluntarily sanctioned the formation of an institution of more humble pretensions, at each of the presidencies, for instruction in the vernacular languages. The abolition of the college followed.

The plan thus frustrated by orders from home

demands some examination, on account both of the important objects which it was designed to promote, and the character of him to whom it owed its origin. That it is desirable that the civil servants of the East-India Company should be well-educated men, is a position from which few will be found to dissent. There are instances in which men, having few of the advantages of liberal education, have not only raised themselves to high station, but have shewn an eminent degree of fitness for the position which they have attained. But these instances, where native strength of mind has supplied the gifts which in ordinary cases are only to be acquired by study, cannot be admitted to afford an adequate foundation for the establishment of a general rule. There is reason to believe that, at the time the Marquis Wellesley recorded the minute from which his views on the subject have been quoted, the education of many of those destined to discharge in India the duties of statesmen, legislators, judges, and financiers, was extremely defective. The original commercial character of the East-India Company had led to the belief that the measure of education which fits a youth for the counting-house—perhaps something less than the ordinary measure—was enough to qualify him for the civil service of India. During the latter half of the last century, the prevailing feeling on the subject of education was narrow and illiberal. At an earlier period, whoever received any education at all was instructed in the elements at least of classical knowledge. The extension of the commercial interest of

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Great Britain had led to a different course. Education was more widely diffused, but it was essentially altered in its character. Those branches of knowledge which could be rendered immediately available to the acquisition of wealth came to be regarded as the only objects worthy of attention; and the graceful and liberal studies which had formerly been cultivated, to the exclusion of all others, were in their turn excluded, because they could not readily be made instrumental to raising a fortune. Independently, therefore, of the deliberate opinion left on record by the Marquis Wellesley, there is good ground for believing that, in many cases, the civil servants of the East-India Company at that period had devoted little attention to those studies which tend to refine, liberalize, and elevate the mind. The governor-general, himself an accurate and elegant scholar, could not fail to be struck with the deficiency, and to lament its consequences.\*

With regard to the Oriental tongues, the deficiency, though scarcely more lamentable, was certainly more calculated to excite surprise. Men called upon to perform duties of the highest importance in a country in which they were strangers—duties involving the rights and interests of millions—men

\* With the Marquis Wellesley, the studies of his youth have become the delight and consolation of his age. Resuming at a very advanced period of life the elegant amusement which classical composition affords, he has shewn that years have abated neither his love for liberal learning nor his power of displaying it.

incurring this responsibility, and surrounded by almost every species of perverse influence which could debase or deceive, were not even required to submit to any prescribed course of study, for the purpose of acquiring an ordinary measure of skill in the tongues spoken by almost all around them. But for the extraordinary manner in which the Indian empire of Great Britain had grown up—but for the extraordinary apathy which prevailed at home on all subjects connected with India, except when periodical fits of pity for the wrongs of India seized the nation, and invariably directed its attention far from all useful and substantial modes of improvement, such a state of things could never have existed. It was certainly not creditable that it should have continued so long, and much honour does it reflect on the Marquis Wellesley, that if he were not the first to perceive the evil, he was certainly the first to suggest a remedy.

Again, nothing could be more pitiable than the moral destitution in which the youths sent to India were left, at that dangerous period when the boy is rapidly growing into the man. In some cases they might have friends residing at the place of their destination, whose care might counteract the temptations to which youth everywhere, but nowhere so much as in India, are exposed; but unless where a near degree of relationship existed, the connection would have little of authority, and instances must have been numerous, where a young writer was thrown upon the

shores of India without having a claim upon any British inhabitant, beyond the common claim of country, for advice or attention.

It may be granted, therefore, that there were abundant grounds for some measures which should raise the standard of general learning among the civil servants of India, make adequate provision for the cultivation of the eastern languages, afford some protection to the inexperienced, and some restraint upon the levity of those whose imprudence, while it could not fail to be injurious to themselves, would, in all probability, be detrimental to the interests and happiness of a large circle—of those among whom they were to hold office.

It remains to inquire whether the establishment of the College of Fort William was the best mode by which the existing evils could be averted; and, in treating of this, it will be convenient to reverse the order in which those evils have been noticed.

How far such an institution was likely to be useful for the purposes of moral training, is a question which it is not easy to answer. There may be circumstances in which the watchfulness of friends may supply a far better mode than can be furnished by even the best conducted collegiate establishment; but if provision is to be made for numbers, it can only be made on principles that can be applied to all. On this part of the plan the governor-general expressed himself with great earnestness and confidence. “This institution,” said he, “will be best appreciated by every affectionate

parent in the hour of separation from his child destined for the public service in India. Let any parent (especially if he has himself passed through the Company's service in India) declare whether the prospect of this institution has aggravated or mitigated the solicitude of that painful hour,—whether it has caused additional doubts and fears, or inspired a more lively hope of the honourable and prosperous service—of the early and fortunate return of his child? ”\* Still the lessons of experience cannot be forgotten. The prevailing state of morals, wherever young men are congregated in large numbers, is not such as to afford much encouragement to an extension of the system. All that can be urged is, that even partial and imperfect restraint is better than total abandonment.

The study of the native languages, it may be presumed, can be more efficiently pursued in India than at home. A degree of acquaintance with their grammatical principles may be a useful preparation; but all experience shews that living languages are more readily, as well as more perfectly, acquired among the people with whom they are vernacular, than under any other circumstances. It would not be difficult to assign reasons for it, but it is unnecessary, since all that is requisite is an appeal to fact.

On the remaining point, the balance of advantage seems against the College of Fort William. For the attainment of general learning India possesses

\* Minute above quoted.

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no peculiar facilities; and to take youths there to teach them that which they might more conveniently learn at home, is a plan sanctioned neither by principle nor experience. In the public and private seminaries of England the teachers of the learned languages and the liberal sciences are numerous and efficient enough to remove the necessity for providing for the servants of the East-India Company any means of pursuing the usual objects of youthful study which are not open to the rest of their countrymen. All that can be secured by a college for their especial benefit might be secured quite as effectually, and far more cheaply, as well as more conveniently, by other modes. If candidates for civil office in India can pass a sufficient test of scholarship, it matters not where they acquired the qualification; but it is certain that India is not the most likely place to acquire it either effectually or rapidly. This objection was foreseen by the governor-general; it is, indeed, so obvious, that it was impossible that his sagacity could overlook it. "It may be contended," said he, "that many of the enumerated evils may be precluded, by not allowing the writers to proceed to India until they shall have reached a more advanced age than that at which they now usually embark; and by requiring them to undergo examinations in England, for the purpose of ascertaining their proficiency in the branches of knowledge necessary to the discharge of their duties in India." He combats this by a variety of reasons, stated with great force and ingenuity. Among

these, the objections of parents stand prominently forward. It was to be apprehended, indeed, that many would object to the expense of bestowing on their sons an education superior to that which had formerly been required; and though this does not appear, the governor-general might probably entertain no small portion of fear, that if his plan were not carried into effect, its place would not be supplied by any other; that no examination in England would supersede the necessity for a college in India; and that the evils of the existing system would be continued without diminution. The fear of being disappointed in his favourite object of improving the character of the civil service probably operated to prompt the establishment of the college, without waiting for authority from home. All the motives assigned by the governor-general undoubtedly operated upon his mind; but it is difficult to suppose that he did not entertain some degree of despair as to the effect of mere representations of the necessity of taking some steps in a matter upon which he felt deeply; and he may be presumed to have cherished a hope that when the college was established, and actually in the course of realizing some of the benefits expected from it, no attempt would be made to disturb its operation.

The extent of knowledge to which the governor-general refers, as requisite to the due performance of the duties of a civil servant, is very wide and comprehensive. It could scarcely be mastered at an age even considerably exceeding that at which

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writers were ordinarily sent out, and some of its divisions, ethics and jurisprudence, are justly declared by him to be suited only to the ripened intellects of maturer years. In what manner the cultivation of such studies can best be promoted and advanced among the members of the civil service, it is difficult to determine; but it is certain that they are not the proper studies of boyhood, and that the mind can neither be strengthened nor informed by urging upon it exercises disproportioned to its state of development.

The suppression of the college added one further mortification to those which the governor-general had already experienced; but his design to return home at the expiration of a year from the time when he announced it was not carried into effect. The Court of Directors requested him to prolong his stay for another year, acknowledging that, though they had differed from him in some material points, it was impossible not to be impressed by the zeal and ability which he had displayed in the general management of their affairs, and intimating a conviction that the interests of the Company would be essentially promoted by his yielding to their request. Whether or not he would have complied, had India remained at peace, cannot be known; but a state of affairs had arisen which deprived him of the opportunity of returning with honour. He consequently remained to enter upon a new course of arduous and important service, which must now be followed.

The governor-general had been desirous of drawing more closely the connection between the British government and the Peishwa. He had invited that prince to co-operate in the war against Tippoo Sultan, and though the appeal was disregarded, he had proposed to bestow on the Peishwa a portion of the territory which the British arms had conquered. He had been anxious to conclude a subsidiary treaty with the head of the Mahratta confederacy, but the measure, though unremittingly pursued for a long period, had failed. Throughout these negotiations the Peishwa did not discredit the established character of his countrymen for proficiency in all the arts of evasive and dishonest policy. While seeking to amuse the British agents by a series of illusory representations, he was employed in endeavouring to detach the Nizam from his British ally, and to engage him in a confederacy against that power to which he was indebted for protection. At length, late in the year 1801, the Peishwa, being surrounded with difficulties from which he knew not how to extricate himself, signified his willingness to subsidize six battalions of British troops, on the condition that they should not be stationed within his own dominions, but be prepared at all times to act on his requisition, and for the payment he proposed to assign territory in Hindostan. The proposal required and received mature consideration. The Peishwa was obviously and not unnaturally anxious to surrender as small a portion of power as possible. He was aware that the permanent establishment of

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a British force at Poona would be fatal to his independence—he therefore sought to keep it at a distance, except in cases of emergency. In the opinion of the governor-general, he probably calculated that the knowledge of his ability to command so powerful a body of troops as that which he proposed to subsidize would be sufficient to support his authority and overawe those who might be disposed to subvert it. As to the portion of the territory to be assigned for the payment of the required force, it was simply stated to be in Hindostan. From this intimation it was inferred that it was to be north of the Nerbudda. There, however, the Peishwa possessed only a nominal authority, and the assignment of territory, under such circumstances, was very different to transferring its possession. It was suspected, also, that the territory might be selected with a view to the reduction of the power of Scindia or of Holkar, or of relieving the Peishwa from the control exercised over him by the former chief, which he had long felt a sore burden, and that the mode by which this object was to be effected was by involving Scindia in a contest with the British government. There were some other proposed conditions of inferior importance, to which it is not necessary to advert. The governor-general, on a review of the relative positions of the Peishwa, his nominal dependents, and the British government, deemed the proposal inadmissible without considerable modification; but there were indications in the political horizon which disposed him to acquiesce in the re-

quired limitation as to the portion of the subsidiary force, provided a less objectionable arrangement for the discharge of the subsidy could be effected. In July, 1802, the British resident at Poona was instructed to intimate that he was prepared to make a communication on the subject of the Peishwa's proposal. The Peishwa received the intimation with great indifference, and manifested a remarkable absence of curiosity as to the governor-general's determination. At last the affair was opened and the proposed arrangement discussed, but with little apparent probability of an early conclusion. The approach of Holkar, who was in arms against Scindia and his nominal head, the Peishwa, brought the negotiation to a crisis. On the 23rd of October Holkar encamped within a short distance of Poona. On the 25th an action took place between his army and the combined force of the Peishwa and Scindia. The Peishwa, to be prepared for the event, whatever it might be, moved out of the city attended by the standard of the empire, and at the same time dispatched his minister to the British resident with an instrument under the prince's seal, declaring his consent to subsidize the proposed number of troops, and engaging, for their subsistence, to cede to the Company territory in Guzerat or in the southern quarters of his dominions, yielding an annual revenue of twenty-six lacs. The minister, at the time of presenting this instrument, gave the British resident the fullest assurance that it was the Peishwa's intention and meaning, that a general de-

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fensive alliance should be concluded between himself and the Company, on the basis of the treaty of Hyderabad. The resident deemed it expedient, under the circumstances, immediately to suggest to the governments of Madras and Bombay the necessity of preparing a body of troops at each presidency, for the eventual support of the Peishwa's government. He made a similar application to the resident at Hyderabad, with a view to the service of a considerable detachment from the subsidiary force stationed there. These preparations were not needless. The battle, which had commenced at half-past nine in the morning, ended about mid-day, when victory rested with Holkar, a result to be attributed in a great degree to his own desperate efforts. The Peishwa fled with a body of cavalry to the fort of Singurh. The Company's resident, Colonel Close, remained at Poona, and the British flag, which waved conspicuously at his quarters, commanded the respect of all parties.

The engagement of the Peishwa had been transmitted without delay to the governor-general, who ratified it on the day of its arrival. Orders were at the same time issued to the governments of Madras and Bombay, and to the resident at Hyderabad, confirming the requisitions of Colonel Close for the assemblage of troops. The Peishwa, quitting Raigurh, proceeded to Mhar, whence he dispatched letters to the Bombay government, requesting that ships might be sent to convey him and his followers to that presidency. Alarmed by the advance of

some of Holkar's troops, he soon after fled to Se-verndroog, where he resided for some time under protection of the fort. A British ship finally conveyed him to Bassein, where he arrived on the 16th of December, attended by a small escort of about a hundred and thirty followers.

The British resident remained at Poona for some time after the departure of the Peishwa, and had several conferences of an apparently friendly character with Holkar. The object of that chief was to obtain possession of the person of the Peishwa, and use the name and authority of the prince, as Scindia had previously done, for his own purposes. To this end he was desirous of having the support of the British government, and he invited the resident to undertake the task of effecting an accommodation for him with the Peishwa. Colonel Close referred him to the governor-general; and with some difficulty obtained permission to depart. He arrived at Bombay on the 3rd of December. On the 6th he received a communication from the governor-general, approving of the arrangements into which he had entered. On the arrival of the Peishwa at Bassein Colonel Close waited on the prince, and the necessary steps were commenced for the conclusion of a definitive treaty. Some difference existed as to the territories to be assigned for the pay of the subsidiary force, but it was terminated by the Peishwa suddenly and unexpectedly signifying his assent to the surrender of those on which the British resident had insisted. On the last day of the

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year 1802 the treaty was signed and sealed; and the counterpart, duly ratified by the governor-general, was shortly afterwards transmitted to the Peishwa.

This document was of great length, comprising no fewer than nineteen articles. It declared the friends and enemies of either of the contracting parties, friends and enemies of both, and confirmed all former treaties and agreements between the two states not contrary to the tenor of the new one. It provided for the joint exertions of both, to defend the rights or redress the wrongs of either, or of their respective dependents or allies; and this provision was followed by an explanatory addition, declaring that the British government would never permit any power or state whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights and territories of the Peishwa, but would at all times maintain and defend them, in the same manner as the rights and territories of the Company. The subsidiary force was to consist of six thousand regular native infantry, with the usual proportion of field-pieces and European artillerymen attached, and the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition, and it was to be permanently stationed within the Peishwa's dominions. This last point was an important departure from the plan proposed by the Peishwa, and to which the governor-general was prepared, if necessary, to consent: but the concession was not extorted by the force of circumstances; it had been yielded by the Peishwa at

Poona, and before his fortune had taken the unfavourable turn which led to his flight. A succeeding article provided for the cession of territory, described in a schedule attached to the treaty for the payment of the subsidiary force; and another provided for exchange of territory, should it at a future period appear desirable. The total annual expense of the force was estimated at twenty-five lacs—the estimated value of the lands ceded was twenty-six lacs, the additional lac being intended to meet possible deficiencies—an arrangement, the expediency of which will be denied by none who have had opportunity of observing the wide difference which, in matters of Indian revenue, ordinarily exists between estimates and realizations. By the next article, designed to avert a collision of authorities and claims, it was stipulated that orders should be given for admitting the Company's officers to the charge of the ceded districts as soon as it should be signified that they were prepared to take it; that all collections made by the Peishwa's officers between the date of the treaty and the period of the Company's taking possession should be carried to the credit of the latter; and all claims to balance on account of antecedent periods be considered void. All forts within the ceded districts were to be given up without injury or damage, and with their equipment of ordnance stores and provisions. Grain, and all articles of consumption, and provisions, and all sorts of materials for wearing apparel, together with the necessary numbers of cattle, horses, and

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camels, required for the subsidiary force, were to be entirely exempted from duties—the commanding officer and the officers of the force were to be treated “in all respects in a manner suited to the dignity and greatness of both states.” The force was to be at all times ready to execute services of importance, such as the protection of the Peishwa’s person, the overawing and chastisement of rebels, or suppression of disturbances in his dominions, and due correction of his subjects and dependents who might withhold payment of the just claims of the state; but it was not to be employed on trifling occasions, nor in a variety of ways which were enumerated. The negotiation of this treaty afforded opportunity for relieving Surat from certain Mahratta claims, which had been a source of much vexation and dispute, and it was not neglected. These claims were to be abandoned on consideration of the surrender, on the part of the Company, of land, the revenue of which should be equal to the annual estimated value of the Mahratta tribute. Some similar claims in other places were to be extinguished in the same manner. The article with regard to the employment of Europeans by the Peishwa was far less stringent than that inserted in other engagements of like character between the British government and its allies. In place of stipulating for the entire exclusion of Europeans and Americans from the service of the Peishwa, the treaty, after reciting that it had been usual for that prince to enlist and retain in his service Europeans of dif-

ferent countries, provided that, in the event of war breaking out between the English and any European nation, and of discovery being made that any Europeans in the Peishwa's service belonging to such nation at war with the English should have meditated injury towards their government, or have entered into intrigues hostile to their interests, such persons were to be discharged, and not suffered to reside within the Peishwa's dominions. The following article restrained the Peishwa from committing any act of aggression against the Company's allies or dependents, or against any of the principal branches of the Mahratta empire, or against any power whatever; and bound him to abide by the Company's award, should differences arise. Two other articles, which referred to existing disputes with various parties (the Mahrattas were never without a standing array of disputes with every Indian power), gave to the Company the right of arbitration, and pledged the Peishwa to obedience. In the event of war, the Peishwa engaged, in addition to four battalions of the subsidiary force, to aid the Company immediately with six thousand infantry and ten thousand horse from his own troops, and, with as little delay as possible, to bring into the field the whole force which he might be able to supply from his dominions. The Company, on the other hand, engaged to employ against the common enemy the largest force which they might be able to furnish, over and above the number of the subsidiary troops. When war might appear probable,

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the Peishwa was to provide stores and other aids in his frontier garrisons. He was neither to commence nor pursue negotiation with any power whatever without giving notice and entering into consultation with the Company's government. While his external relations were thus restrained, the rights preserved to him in his own dominions were most ample. The Company disclaimed all concern with the Peishwa's children, relations, subjects, or servants, with respect to whom his highness was declared to be absolute. The subsidiary force were to be employed, if necessary, in suppressing disturbances in the ceded districts; and if disturbances should arise in the Peishwa's territories, the British government, on his requisition, were to direct such of the Company's troops as should be most conveniently stationed for the purpose to assist in quelling them. The concluding article, in Oriental fashion, declared that the treaty should last as long as the sun and the moon should endure.

The conclusion of this treaty is to be regarded as an important step in the extension of the salutary influence of the British government in India. The formation of such an engagement had long been anxiously desired; but the hope of success, repeatedly entertained, had been so often defeated that it grew faint. The internal disputes of the Mahratta confederacy at last afforded an opportunity, which was improved both by the governor-general and the resident at Poona with admirable tact and promptness. If the terms were not such as were in all respects

to be desired, they were the best that could be obtained. To have deferred the conclusion of the treaty, in the hope of improving them, might have been to lose the only opportunity which had ever offered for negotiating with a chance of success. The Peishwa, indeed, was powerless in himself; but he was not compelled to choose the British government for his champion. He might have thrown himself into the arms of either Scindia or Holkar. He would then, it is true, have enjoyed but the mere shadow of authority; but he might have preferred that the substance should be possessed by a Mahratta, rather than an European power. It was certainly dangerous to risk this. Most important was it, not only that the Peishwa should become attached to the British government by the bond of a subsidiary alliance, but that this should be effected without delay. The Peishwa, too, had expressed a desire to place himself altogether in the power of the English, by taking refuge at Bombay. His application had not been complied with; but it was an expression of confidence in the character of the British government which called for a suitable return. He had pledged himself, before departing from Poona, to receive a subsidiary force, and to make a cession of territory to defray the expense. These important points being secured, the British government, in refraining to take advantage of the fallen fortunes of the prince, pursued a policy at once wise and generous.

In conformity with the suggestions of Colonel

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Close, confirmed by the governor-general, the whole of the subsidiary force stationed in the territories of the Nizam, amounting to something more than eight thousand three hundred men, marched from Hyderabad at the close of the month of February, and on the 25th of March reached the town of Paraindah, situate on the western frontier of the Nizam's dominions, about a hundred and sixteen miles from Poona. The subsidiary force was accompanied by six thousand of the Nizam's disciplined infantry, and about nine thousand cavalry. At Madras Lord Clive prepared for carrying out the views of the governor-general. On the 27th of February he instructed General Stuart, then present with the army on the frontier of Mysore, to adopt the necessary measures for the march of the British troops into the Mahratta territory, leaving it to the judgment of the general to determine the amount of force necessary to be detached for the purpose. The choice of a commander Lord Clive did not delegate to another. He selected for the command Major General Wellesley, who, in addition to his military claims, had acquired in Mysore much local knowledge that could not fail to be eminently useful, and by his campaign against Dhoondia Waugh, had established among the Mahratta chieftains a high degree of reputation and influence. The detachment made by General Stuart consisted of one regiment of European and three regiments of native cavalry, two regiments of European and six battalions of native infantry, with a due proportion of

artillery. It amounted to nearly ten thousand men, and to this force was added two thousand five hundred of the Rajah of Mysore's horse. It is impossible to advert to this without referring to one advantage of the conquest of Seringapatam, and the subsequent treaty which the movement of the troops under General Wellesley brings to notice. For the first time in the wars of Great Britain with the native states were the power and resources of Mysore brought to the assistance of the Company's government. Hitherto that state had been a source of unceasing danger and alarm. The policy of the Marquis Wellesley had converted it into a valuable accession of strength.

General Wellesley commenced his march from Hurryhur, on the frontier of Mysore, on the 9th of March, and crossed the Toombuddra river on the 12th. The march of the British troops through the southern division of the Peishwa's territories had the effect of restoring a degree of peace which the country rarely experienced. The chieftains and jagheerdars, whose petty differences had previously kept the districts oppressed by them in a state of constant warfare and outrage, suspended their contests for a time, awed by the presence of a commander whose name imposed terror on all disturbers of the peace. Most of them joined the British army in support of the cause of the Peishwa. Among the number were several who had incurred that prince's displeasure, and who hoped that the influence of the British government, exercised in acknowledgment of their

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services, might be sufficient to restore them to favour. On the 15th of April General Wellesley effected a junction with the force from Hyderabad. As he proceeded, the advanced detachments of Holkar retreated before him, and on his approach to Poona the chieftain himself retired from that place to Chandoor, a town about a hundred and thirty miles distant, leaving at Poona a garrison of fifteen hundred men. Under these circumstances, it was not deemed necessary to advance to Poona all the troops at his disposal, and as the country was much exhausted and a great deficiency of forage prevailed, it was not advisable. General Wellesley, therefore, determined so to distribute his troops that the whole might procure forage and subsistence, but at the same time to reserve the power of readily forming a junction, should such a step be desirable. Colonel Stevenson, with the Hyderabad force, was ordered to march to Gardoor, to leave near that place, and within the Nizam's dominions, all that prince's troops, and to place himself, with the British subsidiary force, in a position on the Beemah river, towards Poona, near its junction with the Mota Mola river.

General Wellesley continued his own march towards Poona by the road of Baramooty. He had received repeated intimations that it was intended to plunder and burn the city on the approach of the British troops. As this would have been an exploit perfectly in accordance with the Mahratta character, the prevalent belief was by no means improbable.

The Peishwa, alarmed for the safety of his capital and his family, urgently solicited that some of his own troops might be dispatched for their protection; but the British commander knew too well the character of those troops to act upon the suggestion. On the 18th of April, it was ascertained that the Peishwa's family had been removed to the fortress of Saoghur, a measure supposed to be preparatory to the destruction of the city. When this intelligence was received, General Wellesley was advancing to the relief of Poona with the British cavalry. At night, on the 19th of April, he commenced a march of forty miles, over a very rugged country and through a difficult pass. The next day saw him at the head of his cavalry before Poona, the whole distance travelled in the preceding thirty-two hours being sixty miles. The commander of Holkar's force in Poona, on hearing of General Wellesley's approach, precipitately quitted the place with his garrison, leaving to the English the easy duty of taking possession. A great part of the inhabitants had quitted their homes and fled to the hills during the occupation of Holkar. The few that remained manifested great pleasure at the arrival of the English troops, and those who had fled gave evidence of the confidence to which the change gave birth by returning to their homes and resuming the exercise of their usual occupations. While General Wellesley was on his march, preparations had been making at Bombay for the return of the Peishwa to his capital. From the time when

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he took up his residence at Bassein, he had, at his own request, been attended by a British guard. This force was now considerably augmented, and, being placed under the command of Colonel Murray, formed the prince's escort on his march back to the capital, whence he had so recently made an ignominious flight. On the 27th of April he left Bassein, attended by the British resident, Colonel Close; on the 13th of May he took his seat on the musnud in his palace at Poona, amidst the roar of cannon from the British camp, echoed from all the posts and forts in the vicinity.

The accession of the principal Mahratta states to the great confederation, of which the British government in India was the head, had been an object which the governor-general had long and strenuously laboured to effect. His efforts, so long and so often frustrated, had at length succeeded with regard to the chief authority in the Mahratta confederacy, and the Peishwa was now the subsidiary ally of the English. To conciliate Scindia, the resources of diplomacy had been tried, almost as perseveringly as they had been used to win the Peishwa, but with no better success than had attended their exercise with the latter chief, before the impending loss of every vestige of power led him to seek, in a British alliance, the means of deliverance from the ambitious dependents who were anxious to take charge of his person and authority. Scindia had met the overtures of the British resident civilly, but evasively. The turn which affairs had taken seemed to warrant the hope of a

different issue—a hope corroborated by a letter which Scindia addressed to the governor-general, after the flight of the Peishwa from his capital. In this communication Scindia announced his march from Oujein towards the Deccan, for the declared purpose of restoring order and tranquillity in that quarter, and expressed a desire that, in consideration of the friendship subsisting between the British government and the Peishwa, and of the relation in which Scindia stood to both, as guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, the former would, in “concert and concurrence with him, render the corroboration of the foundations of attachment and union, and the maintenance of the obligations of friendship and regard, with respect to his highness the Peishwa, as heretofore, and conformably to existing engagements, the objects of its attention.” This was sufficiently vague; but it was not more vague than the generality of Mahratta communications. If it could be regarded as bearing any meaning, it was to be understood as a call upon the British government to aid in the restoration of the Peishwa to the musnud at Poona.

A few days after the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, Colonel Close addressed a letter to Scindia, announcing that engagements of a defensive nature had been formed between the British government and the Peishwa; and that, agreeably to the tenor of those engagements, a British force would be stationed within the Peishwa’s dominions. In making this communication, Colonel Close expressed his hope that Scindia would co-operate with the British

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government in endeavouring to arrange the affairs of the Peishwa, and restore the prince to the exercise of his authority at Poona. The answer of Scindia was satisfactory, as far as any Mahratta answer could be satisfactory. It was in the following terms:—"I have been favoured with your acceptable letter, intimating that, as the relations of friendship had long subsisted between the Peishwa Saib Bahaudur and the English Company Bahaudur, engagements of a defensive kind were concluded between the two states; and that accordingly, with a view to the occurrences that had taken place at Poona, the Nabob Governor-General Bahaudur had determined to forward a British force to that quarter, to the end that, with my concurrence and co-operation, the refractory may be brought to punishment. My friend, in truth, the ancient relations of friendship and union which hold between the different circars required such a design and such a co-operation. My army, which has also marched from Oujein towards the Deccan, with a view to lay the dust of commotion and chastise the disrespectful, crossed the Nerbudda, under happy auspices, on the 8th of February, and will shortly reach Boorhampore. My friend Colonel Collins, who, agreeably to the orders of his excellency the most noble the governor-general, has left Furruckabad for this quarter, may be expected to join me in a few days. Inasmuch as the concerns of the different circars are one, and admit of no distinction, on the arrival of my forces at Boorhampore, I shall without reserve make you acquainted with

the measures which shall be resolved on for the arrangement and adjustment of affairs." The letter concluded with some expressions of piety, very edifying from a Mahratta, but not necessary to be quoted.

The mission of Colonel Collins, referred to in the above letter, had its origin in instructions forwarded by the governor-general to that officer soon after the Peishwa had consented to enter into a subsidiary alliance with the Company. Colonel Collins accordingly proceeded to the camp of Scindia at Boorhampore. On his way he received a letter from Colonel Close, apprizing him of the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, and of the fact that Scindia had been informed of it. The first communication made by Colonel Collins after his arrival in Scindia's camp, therefore, announced the British officer's knowledge of these events, and his authority to enter into engagements with Scindia similar to those which had been concluded with the Peishwa. Scindia, in reply, referred the discussion of the important points of this communication to personal conference; but the opportunity for thus discussing them was long in arriving. At length a meeting took place, when the British resident stated the objects of his mission to be threefold: to concert with Scindia the most effectual means of restoring and securing tranquillity in the Deccan; to offer to that chief the mediation of the British government for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between him and Holkar; and to make to him a tender

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of admission to the general defensive alliance on terms similar to those which had been accepted by the Peishwa. It was answered, on the part of Scindia, that the important nature of these proposals called for mature deliberation, and that time was necessary for the purpose. The conference here terminated. Five days afterwards, one of Scindia's ministers attended the resident to convey to him the results of the consideration which had been bestowed on his proposals. To the first it was answered, with true Mahratta ambiguity, that for the British government to concert with Scindia the most effectual means of restoring and securing tranquillity in the Deccan was conformable to the relations of friendship subsisting between the two states—to the second, "that the affairs of the families of Scindia and Holkar had been one and the same from father to son; that heretofore differences had arisen between them, but that these differences had always been adjusted by themselves." To the third of Colonel Collins's proposals the answer was, that Scindia, being guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, had been surprised at the conclusion of the defensive alliance between the Peishwa and the British government without his knowledge; that, after a personal conference with the Peishwa, he should be apprized of the real state of circumstances, and should then act in such a manner as might be suitable and proper. It will be unnecessary to waste time on the answers to the first and second of Colonel Collins's suggestions; they are mere ordi-

nary specimens of the eastern art of putting together words for the ear alone, not for the understanding. The third may justify some examination. Although Scindia now declared that he had been surprised at the conclusion of the defensive alliance between the British government and the Peishwa without his knowledge, it is to be remembered that he had expressed no surprise when, some time before, the same fact had been communicated to him by Colonel Close. Adverting, in his answer to this arrangement, to the consequent movement of a British force, and to the request for his co-operation, he had said that “the ancient relations of friendship and union which hold between the different circars required such a design and such a co-operation.”\* This language does not necessarily imply his approval of the treaty. It is, according to Mahratta custom, adapted to receive almost any interpretation which it might be convenient to put upon it; but if it expresses no approbation, it certainly indicates no surprise; and if Scindia were sincere in his subsequent avowal of this feeling, it must be concluded that while, in all other persons, surprise is the instantaneous result of some unexpected discovery, in the Mahratta chief it required a considerable space of time to mature and bring it forth. His complaint, that a treaty to which he was guarantee had been set aside without his knowledge, was as frivolous as his affectation of surprise was unwarranted. Scindia had no interest in the treaty—at least he had ostensibly no interest

\* See page 292.

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in it. His office of guarantee, so long as it continued, bound him to enforce its observance upon both the parties for whose benefit the engagement was contracted; but it certainly gave him no authority to prevent their making any additional engagements, or even abrogating the original treaty by mutual consent. The only effect of such measures with regard to him would be to release him from the obligation of enforcing, in his capacity of guarantee, the stipulations of the treaty which had been modified or annulled. To discuss the nature of the relation subsisting between the Peishwa and those chiefs who acknowledged him as their head would be idle, because no satisfactory conclusion could be attained; but if any point connected with it be clear, it is the right of the Peishwa to bind himself by treaty without consulting the inferior chiefs. Scindia was not a party to the treaty of Salbye, and he had no claim to be a party to any new treaty. If, however, he were anxious to form an alliance with the British government, the opportunity was afforded him. He, indeed, thought that the new treaty was injurious to his interest, and so it was, by taking the Peishwa out of his power. But the power which he had exercised was an usurpation unsanctioned by the avowed principles of the Mahratta confederacy. All indeed within that confederacy was usurpation; but the whole question may be reduced to very simple elements: if the theory of the Mahratta association were to be upheld, Scindia was a dependent of the Peishwa, and

his attempts to establish his own authority on the ruin of that of his superior were little if at all short of treason; if the theory were to be discarded, and Scindia to be viewed as an independent prince, seeking to advance his own ends by subjugating another to his will, the right of the latter to seek the means of escape, and the right of a neighbouring state to afford those means, are indisputably clear. The course of events was unfavourable to the views of Scindia, but he had not the slightest ground for reasonable complaint. His intimation of the necessity of a personal conference with the Peishwa implied either a doubt of the truth of the representations made by the agents of the British government, or an intention to obstruct the progress of the new arrangements. To indicate such a doubt was offensive to the British government—to entertain such an intention was the preliminary to a state of hostility. Some of these points were pressed on the notice of Scindia and his ministers by Colonel Collins, and he succeeded, after a time, in drawing from the chief a declaration unexampled perhaps in the annals of Marhatta diplomacy for explicitness. Scindia now stated that he could not give a decided answer to the proposals of the British government till after a conference which he proposed to hold, not with the Peishwa himself, but with an agent of that prince, whose arrival he expected; but he added, that he had no intention whatever to obstruct the completion of the arrangements lately concluded between the Peishwa and the British government; that,

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on the contrary, it was his wish to improve the friendship at present subsisting between the Peishwa, the British government, and his own state. Notwithstanding these favourable feelings, Scindia manifested a strong dislike to the march of the British troops to Poona, and he requested that orders might be issued to stop them. He preferred that the city should remain in possession of Holkar rather than be delivered by the interposition of a British force. At the period when this reasonable request was made, no orders could have been issued in time to prevent the march of General Wellesley to Poona—it is needless to add that, even had time permitted, no such orders would have been issued.

In addition to the inferences to be drawn from the conduct of Scindia and his ministers, other grounds for suspecting their intentions existed. On the day on which Colonel Collins joined the chieftain's camp, he received intelligence that a confederacy between Scindia and other Mahratta chiefs, for purposes hostile to the British interests, was in course of arrangement. Scindia's prime minister had been deputed on a mission to the Rajah of Berar. Another confidential servant was dispatched to the Peishwa, to remonstrate, as it was believed, against the treaty of Bassein, and vakeels from Holkar arrived in Scindia's camp for the purpose of effecting an adjustment of their differences. The deportment of Scindia's ministers towards the British resident became intemperate and offensive,

and early in May that chief marched from the vicinity of Boorhampore to meet the Rajah of Berar, who had taken the field with a large army. He, however, expressed a wish that the British resident should follow him, with which Colonel Collins complied.

The governor-general had doubted the existence of the alleged confederacy against the British government, and the grounds of doubt were not unreasonable. That Scindia and the Rajah of Berar should be disposed to reduce the Peishwa to a state of subserviency to their views might readily be believed; but that they should venture, in carrying out such a plan, to provoke the hostility of the British government was scarcely credible. Happily, the governor-general did not suffer his doubts to overcome his caution. He was struck by comparing the apathy of Scindia, while Holkar was in undisturbed possession of the Peishwa's capital, with his renewed activity when that capital was about to be rescued by a British force. He wisely, therefore, deemed it necessary to instruct Colonel Collins to remonstrate with Scindia, and to require from him unequivocal evidence of friendly intentions; it being pointed out that the only satisfactory evidence would be his retirement to his dominions north of the Nerbudda. Scindia was further required to disavow the imputation of being engaged in a confederacy with Holkar and the Rajah of Berar against the English. A remonstrance was also addressed to the Rajah of Berar, which was followed by a second

communication of like character, on the governor-general receiving intelligence that the Rajah had put his army in motion for the purpose of meeting Scindia.

Colonel Collins, on receiving his instructions, proceeded without delay to act upon them. Having explained at length the treaty of Bassein, he demanded whether it contained any thing at variance with Scindia's rights. One of the ministers answered that it did not, and Scindia himself confirmed the acknowledgment. Colonel Collins then claimed to be informed of the nature and objects of the recent negotiations among the Mahratta chiefs. He was answered that Scindia had no intention to invade the dominions of either the Nizam or the Peishwa; but, on the resident urging the necessity of a disavowal on the part of Scindia of any intention to disturb the treaty of Bassein, it was answered that Scindia could afford no satisfaction on that point until he had conferred with the Rajah of Berar. The resident continued to press the points suggested by his instructions, representing that the refusal of Scindia to afford satisfactory explanation, combined with the unremitted prosecution of his military arrangements, would compel the British government to adopt precautionary measures upon every part of Scindia's frontier, and that the confirmation of the report of his accession to a confederacy against the British power would lead to the immediate commencement of active hostilities. The chief, to whom the representation was addressed,

remained unmoved by it. He adhered to the silence which he had resolved to maintain as to his future intentions, and terminated the conference with this remarkable declaration :—" After my interview with the Rajah of Berar, you shall know whether it will be peace or war." Suspense was thus converted into certainty. Scindia was prepared to embark in a war with the British government if the Rajah of Berar would join him. On the decision of that prince it rested whether it should be " peace or war." Scindia had acknowledged that he had no just grounds of exception to the treaty of Bassein, but that treaty was, notwithstanding, to be the cause of involving the Mahratta countries in all the calamities of war if the Rajah of Berar should stand firm. The insult offered to the British state by Scindia's declaration, that state might perhaps have afforded to despise when coming from a chief of freebooters ; but the positive danger indicated could not be disregarded, and the governor-general proceeded with promptitude and vigour to prepare for the crisis which was obviously approaching. Before, however, adverting to the measures resorted to for the purpose, it will be convenient to follow the proceedings at the camps of Scindia and the Rajah of Berar so long as negotiation was maintained with them by the English authorities. On the 4th of June the meditated meeting between those two chiefs took place at Mulkapore, on the frontier of the Nizam's dominions ; but on that occasion nothing passed beyond the exchange of the usual

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ceremonies. On the 8th a long conference took place, and on the following day Colonel Collins reminded Scindia of his promise to give an explicit answer after his interview with the Rajah of Berar. The reply of Scindia was as usual evasive; and on the subject being more formally pressed upon him three days afterwards, the necessity of another conference was assigned as a reason for the delay of a decided answer. The Rajah of Berar, in answer to representations made to him by the British resident, referred in like manner to an intended conference, in which not only Scindia and himself were to engage, but also Holkar, whose name was now, for the first time, introduced as a party necessary to be consulted in deciding the question of war or peace with the English. This suggestion seemed to postpone the decision indefinitely, as Holkar was at a great distance from Mulkapore. Scindia subsequently intimated a wish that the resident should pay a visit to the Rajah of Berar, and Colonel Collins, in consequence, requested the Rajah to appoint a day for receiving him. The Rajah declined to appoint any day, and appeared anxious to dispense with the proposed visit. As it could not be doubted that Scindia was acquainted with the Rajah's feelings, and that when he made the suggestion he well knew what reception awaited the proposal, Colonel Collins justly concluded that he had been wantonly exposed to insult, and intimated his intention to retire from Scindia's camp. He was entreated to postpone his departure for six days, and he consented. He was further ad-

mitted to an audience of the Rajah of Berar, but the Rajah simply acknowledged that he had received a letter from the governor-general, declining to enter into any discussion upon it. Little interest would attach to a detail of further conferences and correspondence, which would exhibit nothing but a repetition of a desire, on one side, to procure an explicit answer, and an exhaustion of all the arts of evasion and delay, on the other, to avoid it. In conformity with instructions from the governor-general, General Wellesley, about the middle of July, addressed a letter to Scindia, requesting him to separate his army from that of the Rajah of Berar, and retire across the Nerbudda; which being effected, the British troops under General Wellesley, who had made some advance, were to retire to their usual stations. The transmission of this letter, and discussion of its contents, gave rise to further communications between the resident and Scindia's ministers, of the same character with those which had preceded it. Proposals which must have been known to be untenable were made to Colonel Collins; and when, at length, he had consented to forward one somewhat less objectionable than others which had preceded, it was transmitted to him for dispatch to General Wellesley, with alterations which were in direct violation of its spirit. The resident now justly conceived that further attempts to preserve the relations of peace were at once hopeless and imprudent. On the 3rd of August he commenced his march from Scindia's camp, and from that period

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the British government was to be regarded as at war with the confederate chieftains.

The governor-general had made extensive preparations for carrying on hostilities with vigour and effect. A vast plan of military and political operations, embracing within its compass the entire territory of India, had been framed, and all its details, with a due regard to contingencies, had been arranged with minute care. It consisted of two grand divisions, the management of which were assigned respectively to the commander-in-chief, General Lake, and to General Wellesley. To the former officer were committed the affairs of Hindostan—to the latter those of the Deccan.

In this plan, the views of the Marquis Wellesley were directed not merely to the temporary adjustment of the disputes which had rendered it necessary to put large armies in motion, but to such a settlement as should afford a reasonable prospect of continued peace and security to the British government and its allies.

A. D. 1803. General Wellesley had marched from Poona, with the main body of the forces under his command, on the 4th of June. The Peishwa was to have provided a contingent to accompany him, but a very small portion of the stipulated force was furnished. Under the authority conferred on him by the governor-general, General Wellesley exercised a general superintendence over the diplomatic intercourse of Colonel Collins with Scindia and the Rajah of Berar. On this coming to an end, he gave

immediate orders for the attack of Scindia's fort of Baroach, and issued a proclamation explaining the grounds upon which it had become necessary for him to commence hostilities against the combined Mahratta chiefs. The force under his immediate command at this time consisted of three hundred and eighty-four European, and one thousand three hundred and forty-seven regular native cavalry; one thousand three hundred and sixty-eight European, and five thousand six hundred and thirty-one native infantry. In addition to these numbers were a few artillerymen, between six and seven hundred pioneers, two thousand four hundred horse, belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, and three thousand Mahratta horse. Nearly eighteen hundred men, European and native, with some Bombay lascars, and a small park of artillery, had been left at Poona for the protection of the capital and person of the Peishwa. The weather prevented General Wellesley from marching as early as he wished. On the 8th of August it cleared, and early in the morning of that day he dispatched a message to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, to require him to surrender the fort. He refused, and the pettah was immediately attacked at three points. The contest was severe, but it terminated in favour of the British. On the following day preparations were made for attacking the fort. On the 10th a battery of four guns was opened; the fire of which soon had the effect of inducing the killadar to make an overture of surrender upon

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terms. On the 12th, he with his garrison of fourteen hundred men marched out, and the British commander took possession. The effect of this capture was to place at the command of the English all Scindia's territories south of the Godavery.

A few days after the fall of Ahmednuggur, General Wellesley had the satisfaction to hear that his orders for the attack of Baroach had been successfully carried into effect. This duty was performed by Colonel Woodington. He had expected assistance from a schooner with two eighteen-pounders, which was to have been brought to anchor within a short distance of the fort. It was found impracticable to bring her up, and in consequence Colonel Woodington was compelled to make an arrangement for bringing up the eighteen-pounders and stores in boats. The pettah, though defended by the enemy in great force, fell into the hands of the English without much either of difficulty or loss. The fort was subsequently stormed, and though a vigorous resistance was offered, the attack was eventually successful. The loss of the British was small; that of the enemy dreadfully heavy.

A.D. 1803. The capture of Baroach was effected on the 29th of August. On the same day on which victory thus graced the British arms at the western extremity of the peninsula of India, the army of Bengal, under General Lake, struck the first important blow against the enemy on the frontier of Oude. Its object was a French corps in the service of Scindia, under the

command of an officer named Perron.\* This corps, which was originally raised by an officer named De Boigne, had acquired great celebrity in India. De Boigne is said to have been a native of Savoy, who, after serving successively in the armies of France and Russia, and having, whilst in the service of the latter power, been made prisoner by the Turks, found his way to Madras, where he became an ensign in the army of the East-India Company. According to some authorities, the distant prospect of promotion in that service discouraged him; according to others, he took offence at some act of the governor; but, whatever the cause, he quitted Madras and proceeded to Calcutta, being provided with letters of introduction to Mr. Hastings. From Calcutta he proposed to proceed overland to Russia, and the design, it has been alleged, was not then first formed. It is said that at St. Petersburg De Boigne had laid before the Empress Catherine a project for exploring the countries between India and Russia—that, in the exercise of its usual policy, the Russian court had offered encouragement to the plan—and that at Calcutta De Boigne submitted it to Hastings, concealing from him the fact that the government of Russia was interested in the project. Hastings, who was always zealous for the extension of the boundaries of geographical knowledge with regard to India and the surrounding countries, gave him a commendatory letter to the Vizier, who bestowed

\* Not the person mentioned at page 31 as in the service of the Nizam.

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on him a dress of honour, in addition to other gifts better suited to the necessities of a traveller. Circumstances, which are differently related, led him to relinquish the dangers and difficulties of his projected journey to Russia for a continued residence in India, and Hastings soon learned that De Boigne had entered the service of the Rajah of Jeypoor. The governor-general thereupon recalled him to Calcutta, and, though he had no power of enforcing the call, De Boigne thought fit to obey it. He succeeded in making his peace with Hastings, and obtained his permission to return. In the interval the Rajah of Jeypoor had resolved to dispense with his services, but he made him a liberal present; and, according to some, De Boigne further improved his fortune by successful speculations in trade. But De Boigne was not at ease—he longed to resume his military habits and occupations, and opportunity was not wanting. Scindia was actively engaged in promoting his own aggrandisement at the expense of his neighbours, and De Boigne deemed that his own interests would be best advanced by uniting them with these of Scindia. In his eyes all services were alike if they offered hope of promotion or of gain. Whether he sought Scindia, or Scindia him, seems doubtful; but he entered the service of that chief, and soon secured such a measure of his confidence as led to the rapid increase of his own power and influence. De Boigne at first commanded two battalions. In process of time the number was augmented to eight, and subse-

quently to sixteen, with a train of eighty pieces of cannon. At later periods still further additions were made, and the whole were formed into three brigades; the first and third commanded by Frenchmen named Perron and Pedrons, the second by an Englishman of the name of Sutherland. De Boigne retired some years before the period immediately under notice, partly, it is believed, from a fear that jealousy of his overgrown power might lead to some attempt to reduce it, partly because his constitution was broken and debilitated, and partly because one object to which his exertions had been assiduously directed was attained, in the accumulation of a fortune supposed to amount to four hundred thousand pounds. The retirement of De Boigne led to a struggle for the honour of succeeding him in the chief command. Sutherland aspired to it, but Perron, having the advantage of seniority, and the still greater advantage of being present with Scindia at the time the vacancy occurred, secured to himself the desired post.

The origin of Perron was very humble: he had arrived in India as a common sailor. Having entered the service of De Boigne, he manifested an aptitude for rising not inferior to that of his commander.\* On succeeding to the chief command, he

\* The account of De Boigne and his successor, Perron, does not rest on official documents, but is taken partly from a note in Duff's *History of the Mahrattas*, grounded on information furnished to the writer by De Boigne himself, and partly from a work entitled "A Sketch of the Rise, Progress, and Termination of the Regular Corps

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sedulously improved all opportunities for increasing his own power. De Boigne had received certain lands for the maintenance of his troops. Perron, succeeding to this as well as to the authority of his predecessor, sought both to extend his possessions and to render himself independent of the chief from whom they had been obtained. Scindia's local authority in Hindostan had declined, and that of Perron had increased. The districts subject to the latter yielded a revenue of vast amount. The inhabitants regarded him as their immediate chief, while the allegiance of the troops at his command was naturally and necessarily yielded rather to the man from whom they received orders, subsistence, and pay, than to an authority of which they knew little, and which was never visibly exercised. The designs of Perron had been aided by a variety of circumstances. Though a Mahratta, Scindia was greatly inferior to him in cunning and activity. The almost exclusive direction of that chief's attention to the Deccan—the anxiety with which he had sought to promote his interests at Poona, had greatly

formed and commanded by Europeans, in the service of the Native Princes of India, with details of the principal Events and Actions of the late Mahratta War, by Lewis Ferdinand Smith, late Major in Doulat Roa Scindia's service." The writer had good means of acquiring information, and there is every reason to believe that he employed them honestly. The book, which was originally published in Calcutta, is curious in itself. The copy in the library of the East-India Company will, to many, possess an additional interest from bearing the following inscription:—"From the Marquis Wellesley, 26th April, 1808."

weakened his influence in the northern parts of India. In states constituted like those of the Mahratta confederacy, the authority of the prince is always endangered by absence or inactivity; and in the case of Scindia, the causes of decline previously at work had been powerfully aided by the success of Holkar. The result was, in the words of the governor-general, "to found an independent French state on the most vulnerable part of the Company's frontier."\* Nor was it to be overlooked that Perron's influence extended considerably beyond the dominions of which he possessed the actual administration. He sought to dictate with the authority of a superior to the petty states around him, and even to some at a distance; and having at his disposal a military force, which neither with reference to numbers nor discipline could be despised, his attempts were not unattended with success. The governor-general saw the necessity of crushing without delay this new and formidable enemy. General Lake was instructed to regard "the effectual demolition of the French state, erected by M. Perron on the banks of the Jumna, as the primary object of the campaign," and the general was to distribute his forces and regulate his operations in such a manner as to effect it without delay.

On the 7th of August Lord Lake had marched from Cawnpore with the infantry on that station under the command of Major-General St. John.

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\* Letter to General Lake, 27th of July, 1803.

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The cavalry, under Colonel St. Leger, followed on the 8th. On the 13th the whole army encamped near Kanouge. It was subsequently joined by Major-General Ware with a detachment from Futtyghur. On the 28th it encamped on the frontier, and at four o'clock on the morning of the 29th, entered the Mahratta territory. No time was lost in moving to the attack of Perron's force, which was strongly posted at a short distance from the fortress of Alyghur. At seven o'clock the British cavalry advanced upon them in two lines, supported by the infantry and guns; but the rapid retreat of the enemy put an end to the action almost as soon as it had commenced. Attempts were made to charge some considerable bodies of cavalry who made pretence of standing, but in vain. All fled, and with such hearty vigour as left to their pursuers little chance of overtaking or doing them any considerable mischief. The English took possession of the town of Coel, and made preparations for attacking Alyghur, which place Perron had left in charge of Colonel Pedrons; but the attack was delayed for a few days to try the effect of negotiation. It has too often been the practice of Europeans in Indian warfare to have recourse to means of attaining their objects, which, however common in native contests, are highly discreditable to nations professing to be governed by higher standards of morality and honour. It was thought that corruption might prove an efficient substitute for arms, and it was not till the hope of success from this source had failed that

it was resolved to try more honourable means of obtaining possession of Alyghur.\*

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\* In passing censure on any part of the conduct of so excellent an officer, and—notwithstanding his occasional resort to practices which honourable feeling must condemn—so high-minded a man as General Lake, it is just to allow him the benefit of explaining his own motives. In a letter to the Marquis Wellesley, dated September 1st, 1803, he says:—"I have not yet moved from hence [Coel], nor am I in possession of the fort of Alyghur; my object is to get the troops out of the fort by bribery, which I flatter myself will be done. My reason for gaining it in this way proceeds from a wish to expedite matters and save the troops." The general then proceeds to notice the difficulties and objections to attempting the reduction of the place either by a regular siege or a *coup de main*, after which, he continues, "The loss of men, particularly Europeans, is a most serious consideration. Therefore, if by a little money I can save the lives of these valuable men, your lordship will not think I have acted wrong or been too lavish of cash. No one exacts more of a soldier than myself when I think it absolutely necessary to call forth their exertions; at the same time I have ever avoided risking the life of a soldier when it could be spared." The general tone of these sentiments is highly creditable to the writer; yet it must be remembered that if humanity be, as it unquestionably is, a bright grace in the character of a soldier, so also is that chivalrous feeling of honour, which would shrink from tempting an opponent to acts which the tempter feels would involve himself in unutterable disgrace. There is, in this instance, one extenuating circumstance which it would be unjust to pass over. The parties to be bought were not men warring for their country's interest and honour, but mercenary hirelings whose swords were purchaseable, and whose allegiance, it must be presumed, would be transferred from one master to another as circumstances might render convenient. To such men the offer of a bribe did not convey the insult which it bears when tendered to a soldier whose services are not marketable; but still, as these men had bound themselves to serve Scindia, they ought to have adhered to their bargain; and if a breach of faith were reprehensible in them, it was reprehensible also to tempt them to commit it.

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After weighing the comparative advantages of seeking the reduction of the place by a regular siege or by an immediate assault, the latter course was resolved upon. The 4th of September was fixed for the attack. The force destined for it was composed of four companies of the King's 76th regiment and detachments from two regiments of native infantry. It was led by Colonel Monson, an officer of distinguished bravery. During the preceding night two batteries of four eighteen-pounders each had been erected to cover the approach of the storming party, which left the camp at three o'clock in the morning, and advanced in a curved direction towards the gateway. On arriving within four hundred yards of it they halted till break of day. While thus waiting, an officer, who had been reconnoitering, reported that sixty or seventy of the enemy were seated round a fire smoking in front of the gateway. A British party was immediately detached in the hope of taking them by surprise, and to endeavour, amidst the confusion which it was expected would ensue, to enter the fort with them and secure the gate till the main body should arrive. The latter object was not attained. The surprise was so complete, and the ardour of the British party so great, that all opportunity of retreat for the enemy was cut off. Not one of them escaped to relate the particulars of the surprise; and though the sentinels on the ramparts gave fire on hearing the disturbance, no extraordinary alarm was excited, the affair being taken to

be the result only of a near approach of the videts of the British force.

The morning gun was the signal for the movement of the storming party, which, covered by a heavy fire from the two batteries, advanced till they came within a hundred yards of the gate. Here a traverse had been recently thrown up, and mounted with three six-pounders, but the enemy were dislodged before they had time to discharge them. Colonel Monson pushed forward with the two flank companies of the 76th regiment to enter the fort with the retreating guard, but the gate was shut and the approach exposed to a destructive fire of grape. Two ladders were then brought to the walls, and Major M'Leod, with the grenadiers, attempted to mount; they were opposed by a formidable row of pikemen, and desisted. It was then proposed to blow open the gate, and a six-pounder was placed for the purpose, but failed. A twelve-pounder was brought up, but a difficulty arose in placing it, and in these attempts full twenty minutes were consumed, during which the assailants were exposed to a destructive fire. The enemy behaved with great bravery, descending the scaling ladders which had been left against the walls, to contend with the party seeking to force an entrance. The first gate at length yielded, and the attacking party advanced along a narrow way defended by a tower pierced with loopholes, from which a constant and deadly fire was kept up by matchlock-men,

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while showers of grape poured from the batteries. The British party, however, kept on its way to the second gate, which was forced without much difficulty. At the third the assailants passed in with the retreating enemy, but a fourth still remained to be carried. Here the progress of the assailants was again stopped. The attempt to blow open the gate failed, but Major M'Leod succeeded in forcing his way through the wicket and ascending the ramparts. Resistance now became feeble, and the fortress of Alyghur passed into the hands of the British, the reward of about an hour's vigorous efforts. The loss of the English was severe, and among the wounded were Colonel Monson and Major M'Leod. The loss of the enemy was, however, much greater; and as the fort had been made by the French their principal dépôt for the Doab, a vast quantity of military stores were transferred with it to the British, besides two hundred and eighty-one pieces of cannon.\*

The terror inspired by the fall of Alyghur caused the immediate evacuation of some minor forts, the governors being unwilling to await the arrival of the victors. The event was also followed by another, scarcely less important and desirable. This was the surrender of Perron to the British general. The

\* The official details of the fall of Alyghur are not very full, and their deficiencies have been supplied by reference to the Memoir of the War in India by Major William Thorn, who served under General Lake.

step was not occasioned, perhaps it was scarcely accelerated, by the success of the British arms at Alyghur. Some time before the actual commencement of hostilities, Perron had announced to the governor-general his wish to quit the service of Scindia, and obtain permission to pass through the British territories on his way to Europe. A favourable answer had been returned, but Perron did not follow out his proposed plan. He subsequently made overtures to General Lake, and some negotiation took place which ended in nothing; and the British army, as has been seen, attacked the French adventurer immediately on entering the Mahratta territory. His rapid flight on that occasion seemed to indicate little determination to resist, and soon after the capture of Alyghur he renewed his application for permission to enter the British territories. It was promptly complied with, and one great object of the war was thus achieved almost without an effort.

The retirement of Perron, after raising himself to the rank of a petty sovereign, cannot but appear extraordinary. It was not the effect of moderation nor of satiety, but of necessity. Perron continued to love power, and all that power can command, as well as he had ever loved them; but a combination of circumstances had rendered his tenure of power insecure, and he thought it better to preserve his moveable property, which was considerable, than risk it in a contest for dominion which might probably be unsuccessful. The English government

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had determined on the destruction of his power if practicable. But, besides this cause for alarm, he had others arising out of the circumstances of the Mahratta state, of which he was a dependent. Perron's conduct had given rise, in Scindia's mind, to suspicion. A chief, named Ambagee Ingolia, took advantage of it to advance his own interests and undermine those of Perron. His views are said to have been aided by a supply of money to meet the wants of Scindia, and the authority of the French chief was transferred to his native rival. To render the transfer effective, Ambagee Ingolia intrigued with Perron's officers. Had they been faithful, their commander might not have been compelled to seek safety in flight; but where personal interest is the sole motive of action, fidelity is never to be relied upon; and some officers, who had received signal marks of Perron's favour, went over to his enemy. He had consequently no choice but to withdraw: to remain was to devote himself to plunder and perhaps to death.\*

The retreat of Perron was the virtual dissolution of the French state which he had formed on the Jumna. This did not necessarily involve the reduction of the force which he had commanded; but the loss of its chief, preceded as it had been by a course of conduct on his part, which was at the least undecided, if not pusillanimous, shook greatly the strength of native confidence in French officers, and impressed those officers with a strong feeling of the

\* Duff's History of the Mahrattas, and Smith's Sketches.

necessity of providing for their own safety. An officer named Fleury had attacked a body of troops under Colonel Cunningham, who, after vigorously resisting and temporarily beating off a force greatly superior to his own, had been compelled to accept for himself and his men permission to retire with their arms, on condition of not again serving against Scindia during the war. A detachment was sent against Fleury, which he contrived to evade, but he finally accompanied his chief to the British camp. Another officer, named Louis Bourquin, who commanded a division of Perron's force, resolved to make a stand against the main body of the English under General Lake. The hostile armies met on the 11th September, about six miles from the imperial city of Delhi. The British had performed a march of eighteen miles, and had just taken up their ground for encampment, when the enemy appeared in such force as to oblige the grand guard and advanced picquets to turn out. The numbers continued to increase, and General Lake, on reconnoitering, found them drawn up on rising ground in great force and complete order of battle. Their position was well defended, each flank being covered by a swamp, beyond which cavalry were stationed, while artillery guarded the front, which derived further protection from a line of entrenchments. The English commander resolved, however, to give them battle. The whole of his cavalry had accompanied him on his reconnoissance, and that being completed, he sent orders for the infantry and artil-

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lery to join. This could not be effected in less than an hour, during which the British cavalry, which were two miles in advance, were exposed to a heavy fire from the enemy, which brought down many men. During this interval the horse of General Lake was shot under him.

Although the British commander had determined on hazarding an action, he felt that to attack the enemy in the position which had been taken up would be attended with but a feeble chance of success. He therefore ordered his cavalry to fall back, partly to cover the advance of the infantry, but principally with a view to allure the enemy from their advantageous post by the appearance of a retreat. The feint had the desired effect. No sooner were the British cavalry in motion than the enemy rushed forward with wild manifestations of triumph and delight, the vivacity of the French leaders having communicated itself to those whom they commanded. But their exultation was soon checked. The cavalry continued their retrograde movement till the infantry came up; the former then opened from its centre and allowed the latter to pass to the front. Preparations having been made for guarding the flanks of the British force, one of which was threatened by some native cavalry, the whole line moved forward. A tremendous fire from nearly a hundred pieces of cannon, some of them of large calibre, fell around them; but the British troops, unmoved by it, advanced steadily and without removing their muskets from their shoulders till within a hundred paces

of the enemy. Orders were then given to charge—the whole line fired a volley, and, headed by the commander-in-chief, pushed on their bayonets with resistless force. The fate of the day was decided—and when the troops halted after the charge, the enemy were flying in all directions. The victorious infantry immediately broke into columns of companies, by which movement the whole of the cavalry, both European and native, were enabled to charge through the intervals with their gallopper guns, pursuing the enemy to the Jumna, where great numbers perished. All the artillery and stores of the enemy fell into the hands of the English, and three days after the battle, Louis Bourquin, with four other French officers, surrendered themselves.

In the city of Delhi, which was forthwith evacuated by the French, the battle had been an object of much interest. There, at the ancient seat of the power which Baber had reared—where Akbar had placed on record the length and breadth of the provinces which owned its sway—where Aurungzebe had assembled mighty armies to chastise his enemies and reduce to subjection tributary kings—there dwelt the living representative of the house of Timour in the person of a miserable man, old, blind, and decrepid—without power, without pomp or state or retinue—almost without the means of commanding the common necessities of life. This was Shah Allum, once the gallant Shazada, whose military energy had alarmed and annoyed the British government, but for many years the suffering captive of those who secured his

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person for the sake of abusing his name to purposes of selfish aggrandizement. He had allied himself with the Mahrattas, and through their assistance had obtained possession of Delhi.\* This is not the place to pursue the troubled history of his life. It must suffice to say that thenceforward it was an almost unbroken series of calamity. The territories nominally subject to the emperor were the constant scene of disorder and rebellion. Surrounded by troubles of every description, he conceived the most violent suspicions of the loyalty of his eldest son. Such suspicions are of common occurrence in Oriental monarchies, and are frequently not unwarranted. In this instance there seems to have been no ground for them. Alienated from the affections of his father by those who had an interest in fomenting dissensions, the Shazada passed a great part of his life at a distance from the city which was the witness of the former glory and present degradation of his house. He made repeated efforts to obtain the aid of the British government for the deliverance of his father from thralldom, but in vain. Hastings was not indisposed to afford it, but was restrained by orders from home, dictated in the spirit of the non-intervention policy which then prevailed. The Shazada died in the British dominions, of fever, and not long afterwards the calamities of his wretched parent were consummated. A ruffian chief, of Rohilla origin, named Gholaum Kaudir Khan, having obtained possession

\* See vol. ii. page 35.

of the city of Delhi, and with it of the person of the emperor, committed the most dreadful excesses—excesses which an historian has felt justified in declaring to be “almost without parallel in the annals of the world.”\* The apartments of the women, which, in the East, usually command some respect even from the most abandoned, were rendered by Gholaum Kaudir the scene of crimes, of which violent and indiscriminate plunder was the lightest; and the emperor, after being exposed to every insult which malice and insolence could devise, was deprived of sight by the dagger of the wretch who had previously heaped on him every other misery. The arms of Scindia rescued the unhappy monarch from the power of Gholaum Kaudir, and the crimes of that miscreant met a fearful retribution.† The authority of Shah Allum was once more recognized, but the recognition was only formal. All substantial power was exercised by the Mahratta authorities. The office of vakeel ool-moolk, or executive prime minister of the Mogul empire, was bestowed on the Peishwa, but Scindia had no intention to burden his highness with the duties of

\* Captain Duff, author of the History of the Mahrattas.

† He fled to Meerut; being hard pressed there by the Mahrattas, he effected his escape, but was subsequently taken, loaded with irons, and exposed in a cage. After this he was deprived of his eyes, ears, nose, hands, and feet, and in this horrible situation sent forward to Delhi. But he never reached that scene of his atrocities, death putting a period to his sufferings on the way. Such are the crimes and such the punishments practised in the East, and yet it has been questioned whether the introduction of English principles of government be an advantage.

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the office. The discharge of these he personally undertook as the Peishwa's deputy, and the function, with all its power and influence, passed to his successors. Perron, in the course of his restless intrigues, obtained the appointment of commandant of the fortress of Delhi, and thus the person and power of Shah Allum was transferred from the Mahrattas to the French. From neither did the emperor meet with either kindness or generosity. He was not merely deprived of power—of this he could scarcely complain, having, by his own act, transferred his right to others—but his rank and misfortunes commanded no sympathy, and even the means of subsistence were tardily and scantily dealt out to him. A considerable sum had been professedly allotted to the support of the royal household, but so badly was it paid, that the emperor and his family were often in want.

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The triumph of the British arms under General Lake opened a new scene. Immediately after the battle the emperor had dispatched a message to the victorious commander, offering the monarch's congratulations and soliciting protection. An appropriate answer was returned; and on the 16th of September the heir of Timour, so long the victim of adverse fortune, seated in the capital of his ancestors, gave audience to the English general. In that place his predecessors, clothed in the most gorgeous productions of the loom, had sate upon thrones formed of gold, and made radiant by a dazzling profusion of the most costly jewels. Around them had stood

hundreds of obsequious guards and dependents, waiting in mute and watchful attention the expression of the sovereign's will, and ready to give it effect as soon as uttered; while vassals from distant countries, or their representatives, tendered respectful homage to the lord of the faithful throughout India, and wooed his favour by presents worthy of his rank. Far different was the scene which met the eye of the British general and his attendants. Beneath a small and ragged canopy, the appearance of which seemed a mockery of regal state, sate one whose age exceeded that usually attained by man, but in whose appearance the operation of time was less apparent than that of long and hopeless misery. Eighty-three years had passed over his head, and they had been filled with trouble and sorrow. While his name was held in reverence throughout India, his life had been passed amid poverty, danger, and suffering, and all around him at this moment indicated the most wretched destitution. But there was one element of misery greater than all. The light of heaven, the common source of enjoyment to the prosperous and the wretched, shone not for him—the face of nature was to him a blank. The miserable satisfaction of contrasting the appearance of all things around him then with former scenes was denied him. Strangers from a far distant country stood before him—in their hands was his fate—they addressed to him words of sympathy, and kindness, and comfort, but he could not read in their countenances a confirmation of the friendly language which fell

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on his ear. Poor, dependent, aged, infirm, and sightless, the head of the empire illustrated in his person the wide-spread ruin which had overwhelmed the empire itself.

Shah Allum regarded the English as his deliverers, and he bestowed on General Lake a host of titles, in testimonial of his bravery and military skill—the sword of the state, the hero of the land, the lord of the age, and the victorious in war. Such were the terms in which, in the spirit of Oriental exaggeration, the services of the British commander were acknowledged.

Colonel Ochterlony was left at Delhi, in a capacity similar to that of resident, and Lord Lake resumed his march. But before adverting to the subsequent events of his career, attention must be directed to the progress of the British arms under General Wellesley in a different part of India.

Scindia and the Rajah of Berar had entered the territories of the Nizam, and it was supposed would cross the Godavery, which was fordable, and attack Hyderabad. General Wellesley moved to counteract them, and the confederates retired towards the point by which they had entered. They were soon after joined by a considerable detachment of regular infantry under two French officers. On the 21st of September, General Wellesley was so near the corps of Colonel Stevenson, who commanded the Hyderabad subsidiary force and the Nizam's horse, as to be able to hold a conference with that officer, when a plan was concerted for attacking the enemy on

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the 24th, it being understood that their army was collected at a place named Bokerdun. General Wellesley was to attack their left, and Colonel Stevenson their right. The former directed his march with the view of arriving on the 23rd within twelve or fourteen miles of the enemy; but it turned out that the information upon which the plan had been arranged had deceived the commander. The enemy's camp, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right at that place, and extended several miles to Assye. There was a district, as well as a village, called Bokerdun: the camp was entirely within the district, and hence arose the mistake. Its result was, that General Wellesley on the 23rd found himself within six miles of the enemy, instead of the distance which he had expected. To add to the surprise which the discovery of the enemy's position was calculated to produce, and to increase the difficulty of deciding how to deal with the unexpected state of circumstances, General Wellesley received intelligence that the confederates were about to retire. If, therefore, he postponed the attack till the arrival of Colonel Stevenson on the following day, the opportunity might be lost, by the departure of the enemy in the night. It was probable that they might have heard of his approach, and the intelligence would be likely to accelerate their removal. Should this not be the case, there was another danger of a different character: General Wellesley could not hope to withdraw unobserved, and retreat would have exposed him to harassing attacks from the enemy's cavalry, at-

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tended, in all probability, with the loss of part of his baggage. These were reasons against retreat. On the other hand was the alarming fact, that in his front was a hostile army, comprising a body of infantry three or four times as many as his own, a numerous cavalry, and a vast quantity of cannon; the whole occupying a formidable position. In emergencies like this, the bolder course is not unfrequently the safest. General Wellesley preferred it, and resolved to attack.

The enemy's right consisted entirely of cavalry, and it was in front of this that the British commander found himself. He determined, however, to direct his attack to their left, as the defeat of the infantry was the more likely to be effectual. Between the hostile armies flowed the river Kaitna. This was crossed by the British force at a ford which happily the enemy had neglected to occupy. The infantry were immediately formed into two lines, and the British cavalry, as a reserve, into a third. The native horse were employed in keeping in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry, which had followed the march of the British force.

The attack was made with promptitude and vigour; it was attended by corresponding success. Some mistakes occurred, which, though they affected not the fortune of the day, added greatly to the loss of the English. The enemy had made a change in their position, which threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and which was surrounded by cannon. General Wellesley ob-

serving this, directed the officer commanding the picquets on the right to keep out of shot from that village. The officer, misapprehending the order, led directly upon it. The 74th regiment, which had been ordered to support the picquets, followed, and suffered severely. The mistake rendered necessary the introduction of the cavalry at an earlier period than was desirable. Various evils attended this step. The cavalry suffered much from the cannonade; they were incapacitated for pursuit when the period for thus employing their services arrived, and when they were brought forward there was no reserve. One consequence of this deficiency was, that stragglers left in the rear of the British force, who had pretended to be dead, were suddenly restored to animation, and turned their guns upon the backs of the conquerors. But the victory, though bought by the sacrifice of many valuable lives, was complete. The resistless bayonets of the British troops drove the enemy before them in repeated charges, and when their last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, leaving the English masters of the field, and of nearly a hundred pieces of cannon abandoned by the fugitives. General Wellesley shared largely in the labours and the dangers of the conflict. Two horses were killed under him, and every officer of his staff experienced similar casualties. The loss on the part of the English amounted to nearly four hundred killed. The number of wounded was fearfully large—between fifteen and sixteen hundred. The enemy left twelve hundred

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killed, and a vast number were wounded; but many of the latter being scattered over the country, not even an estimate could be formed of the amount. Among the mortally wounded was Scindia's principal minister, who survived but a short time.

The battle of Assye places in a conspicuous light the cool determination of the general, and the admirable qualities of the troops at his disposal. Entangled in difficulties from which there was no escape but through danger, he chose the mode which to the superficial or the timid would have appeared the most dangerous. He was justified by the character of his troops, and the result was alike honourable to his own judgment and to the intrepid spirit of those on whom he relied. Misinformation brought the battle prematurely on—mistake added to its dangers and difficulties; but all untoward circumstances were successfully overcome by the admirable judgment of the leader and the devoted earnestness of his followers.

So rapid and so numerous were the successes of the British arms, and so much were all these operations parts of one consistent whole, that it is impossible to restrict the attention of the reader for any length of time to one series, without neglecting and throwing out of place other transactions of great interest and importance. The proceedings of General Lake must now for a brief interval supersede the record of those of his co-adjutor in the south. On quitting Delhi, General Lake had marched towards Agra, at which place he arrived on the 4th of Octo-

ber. The fort was summoned ; but no answer being returned, preparations were made for dislodging seven battalions who held possession of the town, of an encampment with a large number of guns on the glacis, and of the ravines on the south and south-west face of the fort. This being effected with success, though not without considerable loss, the operations of the siege commenced, the approaches being made under cover of the ravines which had been won from the enemy. On the 14th a communication was received from the fort, demanding a cessation of hostilities, on the ground that terms were about to be proposed. General Lake, in consequence, directed the firing to cease for a few hours, and requested that a confidential person might be sent without delay with the proposed terms. Terms were sent, and General Lake dispatched one of his own officers with letters, giving his assent to them. The fort had been for some time the scene of mutiny ; but in the communication to General Lake it was stated that all ill-feeling was at an end, and that officers and men were alike ready to abide by whatever agreement might be made between their commandant, Colonel Hessing, and the English general. But this unanimity, if it ever existed, was of short duration. The British officer dispatched to make the final arrangements found great diversity of opinion among the native chiefs, and a great desire to raise objections. While he was endeavouring to remove these, the firing from the fort was recommenced without any apparent cause. On this the

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English officer returned. The belief of General Lake was, that the overture was but an expedient to gain time, and this opinion seems highly probable. Throughout his career the humanity of the commander-in-chief was eminently conspicuous, and it is to this feeling that his consent to a cessation of firing is to be ascribed. It may, however, be doubted whether, under the circumstances, he was justified in consenting to discontinue his fire, with a view to obtaining a surrender on terms. He had expressed his belief that the place would not stand ten hours' breaching,\* and any appearance of hesitation was calculated to give confidence to the enemy, and diminish that feeling among his own troops.

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\* Letter to the Marquis Wellesley, Oct. 10th, 1803. See Despatches.

† Among the ordnance taken at Agra was a gun of enormous magnitude, called the "great gun of Agra." It was said to be composed of various metals, including those to which the common

In addition to the great plans which General Lake and General Wellesley were successfully working out, there were various detached operations at this time in progress, all bearing some relation to each other, and all conducted with vigour and success. The notice of some of these must be deferred to a later period, but the occupation of Cuttack, which was completed during the month of October, may properly be adverted to in this place. This service was effected by Colonel Harcourt, who, having occupied that great seat of Hindoo superstition, Juggernaut, proceeded to reduce the fort of Barabuttee, situate about a mile from the town of Cuttack. The fort was built of stone, and was surrounded by a ditch twenty feet deep, and varying in breadth, according to the situation of the bastions, from thirty-five to a hundred and thirty-five feet. A battery was completed on the night of the 13th of October, and on the morning of the 14th opened its fire. By eleven o'clock most of the defences in that part of the fort against which the fire was directed were taken off, the enemy's guns were silenced, and Colonel Harcourt judged that the time for attempting to gain possession had arrived. Over the ditch was a narrow bridge leading to the gate, and by this communication the assailants were to

consent of mankind has assigned the epithet precious; and it was possibly true, as the shroffs of the city offered the English commander a lac of rupees for the gun merely to melt down. The *calibre* of this extraordinary instrument of destruction was 23 inches; its length, 14 feet 2 inches; its weight, 96,000 pounds. A ball of cast-iron for this gun would weigh 1,500 pounds.

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endeavour to effect an entrance. The party, which consisted of both Europeans and sepoy, was led by Lieutenant Colonel Clayton. They advanced under a fire of musketry from the fort, ill-directed but heavy, to which they were exposed for forty minutes. The gate was to be blown open, but no impression could be made except on the wicket, the remainder being fortified by large masses of stone. The wicket having yielded, the assailants entered, but could only pass singly. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, and a very determined resistance offered at the outer and two succeeding gates, the British party gained possession of all, and the victory was the more gratifying from its having been attained with comparatively little loss. The capture of Barabuttee was followed by the entire submission of the province of Cuttack, and the greater part of the troops by whom the conquest had been effected were at liberty to enter Berar, to co-operate with the army under General Wellesley.

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The month of November opened with a brilliant addition to the splendid success which in every quarter had crowned the arms of England. General Lake marched from Agra on the 27th of October, in pursuit of a Mahratta force composed of some brigades dispatched from the Deccan in the early part of the campaign, and of a few battalions which had effected their escape from Delhi. Great anxiety was felt to destroy or disperse this corps, on account of its being provided with a numerous artillery. The march of the English army having been seri-

ously impeded by unfavourable weather, it was resolved to leave the heavy artillery at Futtypore, and pursue the enemy by forced marches. On the 31st, the British force encamped at a short distance from the ground which the enemy had quitted on the same morning, and General Lake determined to push forward with his cavalry, in the hope of overtaking and delaying them by a light engagement till the infantry should be able to come up. At midnight the cavalry was accordingly put in motion, and, after a march of twenty-five miles, came up with the enemy soon after day-break. On descrying them, the English commander supposed that they were in retreat, and, to prevent their effecting this object, he resolved to attack them at once, instead of acting upon the plan which he had proposed of keeping them in check till the infantry arrived. The official details of the early proceedings of this day are singularly obscure; but this much is certain, that the attempt to make any permanent impression on the Mahratta line by cavalry alone was unsuccessful. The enemy's artillery mowed down men and horses in masses, and the sacrifice was vain. The valour displayed by the British cavalry in this fruitless struggle commands indeed the most unbounded admiration, mixed with a deep feeling of regret that it should have been so utterly wasted. Nothing could excuse the premature conflict provoked by General Lake, but the mistake under which he laboured in believing the enemy to be in retreat, and the laudable desire which he felt to prevent the

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escape of a force which was regarded with considerable apprehension. The infantry, which had marched at three, arrived at eleven, having occupied in their march only two hours more than the cavalry. At this time a message was received from the enemy, offering to surrender their guns upon terms. This was remarkable, because up to this period the Mahrattas had no cause to be dissatisfied with the fortune of the day. The probability is, that it was an expedient to gain time for some desired object, and the result seems to countenance such a belief. General Lake accepted the offer, "anxious," as he says, "to prevent the further effusion of blood." He might have adduced another reason also: his infantry, after a long march, performed very rapidly, under a burning sun, needed rest and refreshment. Whatever might be the motive of the Mahrattas for seeking delay, this circumstance made delay not the less desirable for the English. General Lake allowed the Mahrattas an hour to determine whether they would agree to his acceptance of their own proposals, a mode of proceeding more easily reconcilable with the ordinary course of Indian negotiations than with common sense. The English general seems to have expected little from this overture, and, whatever the measure of his expectation, he acted wisely in employing the interval of suspense in making preparations for renewing the attack under more advantageous circumstances. The infantry were formed into two columns on the left. The first, composed of the right wing, was destined to

turn the right flank of the enemy and to attack the village of Laswaree; the second column was to support the first. There were three brigades of cavalry. One of these, the third, was instructed to support the infantry; the second was detached to the right to watch the motions of the enemy, take advantage of any confusion that might occur, and fall upon them in the event of a retreat: the remaining brigade—the first, which was formed between the third and second, composed the reserve. As many field-pieces as could be brought up with the gallopers attached to the cavalry formed four distinct batteries for the support of the operations of the infantry.

The hour of expectation passed, and nothing further being heard from the enemy, the infantry were ordered to advance. Their march lay along the bank of a rivulet, and for a time they pursued it under cover of high grass and amidst broken ground concealed from the enemy. As soon, however, as they were discovered and their object ascertained, the enemy threw back their right wing under cover of heavy discharges of artillery. Showers of grape, poured forth from large mortars as well as from guns of heavy calibre, did fearful execution on the British infantry, whose batteries returned the fire with promptitude and vigour indeed, but, from their inferiority in numbers and weight of metal, with very inferior effect. The King's 76th was at the head of the advancing column, and so dreadful were the ravages made in its ranks by the storm of

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fire to which it was exposed, that, on its arriving at the point from which the charge was to be made, General Lake resolved rather to proceed to the attack with that regiment and some native infantry who had closed to the front,\* than to wait for the remainder of the column, whose advance had been, from some cause, delayed. The conduct of the men nobly justified the confidence reposed in them by their commander. They advanced with as much regularity as was practicable, under a tremendous shower of canister-shot, which further thinned their previously weakened ranks. This was immediately succeeded by a charge from the enemy's cavalry; but they were received in a manner which sent them back in confusion. They rallied at a short distance, and there being reason to apprehend further mischief, the King's 29th dragoons were ordered to attack them. They formed on the outward flank of the 76th, by whom they were received with cheers, which were echoed back by the cavalry with no diminution of vigour. From this time the details of the battle became too involved to be narrated with perspicuity. A general charge of horse and foot was made, in which the desperate valour of the assailants set at naught every obstacle and defied every danger. At the moment when the commander-in-chief was about

\* It is due to those who shared the post of honour with the King's 76th in this scene of death, to state that they consisted of the second battalion of the 12th native infantry and five companies of the 16th.

to place himself at the head of the infantry, his horse was shot under him. While in the act of mounting that of his son, Major Lake, that officer was wounded by his side; but this was no time for the indulgence of even the deepest sympathies of nature. The notes of the cavalry trumpets sounding to the charge—which caught the ear when the thunder of the guns from the enemy's lines for a moment subsided—told that those lines were to be won, and those guns made prize—and such was the result. The enemy fought with a determination far exceeding all that had been expected of them, and it was not till they had been dispossessed of all their guns that they relinquished the contest. Even then some of the best qualities of the character of a soldier were displayed, in an attempt made by their left wing to effect an orderly retreat. In this, however, as in every other point, they were defeated; a regiment of British dragoons, and another of native cavalry, breaking in upon them, cutting many to pieces, and making prisoners of the rest, with the whole of their baggage.

The loss of the English, in killed and wounded, amounted to more than eight hundred; but this, though heavy, was not to be compared with that of the enemy. About two thousand of the latter were taken prisoners, and with the exception of these, and of a few whom the possession of good horses and local knowledge might enable to escape to a distance, the whole of the seventeen battalions were destroyed. It has been conjectured that the num-

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ber of slain could hardly be less than seven thousand.\* The destruction of this force was scarcely less important with regard to that strength which is based on opinion, than on account of its actual and immediate effect in crippling the resources of the enemy. The battalions which fell at Laswaree constituted the flower of Scindia's army, and had been distinguished by the imposing name of the Deccan Invincibles. The charm was now broken; not only had the invincible battalions been vanquished, but so entire had been their defeat that they had ceased to exist. The completeness of their destruction was indeed in one sense honourable to them, for it attested the vigour of their resistance; but how proud was the distinction earned by those who had dispelled the illusion which had raised this corps above the reach of the chances of war, and claimed for it a charter of perpetual success!

The victory was gained entirely by hard fighting. The course taken by General Lake in various instances was bold even to the verge of rashness. So nearly did it approach the line which separates courage from temerity, that had the result been unfavourable, it would probably have been impugned by that numerous class whose judgment, if not altogether governed by the event, is greatly modified by it. His venturing to attack the enemy with his cavalry alone cannot be defended without reference to the belief under which his resolution was

\* This is the estimate of Major Thorn.

taken. He found the enemy were about to elude him altogether. The subsequent advance to charge with only part of his infantry is more easily defensible. Exposed as they were to a fire which was rapidly consuming them, it was scarcely possible that they could be placed in more unfavourable circumstances, while an indication of fearless determination was calculated at once to keep up their spirit and to abate that of the enemy. But whatever opinion may be formed of the conduct of the battle of Laswaree, it is impossible to trace its progress and results without a deep impression of reverence for that indomitable courage and perseverance by which victory was secured to the English. The sanguine and imaginative will, from a perusal of its history, catch some portion of the spirit which burned in the breasts of those by whom it was won; and if a casual recollection of it should ever flit over the mind of one engaged amid equal dangers in maintaining the cause of England in distant lands, the lapse of years will detract nothing from the force of the example: the dauntless heroism of those who fought and conquered at Laswaree will aid to nerve the arms and brace the sinews of the soldier, so long as their deeds are remembered.

Again does it become necessary to direct attention to the army in the south, for the purpose of noticing in their proper place its contributions towards the safety and honour of the British government. General Wellesley had apprized Colonel Stevenson of the necessity imposed on him of attacking

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the enemy at Assye without waiting for his junction. The latter immediately marched with part of his troops; and the enemy, on hearing of his advance, departed suddenly from the spot where they had passed the night after the battle, and proceeded towards the Adjunttee Ghaut. Colonel Stevenson, having met with considerable difficulties on his march, was unable to pursue them; and he was further detained, that the wounded in the battle of Assye might have the assistance of his surgeons, great inconvenience and suffering having been occasioned by the want of a sufficient number of medical officers. When Colonel Stevenson advanced, the enemy's infantry, or rather the wreck of it, retired towards the Nerbudda. This division of the British force met with no interruption in the field, and Colonel Stevenson obtained possession of several important fortresses with little difficulty. General Wellesley in the mean time made some rapid and harassing marches, all of them intended to promote important objects. His situation cannot be better painted than in his own words. "Since the battle of Assye," says he, "I have been like a man who fights with one hand and defends himself with the other. With Colonel Stevenson's corps I have acted offensively, and have taken Asseerghur; and with my own I have covered his operations, and defended the territories of the Nizam and the Peishwa. In doing this, I have made some terrible marches; but I have been remarkably fortunate—first, in stopping the enemy when they intended to

pass to the southward through the Casserbarry Ghaut; and, afterwards, by a rapid march to the northward, in stopping Scindia when he was moving to interrupt Colonel Stevenson's operations against Asseerghur, in which he would otherwise have undoubtedly succeeded. I moved up the Ghaut as soon as Colonel Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur; and I think that in a day or two I shall turn Ragojee Bhoonslah,\* who has passed through to the southward. At all events, I am in time to prevent him doing any mischief. I think that we are in great style to be able to act on the offensive at all in this quarter; but it is only done by the celerity of our movements, and by acting on the offensive or defensive with either corps, according to our situation and that of the enemy."†

In pursuit of the Rajah of Berar, General Wellesley arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th of October. The Rajah was so little anxious for a meeting, that in the two days succeeding the arrival of the British force at that place he moved his camp five times. He, however, gathered sufficient confidence by the 31st, to venture, with a body of four or five thousand horse, to attack a small force engaged in protecting a convoy of fourteen thousand bullocks, but was compelled to retire without any advantage beyond the capture of a few of the beasts.

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Several weeks before this transaction, vague and

\* The Rajah of Berar.

† Letter of General Wellesley to Major Shawe, 26th October, 1803. See Wellington Despatches.

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apparently unauthorized overtures for negotiation had been made on the part of Scindia to General Wellesley. Early in November there arrived in the English camp, on a mission from Scindia, a Mahratta chief of considerable rank, named Jeswant Rao Ghorepuray, and a Brahmin named Naroo Punt; but these persons, when called upon to produce their credentials, had none to shew. They were permitted to remain in the English camp till measures could be taken for remedying this defect; but before any answer could be received to their application for the purpose, a letter was received by General Wellesley from Scindia, disavowing Jeswant Rao Ghorepuray and his colleague, and intimating an intention of sending another person to negotiate with the British general. The latter was persuaded, notwithstanding, that Scindia had really dispatched the mission which he now disavowed, and, notwithstanding the letter of Scindia, it was not dismissed. General Wellesley was not unacquainted with the characteristics of Mahratta diplomacy. "In proportion," said he, "as I gain experience of the Mahrattas, I have more reason to be astonished at the low and unaccountable tricks which even the highest classes of them practise, with a view, however remote, to forward their own interest."\* An addition to his experience was now about to be made, perfectly in accordance with that which he had previously gained. Shortly after the receipt of Scindia's letter, disavow-

\* Letter of General Wellesley to the governor-general, 11th November, 1803.

ing Jeswant Rao Ghorepuray and his Brahmin associate, those parties produced a letter from their master, conveying to them certain powers sufficient to corroborate their claims to be received as the representatives of Scindia, but insufficient to justify the British commander in even opening a negotiation. Unable to treat for a peace, the vakeels proposed a temporary suspension of arms, and this was acceded to on condition that Scindia with his army should enter Berar twenty coss to the eastward of Ellichpore,\* and keep, at all times, at that distance from the British troops. On the part of Scindia, it was demanded that the cessation of arms should extend to Hindostan, but to this General Wellesley refused to consent. "The rule," said General Wellesley, "not to cease hostilities till peace be concluded, is a good one in general."† His chief reason for concluding that a deviation from it would, in this case, be beneficial, was, that if hostilities continued uninterruptedly, Scindia would probably embarrass the contemplated operations of Colonel Stevenson, while the English would be unable to do any thing effectually against Scindia, the army with him in the field being composed entirely of horse, to follow which would draw the English force too far from its sources of supply, and prevent its being directed against the Rajah of Berar. Colonel Stevenson was preparing to attack Gawilghur, within the territories of the last-named chief, and the fall of that place was regarded

\* About forty miles.

† Letter to governor-general, 23rd November, 1803.

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as of great importance. An irruption of the enemy into Guzerat, which was but weakly provided with the means of defence, was also apprehended, and to avert this was one of the objects of the British general in concluding the truce: another was, to effect a division between Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, who was not included in it. The agents had proposed that it should extend to the forces of that chief, but the proposal, independently of its interfering with one main object of the British commander, that of separating the interests of the confederates, could not have failed to be rejected. The agents of Scindia had no powers to treat for the Rajah of Berar, and consequently he could not be bound by any stipulations which they might make on his behalf. He might have repudiated them on the ordinary principles of reason and justice, and without any necessity for resorting to the convenient resources of Mahratta morality.

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Colonel Stevenson, having equipped his force at Asseerghur for the siege of Gawilghur, marched to Ballapoor, where he was joined by the convoy which the Rajah of Berar had in vain attempted to cut off. To support and cover his operations, General Wellesley descended the ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th of November. At Parterly was a force belonging to the Rajah of Berar, and commanded by his brother, Manoo Bappoo: it comprised, together with a body of cavalry, a great part, if not the whole, of the Rajah's infantry, and a large proportion of artillery. Scindia's vakeels became alarmed

by General Wellesley's approach to this force, and entreated that it might not be attacked. His answer was, that there was no suspense of arms with the Rajah of Berar; and to this communication he appended another, probably more unexpected, that there was none with Scindia till he should comply with the terms of the agreement. The provision that Scindia should occupy a position twenty coss to the east of Ellichpore had not been complied with, that chief being encamped at Serroody, about four miles from the force under Manoo Bappoo. That Scindia should conform to any obligation except so far as it appeared to answer a present purpose, was, indeed, not to be expected. His conduct had reduced the armistice to that which Mahratta engagements may, for the most part, be considered—an idle and useless piece of writing, without force and without value. General Wellesley accompanied his notice of Scindia's breach of engagement by a declaration that he should attack the enemies of the Company wherever he should find them, and Scindia was undoubtedly to be accounted not merely as an enemy, but as one engaged in active hostilities.

At Parterly General Wellesley was joined by the division under Colonel Stevenson. Shortly after their arrival parties of the enemy's horse appeared, with which the Mysorean cavalry skirmished during part of the day. On General Wellesley going out to push forward the picquets of the infantry to support the Mysorean horse, he perceived a long line

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of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Argaum, about six miles from the place where he had intended to encamp. It was late, the day had been intensely hot, and the British had marched a long distance; but, notwithstanding these circumstances, General Wellesley resolved not to lose the opportunity which presented itself, and he accordingly marched forward to attack. The advance was made in a single column, in a direction nearly parallel to that of the enemy's line, the British cavalry leading. The rear and left were covered by native cavalry.

The enemy's infantry and guns were on the left of their centre, and on the left of these was a body of cavalry. Scindia's army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the right, and to its right was a body of pindaries\* and other light troops. The enemy's line extended about five miles, having in its rear the village of Argaum, with extensive gardens and inclosures. In its front was a plain, but considerably intersected by water-courses.

As the British army approached the enemy it was formed into two lines, the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second, supporting the right, which was rather advanced, to press on the enemy's left. The left of the British was supported by the Mogul and Mysore cavalry. Some delay took place from part of the native infantry getting into confusion. By one of those inexplicable panics which some-

\* Marauders, of whom more will appear in the latter portions of the history of India.

times seize even the best troops, some battalions, which had eminently distinguished themselves at the battle of Assye, were so terrified by the cannonading, far inferior as it was to what they had previously encountered, that they broke and fell into confusion. Happily, the general was at no great distance, and the presence of him who had so lately led them to victory brought them back to their duty. The whole then advanced in the best order.

The conflict was not marked by any of those vicissitudes which lend interest to the narrative of such events, when victory seems to hover between the combatants. The battle was sanguinary, but from the moment when the temporary confusion in part of the British line was dispelled, the result was not for an instant doubtful. The King's 76th and 78th regiments were fiercely attacked by a large body of Persian troops, and the latter were entirely destroyed. Scindia's cavalry made a charge on the first battalion of the 6th regiment; but being repulsed with great slaughter, the whole line of the enemy gave way, and fled in the utmost disorder, abandoning to the victors thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition. They were pursued, and great numbers of the fugitives destroyed. The close of the day gave some advantage to the flying, but the light of the moon was sufficient to enable the pursuers to add to their previous captures many elephants and camels, and a considerable quantity of baggage. The loss of the English in killed and wounded amounted to three hundred and forty-six.

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The enemy suffered dreadfully, and General Wellesley declared his belief that, with one hour more of daylight, not a man would have escaped.

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After this signal victory, General Wellesley determined to proceed to the siege of Gawilghur. Both divisions of the army accordingly marched on the 5th of December, and arrived at Ellichpore on the same day: here they halted on the 6th, to provide an hospital for the wounded.

Gawilghur is thus described by General Wellesley:—"The fort of Gawilghur is situated on a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poona and Taptee. It stands on a lofty mountain in this range, and consists of one complete inner fort, which fronts to the south, where the rock is most steep, and an outer fort, which covers the inner to the north-west and north. The outer fort has a third wall, which covers the approach to it from the north by the village of Labada. All these walls are strongly built, and fortified by ramparts and towers. The communications with the fort are through three gates: one to the south with the inner fort; one to the north-west with the outer fort; and one to the north with the third wall. The ascent to the first is very long and steep, and is practicable only for men; that to the second is by a road used for the common communications of the garrison with the countries to the southward; but the road passes round the west side of the fort, and is exposed for a great distance to its fire; it is so narrow as to make it impracticable to approach regularly by it, and the rock is

scarped on each side. This road also leads no further than the gate. The communication with the northern gate is direct from the village of Labada, and here the ground is level with that of the fort : but the road to Labada leads through the mountains for about thirty miles from Ellichpore, and it was obvious that the difficulty and labour of moving ordnance and stores to Labada would be very great."

Notwithstanding the objections existing against the last-mentioned route, it was resolved to adopt it, on the ground that it was the least objectionable of the three, and the requisite measures were immediately taken. Two detachments were made,—one to drive the enemy from the ground which they occupied to the southward of the fort ; the other to seize the fortified village of Dameraum, covering the entrance to the mountains which were to be passed in the way to Labada. These detachments succeeded in performing the services on which they were respectively dispatched.

On the 7th of December both divisions of the army marched from Ellichpore ; Colonel Stevenson into the mountains by Damergaum, and General Wellesley towards the southern face of the fort of Gawilghur. From that day till the 12th, when Colonel Stevenson broke ground near Labada, the troops in his division went through a series of exhausting labours not unprecedented in Indian warfare, but rarely paralleled elsewhere. The heavy ordnance and stores were dragged by hand over

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mountains and through ravines for nearly the whole distance which had to be passed, and this by roads which it was previously necessary for the troops to construct for themselves. At night, on the 12th, Colonel Stevenson erected two batteries in front of the north face of the fort; one, consisting of two iron eighteen-pounders and three iron twelve-pounders, to breach the outer fort and third wall; the other, composed of two brass twelve-pounders and two five-inch howitzers, to clear and destroy the defences on the point of attack. On the same night the troops of General Wellesley's division constructed a battery on a mountain towards the southern gate. Two brass twelve-pounders were here mounted—two iron ones were to have been added, but no exertions of the troops could get them into their places.

All the batteries opened their fire on the morning of the 13th, and on the 14th, at night, the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable. The party destined for the main attack from the north was led by Lieutenant Colonel Kenny, and, to divert the enemy's attention, two attacks were made from the southward by troops from General Wellesley's division, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Wallace and Lieutenant Colonel Chalmers. About ten in the morning the three parties advanced, and nearly simultaneously. The detachment under Colonel Chalmers arrived at the north-west gate at the moment when the enemy were endeavouring to escape through it from the bayonets of the assailants under

Colonel Kenny. Thus far, therefore, the attack had entirely succeeded; but the wall of the inner fort, in which no breach had been made, was yet to be carried. After some attempts upon the gate of communication between the inner and outer fort, a place was found at which it was deemed practicable to escalate. Ladders were brought, by which Captain Campbell and the light infantry of the King's 94th ascended: by them the gates were opened to the storming party, and the fort was in the British possession. This acquisition was made with comparatively small loss. During the siege and storm, the total amount was one hundred and twenty-six killed and wounded. The garrison was numerous and well armed: vast numbers of them were killed, particularly at the different gates. Much ordnance and many stand of English arms were found within the fort. The killadar was a Rajpoot of eminent bravery, but whose judgment seems to have been so greatly inferior to his courage that he had been unable to frame any regular plan for defending the inner wall. He was aided by another Rajpoot, Beni Singh, bold and intrepid as himself; but the bravery of the leaders does not seem to have been shared by those whom they commanded. Little of their spirit was displayed by the garrison. The two Rajpoot commanders appear to have considered the fall of the place as inevitable, and to have resolved not to survive the event. Their bodies were found among a heap of slain; a more fearful evidence

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of the determined spirit in which they had acted was afforded by the discovery, that, in conformity with the feeling of their country, they had doomed their wives and daughters to become sharers in the fate which they scorned to evade for themselves. But the task had been imperfectly performed. A few of the women only were dead: the rest, some of whom had received several wounds, survived to afford exercise to the humane feelings of the conquerors. It is scarcely necessary to add, that General Wellesley directed all attention and respect to be shewn them.\*

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The battle of Argaum and the capture of Gawilghur impressed the confederate chieftains with a sense of the necessity of quickening their endeavours, to secure to themselves some portion of territory and some degree of power. Before the occurrence of the latter event, the Rajah of Berar had dispatched vakeels to the camp of General Wellesley, and on the 17th of December a separate treaty of peace with that chief was concluded. By this treaty the Rajah ceded the perpetual sovereignty of the province of Cuttack, including the fort and district of Balasore, to the Company and their allies. The latter were not named, and General Wellesley, in transmitting the treaty to the governor-general, observed: "The reasons for omitting to name the allies in the treaty, and to engage that they shall ratify it,

\* The discovery of these females is related in a journal of Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B., quoted in the Wellington Despatches.

will become sufficiently obvious when the character and conduct of the government of these allies are recollected. It will remain with your excellency," he continued, "to give such orders as you may think proper to the residents at the different durbars, to obtain the assent of the allies to the treaty, but I should imagine that the Rajah of Berar will be satisfied with your excellency's ratification." In truth, there was not, and never has been, a prince in India who would not feel more confidence in the simple promise of the head of the English government than in the most solemn securities of any native sovereign within the country. The general terms in which the cessions were made were thus accounted for by General Wellesley: "The cessions under the treaty are made to the British government and its allies, and I have drawn it in this manner in order that your excellency may have an opportunity of disposing of them hereafter, in such manner as you may think proper." Besides the cessions above mentioned, the Rajah of Berar relinquished all claims on certain old possessions of the Nizam, the revenues of which had for some time been collected by the two princes in various proportions. At first the Rajah received only a fifth: the encroaching spirit of Mahratta policy soon increased his share to a fourth. It then became half, by treaty, and latterly four-fifths, by exaction and violence. By the treaty this partition, with all its tendency to throw the whole into the hands of the Mahratta prince, came to an end, and the frontier of the Nizam was carried forward to the

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Wurda river. The ministers of the rajah were desirous of the insertion of an article confirming all grants and treaties made heretofore by the Nizam and the Peishwa; but General Wellesley objected that he could not consent to confirm that of which he had no knowledge. In place of such confirmation, he proposed the mediation and arbitration of the British, and a claim upon its justice, as the best security that the Rajah could have for his demands upon the other powers; and the proposal being accepted, an article was framed, binding the Company's government to the discharge of the requisite duties. The comment of General Wellesley upon this part of the negotiation is full of instruction. "It appears to me," says he, "an important point gained, and highly honourable to the character of the British government, that even its enemies are willing to appeal to its justice against the demands of its allies." To an article binding the Rajah never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or subject of any European or American government at war with the English, or any British subject, whether European or Indian, without the consent of the British government, no objection was offered by his ministers; but a clause was added, at the Rajah's request, by which the Company engaged not to aid or countenance any of his discontented relations, rajahs, zemindars, or subjects, who might fly from, or rebel against, his authority. A succeeding article, providing that accredited ministers from each government should reside at the court of the other, was admitted by the

Rajah's ministers with equal facility, but another was the occasion of some difficulty. The British government had concluded treaties with some minor chieftains, feudatories of the Rajah. The article in question required that these treaties should be confirmed, and it was provided that lists of the parties with whom treaties had been made should be given to the Rajah, when that with himself should be ratified by the governor-general. The Rajah's minister objected that, after the cessions which his master had made by former articles of the treaty, he had no territory left which he might not be bound to give up by virtue of the article under consideration. The answer of General Wellesley was decisive. The Rajah's minister was told that the article was indispensable, and could not be given up; but it was added, that the British government would not have consented to conclude a treaty of peace with the Rajah had it desired the destruction of his state. The article, it was explained, was not intended to apply to more cases than were absolutely necessary to preserve the good faith of the British government, and it was stated that it should be applied to no other. The vakeel professed himself satisfied, and the article was admitted. By an article immediately following that which had occasioned the discussion above noticed, the Rajah agreed to separate himself from the confederacy formed by Scindia and other Mahratta chiefs against the Company. This, like the preceding article, was a source of some difficulty—not that it was objected to by the Rajah, but the British com-

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mander demanded a hostage for its due performance. The answer of the Rajah's vakeel was, that his master would send whomsoever the English general pleased—with certain exceptions—those exceptions extending to the only persons whose presence in the English camp would be of the least value as a security, the brother, son, or nephew, of the Rajah. Fearing that this point would not be conceded, and that the treaty, which it was certainly very desirable to the British government to obtain, might go off on the question, General Wellesley resolved not to persist in demanding a hostage.\* The last obstacle

\* The Marquis Wellesley, in a private letter addressed to General Wellesley a few days subsequently to the conclusion of the treaty (of which he was not aware), directed hostages to be required, and suggested the possibility of the two principal confederates being hostages for their own good conduct. The letter has no public interest, but it is so happy a specimen of epistolary composition, and is withal so brief, that its insertion cannot fail to give pleasure to the reader. It has all the ease, vigour, and sportiveness which mark Clive's familiar letters, with (as might be expected from the superior advantages of its writer) greater correctness and elegance. Such effusions are valuable as evidence of the equanimity which minds of high order maintain amid circumstances which would be felt by inferior intellects overwhelming. The letter will be found in the Despatches of the Duke of Wellington:—

“Fort William, 23rd December, 1803.

“My dear Arthur,—I received this morning your dispatch of the 30th of November, from Paterly, with the account of your signal and most seasonable victory of Argaum. Although I entirely approved of your armistice, and thought it a most judicious measure, I confess that I prefer your victory to your armistice; and I think your last battle must have removed every obstacle to peace, and facilitated every accommodation which can tend to enlarge the channels of amicable intercourse.

to the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiation was thus removed, and the confederacy against the British government was deprived of an important limb. The treaty was duly ratified by the Rajah of Berar, and also by the governor-general.

The secession of the Rajah of Berar probably determined Scindia to seek peace with more earnestness and sincerity than he had heretofore displayed. Jeswant Rao Ghorepuray and Naroo Punt had remained in the British camp, and on the 23rd of December they were joined there by two of Scindia's ministers, named Eitul Punt and Havel Nyn, with the declared object of concluding a peace. The ordinary course of Mahratta diplomacy might, however, have been pursued, but for the extraordinary decision of General Wellesley; and the result of his firmness was, that on the 30th a treaty was signed, which, like that with the Rajah of Berar, was declared to be with

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“ I have not yet discovered whether the battle was occasioned by a rupture of the truce on the part of Scindia, or by Scindia's refusal to grant to his vakeels the powers which you most properly have required for the purpose of founding the basis of the negotiation on the admission of a retention of a part of our conquests, or by Scindia's re-disavowal of his avowal of Jeswant Rao Gorepuray, or by an accidental rencontre of the armies before the truce had commenced, or by a treacherous junction between Scindia and the Rajah of Berar. But, *quâcunque viâ*, a battle is a profit with the native powers.

“ In any truce or treaty, you must now require hostages from Scindia's or Ragojee's [Rajah of Berar's] family, upon Lord Cornwallis's principle in 1792. If you should happen to take the persons of Scindia or Ragojee, you will send them with an escort of honour to Fort William to negotiate peace with me, and to be their own hostages for its due execution.”

the Company and its allies, the latter not being named, and the cessions to be made to the allied powers generally. Those cessions comprised all the territories north of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypore and Joudpore, and the Rana of Gohud, with the exception of certain pergunnahs considered the private property of Scindia's house. The jaghire lands of the ladies of his family, and those of some of his powerful ministers and sirdars, were to remain in their possession, under the protection of the British government; and other sirdars in Scindia's service were to be provided for by pensions or jaghires, subject to a provision fixing a limit to the total amount to be thus applied. General Wellesley, in communicating this arrangement to the governor-general, thus assigns his reasons for consenting to it: "It would have been impossible to arrange this great cession, in the disturbed state of Scindia's government, under all the circumstances of his misfortunes in the war, and of the great diminution of his military power and reputation in comparison with that of his rival Holkar, without determining to provide, in some degree, for those who reaped benefits from the revenue of the ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar's hands, and to add to his arms, all the sirdars and troops who had been subsisted by the resources of those countries, who must have been forthwith discharged from Scindia's service, and must have looked to Holkar for protection and future employment. I chose the former, which I think is most consistent

with your excellency's policy; and it appears that, besides avoiding the evil of increasing the numbers of the followers of the only freebooter that remains in India, it tends to establish an influence in Scindia's durbar, which must guide its measures in a great degree, even if Scindia should omit to unite himself more closely with the Company, and must tend greatly to facilitate all the objects of the British government in his durbar, if he should agree to the terms of the general defensive alliance."

Besides the districts already described, Scindia agreed to give up, in perpetual sovereignty, the forts of Baroach and Ahmednuggur, and the territories depending upon them, except so much of the territory dependent on the latter as formed part of his family property; but into the land thus reserved to him he was never to introduce any troops to collect revenue, or under any pretence whatever. Further, Scindia renounced for ever all claims of every description upon the British government and their allies, the Nizam, the Peishwa, and the Guicowar; he agreed to confirm the treaties concluded by the British government with the rajahs and others previously his feudatories; to admit the rights of the Peishwa to certain lands in Malwa as formerly existing, and, in case of difference, to submit to the arbitration of the Company; to relinquish all claims upon the emperor, and abstain from all interference in his majesty's affairs. The provision, excluding from Scindia's service Frenchmen and other foreigners, was the same as that in the treaty with

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the Rajah of Berar. Accredited ministers from the two states were to be reciprocally received. Scindia was to be admitted, if he chose, to the general defensive alliance subsisting between the Company and its allies; and in the event of his consenting within two months to become a party to it, the Company engaged to furnish a force, for the defence of his territories, of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance and artillery, and usual equipments; but no pecuniary payment or further territorial cession was to be made on this account; the expense of the force was to be defrayed out of the revenue of the lands ceded by other articles of the treaty. If Scindia should decline to become a party to the general defensive alliance and receive a British force, the refusal was not to affect any other stipulations of the treaty. The exemption of Scindia from any additional charge on account of the British, should he consent to receive such a protection, was one of the most extraordinary, but, at the same time, one of the most judicious points of arrangement exhibited in the treaty. The reasons operating on the mind of the British negotiator, and tending to its adoption, are thus stated by himself in addressing the governor-general:—"In the course of this war, Scindia's power, reputation, and military resources have been greatly diminished, while his rival, Holkar, after having recovered the possessions of his family by his treaty of peace with Scindia, remains with undiminished power and increased reputation. Comparatively with those of

Scindia, his power and his military resources are much greater than they were previous to the war; and I have but little doubt that the contest between those chiefs will be revived. This would be a matter of but little consequence to the British government, if the parties were so equal in point of strength, resources, and abilities, as to render the event of the contest doubtful. But Holkar is certainly, at this moment, superior to Scindia in every point of view, and the consequence of leaving the latter to his own means must be that he will fall an easy prey to Holkar; or if he should endeavour to avoid the contest, which I do not think probable, his government will, by degrees, become dependent upon that of his rival. Under these circumstances, and particularly as I was aware of your excellency's determination to support the peace, and the relative situation in which it should leave the different powers in the manner in which that had been established by the exercise of the force of the British government, I thought it expedient to hold forth to Scindia an option of becoming a party of the general defensive alliance; and, as a further inducement to him to agree to that treaty, to engage that the assistance which should be given to him should occasion no further diminution of his revenue. I was induced to make this last engagement by the conviction that Scindia would not agree to the treaty of general defensive alliance, although his ministers proposed that he should unite himself more closely with the Company, if he were to be

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obliged to pay for the assistance which he should receive, and that if he does agree to that treaty, the peace of India is secured as far as it can be by human means. I have every reason to believe, also, that when Scindia shall wind up his affairs at the end of the war, he will not have a disposable clear revenue such as the British government would require to pay the expenses of the force which might be given to him.”\*

It thus appears that there was reason to suspect that Scindia could not have paid for a subsidiary force had he been disposed, and that, if he had possessed the power of paying, he would have been unwilling to pay. It was important to uphold him against Holkar, and to attach him, if possible, to the British confederacy—so important, that with reference to the fact that the English acquired by the treaty large territorial cessions, and in consideration of this advantage, it was worth while to afford to Scindia the assistance of the British force without demanding more. Such were the views of General Wellesley, and they were justified by the circumstances under which they were formed.

The day on which the negotiations with Scindia were brought to a termination was distinguished by an event of a different character, but one calculated to promote the interests of peace and order. General Campbell, with a force previously employed in defence of the Nizam's territories, had been dis-

\* Letter from General Wellesley to the governor-general, 30th December, 1803. See Wellington Despatches.

patched into the south Mahratta country to check some suspicious indications on the part of the jaghiredars there. On the 27th of December he received at Woodasoory information that a party of Mahratta plunderers, amounting to about ten thousand horse, with some pindaries on foot, had passed the Kistna at the Dharoor Ghaut, and were proceeding towards Modianoor. General Campbell marched on the following morning with his cavalry and flank companies lightly equipped, and on the 29th reached Jallyhall, when a party of marauding horse sent to watch his motions were surprised, and their chief, a notorious plunderer, with several of his officers—if officers they may be called—brought in prisoners. The leader of the ruffian force, of which General Campbell was in search, was a man named Mahomed Bey Khan; but this name he repudiated as unsuitable to his purpose. That by which he chose to be known was Dhoondia Waugh, a name which it will be recollected was borne by a preceding adventurer, whose career towards sovereignty, as well as his life, were prematurely abridged by General Wellesley.\* Although the death of Dhoondia Waugh was a matter of sufficient notoriety, the new adventurer found from eastern credulity a ready admission of his pretensions. He was, moreover, a devotee, and exhibited that combination of undisguised robbery and avowed sanctity, which, however extraordinary elsewhere, is not regarded as remarkable in countries where religion, though extend-

\* See page 118.

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ing its control to almost every outward act which men can perform, aspires not to the office of purifying the heart. At Jallyhall General Campbell heard that this saintly robber had pitched his camp between Doodyhall and Moodianoor, with the intention of intercepting the British convoys and carrying his depredations beyond the Toombuddra. The British commander thereupon marched on the enemy on the evening of the 29th of December, and at four o'clock on the morning of the 30th learned that he was within six miles of those whom he sought, and that they were entirely ignorant of his approach. At dawn of day he came upon them, and pushed his cavalry into the centre of their camp with little opposition. An hour sufficed to destroy part of the band which the sham Dhoondia Waugh had collected around him, and to disperse the rest. Two thousand of the enemy were killed, and upwards of one thousand wounded or made prisoners; the remainder threw down their arms and fled. Among the prisoners was the venerable facquir, who, under borrowed plumes, had led to the work of plunder and devastation. His banner, on the day of his defeat, was followed by four Frenchmen, who, it seems, in the search for military employment, were oppressed with few scruples as to its character when tested by the principles of morality, or the degree of estimation in which it must be regarded by men trained in European modes of thought. One of these, whose dress and appointments seemed to indicate him to be a person above the common rank, was killed; the re-

maining three escaped by the help of good horses and their own discretion, which prompted them to depart at an early period of the engagement. The whole of the freebooters' baggage and bazaars, and upwards of twenty thousand bullocks, were taken. Only two men in the English force were killed and fifteen wounded. The flank companies of the King's 83rd, after marching thirty miles, came up with the cavalry, and had their full share in the attack upon this horde of plunderers.

Among the objects embraced by the governor-general's comprehensive plan of warfare was the occupation of Bundelcund. This design was prosecuted during the progress of the important operations which have been narrated, but was not entirely completed until after the conclusion of peace with the Rajah of Berar and Scindia. The Peishwa had certain claims on Bundelcund, and it was as his ally that the English, in the first instance, appeared there. More than seventy years before the occurrence of the transactions under review, a Hindoo prince of Bundelcund, named Chitoor Sal, being hard pressed by a Rajpoot enemy, solicited the aid of the Peishwa. It was promptly granted, and so highly was the service appreciated by Chitoor Sal, that he adopted the Peishwa as a son, and on his death left him an equal share of his dominions with two sons, whose claims to the title were founded in nature. This was the origin of the Peishwa's right. It is unnecessary to pursue the history of Bundelcund minutely—it will be enough to say that it differed

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little from that of other parts of India under native government or native anarchy. Late in the eighteenth century we find the province overrun by two chiefs, named Ali Bahaudur and Himmut Bahaudur, the former an illegitimate scion of the house of the Peishwa, the latter a soldier of fortune, little scrupulous as to modes of obtaining its favour, though distinguished for his religious attainments, and holding high rank in one of those associations which open to fanaticism means for gratifying spiritual pride, and to imposture opportunity for profitable deception. He was a Gossain.\* Ali Bahaudur

\* “The Gossains,” says Captain Duff, “properly so called, are followers of Mahdeo: the Byragees generally maintain the supremacy of Vishnoo. The Gossains are a much more numerous body in the Mahratta country than the Byragees: their dress, when they wear clothes, is invariably dyed orange, a colour emblematical of Mahdeo. The Gossains, for the most part, have deviated from the rules of their order in a manner universally stigmatized by Hindoos. They engage in trade; they enlist as soldiers; some of them marry, and many of them have concubines. Gossains who go without clothing acquire superior character; but those of greatest sanctity are the Gossains who never shave or cut their hair or nails, or who have vowed to keep their heads or limbs in a particular position. The penances, by extremes of heat and cold, and the voluntary tortures which some of them undergo, are often greater than one might suppose the human frame could endure. Men who survive such exposure and voluntarily submit to such bodily suffering are, it may easily be conceived, very formidable when they take up arms. Gossains and Byragees have frequently waged a religious war, and some of the divisions of Gossains have had desperate battles with each other. Under a weak or unsettled government, the Gossains and Byragees have both been guilty of dreadful outrages on the persons and property of the inoffensive part of the community; but the former are more notorious in this respect than the latter.

acknowledged the paramount authority of the Peishwa, and owned his own liability to render tribute, but which, according to oriental fashion, he never paid. His death left the authority of Himmut Bahaudur predominant; but that pious person

They used to travel in armed parties, and, under pretence of seeking charity, levied contributions on the country. Where unsuccessfully resisted, they frequently plundered, murdered, and committed the most brutal enormities."—Duff's History of the Maharrattas, vol. i. pp. 16, 18.

The religious mendicancy of the Gossains thus so closely resembles freebooting, that no surprise need be felt at the union of the two pursuits. In a note on part of the passage above quoted, Captain Duff, after stating that there are ten divisions of Gossains, distinguished by some shades of difference in their observances, gives the following account of the process by which these turbulent devotees are fabricated:—"To become a Gossain, such castes as wear the *kurgoota* or string round the loins destroy it, and substitute a piece of cloth if any covering be deemed necessary; and the person generally attaches himself to some one of the fraternity, as desirous to become a *chela* or disciple. The novice may proceed thus far and still retreat; the irretrievable step by which he becomes a Gossain for ever is in the ceremony called *home*, which, in this case, must be gone through in the most solemn manner. It is performed by taking an earthen vessel, one cubit square, termed *stundeel*; this is to be filled with pure unmixed mould, over which powders of various colours are to be strewed; upon this a fire is kindled, and over the whole ghee or milk is poured for a certain number of times, during which *munturs* or mystical verses are repeated, and vows solemnly made of poverty, celibacy, and perpetual pilgrimage to the different holy places throughout India." The value of these vows has been illustrated by Captain Duff's statements as to the practices of those who make them. He adds, that "the disciples of a Gossain are obtained in three ways—voluntary followers, slaves purchased, and children obtained from parents who had vowed to make them Gossains previous to their birth."

not feeling quite secure in his authority, and thinking that a jaghire under a power able to protect its dependents was preferable to the possession of nominal sovereignty without the means of maintaining it, made a tender of the province of Bundelcund to the British government. The offer was made to Mr. Henry Wellesley while holding the office of lieutenant-governor of the ceded provinces. It was declined on the obvious and honourable ground that it could not be accepted without violating the rights of the Peishwa.

The capture of Poona, the flight of the Peishwa, and the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, by changing the position of the British government effected a change in its determination. The occupation of Bundelcund, in the name and on the behalf of the Peishwa, was consistent with justice, while, at the same time, it was undoubtedly expedient, with a view to prevent its falling into the hands of the confederated chiefs. Mr. Mercer, a medical officer, who had been secretary to Mr. Henry Wellesley, was accordingly dispatched to Illahabad, to confer with an agent of Himmut Bahaudur, and terms for the co-operation of that personage were arranged. The Gossain, it appeared, had a relative who had been engaged in the conspiracy of Vizier Ali, and on that account was kept prisoner at Lucknow. His liberation was demanded by Himmut Bahaudur, and the British government undertook to solicit the Vizier to grant it, on condition of the party thus favoured giving security for his future good conduct.

Thus much did the holy man stipulate for his relation; but, albeit his vows should have weaned him from any aspirations after the ordinary objects of human desire, he had yet something to ask for himself. It was not a cell, where he might pass his days in solitary meditation, nor a sum of money to be disbursed in charitable gifts—it was a jaghire in the Doab, suitable, not to his profession, but to “his rank and station,” and an assignment of revenue in Bundelcund of twenty lacs of rupees for the support of a body of troops which this despiser of earthly good proposed to keep at his command. In consideration of this arrangement, the troops were to be always prepared to obey the orders of the British government. These terms were granted, the progress of the negotiation being facilitated by another carried on with the Peishwa for the cession to the British government of territory in Bundelcund in place of other cessions made by the treaty of Bassein.

A British detachment which had been formed near Illalabad, under Lieutenant Colonel Powell, shortly afterwards entered the country, and was joined at Teroa by Himmudt Bahaudur, at the head of eight thousand irregular infantry, about four thousand horse, three regular battalions commanded by a European officer, and twenty-five pieces of ordnance. On arriving at the river Cane, which flows through Bundelcund and falls into the Jumna a little below the town of Corah, they found posted on the opposite side the army of Shumsheer Bahaudur, son of Ali

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Bahaudur, who, like those by whom he was confronted, professed to act in the name of the Peishwa. Having reduced several forts in the vicinity, and established the British authority between the Jumna and the Cane, Colonel Powell crossed the latter river. A series of desultory warfare and indecisive negotiation followed. The British authority continued, in the mean time, to be extended. Shumsher Bahaudur found great difficulty in prevailing on himself to submit, although submission was obviously inevitable; but an offer to settle on him and his family an annual sum of four lacs of rupees brought him to the English camp. His submission was speedily followed by the surrender of all the forts in Bundelcund held by his adherents.

Mention has been made of a negotiation with the Peishwa, having for its object an exchange of a portion of the cessions made under the treaty of Bassein. It ended in the formation of eight supplemental articles to that treaty, by the first of which certain territories in the Carnatic, yielding a revenue of sixteen lacs, were restored to the Peishwa. By the second, the Company's government renounced a portion of territory in Guzerat, yielding three lacs sixteen thousand rupees. The third provided for the addition to the Poona subsidiary force of a regiment of native cavalry, of the same strength and complement as the cavalry regiment belonging to the Hyderabad subsidiary force. The fourth annulled the fifteenth article of the treaty, which regulated the amount of force to be brought into the

field by the Peishwa in case of war, and fixed it at four thousand cavalry and three thousand infantry, with a due proportion of ordnance and military stores; this was a considerable reduction from the former amount, which was ten thousand cavalry and six thousand infantry. The fifth article provided that a corps of Mahratta cavalry, amounting to five thousand, should, during the war, be maintained by the British government for the service of the state of Poona, two thousand of whom were to serve with the Peishwa, and three thousand with the British army in the field. The sixth related to the cessions to be made in consideration of the countries relinquished by the Company under the first and second articles, and of the additional expense incurred by them under others. Territory in Bundelcund producing a revenue equal to that ceded in the Carnatic and Guzerat, namely, nineteen lacs sixteen thousand rupees, was to be transferred to the Company; a further tract of country, yielding fifty thousand rupees, was to be bestowed, in consideration of the high value of the country restored in Guzerat, and cessions to the amount of separate sums of seven lacs and a half, five lacs, and four lacs, to meet the expense of the cavalry regiment added to the subsidiary force, that of maintaining the Mahratta corps of horse, and the extraordinary expenses of putting down resistance in Bundelcund and establishing the British authority there. The total value of the cessions in Bundelcund was thus thirty-six lacs sixteen thousand rupees. By the seventh

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article, the whole of these cessions were to be taken from those parts of Bundelcund most contiguous to the British possessions, and most convenient for the Company's occupation. The eighth article related to the territory restored in Guzerat, and, after reciting that such territory was particularly valuable to the Company, by reason of its proximity to the city of Surat, in the prosperity of which the British government entertained an anxious concern, it provided that the territories referred to should be so managed and governed at all times by the Mahratta authorities, as to conduce to the convenience of Surat, by attention to the rules of good neighbourhood, and the promotion of amicable and commercial intercourse between the inhabitants on both sides. It was further provided, that as the sovereignty of the river Taptee belonged to the British government, the Mahratta authority in the restored territory should have no right or concern whatever in the wreck of any vessel that might be cast upon any part of the country bordering on the river, but should be bound, in the event of any wreck taking place, to render the vessel all practicable aid, for which the parties assisting were to be entitled to receive, from the owners of the wreck, just and reasonable compensation. This last article was not unnecessary. Even in countries where higher principles of action than prevail among the Mahrattas are professed, the fragments of property that have survived the destruction occasioned by tempest or accident are but too frequently regarded as lawful objects of

appropriation. The Mahrattas, in adopting this view, would only be extending to the waters the principles by which their conduct is invariably governed on the land. On the remainder of the supplemental articles little observation is necessary. The exchanges of territory were convenient to both parties interested in them. The British government obtained territory in a quarter where it was very desirable to possess it. The Peishwa received back a country from which he would realize a revenue, in exchange for one from which he had never derived any; while Bundelcund, by being placed under the authority of the Company, was relieved from the anarchial state which had long prevailed, and placed in circumstances to partake of the good order and prosperity which characterize the British dominions in India, as compared with those under native governments.

A brief digression from the progress of events in India must now be permitted, for the purpose of noticing a naval action of extraordinary brilliancy, in which the Company's ships, unaided by any vessels of war, signally sustained the honour of Great Britain in the Indian seas. A fleet from Canton had been dispatched from that place on the 31st January, 1804, under the care of Captain Dance, who commanded one of the ships named the Earl Camden, and who was selected for the charge assigned to him as being the senior commander. On the morning of the 14th of February four strange sail were discerned. It was subsequently ascer-

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tained that they consisted of a ship of eighty-four guns, two heavy frigates, and a corvette of twenty-eight guns. At daybreak, on the 15th, the ships which had been discerned on the preceding day were observed lying to, about three miles to windward of the English fleet. The merchantmen hoisted their colours and offered battle if the strangers chose to come down. The four ships immediately hoisted French colours, and the larger was observed to carry a rear-admiral's flag. In addition to the ships already mentioned was a brig, which hoisted Batavian colours. They formed a squadron which had been dispatched under Admiral Linois to the Indian seas on the recommencement of hostilities between the English and French after the brief peace of Amiens. The enemy evincing no alacrity in accepting the invitation of the British commander, the latter formed in order of sailing and steered his course. The enemy then filled their sails and edged down towards the English, with the obvious intention of cutting off their rear. As soon as this was perceived, Commodore Dance made the signal to tack and bear down. The manœuvre was performed with great precision, and the gallant merchantmen stood towards the enemy under a press of sail, and forthwith opened their fire on the headmost ships. The Royal George, commanded by Captain Timins, was the leading ship of the English line, and was carried into action in admirable style. The Ganges, Captain Moffatt, was the next, and this was followed

by the commodore's ship. The fire of these three had such an effect on the enemy, that before the remaining ships could be brought up they stood away to the eastward under all the sail they could set. The English commander made signal for a general chase, and the enemy was pursued for two hours, when Commodore Dance, fearing that he might be carried too far out of his course, and with reference to the great value of the ships and cargoes (estimated at eight millions), deemed it prudent to discontinue further attempts to overtake the frightened foe.\* Had circumstances

\* The intrepid conduct of Commodore Dance and those under his command excited a very general and lively feeling of admiration at home. From the Crown, the commodore received the honour of knighthood. The Court of Directors of the East-India Company presented to him the sum of two thousand guineas, and a piece of plate of the value of two hundred. The Proprietors of East-India Stock manifested their sense of his merits by a resolution passed in general court, bestowing on him a pension of five hundred pounds per annum. All the officers and men engaged received from the Court of Directors tokens of its approbation. Captain Timins, who is mentioned in the text as commander of the Royal George, which led the attack, was presented with a thousand guineas, and a piece of plate of the value of a hundred guineas. Captain Moffatt, of the Ganges (also mentioned in the text), received five hundred guineas, and a piece of plate worth one hundred guineas. To the following officers the Court awarded five hundred guineas each, and a piece of plate worth fifty guineas:—Captain Wilson of the Warley, Captain Farquharson of the Alfred, Captain Torin of the Coutts, Captain Stanley Clarke of the Wexford, Captain Meriton of the Exeter, Captain Wordsworth of the Earl of Abergavenny, Captain Kirkpatrick of the Henry Addington, Captain Hamilton of the Bombay Castle, Captain Ward Farrer of the Cumberland, Captain Pendergrass of the Hope, Captain Hunter Brown of the Dorsetshire, Captain Larkins of the Warren Hastings, and Mr. Lochner in command

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permitted, there can be no doubt that those who had so bravely commenced would have brought the affair to a worthy conclusion.

An event so honourable to the maritime service of the East-India Company could not be passed in silence without injustice to that service, and to the country to which it was an ornament and a safeguard. The narrative must now return to the course of negotiation consequent on the splendid success of the British army by land. The opening afforded for Scindia's accession to the general defensive alliance was improved by the dispatch of Captain Malcolm to the camp of that chieftain, to endeavour, by negotiation, to attain the object. After encountering the usual amount of difficulty interposed by Mahratta habits of delay and dissimulation, he succeeded, and on the 27th of February a

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of the Ocean. Captain Stanley Clarke, above mentioned, is now a Director of the East-India Company. To Lieutenant Fowler, of the royal navy, who was a passenger on board the *Earl Camden*, and who entitled himself to be honourably noticed, three hundred guineas were voted for the purchase of plate. The services of the officers and men were acknowledged by gratuities of the following amounts:—Chief officers, £150; second officers, £125; third and fourth officers, £80; fifth and sixth officers, £50; pursers and surgeons, £80; surgeons' mates, boatswains, gunners, and carpenters, £50; midshipmen, £30; petty officers, not named, £15; seamen and servants, £6. It thus appears that not a single person was overlooked in the distribution of reward.

The Committee of the Patriotic Fund voted to Captain Dance a sword and a vase, each of a hundred pounds value. A sword and a vase of the same value were voted to Captain Timins; to each of the other captains, and to Lieutenant Fowler, a sword of the value of fifty pounds.

treaty of alliance was signed. It consisted of sixteen articles. The first contained an ordinary declaration of friendship and union. By the second the parties bound themselves to concert and prosecute measures of defence in case of either being attacked, the expression of this mutual obligation being accompanied by a long explanation declaring that the British government would never permit any power or state to commit any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against Scindia, but, on his requisition, would maintain and defend his rights and territories in like manner with those of the Company. By the third, Scindia was to receive a subsidiary force of not less than six thousand infantry, duly provided with artillery and properly equipped; and by the fourth, that prince was exonerated from all additional expense on this account. The fifth article provided for the mutual exemption from duties, of supplies for the forces of the Company or of Scindia when in the territories of each other, and for securing to the officers of the two states due respect and consideration. The sixth declared the purposes for which the subsidiary force was to be employed, which were stated generally to be “services of importance”—a description illustrated by enumerating a few instances of similar character to those referred to in other subsidiary treaties. The seventh article extended, and rendered more stringent, the provision of the former treaty against the employment of foreigners. The change was made on the sug-

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gestion of the governor-general. By the former treaty, Scindia was restrained from taking into his service or retaining therein any Frenchman, or the subject of any European or American power, the government of which might be at war with Great Britain. The amended article introduced into the new treaty contained no reference to the contingency of war; Scindia was never to employ in his service or permit to remain in his dominions any European or American whatever, without the consent of the British government. In return, the British government undertook never to employ or sanction the residence within its dominions of any person guilty of crimes or hostility against Scindia. The seventh article restrained Scindia from negotiating with any principal states or powers without giving notice to the Company's government and entering into consultation with them. On the other hand, the Company's government declared on their part that they would "have no manner of concern with any of the Maharajah's relations, dependents, military chiefs, or servants, with respect to whom the Maharajah" was admitted to be "absolute." The British government was never to afford "encouragement, support, or protection to" any of the parties above enumerated "who might eventually act in opposition to the Maharajah's authority, but, on the contrary," on being required, were "to aid and assist to punish and reduce all such offenders to obedience," and no officer of the Company was to interfere in the internal affairs of Scindia's govern-

ment. Undertaking the military defence of the country, it was not unreasonable that the British government should be bound to defend the prince from internal as well as external attack. The danger from rebellion might be as great as from invasion, and it would be absurd to maintain, that while the British government might justly repel the latter by force, it was to sit still and silently witness the progress of the former—suffering it to triumph or to be suppressed by the unaided force of the prince, as the event might chance to be. It is certain, indeed, that the majority of native governments are bad, and that the British government, by upholding them, supports a certain measure of abuse. But there is nothing before it but a choice of evils. The governments would be bad under any circumstances, and the influence of the Company is always directed towards making them better. Rebellions in the East usually originate in personal feelings, and result in the exchange of one oppressor for another. The people have little to expect from them, while from the steady exercise in their favour of the combined influence of knowledge, character, and power, they may hope for much. There is a point, too, beyond which native princes under British protection cannot be allowed to pass. They will be reminded, and if necessary in the most decisive manner, that they have duties as well as rights, and that the objects of the British government in forming extended alliances are not to perpetuate oppression and feed the embers of insurrection, but to maintain

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external and internal peace, and to diffuse throughout India the elements of prosperity.

The eighth article bound Scindia to refrain from entering into hostilities with any state in alliance with the Company, and to submit all disputes with any such states to its arbitration. The tenth and eleventh regulated the amount of force to be furnished by each party in the event of their being engaged in war with any other power, and provided for the accumulation of stores. The twelfth provided for the equal partition of conquests made in any such war, on condition that each party should have fulfilled the stipulations of the treaty. The thirteenth related to points of detail connected with the employment of the subsidiary force, and of other forces of the Company, in the event of disturbances. The fourteenth restricted both parties from interfering with the tributaries of the other. By the fifteenth the Company agreed to exert their influence to maintain the observance of such ceremonies and customs as should appear to be fixed in communicating between the Peishwa and Scindia, and to recognize the right of the latter to all the possessions which he held either by written or unwritten authority, provided the written authority, if any, should not contravene the provisions of the treaty, and that all disputes relating to possessions held by unwritten authority should be referred to the arbitration of the British government. In this case, therefore, the Company only agreed to recognize that which themselves should determine to be

right. The article concluded with an engagement on the part of the British government to use its endeavours to prevent any acts done by Scindia or his ancestors, under the authority of the Peishwa, from being subverted; provided, however, the maintenance of such acts should be consistent with the honour and dignity of the Peishwa and the stipulations of the treaty of peace. The value of such an engagement, so qualified, is very easily appreciated. The sixteenth article related to the negotiation and ratification of the treaty, and to the delivery of the ratified copy.

From causes which will hereafter appear, the provisions of this treaty became practically of no importance; but a just estimate of the policy then pursued in India could not have been formed without a full exposition of the views entertained and the measures adopted with regard to Scindia. For this reason, the principal parts of the treaty have been exhibited with a degree of care which, for other purposes, would be unnecessary.

Allusion has been made to treaties concluded with certain minor chiefs. These were the Rajahs of Bhurtpore, Jodepore, Jeypoor, Machery, and Bhoondee, the Rana of Gohud, and Ambajee Ingolia. The territories of the whole lay in the region of the Jumna; all the treaties were concluded by General Lake; and, in most instances, the friendly desires of the native princes received an impulse from the result of the battle of Laswaree. The first to tender his adherence was the Rajah of

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Bhurtpore, with whom a treaty was, in consequence, concluded, stipulating perpetual friendship and alliance, binding the British government not to interfere in the concerns of the Rajah, nor to exact tribute of him, and engaging each party to co-operate in defending the territories of the other. By the treaty with the Rajah of Machery, that chief agreed to refer his disputes for settlement to the Company's government, and to defray the charge of aid afforded him for the defence of his dominions at the same rate as other chiefs of Hindostan. The Rajah of Jeypoor made similar engagements, and further agreed to act, in time of war, "though in reality master of his own army," agreeably to the advice of the British commander employed with his troops. He also engaged not to entertain in his service, or in any manner give admission to any European without the consent of the Company's government. The treaty with the Rajah of Jodepore corresponded with that formed with the chief last mentioned.\* Ambagee Ingolia was a powerful servant of Scindia, who had been appointed to supersede the authority of Perron, and whose appointment led to the precipitate departure of that person from the spot where he had contemplated the formation of an independent state. Part of the territories which Ambagee had been authorized to administer formed the ancient possessions of the house of Gohud, which had been conquered by Scindia some years before. Am-

\* No copy of the treaty with the Rajah of Bhoondee appears to have been sent home.

bagee made overtures to the British government, offering to detach himself from the service of Scindia and become a tributary to them. It was desirable to afford him encouragement, and the difficulty of reconciling his claims with those of the Rana of Gohud was got over by dividing the country, and assigning the independent possession of part to Ambagee, in consideration of his surrendering the right of administering the whole. A negotiation with this view was opened, and, after much evasion, a treaty concluded, by which Ambagee agreed to surrender all the territory north of Gwalior, together with the fortress of that name, the British government guaranteeing to Ambagee the remainder of the territory which had been under his management. A force was dispatched to take possession of the fortress, and Ambagee readily gave an order for its delivery. The commandant, however, refused to obey the instructions of his master, and measures were taken for the reduction of the place by force. When a breach had been effected the garrison offered to surrender in consideration of the sum of fifty thousand rupees. This being refused, they demanded the value of certain stores as the price of submission, which being granted, possession of the fort was obtained by the English.

By the treaty with the Rana of Gohud, Gwalior was ceded to the Company, by whom the territories restored to her under the arrangement with Ambagee were guaranteed. The Rana was to subsidize a British force of three battalions of infantry, and the

payment was fixed at seventy-five thousand rupees per month.

For the emperor, whose person the success of the campaign had transferred into English keeping, a munificent provision was made, and an adequate degree of state provided. He was not invested with any actual power, and indeed no human agency could have restored the Mahometan empire to respectability. It belonged to an age which had passed, and it was better for the peace and happiness of India that no attempt should be made to revive it.

The conclusion of peace with Scindia and the Rajah of Berar suggests the inquiry, how far the objects proposed by the governor-general at the commencement of hostilities had been effected? A more convenient opportunity will be found for inquiring whether the pursuit of these objects were consistent with wisdom and justice—all that will be attempted here will be a very brief notice of what was proposed as compared with what was performed. We are not left to conjecture what were the objects proposed by the governor-general, nor whether he had accurately defined them to himself. He placed them on record in a letter of instruction addressed to the commander-in-chief several weeks before a blow was struck. They were, first, the destruction of the French state on the banks of the Jumna, with all its military resources; secondly, the extension of the Company's frontier to the Jumna, with the possession of Agra, Delhi, and a sufficient chain of forts

on its banks ; thirdly, the possession of the nominal authority of the Mogul ; fourthly, the establishment of alliances with petty chiefs southward and westward of the Jumna, from Jyenaghur to Bundelcund ; fifthly, the annexation of Bundelcund to the Company's dominions. Such were the objects, the attainment of which, in the estimation of the governor-general, would constitute " the most prosperous issue of a war with Scindia and the Rajah of Berar on the north-western frontier of Hindostan"\*—and they were attained.

\* See Despatches, vol. iii. page 215.

## CHAPTER XIX.

CHAP. XIX. — THE Dutch settlements on the Island of Ceylon had fallen into the hands of the English during the time that Lord Hobart exercised the government of Madras.\* For a short period they formed an appendage to that presidency; but as soon as the ministry at home found leisure to reflect on the subject, it was deemed inexpedient that Ceylon should continue under the administration of the East-India Company. It was accordingly placed under the direct administration of the Crown, and a governor appointed, who was to be altogether independent of the authority which was paramount over all the British possessions on the Indian continent. It would be idle to waste time in conjecturing the causes of this change. The motives are too obvious to be mistaken. All parties when in opposition declaim against the increase of ministerial patronage—all parties when in office labour to add to its extent, till checked by some strong intimation that they have reached the verge of parliamentary forbearance. It is rare indeed that such check is interposed, as those from

\* See vol. ii. page 558.

whom it should come are often too much interested, either for themselves or their friends, to impose any limit on a privilege from which they hope to benefit.

It is worthy of remark, that the chief mover in the proceedings which secured to the ministry the entire patronage of Ceylon was Mr. Henry Dundas, one of the most vehement opposers of the India Bill proposed by the famous coalition ministry, the main object of which was to transfer the patronage of India to that ministry. Mr. Dundas was then in opposition—when the Ceylon question was to be disposed of he was a cabinet minister.\*

\* There appears to have been much indecision (or the appearance of it) in determining on the final disposition of the island; but, at the same time, an unparalleled degree of promptitude in exercising the ministerial claim to its patronage. The first governor was the Honourable Frederick North, who, in a letter to the Earl of Mornington, dated Bombay, 3rd June, 1798 (printed in vol. i. of the Wellesley Despatches), gives a whimsical account of his position, and of the celerity with which he had been dispatched to take possession of an office to which he had *not* been appointed. He says, “As I left England on the 18th of February, this letter, and those which accompany it, will probably give you the first information of my *intended* nomination to the government of Ceylon. I can call it as yet no more than intended, as I received orders from Mr. Dundas to take my departure on board of the first fleet that should sail, *and to wait for my commission and instructions at Bombay*. What that commission and those instructions may be I cannot positively say. I am pretty well assured that Mr. Dundas’s intention is to avoid as much as possible the inconvenience of giving up the island at present to the Company, and the very great one of rendering it entirely independent of the Company’s government; but in what manner these ends will be accomplished I cannot pretend to guess. By a debate in the India House, which your lordship will read in the

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To discover any reason why the government of Ceylon should be separated from that of British India would be impossible; but no one can bestow a serious thought on the subject without perceiving some of the inconveniences likely to result from the separation. It is remarkable, too, that such a course was directly opposed to that which had long been pursued with regard to India. The necessity of some one controlling authority, whose decision on political questions should be irreversible except by the home authorities, had been felt, and the govern-

papers, and which took place since I left London, it seems as if Mr. Dundas had given a promise, that in case the island should be preserved at the peace the Crown would resign it to the Company; but for this supposition I have no authority but the newspapers, and my private opinion of the propriety of the measure. All that I know is, that when I left London, three weeks before my embarkation, *Mr. Dundas had decided that my nomination and that of the other political and military servants of the government should derive from the Crown*; but that at the same time I should be put under the direction and control of the governor-general." That this last point was overlooked or purposely omitted will be seen from the remonstrance of the governor-general, subsequently quoted in the text. The safety of Ceylon, and perhaps of India, was thus endangered, but the patronage was safe to the minister. Mr. North was not the only person sent out to India in anticipation of a commission to be transmitted at a later period, but of which even the character and conditions were undetermined. In a letter to the Earl of Mornington, dated two days after the former, he says, "I have written another private letter to the governor-general, who I suppose will wish to account for the arrival in India of a person unhouselled, unappointed, unannealed, as I am, *with seven or eight more of his majesty's servants in embryo*, who, like myself, have as yet no security for their employment but the word of ministers, a sea voyage of four months, and the expense of necessary preparations."

ments of Madras and Bombay had been required by law to yield implicit obedience on such questions to the government of Bengal. In direct opposition to the views by which this line of policy had been dictated—which have since received a far wider practical application\*—it was determined to give to the government of Ceylon an independent authority. The evils of such an arrangement were distinctly pointed out by the Marquis Wellesley, in a letter addressed to the minister with whom it originated. After discussing the financial position of Ceylon in relation to Great Britain, he thus continues:—"As far as the questions of expense and finance are to be viewed distinctly from other branches of political consideration, I am convinced that the revenue of Ceylon would be infinitely better administered, and more productive, and that its expense would be much more moderate, if it were permanently annexed as a province to the government of Fort St. George, than if it be retained as a separate and distinct government under the Crown. The permanent annexation of Ceylon to the Crown, while the continent of India shall remain under the government of the East-India Company, is, however, a measure more important, in my estimation, with respect to its political than to its financial operation. It is essential to the vigour of this empire that the administration of all its parts should be uniform, framed upon the same system, combined by similar principles, and directed to similar objects and views.

\* By the 3 & 4 Wm. 4, cap. 85.

CHAP. XIX. Unity of power, and an invariable correspondence of system and action, throughout the whole fabric of our government, are the best securities which can be provided against the dangers to which we are necessarily exposed in India, by the vast extent of our possessions, and by the variety of interests which they embrace. If to the natural principles of division and discord resulting from the remote position of our provinces, and from the differences of local prejudices and conflicting interests, be added the establishment of distinct authorities, different in substance and in form from the general government of the empire, and exempt from its control, the weakness of overgrown dominion must ultimately fall upon us; and in every arduous crisis our power will be found inefficient in proportion to its nominal magnitude and extent. Whatever, therefore, may be the nature of the government which the wisdom of parliament may permanently establish for India, I hold two principles to be indispensable for its permanent efficiency and vigour: First, that every part of the empire in India, continental as well as insular, shall be subject to the general control of one undivided authority; which shall possess energy in peace to maintain order, connection, and harmony, between all the dispersed branches of our dominions, and to extend equal benefits of good government to every class of our numerous and various subjects; and in war to direct every spring of action to similar and corresponding movements, to concentrate every resource in an united effort, and by systematic

subordination to diffuse such a spirit of alacrity and promptitude to the remotest extremities of the empire, as shall secure the co-operation of every part in any exigency which may demand the collective strength of the whole. Secondly, that the constitution of every branch of the empire should be similar and uniform, and, above all, that no subordinate part should be so constituted as in any respect to hold a rivalry of dignity, even in form, with the supreme power.”\*

At a later period, when the above views had received some illustration from experience, the Marquis Wellesley returned to the discussion of the question. “The legislature,” said he, “has vested in the governor-general in council, subject to the control in England, the sole power of making war against any native state on the continent of India: the same principle requires that the governor-general in council should possess similar powers with regard to war in Ceylon. The wisdom of the legislature has provided an unity of executive power as the most effectual security for the British empire on the continent of India; and has determined that the authority invested with the sole power of disposing of all the resources necessary for the prosecution of war should also possess the sole power of making war, and that no provincial, local, or subordinate authority should be enabled to involve

\* Letter from the Marquis Wellesley to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas, 10th May, 1801, in vol. ii. of the Wellesley Despatches.

CHAP. XIX. — the general interests of the empire in the expense and hazard of hostilities. The same principles have been wisely established with regard to the political powers of the supreme government on the continent of India; and it has been determined by parliament, that the governor-general in council, who alone can be competent to form a comprehensive view of the interests affected by treaties or by wars with the native states, shall alone be competent to conclude treaties or to make war. But under the existing constitution of the Island of Ceylon, your lordship\* will observe that the order and system established for the general government of India are absolutely reversed: the governor of Ceylon exercises the authority of concluding treaties, of making wars, and of conducting military operations in the island, without the power of furnishing supplies either of men or money beyond the fixed establishment of the island; while the governor-general in council is required to furnish supplies of men and money for the prosecution of war in Ceylon, without possessing any power of controlling the origin, conduct, or progress of the war, which may, however, deeply affect the security, interests, and honour of the general government of India. The Island of Ceylon, however, cannot be excluded from the general operation of these wise and salutary prin-

\* These remarks are quoted from a letter addressed to Lord Hobart, then president of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India. It is dated the 30th November, 1803, and will be found in the 4th volume of the Wellesley Despatches.

ciples, unless it be also excluded from the general CHAP. XIX.  
system of the British civil and military government in India. But that island has justly been termed the bulwark of our empire in India; it is therefore an essential part of our strength, and the due administration of its civil and military government is of the utmost importance to the defence of all our dominions in India. No security for that administration can be so effectual as the uniform operation of the same authority which has been extended over every other branch of the British possessions; nor can an argument be adduced to prove the importance of Ceylon, which will not also demonstrate that its interests are inseparably blended with those of the empire on the continent, and that its government cannot be separated from the general control without hazard to the safety both of that empire and of the Island of Ceylon. The entire military establishment of India ought to be applicable to the general defence of the whole empire. The subdivision of that establishment, and the separation of our general strength into detachments, subjected to independent commands, and appropriated to exclusive provincial and local services, must impair the general efficiency of our army by destroying the unity of our military power. The same principle applies with equal force to the civil authority, which, in an empire of such magnitude and extent, cannot be separated from the military power without the hazard of confusion." After some remarks on the difficulties of conducting military operations under

CHAP. XIX. — the constitution bestowed on Ceylon, the Marquis Wellesley observes:—"The independence of the government and military command of Ceylon would considerably embarrass the government-general in the prosecution of operations against the remaining possessions of the French and Dutch to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, or against Egypt, or against various places in these seas, or even in any transfer of troops from the several maritime garrisons in India. Your lordship is intimately acquainted with the advantages which the ports of Ceylon offer for assembling troops and ships, and for completing every necessary depôt in the preparation of such services. The government-general repeatedly derived important advantages from the full command of those ports during the last war. In the present state of the island, it would not be possible to use its ports and resources with similar effect: a considerable portion of the value of Ceylon, in time of war, is therefore actually suspended by the existing constitution of the government of the island." Some further observations on military points follow these remarks, after which the governor-general thus continues:—"The preceding statements will apprise your lordship that, if Ceylon be entirely exempted from the control of the general civil and military government of India, and from the command of the commander-in-chief and of the captain-general in India, the military establishments of that island cannot be deemed to constitute an efficient part of our general resources

and power in India, excepting only to the extent to which these establishments may be sufficient to prevent the reduction of the Island of Ceylon by the forces of any enemy directed exclusively against that possession. Your lordship's judgment and experience in the affairs of this quarter of the globe will enable you to decide with facility, whether such a separation and subdivision of powers be preferable to an union of all the British resources and strength in the hands of one supreme authority in India, possessing power to apply every branch of the general government to the defence of each part or of the whole, and embracing in one comprehensive view the general welfare and security of the empire, together with the particular and local interests of every province and possession. The despatch addressed to the President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, under date 10th May, 1801,\* to which I had the honour to refer in the thirty-seventh paragraph of this letter, will convey to your lordship my sentiments on this important question. These sentiments have been confirmed by the most mature and deliberate reflection, and by every event relating to the affairs of Ceylon which has reached my knowledge since the independence of that government has been established. In one respect only has my opinion undergone any degree of variation. I am now convinced that the most effectual mode of rendering Ceylon a

\* The despatch from which the first quotation in the text is made.

CHAP. XIX. — valuable addition to the British possessions in India, and an efficient augmentation of our military and political power, would be to annex it as a province directly to the supreme government of Bengal, with orders to the governor-general in council to adopt such measures as might appear requisite for regulating the civil and military government and establishments of the island. Such an arrangement would unite considerable advantages in point of economy with a great improvement of the internal tranquillity, happiness, and prosperity of the island, and with a correspondent increase of its military strength. The government of Ceylon might either be formed upon the model of that of any of the provinces subject to the immediate government of Bengal, and made the station of a court of circuit and appeal, with establishments for the revenue and commerce of the island, and with one of his Majesty's general officers upon the staff commanding the troops; or the government of Ceylon might be similar to that of Prince of Wales Island, with a lieutenant-governor appointed from the civil service of Bengal.\* In this case, also, Ceylon should be the station of a general officer on the staff. I am satisfied that, under either of these arrangements, the Island of Ceylon would become a more valuable and a more secure possession than it can prove under the present constitution of its civil and military government. Your lordship will receive these ob-

\* Such was then the establishment of Prince of Wales Island. In 1805 it was erected into a Presidency, and at a subsequent period reduced.

servations as a testimony of my anxiety for the safety and prosperity of this great empire. My opinions are founded upon mature deliberation and practical experience; and it appears to me to be my positive duty to submit them to your lordship in the most direct and unequivocal language."

The reasoning by which the governor-general supported his judgment is irrefutable; and his conclusion cannot even be questioned without a surrender of the principles applied to the government of India, with constantly increasing strictness, during a period of nearly seventy years. The arguments last quoted were called forth by the occurrence of events in the Island of Ceylon to which it will now be necessary to turn.

In the interior of the island was the kingdom of Candy—a state of some extent and power. Previously to the acquisition of the Dutch settlements in Ceylon, more than one attempt had been made by the English to establish amicable relations with the sovereign of this state, but without success. An overture from the government of Madras, after the conquest, was not more fortunate in its results; and on the arrival of Mr. North, the first governor appointed by the Crown, not only were the relations of Candy to the British government entirely unsettled, but the country itself was in a state of confusion, originating in the death of the king, and the elevation of a usurper in his place, to the exclusion of the rightful claimant of the throne. This had been effected through the intrigues of a man named Pelime

CHAP. XIX. Talauve, who held the office of chief adigur, or first minister. The person whom he had placed on the throne was of low extraction, and destitute of talents. These circumstances probably constituted his chief qualifications in the eyes of the ambitious adigur, who intended, in eastern fashion, to exercise the power without assuming the title of sovereign. He succeeded in attaining his object. The second adigur retained his allegiance to Mootto Sawmy, the lawful inheritor of the throne, and paid the price of his fidelity in the forfeiture of his head. The queen and all the relations of the deceased king were thrown into prison; but, after a time, several, and among them Mootto Sawmy, found means to escape. They claimed protection from the British government, which was granted, but under restrictions which deprived them of all power to disturb the existing government of Candy.

Pelime Talauve was apparently not less disposed to seek the aid of the British government, and he is stated to have made some very atrocious proposals for his own aggrandizement, accompanied by conditions which he believed would be acceptable to the English. These were rejected with becoming expressions of indignation; but soon afterwards, from motives which do not very clearly appear, Major-General M'Dowall was dispatched on a mission to the court of Candy. The instructions given to General M'Dowall seem to indicate a desire, on the part of the governor, to establish the British authority in Candy, and to connect it with his go-

vernment by the tie of a subsidiary alliance.\* But the first interview of business put an end to all hope of effecting any of the objects of the mission, whatever they were. General M'Dowall's first request was moderate; that which he asked was calculated not less for the benefit of the subjects of the King of Candy than for the convenience of the people under the British government—it was for permission to construct a road through the king's territories, to connect Columbo with Trincomalee. The answer was an unqualified denial, the king expressing his decided aversion to any intercourse between his subjects and Europeans. Such was the fruit of this mission, which had been dispatched at vast expense, General M'Dowall being attended to the frontier by a large force, and bearing magnificent presents.

Various attempts at negotiation followed, which, as they were marked by no circumstances of interest and led to no results, may be passed over. The hostile designs of the court of Candy were, however, placed beyond doubt by the warlike preparations reported to be in progress in the country, and by repeated acts of aggression upon British subjects. One of these called forth a remonstrance from the English governor. A number of bullocks, laden with areka-nuts, belonging to persons who were peaceably pursuing an ordinary branch of traffic, were seized and confiscated. The answer to the representation of the British government promised

\* Description of Ceylon, by the Rev. James Cordiner, A.M.

CHAP. XIX. restitution; but the fulfilment of the promise was  
— constantly evaded under some frivolous pretence,  
and no redress was obtained. The governor now  
A.D. 1803. determined on war, and on the 31st of January,  
1803, General M'Dowall marched from Columbo  
with a force about two thousand strong. A few  
days later Colonel Barbutt marched with a large  
force from Trincomalee, and on the 20th of February  
the two divisions met before the city of Candy, the  
capital of the country. General M'Dowall's division  
had performed a march of a hundred and three  
miles; that of Colonel Barbutt had traversed a hun-  
dred and forty-two; and though the progress of the in-  
vaders was not altogether unopposed, the resistance  
which they experienced was too inconsiderable to  
call for notice. On the 21st of February a strong  
detachment marched into Candy, which they found  
completely evacuated, and in several places on fire.  
The great arsenal had been blown up, but a consi-  
derable quantity of ammunition, brass cannon, and  
small arms, were found in various places.

Mootto Sawmy, the lawful claimant of the throne  
of Candy, had been placed under the care of Colonel  
Barbutt. In consequence of representations from  
that officer of the disposition of the inhabitants of  
those parts of Candy with which he was acquainted  
to receive Mootto Sawmy as their sovereign, it was  
determined to recognize his title and proclaim him  
king. On the 4th of March he arrived in the city  
of Candy, and a convention was concluded, by which  
the British government agreed to deliver over to

him that place, and all the possessions belonging to it which were at that time in their occupation, with certain exceptions, among which was included a strip of ground across the Candian territories, of sufficient breadth to form a road from Columbo to Trincomalee. The prince engaged to cede this and the other excepted portions of territory, and to permit all Malays resident in his kingdom to proceed with their families to the British settlements, from which he was to receive an auxiliary force in case he should require it to maintain his authority. The deposed king was to have safe conduct to Columbo, and a sufficient provision for his maintenance; a general amnesty was to be granted, and the English were to be secured certain privileges with regard to the trade in cinnamon, the cutting of wood in the Candian forests, and the surveying of rivers and water-courses with a view to rendering them navigable for the purposes of trade and the mutual advantage of both countries, which object the king was to promote by his assistance. “In this matter,” says a narrator of these proceedings,\* “arrangements were made with the most sincere cordiality between the British government and Mootto Sawmy.” But neither the sincerity nor the cordiality withheld the British government from concluding, within a few days afterwards, other arrangements utterly at variance with the former, and depriving Mootto Sawmy of nearly all that had been professedly secured to him. It is said that this prince, although well re-

\* The Rev. James Cordiner.

CHAP. XIX. — ceived by the inhabitants of the frontier, met with no adherents as he approached the capital, and that he remained in his palace at Candy surrounded only by his own domestics, and supported by no other power but that of the British army. If this be true, it shews the extreme imprudence with which the engagement had been formed: but as it does not appear that Mootto Sawmy himself had misled the British government, as to the extent of his own popularity, it is difficult to see upon what grounds of justice or good faith he could be sacrificed, to repair an error arising out of the credulity and precipitancy of others. Pelime Talauve had never ceased to pursue his trade of intrigue: he “had the effrontery,” says Mr. Cordiner, “to carry on a deceitful correspondence, under the mask of friendship, with the commander of the British forces,” and that commander, he might have added, had the weakness to be deceived by him. “No art,” says the historian, “was left untried which might either dupe or cajole our government”—and Pelime Talauve had no reason to complain of want of success. He promised to betray his puppet master to the English, and requested the despatch of two strong detachments by different routes to the place where the prince was to be seized. The required detachments marched, and had proceeded only a few miles before both were subjected to a heavy fire from every direction: they continued, however, to move on. Their route lay over roads of the worst possible description, and was pursued under the annoyances of which they had received so

early a specimen. They at length arrived at the place where the king was to have been found, but he had not thought fit to wait their approach. The indefatigable Pelime Talauve wished to draw them forward into fresh snares, but the officer in command, Colonel Baillie, declined to be further trepanned, and returned without delay to head-quarters. In the meantime jungle fever had made its appearance in the British force, and committed frightful ravages.

Pelime Talauve continued to correspond with the government, expressing his surprise that the governor should incur so much trouble and expense, and proposing an arrangement in which himself, as might be expected, was to be the party chiefly benefited. These overtures received a favourable answer, and they were followed by the appearance at Candy of the person holding the office of second adigur, or minister, carrying a firelock and match wrapped in white muslin—"as an emblem of peace," says the historian\*—perhaps also as an emblem of purity. This personage was forthwith admitted to a conference with General M'Dowall, and the rights, which a few days before had been solemnly secured to Mootto Sawmy, were summarily cut down, in conformity with more recent views of convenience. The servants of Mootto Sawmy's rival were not less ready to sacrifice the claims of their master than were the English to surrender those of their ally. By General M'Dowall and the Candian negotiator

\* Cordiner.

CHAP. XIX. — it was agreed that Pelime Talauve's pageant king should be given up to the English, and the adigur himself invested with supreme authority in Candy; that he should pay annually a sum of thirty thousand rupees to Mootto Sawmy, who was to hold the semblance of a court at Jaffnapatam; that certain cessions should be made to the English, differing little from those stipulated in the agreement with Mootto Sawmy, and that a cessation of arms should immediately take place. Soon after this arrangement General M'Dowall departed for Columbo, leaving in the city of Candy a garrison of seven hundred Malays and three hundred Europeans, besides a great number of sick, whose removal was impracticable.

Pelime Talauve now expressed a desire to be admitted to an audience of the British governor, for the purpose of arranging a definitive treaty of peace. It was about the same time suggested to the governor that his presence in the province of the seven corles, which was to be one of the cessions, might be desirable; he proceeded thither, and there, on the 3rd of May, received Pelime Talauve. The terms which had been agreed upon by General M'Dowall were confirmed by the governor, and apparently little remained to be done but for the English to extricate themselves from the difficulties of their previous engagement with Mootto Sawmy. Colonel Barbutt undertook to negotiate with that prince, but was prevented by an attack of fever, which in a few days terminated his life. Pelime

Talauve expressed great uneasiness at this, lest it might protract the execution of the articles of the treaty; to avert which inconvenience he earnestly requested that General M'Dowall might be sent to Candy to perform the task which had been designed for Colonel Barbutt. In accordance with the adi-gur's wishes, General M'Dowall marched from Columbo on the 11th of May, and arrived at Candy on the 23rd; but being soon seized with fever, he was compelled, on the 1st of June, to quit it for a situation more favourable to the restoration of health. A. D. 1803.

The garrison at Candy was left under the command of Major Davie. At this time the intentions of Pelime Talauve became evident even to the British authorities, who had so long given him credit for sincerity. He made another attempt to entrap the British commander into the despatch of a force to take the person of the fugitive king, but he was not so weak as to fall into the snare. All around was war, notwithstanding the engagements which had been made for its suspension; and the Candians succeeded in dispossessing the English of several strong posts. On the 24th of June they attacked the capital before daybreak. They were repulsed, but soon resumed the attack, and a fire was kept up from both sides till two o'clock, when the British displayed a white flag, and the firing ceased. Articles of capitulation were with little difficulty agreed upon. By them Candy was to be delivered up, with all the stores and ammunition within it; the British

CHAP. XIX. — troops were to march out with their arms, on the road leading to Trincomalee; Mootto Sawmy was to be permitted to accompany them, and the adigur engaged to protect such sick and wounded as should be unavoidably left, and provide them with provisions and medicines till they could be removed to Columbo or Trincomalee.

At five in the afternoon the British troops, consisting of fourteen European officers, twenty European non-commissioned officers and privates, two hundred and fifty Malays, and a hundred and forty gun-lascars, marched out of Candy, on the road leading to Trincomalee, accompanied by Mootto Sawmy. After advancing a mile and a half, they were compelled to halt for the night: a river was to be crossed which was not fordable, and the party had neither boats nor rafts. In the morning, while endeavouring to provide the means of transit, armed bodies of Candians were observed to gather around them. A party of chiefs, after a time, approached, and informed Major Davie that the king was greatly incensed against the adigur for allowing the garrison to leave Candy, but that if they would deliver up Mootto Sawmy, they should be supplied with boats to cross the river, and receive every assistance on their march. Major Davie, in the proper spirit of a British officer, refused. The offer was repeated some hours afterwards by another party, accompanied by assurances of safety and protection for Mootto Sawmy. Major Davie, on this occasion, is represented to have consulted his officers—as if the

question of surrendering the unhappy prince to his enemies were one of doubt. It is to be presumed that the advice which he received was such as became those to whom the British commander applied for counsel, for his answer to the Candian chiefs was, that he could not part with Mootto Sawmy without orders from Columbo. The Candians departed, but soon returned, declaring that if Mootto Sawmy were not given up, the king would send his whole force to seize him and to prevent the British troops from crossing the river. Major Davie then had recourse to another consultation. How he was advised cannot be known—how he acted is but too certain. He informed Mootto Sawmy that he had no longer power to protect him; and the unfortunate prince, with his relatives and servants, was delivered up to the agents of the king of Candy, or rather of the man who ruled the king. It is said that Mootto Sawmy, on learning his fate, indignantly exclaimed—“Is it possible that the triumphant arms of England can be so humbled as to be awed by the menaces of such cowards as the Candians?”—but this appeal to national feeling was vain. Mootto Sawmy was marched to Candy, and there put to death. Two of his relatives shared his fate. Six weeks after his being surrendered, eight of his servants appeared at Trincomalee, who, after being deprived of their noses and ears, had been suffered to depart.

The day of dishonour, on which Mootto Sawmy was abandoned to destruction, passed without the

CHAP. XIX. English having been able to effect the passage of the river and without their receiving any assistance for the purpose. On that which followed, a body of Candians having taken post within a hundred yards of the British party, their leader advanced to Major Davie, and intimated that it was the pleasure of the king that the garrison should return to Candy unarmed, and that instant death was the penalty of refusal. The requisition was complied with; and after proceeding a short distance towards Candy, the whole of the British officers and soldiers were murdered, excepting Major Davie and two other officers, who were spared, and a corporal named George Barnsley, who, after being left for dead, recovered and made his escape. Native officers and men, who refused to enter the service of the king of Candy, were dispatched in various modes, some of them of extreme barbarity. The sick left in Candy, consisting of a hundred and twenty men belonging to the King's 19th regiment of foot, were all murdered in cold blood as they lay incapable of resistance in the hospital.

The details of the earlier part of this melancholy and discreditable series of transactions are too imperfect to admit of confident remark. Sickness had greatly diminished the strength of the garrison commanded by Major Davie; some desertions from the native part of it seem to have taken place, and more to have been apprehended; but still he was not reduced to extremity. Reinforcements were on their way to his relief. This, indeed, he did not know; but he was certainly bound to protract the de-

fence as long as possible, in the hope that either some assistance might reach, or some accident befriend him. But if the propriety of his abandonment of Candy be open to doubt, that of his subsequent abandonment of the unhappy prince, Mootto Sawmy, is liable to none. Mootto Sawmy had been invited from Trincomalee, where he was in safety, to Candy, where the English either wanted the power to place him on the throne, or were induced by the arts of Pelime Talauve to abstain from using it. They then, with an extraordinary degree of levity, degraded Mootto Sawmy from the rank of a king to that of a stipendiary upon the bounty of the man who hated him, and had already violently deprived him of his rights. This was a great stain upon the honour of the British nation, but one far darker followed in the surrender of Mootto Sawmy to certain death. For the safety of that prince the faith of the British government was pledged, and it was the duty of every man in its service to shed his last drop of blood in defending him from harm. Honour was sacrificed to fear, and the reward was worthy of the act. Those who devoted Mootto Sawmy to destruction thought by the dishonourable deed to ensure safety to themselves. But they were disappointed—their weakness and perfidy were rewarded by a miserable death or a more miserable captivity. Painful as are the feelings excited by the narrative of the surrender of Candy and the subsequent events, the story presents a lesson not to be forgotten.

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The corporal, Barnsley, who had happily escaped the death which had overtaken his comrades under Major Davie, succeeded in making his way to a British post called Fort M'Dowall, which was defended by a small garrison under Captain Madge. That officer, on hearing the corporal's intelligence, determined to evacuate the fort and retreat towards Trincomalee. He departed in the night, and during a march of four days was exposed to a constant fire from large bodies of Candians. He then fell in with a detachment proceeding to the relief of Candy, and the enemy thereupon dispersed.

The defence of another English post, named Dumbadenia, demands notice, not from its importance nor the magnitude of the operations carried on before or within it, but from the gallant spirit displayed by a small body of men, not one of whom was in a condition for active service. Dumbadenia was a small redoubt, slightly constructed of fascines and earth; its garrison consisted of only fourteen convalescents of the 19th regiment, who were on their way to Columbo for the restoration of their health, and twenty-two invalid Malays. It was commanded by an ensign named Grant. The Candians, headed by the second adigur, mustered before it in several thousands, and kept up an incessant fire for several days, the garrison lying sheltered behind a breastwork, and only discharging an occasional shot when the enemy ventured to approach sufficiently near to render it effective. Invitations to surrender were sent daily, accompanied by so-

lemn promises of honourable treatment, which would doubtlessly have been observed as strictly as at Candy. Ensign Grant was so enfeebled by sickness as to be scarcely capable of ordinary motion; but his spirit was subdued neither by disease nor the apparently desperate nature of his situation. He strengthened his shelter by bags of rice and such other materials as could be obtained, and resolved to persevere. A seasonable reinforcement, after a time, reduced the fearful disproportion of force against which he had to contend; and another enabled him to bring away in safety the whole of the brave men by whom he had been supported, after destroying all the stores and provisions in the place.

A long series of hostilities on a minute scale followed. The King of Candy, emboldened by the success which had attended him, surrounded the British possessions, and threatened even their capital, Columbo. But his army being totally defeated at Hangwell, about eighteen miles from that city, by Captain Pollock, of the King's 51st regiment, the Candian prince made a precipitate retreat, and revenged his disappointment by cutting off the heads of two of his chiefs, who had the indiscretion to follow his majesty's example with so much zeal as to overtake him before his indignation had found opportunity for vent.

It would be uninteresting to pursue the history of this war further in detail. The imperfect means of defence possessed by the Ceylon government were

CHAP. XIX. increased by assistance from Bengal and Madras.

— The Candians, driven from the British possessions, continued for some time to harass the frontiers.

A. D. 1804. In the spring of 1804 they meditated a general invasion of the British dominions, but were anticipated by an attack on their own. In the following year the enemy resumed their attempts, but were repulsed. From that time there was a suspension of active hostilities, but the relations of the two states were not determined by any treaty or engagement. This state of things has been characterized as “a tacit suspension of hostilities.”\* The war, indiscreetly begun and imprudently conducted, was thus unsatisfactorily terminated. The victims of the massacre of Candy remained unavenged, and the honour of the British name unvindicated.†

When the Marquis Wellesley first exposed to the King's government the inconveniences and dangers attending their determination to isolate the government of Ceylon from that of continental India, he could not have anticipated that his views should at

\* Cordiner.

† In the history of the war with Candy it is proper to state that the author has not enjoyed access to any sources of information which have not been made public. The history is founded partly on published documents, and partly on the information to be found in former narratives, more especially those contained in the Asiatic Annual Register, and the work of the Reverend James Cordiner. The author of the latter publication states that his narrative was composed at Columbo (where he was chaplain during the war), and that it is founded on information afforded by the principal civil servants of government, and an extensive correspondence with respectable officers in the field.

so early a period have received so striking and, in many respects, so disastrous an illustration. The war with Candy had proved that, under the existing arrangement, the island was a source of weakness to India rather than of strength. Had the governor-general possessed the power of control, he would either have postponed the war or have made adequate provision for carrying it on effectually. That the Candians should insult the English authorities, and inflict wrong on those subject to English government, was of common occurrence; and though it was the bounden duty of the representative of the British Crown to resent such treatment, it was not less a duty to choose a proper time for carrying his resentment into effect. He had been warned by the governor-general of India, with reference to the state of affairs in that country, to avoid "by all possible means" a breach with the court of Candy,\* but the warning was not regarded. It is true that there was cause for war, but not such as admitted of no delay. Previous injuries had been submitted to—others involving far deeper wrong were subsequently permitted to pass unexpiated. The seizure of a few areka nuts took the English to Candy—the murder of nearly a hundred and fifty of their countrymen did not lead them there a second time. If it be answered, that the murderous Candians enjoyed impunity because the English had not strength to

\* See letter from Marquis Wellesley to the Hon. Frederick North, 28th November, 1800, in the Wellesley Despatches, vol. ii. page 417.

CHAP. XIX. — punish them, the same answer might have sufficed in the case of the areka-nuts. The weakness which the government displayed, in suffering itself to be deceived by the artifices of Pelime Talauve—the dishonour which it incurred by its treatment of Mootto Sawmy—need no remark; they have been sufficiently apparent in the course of the narrative. The war was not unavoidable, and it produced little except disgrace. It left the relations of Candy and the British government as unsettled as it found them at its commencement—with this change merely, that the Candians had been taught that there was no measure of injury to which the British government would not submit, not excepting even the ferocious murder of a large number of British subjects, for the sake of peace. Englishmen's lives, at the conclusion of the war, were of less importance than areka-nuts had been when it was commenced.

The first information which the governor-general received of the war was from the Ceylon Gazette, containing the proclamation of the governor of the island announcing its commencement. A heavy pecuniary demand for the necessary outlay was immediately afterwards made upon Bengal, but it was intimated to the governor of Madras that no troops would be wanted unless a second campaign should be necessary, which was not thought probable. Subsequently troops were requested; but the request being rested principally on the apprehension of a renewal of the war with France, and being accompanied by favourable representations of the progress of the war in Ceylon,

and the means at the governor's disposal for carrying it on, there was no reason to believe that the want was urgent; and the application was moreover made at a season impracticable for the voyage.

The announcement of the fatal events in Candy opened the real state of affairs in the island. At this time, all the resources of India were required for the efficient prosecution of the Mahratta war. But Ceylon could not be left to ruin; and between the 29th of July, when the danger first became known, and the succeeding November, the island was reinforced from India by two detachments of the King's troops, amounting respectively to two hundred and eighty-two and one hundred and eighty-seven, by five hundred Bengal volunteers, and three hundred Madras sepoy.

A. D. 1803.

The effects of the separation of Ceylon from the government of India were thus not left for any long period to be conjectured. Almost as soon as the separation was effected the fruits began to appear. The consequences had been foreseen and foretold by the governor-general, but his warnings experienced the fate that usually awaits advice which runs counter to men's prejudices and interests. Prediction had now become fact. "Under the new constitution," said the Marquis Wellesley, "treaties have been concluded and a war has been undertaken by the government of Ceylon without the previous knowledge of the government-general; the expenses of that war have, however, been supplied in the first instance by the government-general, and

CHAP. XIX. the calamities which have attended the progress of the war have occasioned demands for troops from the government-general. Whether the war in Ceylon could have been altogether avoided; whether its commencement could have been postponed to a more convenient season; or whether its conduct could have been improved, and an early and honourable peace established upon permanent foundations, are questions which it is neither my present duty nor intention to examine; but it is evident that every arrangement connected with these questions might have been formed with greater advantage under the direct authority of the power which must ultimately furnish the supplies for war and provide the securities of peace. Had the government of Ceylon remained subordinate to this government, the war in that island, if deemed necessary, would have been undertaken after a deliberate preparation of sufficient resources, and after a full consideration of the most effectual means of supplying them. This government could not have been taken by surprise with respect to the actual commencement of the war, or to its result; and an opportunity would have been afforded of apportioning, at an early period of time, to the service in Ceylon such aid as might have appeared, on a just comparison of objects and means, to be compatible with due attention to other branches of the service in India, or to be indispensably necessary for the safety of Ceylon. The independence of Ceylon has placed all these considerations beyond the reach of

the governor-general in council, who was unapprized of the approach of war in Ceylon until it had actually commenced, and of the probable demand for considerable reinforcements in Ceylon, until a war on the continent of India had limited the means of furnishing them.”\*

\* Letter from Marquis Wellesley to Lord Hobart, 30th Nov. 1803, published in vol. iii. of the Wellesley Despatches.

While it cannot be denied that Mr. North, in his transactions with the court of Candy, was for the most part singularly unfortunate, justice requires the avowal that he appears to have been an amiable and estimable man, and to have borne with him from Ceylon the good wishes of all the British inhabitants. The Wellesley Despatches contain a few of his letters, which display all the frankness, spirit, and wit for which his distinguished relative gained credit, even from those who were assailing the treasury bench, of which he was so long the able defender.

## CHAPTER XX.

CHAP. XX. — THE conclusion of peace with Scindia and the Rajah of Berar did not relieve the British government from all apprehension of danger from Mahratta enemies, nor allow of the immediate recall of its armies from the field. Holkar was to have aided those two chiefs against the English, and actually dispatched for the purpose a body of troops under a military adventurer known as Ameer Khan; but the commander, hearing of the glorious battle of Assye, became too much alarmed to proceed, and returned to his employer.\* Holkar participated in the fright of his servant to an extent sufficient to restrain him from taking any decisive steps against the English; but he endeavoured by correspondence to rouse the spirit of the native princes against them. He also plundered the territories of some of the allies and dependents of the British government; and though this was by no means an unequivocal demonstration of enmity, seeing that it is the Mahratta custom to plunder friends and foes with the greatest impartiality, it was justly deemed pro-

\* Memoirs of Mohummud Ameer Khan, printed at Calcutta, 1832.

per to warn him against a repetition of such acts, and to take measures for defending the territories of the Company and their allies from attacks which there was some reason to apprehend. General Lake accordingly took up a position which enabled him to restrain Holkar's predatory operations in the quarter where they were most to be apprehended; and also, under instructions from the governor-general, addressed a letter to that chief, expressing the disposition of the British government to leave him in the unmolested exercise of his authority, provided he would abstain from acts of aggression against that government and its allies. In proof of his amicable intentions, he was required to withdraw his army from the menacing position which it had taken up, to retire within his own territories, and to abstain from exacting tribute from the allies of the Company. Holkar was also invited to send vakeels to the British camp, to make known his wishes and form arrangements for the establishment of relations of friendship. After a considerable time, during which Holkar occupied himself in addressing friendly letters to General Lake, and letters to the surrounding princes filled with denunciations of the nation and government which General Lake represented, vakeels were dispatched by him to the British camp. They were, as usual with Mahratta negotiators, unfurnished with powers to conclude any engagement; their function was simply to communicate the demands of their master. These demands were, that he should be

CHAP. XX. — permitted to collect *chout*, according to the custom of his ancestors—a custom which Holkar regarded as too laudable (to say nothing of its profitableness) to be relinquished; that certain possessions formerly held by his family, including twelve pergunnahs in the Doab and a pergunnah in Bundelcund, should be given to him; that the country of Hurriana should be transferred to him; the country then in his possession guaranteed, and a treaty concluded with him on the same terms as with Scindia. As these terms were not proposed with the expectation of their being accepted, it is unnecessary to discuss their reasonableness or the propriety of putting them forward. They were of course rejected, with a natural expression of astonishment on the part of General Lake that they should have been submitted. With reference to a promise formerly given by Holkar, the vakeels were asked whether their chief would withdraw his troops from their offensive position. The answer was explicit far beyond the ordinary measure of Mahratta candour; it was, that Holkar would not consider the promise binding unless the demands which they had made on his behalf should be complied with. After the conclusion of this conference, the vakeels intimated that some relaxation of the terms might be made. The British commander replied by referring to former connections with Holkar; and requiring, as an indispensable preliminary to negotiation, the immediate return of the chief to his own possessions. It would be useless to follow in detail the progress of

a negotiation distinguished in nothing from others in which Mahrattas are parties: the negotiation came to an end, as it was evident that it must, without any arrangement being effected; and orders were issued to General Lake and General Wellesley to commence hostile operations against Holkar both in Hindostan and the Deccan. These orders were dated the 16th of April, 1804. General Wellesley had some time before received a menacing letter from Holkar, demanding the cession of certain provinces in the Deccan as the condition of peace; and adding that, in the event of war, though Holkar might be unable to oppose the British artillery in the field, “countries of many coss should be overrun, and plundered and burnt;” that General Lake “should not have leisure to breathe for a moment; and that calamities would fall on lacs of human beings in continued war, by the attacks of” Holkar’s “army, which overwhelm like the waves of the sea.” One of those admirable military qualities which pre-eminently distinguished the great commander to whom this letter was addressed, and which has greatly contributed to his brilliant success, is, the habit of leaving nothing to chance, or to a hasty and unpremeditated arrangement, when the opportunity exists of making previous provision to meet coming events. In the exercise of this comprehensive prudence, General Wellesley forthwith proceeded to place the troops under his immediate command in a state of equipment for active service, and to reinforce the corps in Guzerat. On re-

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CHAP. XX. — ceiving orders for the commencement of hostile operations, General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray, commanding the force in that province, to march with the greater part of it for the purpose of co-operating with the commander-in-chief in such manner as circumstances might require. He likewise addressed the resident at Scindia's court, calling for the aid of that chieftain's army in support of the common cause of the allies. Scindia promised to comply, and to adopt the measures suggested by General Wellesley.

Holkar had been at Ajmeer, within the territories of Scindia—ostensibly for purposes of devotion, for Hindoo robbers are remarkably devout. His devotions being completed, he returned through the territories of the Rajah of Jyenaghur, where he remained for some time with a considerable body of horse, engaged in a series of predatory occupations, which it may be presumed his recent visit to Ajmeer had sanctified. To protect the city of Jyenaghur, General Lake made a detachment of three battalions of native infantry, which were placed under the command of Colonel Monson, of the King's 76th regiment. Their approach disturbed Holkar in the exercise of his vocation, and caused him to retire with some precipitancy to the southward. He was followed by General Lake, the detachment under Colonel Monson continuing in advance. On  
A. D. 1804. the 10th of May, a detachment was made from the main body for the purpose of attacking Tonk Rampoor, a Rajpoot town about sixty miles from the

capital of Jyenaghur, in the occupation of Holkar. The detachment, consisting of three battalions of native infantry, a regiment of native cavalry, and a proportion of artillery, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Don. The attack was made at two o'clock on the morning of the 15th of May. Colonel Don advanced with his party undiscovered to within two hundred and fifty yards of the gateway; they were then fired upon by a picquet on their right, but the party moved on without noticing the interruption. On coming within a hundred yards of the passage they encountered a smart fire from the rampart. This was returned by a fire of musketry, which did considerable execution among the men on the ramparts. The first gate was then successfully blown open; the fire of musketry being kept up for the purpose of dislodging the people who occupied the works. The second gate, being out of repair, was not shut; the third and fourth were blown open, and the British force entered the town. While some of the assailants scoured the ramparts, Colonel Don pushed on with the remainder to a small gateway on the south side of the fort, through which the enemy were making their escape. The success of this attempt deprived Holkar of the only footing that he had in Hindostan north of the Chumbul. The country commanded by the fort of Tonk Rampoorra necessarily passed under the control of the possessors of the fort.

Holkar, however, had fled so rapidly, and to such a distance, that it was deemed inexpedient for the

CHAP. XX. — main body of the British army to attempt following him; and General Lake determined to march his troops back into quarters, leaving to Colonel Monson, with the detachment under his command, the duty of guarding against the return of Holkar, while Colonel Murray, it was expected, was moving against him from Guzerat. This determination of the commander-in-chief seems to be little in accordance with his general character; nor is it easy to understand why the main body of the army could not keep the field as well as Colonel Monson's detachment. It appears, indeed, that General Lake's army were suffering much in health from the operation of the hot winds, and that their cattle were perishing from want of forage. Colonel Monson's detachment, being composed entirely of infantry, would have fewer wants than a force of which a large proportion was cavalry; but, on the other hand, from the want of cavalry it would possess fewer facilities for supplying its necessities. The retrograde movement of General Lake seems also to have been subject to difficulties and hardships not inferior to those which might have been expected to attend his advance, and the loss of men almost incredible, with reference to the fact that they never met an enemy, excepting a few robbers of lower grade than the freebooters whom the army had advanced to punish.\* The

\* Major Thorn, who was a witness of the miseries endured and a participator in them, reports the troops as suffering "indescribable misery from the burning wind, which, after passing over the great sandy desert, imparts to the atmosphere in these regions an intensity of heat scarcely to be conceived even by

march was at length completed and the troops dispersed to their allotted stations. CHAP. XX.

those who have been seasoned to the fury of a vertical sun. In every direction," he says, "where the pestiferous current has any influence the effects are painful to those who have the misfortune of being exposed to it, but westward of the Jumna the fiery blast is still more distressing, from the want of rivers and lakes to temper its severity, the nearest resemblance to which, perhaps, is the extreme glow of an iron-foundry in the height of summer; though even that is but a feeble comparison, since no idea can be formed of the causticity of the sandy particles which are borne along with the wind, like hot embers, peeling off the skin and raising blisters wherever they chance to fall." At certain periods of the march, Major Thorn states that from ten to fifteen Europeans were buried daily. "Young men," he continues, "who set out in the morning full of spirits and in all the vigour of health, dropped dead immediately on reaching the encampment ground, and many were smitten on the road by the overpowering force of the sun, especially when at the meridian, the rays darting downward like a torrent of fire, under which many brave and athletic men fell, without the possibility of receiving any relief. Those who were thus struck suddenly turned giddy, foamed at the mouth, and as instantaneously became lifeless. Even when encamped, the sufferings of the soldiers were excruciating; for the tents in general were ill adapted to afford shelter against the solar heat at this season, when the thermometer in the shade frequently exceeded one hundred and thirty degrees of Fahrenheit. The misery was further increased by the scarcity of water, owing to the debility and mortality that prevailed among the *bheasties*, or persons employed in procuring this inestimable article. Numbers of these water-carriers perished through the fatigue which they underwent in this fiery climate, where the natives suffer more than even Europeans themselves when called to extraordinary exertions. Such were the afflicting circumstances of our march: and these were further aggravated by the increasing number of our sick, many of whom were obliged to be conveyed on the common *hackeries*, or country carts, without any covering, and consequently exposed to the sun through the whole day, the vehicles very often not reaching the camp before evening." Sub-

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Although the celerity of Holkar's retreat had rendered it impracticable for the English army to keep near him, his movements had been accompanied by a body of Hindostanee cavalry dispatched for the purpose. It consisted of two parties; one commanded by Captain Gardiner, an officer in the service of the Rajah of Jyenaghur, the other by Lieutenant Lucan, of the King's service. On the 29th of May, Colonel Gardiner learned that a native chieftain named Tantia, in the interest of Holkar, was encamped with a considerable force at no great distance from him. With the assistance of Lieutenant Lucan this place was attacked, and the whole of the infantry, amounting to about two thousand, surrendered, on condition of being escorted to the camp of Bappoogee Scindia, who commanded the troops which Dowlut Row Scindia, in ostensible conformity with his engagements, had put in motion against Holkar. There the prisoners were to be released, under promise of never serving against the British government.

In another quarter the British arms met with reverses. Ameer Khan, with a large body of predatory horse, fell suddenly on two companies of British sepoy and about fifty artillerymen, employed in the trenches against a small fort in Bundelcund, destroyed  
sequently Major Thorn observes: "Nineteen Europeans were buried this day; and melancholy indeed it was to see the route of our army traced by heaps of earth, giving cover to the remains of so many gallant young soldiers, who, after escaping the dangers incident to the fire and steel of war, fell pitiable victims to the climate."—Narrative, pages 345, 346, 347.

the whole party, and carried off their guns and tumbrils. According to this marauder's report he gained other advantages, but the English accounts vary from his own; and as he entirely forgets to record his subsequent defeat and the dispersion of his force, though sufficiently notorious, it is evident that his statement cannot be admitted without a minute inquiry into its truth, which the importance of the facts is not sufficient to warrant.

The trifling disasters sustained in Bundelcund were succeeded by others far more serious. Subsequently to the capture of Tonk Rampoor, Colonel Don, with so many of his detachment as were not required for the garrison of that place, joined Colonel Monson, who, thus reinforced, moved in the direction of Kotah, and arrived in its vicinity early in June. Here he was joined by a body of troops in the service of the Rajah of Kotah. Pursuing a southerly course, he advanced to the strong pass of Mokundra, where he halted a few days to collect supplies; after which, resuming his march, he arrived on the 1st of July in the neighbourhood of the fortress of Hinglaisghur, an old possession of Holkar's family, and held in his name by a garrison of eight hundred foot and three hundred horse. It was assailed on the 2nd, and carried with great rapidity and inconsiderable loss. Colonel Monson subsequently advanced his position about fifty miles beyond the Mokundra pass, to a place where he was informed supplies could be obtained, and from which also he expected to be able to communicate with

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CHAP. XX. Colonel Murray, at that time on his march from Guzerat towards Oujein with a considerable detachment. Colonel Monson's corps had been originally unaccompanied by cavalry, but before this period it had been joined by two bodies of irregular horse, one (already mentioned) under the command of Lieutenant Lucan, the other commanded by Bappoojee Scindia.

Colonel Murray, after advancing a certain distance towards Oujein, became suddenly alarmed; resolved to retire behind the Mahie river, and actually fell back for the purpose. This retrograde movement gave confidence to Holkar, who, after his retreat, had taken post in Malwa, with the Chumbul river between him and Colonel Monson. This post he now quitted, and recrossed the river with his whole army. It had been the intention of Colonel Monson to attack Holkar, but under the influence, as it is represented, of motives arising from various causes—a deficiency of grain in his camp, the absence of a detachment employed to bring up a supply, and of another part of his force that was on its march to join him from Hinglaisghur, but above all, the retreat of Colonel Murray—he determined to retire to the Mokundra pass—a determination induced, it is said, by the treacherous advice of Bappoojee Scindia.\* Accordingly, at four in the morning, on the 8th of July, he sent off the whole of his

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\* So stated by Amcer Khan, who, having on this occasion no apparent motive for falsehood, ought not perhaps to be entirely disbelieved.

baggage and stores to Soonarah, the troops remaining on the ground of encampment, in order of battle, till half-past nine. The infantry then moved off, the cavalry being left on the ground with orders to follow in half an hour, and to send Colonel Monson the earliest intelligence of Holkar's motions. The infantry met with no interruption; but after marching about twelve miles, a report reached them, that at a considerable distance in their rear Lieutenant Lucan's cavalry had been attacked by the whole of that of Holkar. Colonel Monson immediately formed his troops in order of battle, and was proceeding to the support of the party attacked, when Bappoojee Scindia arrived with the fearful intelligence that they were no longer in a situation to receive support. They had been nearly cut to pieces; and their gallant commander, dreadfully wounded, had fallen into the hands of the enemy.\* It is said that this catastrophe was occasioned by the cavalry having remained longer on the field than Colonel Monson intended.

On receiving the news of the destruction of so large a portion of his force, Colonel Monson resumed his march towards the Mokundra pass, which he reached on the following day without molestation.

\* This brave officer, who had rendered excellent service in the war with Scindia, died soon after the action—of his wounds, aggravated by neglect and ill-treatment, according to one report—of poison, according to another.

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On the morning of the 10th of July a large body of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance, and their numbers continued gradually to increase till noon on the 11th, when Holkar, with a degree of modesty becoming his character, sent a letter to Colonel Monson, demanding the surrender of the guns and small arms of the British force. On receiving a refusal—for it need scarcely be stated that the insolent demand was refused—Holkar divided his force into three bodies, which at the same point of time attacked the front and flanks of Colonel Monson's corps. The assailants were bravely repulsed; but, not dismayed by their first failure, they repeatedly returned to the attack, and were as often driven back with severe loss. Finding that he could make no impression on the men whose arms he had coolly demanded, Holkar drew off his troops to the distance of about four miles, where he was joined by his infantry and guns.

The brave resistance offered by the British force on this occasion is but a brilliant speck in the train of disaster and suffering. Colonel Monson had intended to make a stand at Mokundra, but fearful that the enemy might get to his rear and cut off his communication with the pass and with the town of Kotah, which was the only place from whence he could obtain supplies—adverting, moreover, to the circumscribed nature of his position, to the reputed strength of Holkar's force, and the supposed weight and number of that chieftain's guns, he resolved to

continue his retreat to Kotah; and so great was his anxiety to avoid an engagement, that he left his camp standing to deceive the enemy. His march to Kotah was performed under inclement skies and through an inundated country, and when he arrived fresh difficulties awaited him. The Rajah declined to admit the British troops into the town, and declared that he could furnish no provisions, of which they began to be greatly in want; Colonel Monson was, therefore, compelled to pursue his march amidst nearly all the privation and suffering which can attend the movement of an army. On the 15th July the guns became so firmly embedded in the mud which formed the basis of the road by which they had to be transported, as to defy all the efforts made to extricate them; they were consequently spiked and abandoned. The march was then continued through a country completely under water. The Chumbulee rivulet was crossed, and on the 29th the whole of the corps was at Tonk Rampoor. On its progress several trifling conflicts took place, in all of which the character of the British troops was maintained.

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As soon as the situation of Colonel Monson at Mokundra had become known to the commander-in-chief, a reinforcement of two battalions of sepoy, with four six-pounders and two howitzers, and a body of Hindostanee cavalry, had been dispatched from Agra to his relief, as well as a supply of grain. This reinforcement joined Colonel Monson at Tonk Rampoor, where he remained for several days, as if

CHAP. XX. with the intention of making a stand. He, however,  
— finally resumed his retreat, but not until the enemy  
A. D. 1804. were close upon him. On the 22nd of August he  
arrived at the Banas river, which was so swollen  
as to render it impossible to cross. A halt was thus  
unavoidable, and opportunity was afforded for the  
assemblage of the whole force of the enemy in the  
neighbourhood of the detachment. On the 24th the  
river being fordable was crossed in the face of the  
enemy. A sharp action took place, in which a single  
battalion of native infantry not only resisted an attack  
of the enemy, but charged and drove them from several  
of their guns, which, however, they were unable  
to retain. So far from carrying off the enemy's guns,  
the British commander was unable to secure his  
own baggage, the whole of which was abandoned to  
facilitate the retreat of the corps to Kooshailgur,  
which he reached on the night of the 28th.

At Kooshailghur Colonel Monson found a party,  
consisting of six companies of sepoy, which he had  
sent forward under Captain Nicholl, with the treasure  
of the detachment, the day preceding the  
action at the Banas river. This party, on the night  
of its arrival, had been attacked by a body of troops  
belonging to Scindia, but succeeded in maintaining  
their post till the morning, when the whole of the  
detachment, with a company of native infantry previously  
stationed at Kooshailgur, entered the fort,  
having learned that it was the intention of Scindia's  
commander to levy a contribution on the town,  
though it belonged to the Rajah of Jeypore, an ally

of the British government. Here a formal demand was made by the Mahratta leader of the surrender of all the elephants, treasures, and arms of the detachment; on compliance with which, Captain Nicholl was graciously assured he should be permitted to depart without molestation, while refusal was to be visited by a cannonade. This was not an empty threat, for a battery of ten guns was opened on the fort; and a few hours afterwards a body of Scindia's infantry entered the town, from which position they were immediately driven by a party of sepoys, not exceeding, if it amounted to, one-sixth of the number of the enemy, led by Lieutenant Harriott. Captain Nicholl intended to follow up this success by storming the battery, but the Scindians prudently disappointed him by moving off the guns to their camp.

At Kooshailghur Colonel Monson's difficulties thickened. He had expected to find there five battalions, and twenty pieces of cannon belonging to the Rajah of Jeypore, but they had been withdrawn before his arrival. The whole of Holkar's cavalry were gathering and encamping around him; and at this moment, when the fidelity and bravery of every single man were of the utmost importance, he discovered a correspondence between some native commissioned officers and Holkar, having for its object the transfer of certain battalions to the enemy. The danger being known, measures of precaution were taken; but the greater part of two companies of infantry deserted, with about four hundred of the irregular horse.

CHAP. XX. Colonel Monson left Kooshailghur on the day after his arrival; and, having formed his detachment into an oblong square, resumed his march. The enemy followed, harassing them by repeated attempts to charge, which were met with exemplary coolness and spirit. At sunset, on the 28th of August, the detachment was at the Biana pass, where it was intended to halt for the night, the march having been continued from one o'clock in the morning, and the troops having been called upon not long before to repel a desperate charge from the enemy's cavalry. The reception given to the enemy deterred them from immediately renewing the attempt, but their guns arrived at the Biana pass simultaneously with the British force, and the halt of the latter was the signal for the commencement of a powerful cannonade. This compelled Colonel Monson to proceed; and from this period the order and regularity which had previously been maintained appears to have been lost. Separate portions of the detachment made their way, in their own manner, to Agra, and by the 31st all who escaped the enemy had arrived there.

The retreat of Colonel Monson must be placed among the most lamentable transactions which the history of British India presents to notice. The sufferings of so many brave men as were involved in the calamity, the loss of so many valuable lives as were unavoidably sacrificed to purchase the safety of the remainder, appeals strongly to those feelings of sympathy which are awakened when, ceasing to

regard an army as a whole—ceasing to view it as a vast machine framed to effect great objects, we contemplate its members as individual men, influenced by good and evil circumstances, like those for whom their swords are drawn, and on whom the history of an eventful campaign acts but as an exciting romance. The fate of those who fell, and of those who survived to undergo renewed trials and privations, was the more bitter, because, with regard to them, the conqueror's triumph secured not the conqueror's reward. In all their conflicts with the enemy the English were successful; but the ear of the dying soldier was not solaced by the shout of victory, which told him that the field had been won and would be held by his countrymen and comrades; nor could he who had escaped the dangers by which he had been surrounded exult in the reflection that the only remaining duty was to pursue those whom he had aided in discomfiting. When the enemy were repelled, the only hope afforded by success was that time might be gained for pursuing the movement which was to carry the victors further from the enemy—the only prospect before the soldier was a repetition of similar conflicts, under circumstances of equal or greater discouragement.

Such are the reflections naturally engendered by one view of this affecting passage in the history of our country's connection with India. Turning to the colder aspect in which the statesman must regard it, the effect is not less disheartening. The retreat of Colonel Monson's force before Holkar in-

CHAP. XX. — involved not merely the loss of so much territory, the occupation of which would have aided in bringing the freebooter to terms—not merely the loss of so much time, and the indefinite postponement of the object in view—not merely the useless expenditure of the resources of the state, by a great sacrifice of blood and treasure, unattended by any return—all these were evils, but none of them was the master evil. It was the moral effect of this great misfortune—it was the loss of a portion of national honour, and, consequently, of national strength—it was the fearful encouragement which it afforded to the hopes not only of Holkar but of every enemy of the British government throughout India, and the despondency and distrust likely to be generated in the minds of the native subjects of that government, and of its friends beyond the pale of its own dominion. Here, in a political view, were the chief grounds for regret. Every such check as that received by the British arms in this case takes something, for a time at least, from that confidence on the one side, and that dread on the other, which possess an inherent tendency to realize the anticipations to which they gave birth. However equally matched in all that constitutes natural strength, the combatant whose heart glows with the expectation of victory, and he whose spirit quails under the fear of defeat, meet, in truth, upon very unequal terms.

An inquiry into the sources of the disaster will tend to shew that it was not a misfortune resulting from causes which could not have been guarded

against; it will also evince that the blame attached to it extends to more than one person. When General Lake detached Colonel Monson, his orders were that the latter should remain at such a distance from the main army as might enable him to receive support from it: yet General Lake, not long afterwards, retired with his army to cantonments, leaving Colonel Monson without the power of obtaining that support which he had previously thought it necessary to preserve.

Colonel Monson, however, increased the danger by advancing beyond the position which he had been instructed to take. This was in the vicinity of the passes of Bhoondee and Lakery, in the chain of mountains to the southward of Tonk Rampoor. He thought that advantage would arise from advancing to Mokundra, which he represented as a place equally defensible. Subsequently he extended his advance even far beyond Mokundra, thus greatly adding to the distance between his detachment and the army which had receded from it. He did not, however, calculate on being attacked—the return of Holkar was a step for which the English commander was quite unprepared. He believed the freebooting chief to be destitute of the means of offering any serious annoyance, and this belief was shared by General Lake. The last-named officer, addressing the governor-general, says:—"At this period"—the period when, having resolved to leave Colonel Monson's detachment in the field, he withdrew his own army into cantonments—"At this period I was in-

CHAP. XX. — formed from all quarters that Holkar's pecuniary resources were reduced to the lowest ebb; that his army was filled with terror and dismay; and that his troops, who before had been mutinous and discontented, were now deserting from him in great numbers. These representations were rendered more probable from the consideration that a successful war is necessary to retain together an army, and to support the confidence of troops whose chief bond of union is plunder. I therefore gave them considerable credit, although I found it impossible to obtain accurate information, and was aware of the exaggeration which the natives of this country give to all their relations. The reduced state of the enemy's power and resources, and the great distance to which he had prosecuted his flight, appearing to me in a great measure to have released those states with which we were in alliance from all hazard of future depredations, and to have deprived Jeswunt Rao Holkar of all hopes of success in any future attempt to invade the British territories in Hindostan, I determined without further delay to withdraw the main army to their respective cantonments within the Company's provinces." Such was the source of the errors of both General Lake and Colonel Monson, and instances of similar delusions are not unfrequent. A large portion of the reverses which have been sustained by the British nation in the East are to be traced to an absurd confidence either in the good faith of an enemy, or in his weakness, or in his want of disposition to attack.

But while Colonel Monson did not entertain that degree of apprehension with regard to Holkar which the resources of that chief warranted, it is but just to remember that he did not anticipate that complete destitution of support which it was his fate to experience. He confided in the advance of Colonel Murray from Guzerat; and to the extraordinary conduct of that officer in falling back, the ruin which overtook Colonel Monson's corps may be attributed. Sent forward by the commander-in-chief to a distance at which no aid could be furnished within a reasonable period—led on to a still greater distance by his own ardent temperament and his reliance on the advance of Colonel Murray—Colonel Monson seems to have felt no alarm till Holkar's sudden change from retreat to advance roused him to even more than a just sense of his danger. From this moment he appears to have lost all confidence in himself, and to have possessed no settled plan of proceeding. His first impression was to engage the enemy; and whatever might have been the event, its effects could scarcely have been worse than those of the tamer course which he preferred, and in which he persevered till he reached Agra. He generally avoided the enemy when practicable, although when forced into action he was successful. Adverting to Holkar having been permitted to cross the Chumbul unmolested, General Lake says:—"Perhaps the omission should have been repaired by an attack under the most favourable circumstances that could afterwards be obtained. His numbers were cer-

CHAP. XX. tainly inferior to those of the enemy; but he had on his side discipline, approved valour, and the choice of position. A bold effort was likewise evidently necessary to extricate him from his situation, and to avoid the disgrace and misfortunes inseparable from a rapid retreat.\* A bolder man than Colonel Monson never drew a sword; and yet his retreat before Holkar was characterized by a degree of timidity and vacillation of which the military history of Great Britain presents few examples. He meditated a stand at Mokundra, but sudden alarm induced him to abandon his camp and quit that place with singular precipitation. At Tonk Rampoorra he lingered till the enemy was close on his rear, distracted, as it appears, between the orders of the commander-in-chief forbidding his further retreat and his own conviction that retreat was inevitable. The fatal detention at this place led to all the calamities that followed in rapid succession, till discipline gave way before them, and retreat became flight.†

\* Letter to Marquis Wellesley, July 1, 1805.

† Speaking of Colonel Monson at a later period, General Lake said:—"It is somewhat extraordinary that a man brave as a lion should have no judgment or reflection." Without taking the trouble of inquiring whether this proposition be sustained by general experience, General Lake might, by honest self-reflection alone, have ascertained the possibility of a man being "brave as a lion," though endowed but moderately with the intellectual powers which are necessary to the formation of a perfect general.

General Wellesley, in a letter to Colonel Wallace, 12th September, 1804 (see Wellington Despatches), makes some remarks with reference to Colonel Monson's retreat, which are the more valuable as they exhibit some of the principles, the observance of which has mainly contributed to the eminent success of

To erase the scandal brought on the British name by the unfortunate result of Colonel Monson's movement, every resource of the government was immediately employed. Measures were taken for the speedy equipment of several distinct armies, destined to act in different quarters, and to act offensively. The governor-general avowed his decided preference for such a plan, as compared with any plans merely defensive; and his judgment on this point entirely coincided with that of his distinguished brother.\*

the great writer. He says, "We have some important lessons from this campaign :

"First : we should never employ a corps on a service for which it is not fully equal.

"Secondly : against the Mahrattas in particular, but against all enemies, we should take care to be sure of plenty of provisions.

"Thirdly : experience has shewn us that British troops can never depend upon rajahs or any allies for their supplies. Our own officers must purchase them ; and if we should employ a native in such an important service, we ought to see the supplies before we expose our troops in the situation in which we may want them.

"Fourthly : when we have a fort which can support our operations, such as Rampoorra to the northward, or Ahmednuggur or Chandore in your quarter, we should immediately adopt effectual means to fill it with provisions and stores in case of need.

"Fifthly : when we cross a river likely to be full in the rains, we ought to have a post and boats upon it ; as I have upon all the rivers south of Poona, and as you have, I hope, upon the Beemah and the Godavery.

"In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of Monson's, they must be decided and quick ; and in all retreats it must be recollected that they are safe and easy in proportion to the number of attacks made by the retreating corps. But attention to the foregoing observations will, I hope, prevent a British corps from retreating."

\* General Wellesley, writing to General Stuart, on the 7th

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Among the first and most important measures of preparation was the establishment of an army in Hindostan, equipped for light movements, and of sufficient strength to encounter, with a prospect of success, the main body of Holkar's force. This army, it was proposed, should be commanded by General Lake, and joined by a body of irregular horse to be furnished by the allies. All reliance on merely defensive operations was to be abandoned. Holkar was to be pressed, if possible, to an action, and if the attempt should fail, to be pursued to the last extremity. The commander-in-chief accordingly marched on the 3rd of September from Cawnpore, with the whole of the European cavalry and infantry at that place, and arrived on the 22nd at Agra. There another portion of the intended army of Hindostan had been assembled, and was at this time encamped at Secundra, about six miles distant from Agra. The assembled force consisted of three regiments of European light dragoons, five regiments of native cavalry and the horse artillery, the King's 76th regiment of foot, the flank companies of the King's 22nd foot, ten battalions of native infantry, and the usual proportion of artillery.

Holkar had taken possession of Muttra, the British

May, 1804, said :—" If General Lake would make a good dash at Holkar, the war could not last a fortnight ; but if he should stand upon the defensive in Hindostan, it will last for a length of time." The same opinion was expressed in a letter to Major Malcolm. Both letters will be found in the Wellington Despatches. The determination of General Lake to act on the defensive destroyed all probability of the war being a short one.

force there having abandoned it on the 3rd September, leaving behind them a large quantity of grain and baggage, which, together with the town, fell into the hands of the enemy. On the approach of the British army, which marched from Secundra on the 1st of October, Holkar drew off to the north-west, along the bank of the Jumna. Muttra was re-occupied by a force under Colonel Don, and three successive attempts were made by the commander-in-chief, on the 2nd, 7th, and 10th of October, to bring the enemy's cavalry to action, but in vain. In the meantime his infantry and guns had been moving in the direction of Delhi, and on the 8th of October they arrived before that city.

The British resident, Colonel Ochterlony, had anticipated the visit, and provided, as far as lay in his power, for the consequences, by calling in various portions of troops, regular and irregular, and making other preparations for the defence of the city. To place it in a defensible state was, however, no easy task. The city is of great extent; it was unprotected, except by a wall badly constructed, in many places without a parapet, and so far from being capable of resisting the guns of the enemy, unable to bear the shock of those that might be discharged in its defence. Redoubts were constructed at two of the gates, and some partial repairs of the old defences performed. But, after all had been effected, the means of resistance were contemptible; while a great part of the troops within the city were of such a description that no

CHAP. XX. — reliance could be placed either upon their fidelity or their courage, and the general population was of the worst character.

Holkar's army amounted to about seventy thousand men. The force which was to defend Delhi against this overwhelming host consisted of two battalions of native infantry and four companies of another, but a large proportion of these were obliged to be devoted to the protection of the palace and person of the Emperor. Besides the regular troops, there were about two corps of irregular horse and the same number of irregular infantry, and a corps of matchlock-men. But all the irregular horse deserted on the approach of Holkar—some of them to join him—and the matchlock-men broke into mutiny. The mutiny was subdued by severe punishment, but most of the corps subsequently deserted.

The British force was at this time encamped under the walls; they were soon afterwards attacked and driven into the town. The enemy then brought up a hundred and thirty guns and commenced a tremendous cannonade.

The officer in command of the garrison was Lieutenant Colonel Burn, who, with his corps, had been called in from Saharunpore, and a soldier better calculated to contend with the difficulties of his situation could not have been found. Amidst all the disheartening circumstances of that situation was one which yet remains to be noticed. The commander-in-chief, under the belief that it was impos-

sible for so small a force to defend both the city and the person of the Emperor, had ordered that the former should be abandoned and that the exertions of the garrison should be devoted solely to the defence of the citadel. The political resident forwarded this order to Colonel Burn, with instructions to act upon it. He subsequently went in person to require compliance; but in the meantime Colonel Burn, in addition to the suggestions of his own excellent judgment and noble spirit, had fortified himself with the opinion of some of his officers in whom he placed confidence, and had determined not to abandon the city. He was reminded of the peril which he incurred; but he was prepared to encounter it.

The cannonade commenced by Holkar was continued, without intermission, day and night. It was evident that a practicable breach would soon be effected, and Colonel Burn resolved to interrupt the progress of the besiegers by a sortie. This was made on the evening of the 10th of October, when a party, consisting of two hundred men of the battalion under Colonel Burn, and one hundred and fifty irregulars commanded by Lieutenant Rose, proceeded to storm the enemy's battery. They succeeded with little difficulty in gaining possession of it, spiked the guns, and retreated with small loss.

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On the 13th there appeared indications of an approaching attack of a formidable character; unusual vigilance was therefore exercised by the garrison, and supporting parties were directed to be in readiness. The expectation of a serious attack was not

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vain. At daybreak on the 14th the enemy's guns opened in every direction, and, under cover of the cannonade, a large body of infantry, with ladders, made an assault on the Lahore gate. This was the real object of attack, but, to divert the attention of the besieged, guns were pointed against the Ajmeer gate, and a British officer was there mortally wounded. The attack on the Lahore gate, which the enemy confidently expected to carry, signally failed. The assailants were driven back in confusion, and with considerable loss, leaving behind them the ladders by which they were to have gained entrance. This defeat seems to have completely dispirited the enemy. In the evening a show was made of drawing some guns towards the Cashmere gate, which subjected the garrison to the labour of making some preparations for defence there; but none were needed. The disappointed foe retired in the night; and at daybreak all that was visible of the besiegers of Delhi was the rear-guard of their cavalry, at a considerable distance. The successful defence of a place of no strength, with a force numerically insufficient to afford the requisite reliefs, was admirably calculated to revive impressions of respect for the British arms, and to dissipate the unfavourable feelings engendered by the unfortunate retreat of Colonel Monson. The noble determination evinced at this critical period by Colonel Burn was invaluable to his country; and justly did the political resident estimate the effects of the gallant exertions made by that officer and his troops. "The fatigue,"

said he, “suffered by both officers and men could be exceeded by nothing but the cheerfulness and patience with which it was endured; and it cannot but reflect the greatest honour on the discipline, courage, and fortitude of British troops, in the eyes of all Hindostan, to observe, that with a small force they sustained a siege of nine days, repelled an assault, and defended a city ten miles in circumference, and which had ever before been given up at the first appearance of an enemy at its gates.” This eulogy from one who had recommended a different course requires neither addition nor comment. What might have followed had Colonel Burn acquiesced in the views of the commander-in-chief and the resident, and had the loss of Delhi been added to previous disasters, it is fearful to imagine.\*

Foiled in his attempt upon Delhi, Holkar crossed the Jumna at the ford of Panniput, threatening to desolate the British territories in the Doab with fire and sword. General Lake arrived at Delhi on the 18th of October. He did not, however, enter on the pursuit of the enemy till the 31st, although his presence at Delhi could answer no purpose. The delay appears to have been partly occasioned by a deficiency of provisions and beasts of draft. The news of Holkar’s irruption into the British provinces in the Doab roused him to exertion; and detaching

\* Some of the details of the account of the siege of Delhi are derived from the private communications of a distinguished officer then on the staff of Colonel Burn, and now holding high rank in the Indian army.

CHAP. XX. a force under General Frazer, the second in command, in search of Holkar's infantry and guns, General Lake resolved to proceed in person with the whole of the European dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry, the horse artillery, and the reserve of the army, consisting of two companies of European and three battalions of native infantry, in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry in the Doab. The first service which this force was called upon to perform was to relieve the gallant commander of the garrison of Delhi and his battalion. After the departure of the besiegers, Colonel Burn had quitted Delhi to proceed to his station at Saharunpore, from which he had been called by Colonel Ochterlony, to defend the imperial capital. The enemy's horse fell in with his party near Candlah, and completely surrounded them; but Colonel Burn, clearing a road with grape-shot, made good his way to Shamlee, where, getting into a small mud fort, he prepared for a desperate defence. The fort was about a hundred yards square. The party, ill supplied with provisions, were unable to obtain any from the adjacent town of Shamlee, the inhabitants of which place manifested a strong feeling of hostility, and joined Holkar's dismounted horsemen in firing from the town wall with matchlocks on those who had taken refuge in the fort. About a hundred British sepoys thus lost their lives. In this extremity the Mahometan part of Captain Burn's force were subsisted by sacrificing the draft bullocks to the necessity of providing food. The Hindoos, precluded by

their prejudices from this mode of sustaining life, had been without food for some time, when the approach of General Lake relieved them from the presence of the enemy. Holkar's troops did not think fit to wait the arrival of the British commander-in-chief, nor even to take any steps towards ascertaining the extent and nature of his force. No sooner were the clouds of dust which announced the movement of the English column perceptible than the enemy disappeared.

A few days after General Lake had left Delhi the division under General Frazer marched in pursuit of Holkar's infantry and guns. On the 12th of November he arrived at Goburdun, where from the heights the enemy were visible, encamped between a deep tank and an extensive morass—their right covered by a fortified village, and their left extending to the fort of Deeg. No time was lost in preparing for attacking them. At three o'clock in the morning of the 13th four battalions of sepoy and two European regiments marched for the purpose. A detour of considerable extent was necessary to avoid the morass, but at daybreak the British column arrived at the fortified village, situate on a hill which covered the enemy's right; the troops immediately wheeled, the King's 76th regiment and two of the battalions forming a first line, and the remainder a second. The 76th led the way, with its wonted alacrity and determination, by taking possession of the village; which was no sooner accomplished than, running down the hill, they

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CHAP. XX. charged and carried the first range of the enemy's guns, under a tremendous shower of round, grape, and chain shot. The second line had now reached the village, and, on discovering the 76th far in advance) surrounded by the enemy, rapidly pushed forward to their support—the Company's first European regiment being foremost, and the two sepoy battalions following. The two remaining battalions were employed, under Major Hammond, in watching the enemy's brigades and guns near the morass, and keeping them in check. When the first range of guns had been carried, the victors were opposed by a most destructive fire from the second range; and General Frazer losing a leg by a cannon-shot, the command devolved upon Colonel Monson. Nothing daunted by the unhappy accident which had befallen their commander, the British troops advanced, captured the second range of guns, and then continued to charge battery after battery for a space of two miles, when, being close under the walls of Deeg, they were fired upon from the fort. While thus pursuing their successes, the first range of guns had been retaken by a body of the enemy's horse, and turned against the English. But the advantage was enjoyed for a very short time. Captain Norford, with only twenty-eight men, retrieved the guns, the life of the gallant officer being unhappily sacrificed in the exploit.

The troops who had been engaged in carrying the batteries, having pursued their success as far as was practicable towards Deeg, returned to attack

the body which, during their advance, had been kept in check by the battalions under Major Hammond. That officer, with the aid of three six-pounders, had steadily maintained his position in the face of a heavy fire from artillery far superior to his own. Colonel Monson, having ordered up several more six-pounders, moved round under cover of their fire upon the left flank of the enemy, who forthwith made a precipitate retreat into the morass, where great numbers perished. Two battalions of sepoy had been left with the baggage, and some native cavalry had been employed in watching the enemy's horse. These now came up to assist in securing the guns, and removing the wounded; and the British encamped on the field which they had so gallantly won.

The loss of the enemy, on the field and in the morass, has been estimated at nearly two thousand, and eighty-seven pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the English, including some which Colonel Monson had lost on his retreat. The victory was brilliant and complete, but it was not purchased without heavy loss. The English return of killed and wounded amounted to upwards of six hundred and forty, and among them was the brave officer who had planned and commanded the attack: the wound of General Frazer proved mortal, and he survived the victory only a few days.

Holkar was destined soon to sustain another reverse. Himself and his cavalry had been for several days flying with great rapidity before General Lake,

CHAP. XX. pursued with even greater rapidity by that commander. The distance between them kept gradually  
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A. D. 1804. diminishing until, on the 17th of November, after a night march, the head of the British column reached the skirts of the freebooter's camp. The horses were at picket, and beside them lay their riders, wrapt in their blankets, sleeping. For many days the English had been subjected to most harassing marches; and within the twenty-four hours immediately preceding their arrival at Holkar's camp they had marched fifty-eight miles. Their fatigues were, however, forgotten, for the enemy whom they had so perseveringly pursued was now before them; and on the preceding evening fresh vigour had been given to their hopes by the receipt of the news of the glorious battle of Deeg. The first intimation which the slumbering camp of Holkar received of the presence of the English was a discharge of grape from their horse artillery. "It awakened some," says Major Thorn; "but sealed many in an everlasting sleep."\* Before the surprise caused by this fearful warning could be shaken off, the British cavalry dashed into the camp at full gallop, and charging in all directions, the place which had so lately been the seat of repose and silence resounded with the clash of swords, the shouts of an excited soldiery, and the groans of the dying.

Holkar was slow to believe that the disturbance in his camp could be occasioned by General Lake, whom he supposed to be at a considerable distance.

\* Narrative, page 390.

When convinced of it, instead of taking any measures for the safety of his army, he mounted his horse, and, with the troops immediately about him, rode off at full speed. The fate of an army thus abandoned need scarcely be related. Dispersing in every direction, some mounted, others on foot, their horses being too much jaded to carry them, they were followed and cut down in vast numbers so long as the British were able to continue the pursuit, which extended for about ten miles. The loss of the enemy in killed was computed at three thousand, but this formed but a small portion of the amount by which Holkar's army was weakened. By the number of desertions which followed—by the dropping off of masses of fugitives, who never rejoined the ranks of their master, it was believed that his cavalry force had been diminished to the extent of one-half. On the part of the English, only two men were killed and about twenty wounded.

Holkar fled across the Jumna, followed by General Lake, who, on the 28th November, arrived at Muttra. Here he found the division under Colonel Monson, which had retired to this place to deposit the wounded at the battle of Deeg, and to disencumber itself of the vast quantity of ordnance which formed part of the spoil in that memorable action. The guns had been forwarded to Agra, and Colonel Monson, it is stated, intended to fall back beyond Muttra but for the arrival of the commander-in-chief. There, however, after a separation of a month, the two branches of the army met under circumstances which

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CHAP. XX. gave just ground for mutual congratulations. The one had routed Holkar's infantry and divested him of most of his ordnance: the other had marched about five hundred miles, not a step of which had been taken in vain—had struck a fatal blow at the force on which Holkar mainly depended, and was now ready to co-operate in any service that might tend to conduct the war to a satisfactory conclusion.

The first duty to which they were called was to punish the perfidy of the Rajah of Bhurtpore. That prince, it will be recollected, had been among the earliest of the Mahratta tributaries to seek the friendship of the British government after the first brilliant successes of General Lake, and great reliance seems to have been placed upon his fidelity. He had furnished a body of horse to act with the British army, and which was thus employed till the conclusion of the campaign. About the period of Colonel Monson's retreat some circumstances occurred to excite suspicion of the Rajah's sincerity; and, in consequence of information which reached the commander-in-chief, a person named Nerungin Lall was seized in the town of Muttra, who, on examination, confessed that he had been employed for a considerable time in carrying on communications between Holkar on the one hand, and, on the other, several chiefs and zemindars, including the Rajah of Bhurtpore. Colonel Monson also forwarded from Tonk Rampoorra some intercepted letters, addressed to Holkar by the Rajah of Bhurtpore, his eldest son, his confidential servants, and Nerungin Lall, which

fully corroborated the testimony of the last-named person. CHAP. XX.

These discoveries, however, were not deemed sufficient to warrant an immediate dissolution of the relations of amity which apparently subsisted between the British government and the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and which the former was desirous of preserving. General Lake was instructed to remonstrate, and to call upon the Rajah to adhere to his engagements. But of this result being produced by the representations of the commander-in-chief there appeared little hope. It was generally believed that Holkar had been encouraged to advance to the Jumna principally by the promises of the Rajah of Bhurtpore; it was supposed that the Rajah had assisted him with money—it was certain that he had supplied Holkar's army with provisions, had protected his baggage and bazaars, and, through the means of an agent dispatched to the British camp for the ostensible purpose of conferring with the commander-in-chief respecting the junction of the allied forces, had endeavoured to excite disaffection within the British possessions, and to prevail on the zemindars in the Doab to intercept the supplies forwarding to the English army. At the battle of Deeg all reserve was thrown aside; the Rajah's cavalry openly joined that of Holkar, and the English were fired upon from the walls of Deeg, which belonged to the Rajah and was garrisoned by his troops. It could be no longer a question whether the Rajah was to be treated as a friend or

CHAP. XX. — an enemy, and it was resolved to lay siege to Deeg as soon as a battering train could be procured from Agra.

Deeg was defended by a strong mud wall, with bastions, and a deep ditch passing entirely round, excepting at an angle, where stood a high rocky mount, almost a fortress in itself, having an area of about fifty yards square, and presenting four commanding bastions at the four cardinal points. About a mile from this place, and nearly in the centre of the town, was the citadel, strongly built, in good preservation, and well stored with guns. The ramparts were high and thick, furnished with bastions, and surrounded by a deep ditch faced with masonry. Massive gateways and towers of considerable height defended the near and distant approaches.\*

A. D. 1804. On the 13th of December, the battering train having arrived, General Lake took up the position before Deeg which he meant to occupy during the siege. It being previously occupied by the enemy, it was necessary to dislodge them; but this service was performed without difficulty, and without the occurrence of any event calling for notice. At night the pioneers broke ground, and on the evening of the 16th of December a breaching battery was completed within seven hundred and fifty yards of a high outwork at the angle of the town intended to be attacked. On the next morning its fire opened from six eighteen-pounders, four twelve-pounders, and four mortars; but the effect being very small,

\* This description of Deeg is given by Major Thorn.

a battery of three eighteen-pounders was erected during the night of the 20th to the left of the besieging army, and nearer to the enemy's works than that previously erected. By these means a practicable breach was effected by the 23rd, and the commander-in-chief determined to storm on that night. The force to whom this service was assigned was divided into three columns. The centre column, led by Colonel Macrae, who had the command of the whole, composed the storming party. The other columns, commanded respectively by Captain Kelly and Major Ratcliffe, were to make two separate attacks to the right and left of the principal point. The different parties moved so as to reach the places selected for attack soon after twelve, and all succeeded. The storming party passed through a galling fire of cannon and musketry to the breach, and soon gained possession of the works. The two remaining columns, diverging outwards, attacked the enemy under the walls, where they had erected some batteries which those of the English had been unable to touch; these were carried at the point of the bayonet. The British were now in possession of the town and of the batteries without it. Preparations were made for assailing the inner fort, but on the night of the 24th it was evacuated. A hundred guns were captured at Deeg, with a considerable quantity of ammunition and military stores. The year 1804 thus closed in Hindostan with a signal triumph to the British cause.

## CHAP. XX.

Before pursuing further its history in that quarter, it will be proper to advert to the operations carried on against Holkar in the south. In June, General Wellesley, being about to proceed to Bengal on public service, resigned the political and military powers which he exercised in the Deccan; but before withdrawing from the scene where he had won so much renown, he suggested to the residents at Poona and Hyderabad a plan of operations to be carried on against Chandore, and the other provinces of Holkar and his partizans in the Deccan, at the proper season. The troops for this service were to consist of detachments from the subsidiary forces serving with the Peishwa and the Nizam, with the contingents to be furnished respectively by those two powers. A battering train had been prepared at Poona, which, as soon as the weather should permit, was to be sent to Aurungabad, whither Lieutenant Colonel Haliburton, who commanded the portion of the Hyderabad subsidiary force destined for this service, was to proceed with his troops as soon as he was advised of the movement of the train. On its becoming known at Poona that Colonel Haliburton had commenced his march, Colonel Wallace was to move with the detachment from the Peishwa's subsidiary force, and the whole were to join in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad. In conformity with his usual prudential habits, General Wellesley made admirable arrangements for securing supplies of money and provisions for the use of the detachments. The exhausted state of the country through

which Colonel Haliburton had to march, rendered it necessary that large convoys of grain should be advanced to him from Hyderabad; and it being understood that on their receipt that officer would immediately commence his march, Colonel Wallace moved from Poona, crossed the Godavery about the middle of September, and at the end of that month was joined by Colonel Haliburton; the advance of both having been greatly impeded by the weather. Early in October the Peishwa's contingent arrived. On the 8th of that month, Colonel Wallace detached a party to take possession of a small fort belonging to Holkar, called Lasselgong, situated about twelve miles from Chandore. They succeeded in occupying the pettah, but the attempt to storm the fort failed. The strength of the detachment was increased, and on a second attempt the fort was carried, though not without a loss which, with reference to the object, must be considered severe.

A. D. 1804.

The town of Chandore was occupied by Colonel Wallace without opposition. Preparations were made for attacking the fort, and a battery was nearly ready to open, when an offer was made to surrender on terms which Colonel Wallace accepted. The conditions were, the safety of private property and permission to the garrison to depart wherever they pleased. A number of small forts yielded within a few days after the surrender of Chandore, and Colonel Wallace, marching from that place on the 17th of October, arrived before Galna on the 21st, and immediately took possession of the pettah.

CHAP. XX. Batteries were formed for the reduction of the fort, and after their fire had effected two practicable breaches, the garrison surrendered on the same conditions which had been granted at Chandore. The command of these forts deprived Holkar of all his possessions to the southward of the Taptee; and, after making the necessary arrangements for their defence and administration, Colonel Wallace proceeded to take up a position at Borenaire, from which he might be able to move in any direction where the assistance of his detachment might be required.\*

\* Colonel Wallace was specially recommended to this service by General Wellesley, whose judgment in selecting fitting persons to work out his profoundly organized plans is not less striking than the wisdom by which those plans are characterized. The following anecdote of Colonel Wallace is related by Colonel Gurwood, the editor of the Wellington Despatches: "A characteristic trait of this officer is recollected by those who served with the army in the Deccan. At the siege of Gawilghur he had been charged with the execution of certain details necessary to the capture of that place. A heavy gun had been directed to be conveyed by night to an important point, and its transportation over the most rugged mountains so long baffled all endeavours, that the artillery officer, in despair, reported the accomplishment of it to be impossible. '*Impossible, Sir!*' exclaimed Colonel Wallace, who had all his life maintained the most rigid adherence to obedience—'*Impossible! Let us see.*' He then called for a light, pulled the instructions from his pocket, and, having read them, said, '*Oh, no! not impossible; the order is positive.*' The result evinced the efficacy of the order, and also afforded another proof that implicit obedience when accompanied by devoted zeal will in general overcome every difficulty. The expression attributed to Napoleon on a similar occasion was more poetical, '*Monsieur! faire l'impossible, c'est Français!*' This was more chivalrous, and no doubt particularly exciting

The advance of Colonel Murray, with the force under his command, towards Oujein—his subsequent retreat and resumed advance—have already been noticed in narrating the retreat of Colonel Monson. Colonel Murray arrived at Oujein without encountering any opposition, and took possession of the whole of Holkar's territories in that quarter, including the chieftain's capital, Indore. On the 18th of October he advanced from Oujein, and on the 11th of November arrived at Mundasere, having occupied the pergunnahs of Burrowda and Jowra, through which he had directed his march; afterwards advancing from Mundasere, he took possession of various forts of greater or less importance, and by these operations completed the conquest of the whole of Holkar's possessions west of the Chumbul. Continuing to advance, he arrived at the Mokundra pass on the 30th of November, and at Shahabad, about forty miles west of Narwar, on the 25th of December, where he resigned his command to Major General Jones, who had arrived from Bombay to assume it. A.D. 1801.

In Cuttack some annoyances, created by the Rajah of Khoordah and the zemindar of Kunka, were suppressed by a force under Colonel Harcourt. After some minor successes the pettah and fort of Khoordah were carried with great gallantry, by a detachment under Major Fletcher of the Madras

when addressed to a Frenchman; but the expression of Colonel Wallace had its source in the higher and more sober military feeling of duty, that **WHAT IS ORDERED MUST BE EXECUTED.**

CHAP. XX. — European regiment. The Kunka chief, alarmed by the rapid annihilation of the power of the Rajah of Khoordah, read in his fate the necessity of prompt submission to the British authority.

A. D. 1805. The proceedings of General Lake subsequently to the fall of Deeg now call for notice. A few days after that event he broke up his camp, with the highest anticipations of future success, and marched to Muttra, where he was joined by Major General Dowdswell, with the 75th regiment and a supply of stores. On the 1st of January, 1805, the army thus reinforced moved towards the capital of the Rajah of Bhurtpore, which was to be the next object of attack; on the 2nd it took up its position before the place, and on the 3rd preparations for the siege were commenced. A grove, or garden, considerably in advance of the camp was occupied. On the 5th a breaching battery for six eighteen-pounders was commenced; on the 7th it opened its fire. Another battery of four eight-inch and four five-and-a-half-inch mortars being completed by noon on that day, commenced throwing shells into the town. Cannonading on both sides continued with little interruption till the afternoon of the 9th, when the breach in the wall being reported practicable, it was resolved on that evening to attempt to storm.

About seven o'clock the party destined for the duty moved in three columns. Lieutenant Colonel Ryan, with one hundred and fifty of the Company's Europeans and a battalion of sepoy, was ordered to attempt a gateway to the left of the principal battery.

Major Hawkes, with two companies of the 75th regiment and another battalion of sepoy, was to carry the advanced guns of the enemy on the right of the battery. Both columns were to endeavour to make their way into the town with the fugitives; but if that were impracticable, they were to turn and support the centre column in endeavouring to get in at the breach. That column, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Maitland, consisted of the flank companies of the King's 22nd, 75th, and 76th regiments, and those of the Company's European regiment, amounting in the whole to about five hundred men, with a battalion of sepoy. Colonel Maitland's orders were to take the enemy by surprise, but in this he altogether failed. The ground being broken by swamps and pools, the orderly advance of the party was greatly checked; many lost their way, and men belonging to one column followed another. It is represented that, to avoid the fire from the ramparts, Colonel Maitland led his men so much to the left as to encroach upon Colonel Ryan's line of march, and that some altercation took place between these two officers as to the relative situation of the breach and trenches; that Colonel Maitland, then marching to the right, found himself at the entrance of the trenches, when he resolved to direct the head of his column once more to the left, and in that manner to proceed across the plain towards the breach. Long before this period all was confusion. The enemy received the storming-party with a heavy fire of musketry and of grape from three guns in

CHAP. XX. the flank of a circular bastion next to the breach : nevertheless, some of the men, headed by their officers, succeeded in getting across the ditch, the water in which was breast-high, and a few ascended the breach to within a short distance of the top ; but their number was too small to admit of their attempting to storm the enemy's guns. In the meantime Major Hawkes, with the right column, had succeeded in driving the enemy from their advanced guns, and, after spiking them, was on his return to support the centre ; while Colonel Ryan, with the left, had compelled the enemy to quit their post in that direction, but was prevented by the intervention of a deep drain from pursuing his success. Colonel Maitland, whatever might have been his errors or misfortunes, nobly supported the character of the British soldier, and never relaxed in his exertions to bring his men forward till he fell mortally wounded. The greater part of the troops either stopped or went back to the battery as soon as they got to the water. The few devoted men who had ascended the breach, being unsupported, were compelled to retire ; and this ill-judged and unfortunate attempt against Bhurtpore ended in exposing the British arms to the contempt of the enemy. The loss of the English was heavy, and among the killed and wounded was an unusual proportion of officers.

On the day succeeding this disastrous failure the enemy began to repair the breach through which the English had hoped to pass to conquest. The next effort against the place it was resolved should

be directed towards a part of the wall a little to the right of the former point of attack. Batteries were accordingly erected, and two twenty-four-pounders, ten eighteen-pounders, seven twelve-pounders, and eight mortars, opened a destructive fire on the 16th of January. Part of the rampart of the curtain was beaten down, but the next morning the breach was found stockaded; the firing being continued, the piles gave way, and a hole was made completely through the work; but on the 18th the breach was again stockaded. On that day the British army was reinforced by the arrival of Major-General Smith with three battalions of sepoy and some convalescent Europeans, with a few field-pieces. The batteries continued their fire until the 21st, when a breach, reported practicable, had been made; and the enemy, fearful that their guns should be dismounted, withdrew them behind the parapets, thus keeping them in reserve to be employed against those who might be engaged in a future attempt to storm. On the preceding night the English had been compelled to remove from the batteries the two twenty-four-pounders, in consequence of the whole of the shot being expended, and to supply the deficiency by two four-and-a-half-inch howitzers. To add to the difficulties of the besiegers, Ameer Khan had been invited by the Rajah of Bhurtpore to march to his assistance, and the invitation, being accompanied by several lacs of rupees, had been accepted.

A. D. 1805.

Before making a second attempt to cross the

CHAP. XX. ditch it was deemed advisable to gain some knowledge of its breadth and depth at the place where a passage was to be sought. The duty of making the requisite observation was committed to a havildar and two privates of the native cavalry, who reported that the ditch was not very broad, nor did it appear very deep, and that the breach was easy of ascent. Upon this vague statement, the result of an inspection made under circumstances which almost precluded the possibility of any approach to accuracy,\* it was resolved once more to risk an attempt to storm. Noon, A. D. 1805. on the 21st of January, was the time fixed on for the assault. The troops by whom it was to be made

\* Major Thorn appears to have viewed with much satisfaction this attempt to gain some imperfect knowledge of the ditch. The following is his account of it :—"It was requisite to have that part of the ditch opposite the breach inspected, which dangerous service was undertaken and carried into effect by three of our troopers, a havildar and two privates belonging to the third regiment of native cavalry. These enterprising men, having disguised themselves in the dress of the country, sallied out on their horses, about three o'clock in the afternoon, from the neighbourhood of our trenches, and were instantly pursued as deserters by a party of sepoy firing blank cartridges after them. On their arrival at the brink of the ditch, the two troopers' horses fell, and while the men were extricating themselves, the havildar called to the people on the walls, and entreated to be shewn the way into the city, that they might escape from the banchut feringhees, a reproachful term in India for Europeans. This had its effect; and the enemy, without suspecting the stratagem, readily pointed out the way to one of the gates, which happening to be in the very direction required, the havildar, as soon as his men were mounted, rode along the side of the ditch, till having passed the breach and made the necessary observations, the whole galloped back again full speed towards our trenches."—Narrative, pp. 421, 422.

were brought into the trenches before daylight, and the interval was to be employed in destroying the impediments with which the enemy, in the course of the night, might have encumbered the breach. This, however, occupied a period somewhat longer than had been anticipated. At break of day the breach was perceived to be again stockaded, and it was not until three o'clock in the afternoon that it was cleared. The troops then moved out of the trenches, and advanced towards the ditch. Here it was for the first time discovered that, by damming up the water at certain points, a sheet of great depth and breadth had been accumulated in front of the breach. A portable bridge had been constructed for the purpose of crossing the ditch, but it was too short to be of any use; a scaling-ladder was brought to lengthen it, but this got entangled with the bridge, and, instead of connecting it with the escarp, fell over on one side, carrying with it the bridge, from which it could not be disengaged. No systematic attempt was therefore made to pass the storming party over the ditch; but Lieutenant Morris, of the Company's European regiment, and several men, gallantly swam across and ascended the breach. Lieutenant Morris got on the rampart, and there received a severe wound in the leg; in swimming back, when the attempt to storm had been abandoned, he was again wounded in the neck. The retreat commenced in great confusion; but another column of the British force making its appearance from a jungle, round which it had been

CHAP. XX. — moving with a view to an attack upon a different point, the retiring party thereupon rallied. The meditated attack of the advancing column, however, being found impracticable, the whole fell back, leaving to the enemy the bridge and scaling-ladders, and, which was far worse, a large number of wounded. Throughout the advance of the British force, during the delay at the bridge (which occupied at least half an hour), and on the retreat, the enemy kept up a destructive fire of grape, round shot, and musketry. The effect was attested by a melancholy return of eighteen officers and five hundred men killed and wounded. During the attack the British cavalry were engaged in keeping off Holkar and Ameer Khan, a task readily effected by the gallopper guns. About fifty of the enemy were killed.

On the day after these unfortunate attempts a detachment under Captain Welsh was dispatched to bring in a convoy of provisions on its way from Muttra. On returning with its charge it was attacked by Ameer Khan with a vast body of his predatory horse. Captain Welsh took possession of a village on a lofty site, and succeeded in keeping off the assailants till the arrival of a party of cavalry under Colonel Need, who had been dispatched on the sound of the firing being heard at the British camp. The British sepoy, on perceiving the advance of the reinforcement, raised a loud shout of exultation, and, rushing to the enemy's guns, carried them at the point of the bayonet just at the moment

when the cavalry arrived: the latter dashing in, completed the victory. The commander-in-chief, with the remainder of his mounted force, followed Captain Need, but found that nothing was left for them to perform. Four guns and nearly forty stand of colours, with Ameer Khan's palanquin, fell into the hands of the victors; but, on the other hand, they lost a great portion of the convoy which they were escorting, and of which the army was greatly in want. Their necessity was supplied by dispatching Colonel Don with a detachment to bring an immense convoy from Agra, an object which was successfully effected; the attempts of the enemy to intercept this supply being rendered vain by the judicious arrangements made for its safety. Soon after this, Ameer Khan, becoming dissatisfied with his associates, Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpore, departed into Rohilcund, followed by a British detachment under General Smith, which, after pursuing him for several hundred miles and compelling him to repass the Ganges, returned to the British camp before Bhurtpore. During their absence the position of the camp had been shifted, a measure absolutely necessary to the health of its occupants, and which moreover was called for by a change of purpose as to the future point of attack. The army had also been strengthened by the arrival of the division under General Jones, originally commanded by Colonel Murray, and further attempts had been made for the reduction of Bhurtpore. Batteries had been erected and brought into operation on a

CHAP. XX. — new point, and the state of the breach was deemed to warrant a third attempt to storm. The 20th February was appointed for the purpose, and the storming party was ordered to the trenches at an early hour, to be in readiness for attack as soon as the batteries should have beaten down the defences and stockades which might have been raised in the night. At break of day the enemy made a sally on the British trenches, and for a time appear to have retained a decided advantage. They were at length driven back; but the conflict seems to have lasted for several hours, and the English troops, fatigued by their exertions, and dispirited by the long resistance opposed to them, cannot be believed to have been in the best condition for the duty of assaulting a strong fortress from which they had been twice repulsed.

A column under Colonel Don, composed partly of Europeans and partly of sepoy, was to advance to storm; a second column, similarly composed, under Captain Grant, was to carry the enemy's trenches and guns outside the town; and a third, composed in like manner of European and native troops, under Lieutenant Colonel Taylor, was to attack a gate called Beem Nurram gate, which was reported to be easily accessible. Captain Grant, with the second column, carried the intrenchments and batteries against which his efforts were directed, and pursuing the fugitives to the walls of the town, nearly succeeded in obtaining entrance, the enemy not being able to close the gate till the head of the

column was close upon it. Eleven guns were taken, all of which were safely brought into camp. The third column was less fortunate. Having lost its scaling-ladders, and one of its guns being dismounted by a shot from the town, the attempt on the gate was deemed impracticable, and the column retired. CHAP. XX.

The movement of Captain Grant's column was to be the signal for the advance of that of Colonel Don to storm. The Europeans forming the head of the column were accordingly ordered to advance, and the native infantry to follow. Fifty men carrying fascines were to precede the former, who, after throwing the fascines into the ditch, were to wheel outwards and keep up a fire of musketry on the breach while the rest of the party advanced to the assault. But a hesitation occurred: the assailants were exposed to an enfilading fire—an apprehension prevailed that the enemy during their occupation of the extremity of the trench had established a mine—the effect of these discouraging circumstances was aided by the sight of the wounded in the conflict of the morning lying around, and the groans drawn forth by their sufferings; and Colonel Don strove in vain to counteract the impressions thus created. The Europeans in front would not move. A better spirit was manifested by the remains of the flankers of the King's 22nd regiment and by the 12th native infantry. These followed their gallant commander, and two six-pounders were run out upon the plain to keep up a fire on the walls

CHAP. XX. and batteries while the troops attempted an assault. The ditch was impassable at the breach from the depth of the water. The storming party, therefore, proceeded to another part, where the water was shallow, and where a ragged bastion seemed to offer the means of climbing. Having passed the ditch, several succeeded in scrambling up, and the colours of the 12th regiment of native infantry were planted on the top of the bastion; but the ascent was so difficult, that sufficient numbers could not be got up to support each other and render effectual the advantage that had been gained. Those who reached the summit, small as was their number, were ready to persist in the endeavour to maintain it at any hazard; but Colonel Don, aware of the hopelessness of their exertions, recalled the whole party. Soon after the assault the enemy sprang several mines in the breach and counterscarp, but there being no assailants near these points, the explosions were harmless, except to those by whom they were caused, in adding to the damage which the English batteries had inflicted on the works. The loss of the British army on this disastrous day amounted to eight hundred and ninety-four killed and wounded.

On the morrow the commander-in-chief appeared on parade, and addressed in appropriate terms the troops whose unhappy defection on the preceding day had brought dishonour on the service to which they belonged. The effect was, that on those who chose to volunteer for another assault being required to

step out, the whole answered to the call. The assault, it was determined, should take place on that day, and about four o'clock the troops moved to the attack. The party was commanded by Colonel Monson. It advanced with perfect regularity to the bastion on which the colours of the 12th native infantry had on the previous day been planted. A vast gap had been made in the lower part of it, which afforded shelter to those who could avail themselves of its protection, but, as before, there were no means of getting the men from this point to the summit in sufficient numbers. All that could be done, however, was resorted to, and enough was achieved to redeem the honour of those who, on the previous day, had shrunk from the dangers which are but the ordinary incidents of a soldier's life. Several of the soldiers drove their bayonets into the wall, so as to form a series of steps by which they hoped to reach the top, but in the attempt to ascend they were knocked down by logs of wood, shot, and various missiles from above. Others attempted to effect their object by means of the shot-holes caused by the English fire, but they generally failed, and the fall of one man brought down those beneath him. All this time, the enemy from the next bastion kept up a sweeping and destructive fire; but amongst all these dangers and difficulties, Lieutenant Templeton, a gallant young officer who had volunteered to lead the forlorn-hope, succeeded in again planting the British colours near the summit of the bastion. As soon as he had performed this act he fell dead.

CHAP. XX. Major Menzies, a volunteer, and aide-de-camp to the commander-in-chief, whose animating language and heroic bearing are represented to have inspired with renewed energy all who were enabled to hear the one and observe the other, met the same fate, after having actually gained the summit. At every point where an opening seemed to present itself an attempt to render it available was made. On the part of the enemy, an incessant fire of grape was kept up, and from the walls were poured showers of destructive missiles—ponderous pieces of timber, flaming packs of cotton steeped in oil, followed by pots filled with gunpowder and other combustibles, which exploded with fearful effect. Thus raged the conflict for a space of two hours, when Colonel Monson, finding it hopeless, ordered a return to the trenches. Such was the result of the fourth attempt to carry Bhurtpore by assault. It was attended with a loss of nearly a thousand in killed and wounded.

A.D. 1805. In the various attempts against Bhurtpore the English had lost about three thousand men; and they were not now in a condition to renew hostile operations. On the night of the 22nd of February the ordnance was withdrawn from the batteries and the troops from the trenches. The battering train with the army was declared unfit for service; not one eighteen-pounder shot remained for use; very little powder was left, and few other stores. Provisions also were scarce. On the 23rd the enemy burned the British batteries, and on the 24th the British army changed ground—an operation in which they were

considerably harassed by Holkar's cavalry. Its new position was about six miles north-east of Bhurtpore, and covered the road leading to the depôts at Agra, Muttra, and Deeg.

Much argument has been expended on the causes of the failure of the British arms before Bhurtpore; but the inquiry does not appear very difficult or perplexing. Many errors might be committed in the conduct of the siege, but the failure was undoubtedly attributable to the want of sufficient strength. General Lake, confident in the bravery of his troops, appears to have considered that it was sufficient to effect any thing. The strength of his artillery, considered with reference to the duty which it had to perform, was contemptible, and the insufficient number of men may be inferred from the incessant and harassing labours which they were called on to sustain, as recorded in the following extract from a journal of the siege:—"The cavalry brigades and horse artillery troop, detached every third day on foraging parties, were often out of camp from daybreak till dark, and always called for on occasions of convoy and escort duty. They endured great fatigue in the long pursuit of Ameer Khan and in the several attacks upon Holkar, besides doing much duty in protecting the camp. The infantry had to carry on the principal duties of the camp and trenches. With scarcely a relief from some daily duty, they had a share in all foraging parties and convoy escorts, and exclusively bore the brunt of the several assaults. The artillery

CHAP. XX. and pioneers remained, day after day and night after night, constantly on duty. While the other branches of the army had some occasional relief, and the infantry in the trenches were relieved daily, the artillery and pioneers, from the extreme lowness of their number both in officers and men, were harassed far beyond their strength, and had a prodigious share of exposure and fatigue. The details of the Bhurtpore siege," the writer adds, "will, it is hoped, evince that deficiency of siege materials is as contrary to economy as it is fatal to humanity, and serve to inculcate Colonel Jones's maxim, that 'no policy at a siege can be worse than beginning operations with a small quantity of materials, and making the attack keep pace with the supply.'\* In India, where success is the criterion of superiority, and where the tranquillity of our empire depends solely upon the high opinion of our military prowess entertained by the natives, our safety may be considered intimately connected with the result of every siege. No means, therefore, should be neglected, no efforts spared, to ensure success in such operations."†

Both parties had now become weary of the war.

\* Sieges in Spain.

† The official accounts of the siege of Bhurtpore are so extremely meagre, that it has been found necessary to resort to others, in order to present the reader with any approach to that fulness of detail which so important a subject demands. Recourse has therefore been had to the Narrative of Major Thorn, to the appendix to a narrative of the subsequent siege of Bhurtpore published by Captain Creighton, and, in some instances, to a series of papers published in the East-India United Service Journal, under the title of Military Autobiography.

The ill-success of the British commander against Bhurtpore had diminished the confidence with which he had undertaken the siege, while it had for a time annihilated his means of pursuing it; and though the Rajah had reason to rejoice in the good fortune which had attended his efforts for the defence of his capital, he was not without some apprehension for the future; more particularly as it became evident that Holkar could not hope to maintain war successfully against the English, and, single-handed, the Rajah of Bhurtpore could not but feel his own cause to be desperate. The Rajah had been led to join Holkar by the reverses which befel the English; the dark prospects of Holkar now separated the Rajah from that chief. Pursuing the policy of adhering to the side which success seemed most disposed to favour, the Rajah condescended to make the first overture to the English for peace. On the 10th of March vakeels from him were received into the English camp, and negotiations immediately commenced. While these were in progress, the British cavalry marched out to beat up the quarters of Holkar. But Holkar had received information of their approach, and, not liking the visitation, was prepared for flight—an operation which he performed with his usual celerity and success. He retired to a considerable distance south-west of Bhurtpore, where he thought himself secure, but where, notwithstanding, he was surprised by the British cavalry at daybreak on the 3rd of April. About a thousand of his followers fell on this occasion; but

A. D. 1805.

CHAP. XX. — the victory failed of completeness from the same cause which had so often produced similar results. The chief and his troops contended for priority in flight, and all that was left to the English was to pursue as fast and as far as the speed and strength of their horses would allow.

Bappoogee Scindia, whose name will be recollected in connection with the unhappy retreat of Colonel Monson, had now openly joined the enemy, and his cavalry were stationed near Dollpore to support the remains of Holkar's infantry, commanded by Hernaut Singh. To dislodge this force, a detachment, composed of sixteen companies of newly raised sepoy, a battalion of regular infantry, and a party of irregular horse, was dispatched from Agra under the command of Captain Royle.\* He  
A.D. 1805. marched from Agra on the 26th of March; on the 31st he fell in with the cavalry of Bappoogee Scindia and totally routed it. On the 8th of April he attacked the powerful force under Hernaut Singh, consisting of between three and four thousand men, infantry and cavalry, and occupying a strong position under the fortified town of Adowlutnaghur, having the town in its rear, and its front and flanks covered by deep ravines filled with troops. Captain Royle made his dispositions for attack with equal spirit and judgment. The enemy's infantry kept up a heavy and well-directed fire, aided by three guns; but Captain Royle's party rushing in with charged

\* Dr. Forbes Royle, the distinguished naturalist, is a son of this officer.

bayonets, took possession of the guns and put the whole body to flight. Captain Pohlman, with the irregular horse, pursued and killed great numbers of the fugitives. Besides the three guns, all the enemy's baggage was taken, more than twenty stand of colours, and, in addition to a quantity of matchlocks and pikes, a great number of muskets of European manufacture.

On the day distinguished by this brilliant stroke the army before Bhurtpore again changed its ground, taking up nearly the same position which it had previously occupied. This movement appears to have given some uneasiness to the Rajah, and probably accelerated the conclusion of the treaty. On the 10th of April preliminaries were agreed upon : on the following day the third son of the Rajah arrived in the British camp as a hostage ; and on the 17th a definitive treaty was signed, under which the fortress of Deeg was to be restored by the British government, when assured of the fidelity of the Rajah, who pledged himself to aid that government against its enemies, and never to hold any correspondence or have any connection with them, nor to entertain, without the sanction of the English, any European in his service. He further agreed to pay twenty lacs of rupees in compensation of the expenses of the war, three of which were to be advanced immediately ; but the payment of the last instalment of five lacs to be remitted on proof of the Rajah's continued attachment ; and as a security for the due execution of this part of the treaty, one of the

A. D. 1805.

CHAP. XX. — Rajah's sons was to reside constantly with the commanding officer of the British forces in the soubahs of Delhi or Agra.

These terms were not dishonourable to the British; yet the precedent of submitting in patience to repulse and suffering negotiation to wait upon defeat was a bad one. The British commander-in-chief, however, was not sorry to be relieved on any terms from the necessity of making further attempts against Bhurtpore. Not only was he discouraged by his reiterated failures, but he was apprehensive, and justly so, of the effect which they might have upon the hollow allies of the British government; and more especially upon Scindia, whose conduct since the conclusion of peace with him had never ceased to be suspicious. During the negotiations for the treaty under which Scindia had agreed to receive a British force for his protection, a vakeel from Holkar had arrived in the camp of his brother chief; and he continued to reside there, not only after the conclusion of the treaty, but after Holkar had placed himself in a position of unequivocal hostility with regard to the English government. On being apprized of the intention of that government to reduce the power of Holkar, Scindia expressed himself ready to assist, and he actually dispatched a force under Bappoogee Scindia (already mentioned), professedly to co-operate with the British commander-in-chief; but he did not dismiss Holkar's vakeel. His dismissal was at length formally demanded by the British resident; who, at the same time, sub-

mitted a plan formed by General Wellesley, which contained various suggestions for the effective co-operation of Scindia in the hostile proceedings which were about to take place. By this plan it was proposed that Scindia should send an officer to join the army under Colonel Murray, for the purpose of securing the application of the resources of that chieftain's territories to the exigencies of the British force, and of taking charge of such portions of Holkar's possessions in Malwa as Colonel Murray might subdue and think proper to entrust to that officer's care; that Scindia should provide at Oujein battering guns for the use of Colonel Murray, and that he should employ his horse without delay in reducing the principal possessions of Holkar. Scindia, in reply, promised to send an officer to the camp of Colonel Murray as desired; but he took various objections to other parts of the proposed plan. He alleged that, from acting upon it, danger would arise to his own possessions, and that he had no ordnance of the description required to be provided at Oujein; but it was added, that if the guns taken from him in the late war by the British army were restored, they should be applied in aid of the operations of Colonel Murray's force. Holkar's vakeel, it was represented, was on bad terms with his master, and transacted no business for him; his continued residence in Scindia's camp was therefore justified, on the ground that his knowledge of Holkar's affairs might be made useful. These representations were followed by the expression of an

CHAP. XX. expectation that, as the governor-general had declared an intention of assigning to Scindia a portion of the territory which might be taken from Holkar, he would restore to Scindia the forts of Gohud and Gwalior, and further make compensation to him for the loss sustained by the temporary alienation of that portion of his possessions.

The last demand was a renewal of a claim which had been previously discussed, and, as was believed on the part of the British authorities, set at rest. The British government had acquired the right of disposing of the countries in question under the treaties concluded with Ambajee Ingolia and the Rana of Gohud, between whom a division of territory had been made, Gwalior falling to the lot of the latter party, by whom it was surrendered to the English. Ambajee Ingolia soon abandoned his English alliance, and resumed his allegiance to his former master. But the English government continued to maintain their engagements with the Rana of Gohud, and their own right to keep possession of Gwalior. In opposition to their determination on these points, Scindia's diplomatists appear to have urged that the territories in question formed part of the actual possessions of their chief, and had not been directly alienated by the treaty; that the Rana of Gohud had for many years possessed no pretensions to the title of a sovereign prince; that neither that personage nor Ambajee Ingolia came under the description of "rajahs and others," with whom treaties were to be confirmed, under the ninth article

of the treaty with Scindia;\* and that Scindia's ministers had understood, in the progress of the negotiations, that the fort of Gwalior and the country of Gohud were to be retained by Scindia. The first of these allegations was true: the territories of the Rana of Gohud were not directly ceded by the treaty; but the right of the Rana was indirectly acknowledged in the second article, in which certain cessions are described as lying to the northward of the territories of the Rana of Gohud; and again in the ninth, which engages for the confirmation of certain treaties made by the English, provided they did not interfere with Scindia's claims to the southward of the territories of the Rana of Gohud. The denial of the right of that prince to the rank of a sovereign was to be met by reference to the fact that he was the representative of a house whose right to rule was far older than that of Scindia, by whom it had been dispossessed. Scindia's claim

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\* The article ran thus :—" Certain treaties have been made by the British government with rajahs and others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindia. These treaties are to be confirmed, and the Maharajah hereby renounces all claims upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made, and declares them to be independent of his government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharajah situated to the southward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypore and Joudpore and the Rana of Gohud, of which the revenues have been collected by him or his aumildars, or have been applicable, as *surinjaumy*, to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such treaties. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindia when this treaty shall be ratified by his excellency the governor-general."

CHAP. XX. — upon Gohud was that of a conqueror; that of the English to dispose of the country was the same. The Rana, in addition to the right which he derived from the English, had that of ancient possession. It is remarkable, too, that while Scindia was denying that there was any Rana of Gohud, the treaty of peace which he had ratified should contain in two of its articles reference by name to this prince, and to his territorial possessions. It has been said that the right of the British government to dispose of Gohud was the right of a conqueror, and virtually this was the fact. It is true that it was occupied under an arrangement made with Ambajee Ingolia; but force would otherwise have been employed—indeed the employment of some degree of force was at last necessary—and it would be as absurd to deny the right of the British government to occupy the country, because that right was obtained by treaty, as to question the right of a belligerent power to occupy a fortress, because, when about to be subjected to storm, the garrison surrendered upon terms. It was a condition of the transfer of the country, that Ambajee Ingolia should obtain part of it—a condition very discreditable to himself as a servant of Scindia, but perfectly in accordance with the general character of the man. Ambajee Ingolia, in the sequel, traitorously deserted the English, as he had before deserted Scindia. Could this second treachery invalidate his previous acts, or destroy the rights which others had obtained under them? He might forego the advantages which he

had to expect from British protection, but he could not thus deprive others of the benefits which they had derived under a treaty to which he was a party. The final disposition of conquered countries, indeed, must in ordinary cases be dependent on the arrangements made at the conclusion of the war; but had the English government been disposed to restore Gohud to Scindia, they could not have done it without a breach of faith—they had parted with the power by reinstating the Rana in the authority to which he was justly entitled. The treaty with the Rana of Gohud was not signed till after the conclusion of the treaty with Scindia; but the English could not with honour have pleaded a point so purely formal in excuse of the violation of their engagements. Gwalior might have been restored, as it was resigned to the British government; but if the right of the Rana of Gohud be admitted, there was no obligation to restore it, as it unquestionably formed part of the original possessions of his family, and was by him relinquished to the power to which he owed the re-establishment of his rights. Had it been practicable, the treaty with Scindia ought to have provided in distinct terms for the quiet possession by the Rana of Gohud of his dominions, and for the validity of all acts consequent upon his restoration, including the cession of Gwalior to the English government; but when the treaty was concluded, the negotiators were ignorant of the intentions of the governor-general, and from this cause the question was left undecided. The double reference, however, to the Rana of Gohud

CHAP. XX. amounted to a sufficient recognition of his rights, and left Scindia without any claim upon the British government with regard to Gohud, except as a matter of favour. In this view of the question the British government could do nothing, being bound by their engagements with the Rana. The objection that Ambajee Inglia and the Rana of Gohud were not of the description of persons referred to in the ninth article, as rajahs and others heretofore feudatories of Scindia, was of no importance as to the Rana of Gohud, in the face of the recognition of his rights in other parts of the treaty; and as to Ambajee Inglia, the British government had no longer any interest in the question whether the treaty with him were good or bad.

The vision of Mahratta diplomatists is too acute to admit the supposition that the full effect of the passages in the treaty referring to the Rana of Gohud was unperceived by them; and if the Rana had no territory, nor the right to any—if he were to be regarded, as was now contended, merely as a private individual, with what object was his name introduced into the treaty, or what was to be understood by his territories? It appears that General Wellesley, who negotiated the treaty on the part of the British government, was not aware that the state of Gohud had been overrun by Scindia, that he regarded Gohud as a state actually existing, and not as one to be restored:\* but Scindia's servants possessed a full knowledge of the actual state of affairs—with this

\* Letter of General Wellesley to Major Malcolm, 17th August, 1804, in Wellington Despatches.

knowledge they signed a treaty recognizing the Rana of Gohud, and with equal knowledge Scindia ratified it. As to any hopes that might have been held out in the course of the negotiation, that Gohud and Gwalior would be left in Scindia's possession, it might be sufficient to remark that these hopes, if they existed, originated with the Mahratta diplomatists—that they were not encouraged by General Wellesley, who was too cautious a negotiator to excite expectations which arrangements beyond his control might render vain. On the contrary, he warned them of the possible consequences of delay in allowing time for forming engagements which might be detrimental to the interests of their master, but to which, when formed, the British government would be bound to adhere; and he refused to insert in the treaty any thing that might tend to defeat the effect of any such engagements.\* The claim of Scindia was met on the part of the British government by a variety of arguments which it would be tedious to quote; the above may perhaps be sufficient to lead to a just conclusion upon its merits.

The renewal of Scindia's claim to the restitution

\* General Wellesley, who appears to have thought that Gwalior ought to be restored to Scindia, expressed some regret that the point had not been clearly explained before the treaty was signed. (Letter to Major Malcolm, 22nd May, 1804, in Wellington Despatches.) But the state of his information sufficiently excuses the want of greater precaution, while it is certain that the highest degree of exactness would be insufficient to preclude a Mahratta from the exercise of his old and much-loved privilege of chicane.

CHAP. XX. — of Gohud and Gwalior, together with the objections made to the course pointed out by the British authorities for the conduct of the war, gave rise to considerable discussion between Scindia's ministers and the British resident. At length, however, all points of dispute appeared to be amicably adjusted. Scindia engaged to lend all the aid in his power towards prosecuting with vigour the war against Holkar, to dismiss that chieftain's vakeel, to renounce all pretensions to Gohud and Gwalior, and to confirm the treaties referred to in the ninth article of that between the British government and himself. But he made heavy complaints of pecuniary distress, and represented an advance from his British ally as necessary to enable him to carry his good intentions into effect. While Dowlut Rao Scindia was thus professing friendship for the English, and soliciting pecuniary assistance from them, Bappoogee Scindia had employed himself in desolating the territories of Bhoondi, from which Colonel Monson drew part of his supplies, had seized eighty camels belonging to that officer's army, and had stopped the transit of the British post.

Notwithstanding these suspicious indications, and others of a similar character in Malwa, of which Colonel Murray complained, the resident at Scindia's camp was authorized to afford him pecuniary assistance, provided some reasonable security could be obtained that the object for which the advance was made would be effected. With this view, it was suggested that the chief should himself assume the

command of the army under Bappoogee Scindia, and that he should proceed from Borhampore, where his camp then was, to his capital, Oujein. These suggestions drew from Scindia's ministers a declaration, that to their adoption two conditions were indispensable: the first might readily have been expected—it was, that the resident should supply funds to defray the expense of Scindia's march to his capital. The second could scarcely have been anticipated, even by those best acquainted with Mahratta modesty, and best qualified to judge of its extent—it was, that in the event of a junction of Scindia's army with a British force, the Mahratta leader should exercise command over both. The resident replied, that whenever Scindia might be desirous of having the disposal of a British force he might apply for the subsidiary force, in conformity with the provisions of the treaty of defensive alliance; but that the proposal to subject a British army to his command, or to that of his officers, was utterly inadmissible. The application for funds to undertake the march to the capital was answered by intimating that the British government had previously manifested a disposition to relieve Scindia's immediate exigencies, though it could not undertake to provide for the permanent disbursements of the state. The amount of the pecuniary assistance to be afforded, the conditions on which it was to be given, and the period to be appointed for repayment, continued for a lengthened period to furnish grounds for discussion, which was conducted by

CHAP. XX. Scindia's servants in a manner which did not discredit the established character of Mahratta diplomacy. In addition to these topics, the mode in which Scindia was to co-operate with the English was debated; and among other plans submitted for the consideration of the British resident was one, by which Scindia was to take the field in person, with a large body of horse and a proportion of infantry and artillery, at a monthly expense of about a quarter of a million sterling. Together with this plan, three others less costly were suggested; but on the resident inquiring by what means the expense of any of them was to be provided for, he was given to understand that Scindia relied in this respect on the British government. This renewed the interminable discussion which had already consumed so much time, and which continued to occupy the resident and the Mahratta ministers till the arrival in camp of a personage whose presence augured ill for the British cause. This was Scindia's father-in-law, Shirzee Roa Ghatgay by name, a man profligate, intriguing, rapacious, and cruel, beyond even the ordinary measure of Mahratta profligacy, intrigue, rapacity, and cruelty, and not more distinguished by his pre-eminence in all the evil propensities which deform the Mahratta character, than by his inveterate hatred of the English. He had been appointed, under extraordinary circumstances, Scindia's dewan. The appointment originated in the following manner. Before the marriage of Scindia with the daughter of Shirzee Rao, a compact had been made between the

latter personage and the Peishwa, by virtue of which, in consideration of equivalent services, the Peishwa authorized Shirzee Rao to make a promise on his part to Scindia of two crores of rupees—he also engaged to procure Shirzee Rao to be appointed Scindia's dewan. The expenses of Scindia's marriage exhausted his treasury, and he was left without the means of providing for the charges of his military establishment. In this emergency he pressed the Peishwa for payment of the two crores of rupees which had been promised. The prince declared himself unable to raise them ; but suggested that Shirzee Rao should be nominated Scindia's dewan, and in this character levy for the amount upon the rich inhabitants of Poona. The plan was adopted, and Scindia's treasury replenished by the perpetration of a series of atrocities rarely equalled even in countries where such modes of obtaining money are in ordinary practice. All who possessed wealth, or were supposed to possess it, were subjected to the most frightful tortures, under the infliction of which some died. Captain Duff, after detailing the circumstances of the appointment, says, “ Such were the secret means by which Shirzee Rao Ghatgay became minister to his son-in-law, and by which Bajee Rao Rugonath let loose upon his subjects the violence and extortion of a monster whose name will be remembered, while Poona exists, with horror and execration.”\* The course of the dewan was worthy of its commencement ; but at length he fell under the displeasure of

\* History of the Mahrattas, vol. iii.

CHAP. XX. Scindia, and was not only dismissed from his employment, but arrested, and for a time subjected to imprisonment. When set at liberty, he commenced a new career of intrigue and crime. In releasing Shirzee Rao, Scindia had been influenced by the advice of a minister named Balloba Tattyha; and the first use which Shirzee Rao made of his freedom was to compass the destruction of his benefactor, together with his adherents. Balloba was at his instigation thrown into prison, where a natural death released him from further persecution; but his relatives and associates felt the full force of Shirzee's vengeance. For one of them Shirzee invented a new mode of execution: a number of rockets were fastened on him, which being fired, carried the wretched man onward, mangling his body in a horrible manner, to the amusement of the brutal contriver of this new mode of frightful punishment. When Scindia departed to the northward, Shirzee Rao remained in the Deccan to manage the chieftain's affairs in that quarter. Left there ostensibly to suppress the troubles and disorders which prevailed, his presence tended but to increase them. After pursuing his vocation of plunder to the southward, he repaired with a small party to Poona, where he became importunate in his demands for money, and sat in dhurna\* at the door of the Peishwa's favourite minister. This experiment had nearly cost him his liberty, if not his life. The minister, under pretence of giving him

\* For an account of this ceremony see vol. i. page 531.

bills on certain bankers, invited him into the house, received him there with extraordinary courtesy, and after a due interchange of civilities, rose apparently to fetch the promised bills. But the favour which he intended to bestow was of a different kind. His departure was to be the signal for seizing and perhaps murdering his unwelcome visitor. Shirzee Rao, either apprized of the intention, or, which is more probable, suspecting it from some indication on the part of his host, drew his sword, sprung at the throat of the minister, and in this manner dragged him into the street, where vaulting upon his horse, he with his party made the best of their way to the army which he commanded; the whole of which he forthwith brought to Poona, resolving to plunder and burn the city. The interference of the British resident became necessary to prevent mischief; and it was only Scindia's want of the services of this turbulent and audacious man in another place which relieved the Peishwa from the fear and danger resulting from his proximity.\* This was the man who now appeared at Scindia's durbar to inflame the ill feeling already prevailing therein against the English. His influence over Scindia appeared to be as great as it had ever been, and he was admitted to frequent secret conferences. His character and feelings were too well known to leave any doubt of the use made of these opportunities. Had his views required illustration, it would have been found in

\* Duff's History of the Mahrattas, vol. iii.

CHAP. XX. — the fact that he was visited by Holkar's vakeel, whom he received with marks of distinction. The arrival of Shirzee Rao, the attention which he secured, and the continued presence of Holkar's vakeel, called forth fresh remonstrances from the British resident, which were met by fresh assurances of good faith and good disposition towards the English. In the meantime Bappoogee Scindia, with his army, had fallen off to the enemy. This defection being brought to the notice of Scindia's minister, he, with that impudent reliance upon European credulity which Mahratta negotiators so often manifest, and for the indulgence of which, it must be admitted, European diplomatists have not unfrequently afforded ample encouragement, stated the substance of some letters, or pretended letters, from Bappoogee Scindia, representing his submission to Holkar as a measure of necessity, but expressing his resolution to return immediately to his duty. This was somewhat more than the resident was prepared to credit; and after expressing some surprise at his want of faith, Scindia's ministers promised inquiry and explanation. Not long afterwards, Bappoo Wittul, the minister who was believed the best affected to a British alliance, was attacked by disease, which terminated in his death. His illness transferred Scindia entirely into the hands of Shirzee Rao, whose intriguing spirit found fit occupation in moulding the mind of his weak, vacillating son-in-law to his will. Scindia now marched from Borhampore. He was attended, not only by his ministers and servants,

but also by Holkar's vakeel. This was one indication of his feeling towards his British ally. He did not march direct to Oujein, as suggested by the British resident, and as the state of affairs imperiously required—and this was another. It was officially intimated to the resident that Scindia would proceed in the first instance to Jellode, a place within his own dominions, and there settle the future direction of his march. On the morning of the day, however, fixed on for the commencement of the march, and after both Scindia and the resident were actually in motion, the former, without any announcement of his intention, suddenly changed his course, and proceeded in the direction of Bhopal. Bhopal was at this time an object of some interest. The fort and territory of Hosheingabad, belonging to the Nabob of Bhopal, had long been coveted by the Rajah of Berar, who ultimately attained his object by corrupting the persons in charge of the fort. When the Rajah of Berar was engaged in hostilities with the British government, the Nabob of Bhopal took advantage of the circumstance to endeavour to regain Hosheingabad, and succeeded. It had been rumoured that Scindia, in consideration of a sum of money to be paid by the Rajah of Berar, was to assist that chief with a military force, to be employed in reducing Hosheingabad once more under his authority; and in consequence, the Nabob of Bhopal had made application to the British resident with Scindia to be placed under the protection of the British government.

CHAP. XX. He had some claim, on the ground of former services, to the protection which he sought, his predecessor in the government having some years before rendered valuable service to a British force under General Goddard, when that commander was surrounded by hostility and perfidy.\* The overture, however, was met by general expressions of courtesy, accompanied by a statement that the policy of the British government precluded its interposition to influence the results of any contest between states with which it was at amity.

Serious illness had prevented the British resident from keeping up with the march of Scindia, and he did not overtake him until he had arrived within the territories of Bhopal, where his troops were employed under Shirzee Rao in attacking a small fortified village named Cheonee. Immediately on reaching the camp, the British representative dispatched Mr. Jenkins, the secretary to the residency,† to remonstrate. That gentleman accordingly repaired to the durbar, and after adverting to the existing state of facts, proceeded to point out the inconsistency of Scindia's conduct with the obligations of the defensive alliance. He represented that, although Scindia, in reply to the British resident's repeated applications, had declared that he was unable to march unless pecuniary aid were

\* On the march of General Goddard from Bengal to Bombay, during the Mahratta war under Hastings.

† Now Sir Richard Jenkins, G.C.B., and a director of the East-India Company.

afforded by the British government, he had marched, notwithstanding he had received no such aid, and to a distance which, in the direction recommended by the resident, would have enabled him to form a junction with the British force under Colonel Murray; that the late movement of Scindia's army was unconnected with any single object of the contest with Holkar; that it was directed to the injury of a state which maintained relations of peace both with Scindia and the British government, and was thus a violation of the principles of the defensive alliance, which were opposed to aggressive war and the spirit of conquest; and that the attack upon Bhopal was at variance with the provisions of the subsidiary treaty, which treaty, on the other hand, was again violated by the withdrawal of Scindia's forces from the war with Holkar, and the employment of them on objects in which the allied powers had no just interest, and in a manner calculated to increase the number of their enemies.

After many attempts to evade discussion altogether, Scindia made an effort to justify his conduct. He still maintained that he was destitute of the means of co-operating efficiently with the British force; arguing that as Holkar's force consisted principally of cavalry, thirty thousand horse would be necessary to oppose him, and that Colonel Murray had no horse. His march to Bhopal Scindia justified by alleging that the Nabob was his tributary—that the step which he had taken encouraged officers to join him who would otherwise have been deterred

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by the want of pecuniary resources, and that so far from his march being, as the British functionary alleged, unconnected with the objects of the war, it was undertaken with especial reference to them; Scindia's design being, as he stated, to levy contributions on the Nabob of Bhopal, for the purpose of placing his army in a condition to act against the enemy. On part of this explanation the British resident, Mr. Webbe, in a communication to his government, remarked—"The Nabob of Bhopal is not a tributary to Scindia, so considered, although it is true that he has been subjected to such exactions as the superior force of Scindia has occasionally rendered it convenient for him to enforce; but the true object of Scindia's march to this place was founded on a plan concerted between him and the Rajah of Nagpore,\* for the purpose of assisting Ruggojee Bhonsla† in wresting the fort and territory of Hosheingabad from the Nabob of Bhopal." The designs of the Rajah of Berar with respect to Hosheingabad have been already mentioned. It was believed that his views extended further than the recovery of the fort and territory known by that name. There was some reason to apprehend that he meditated the resumption, by force of arms, of the territory which had been surrendered by the treaty so lately concluded by him with the British government. The existence of such views was attested by a series of correspondence which fell into the hands of the British resident at Nagpore; and was further cor-

\* The Rajah of Berar.

† Rajah of Berar.

roborated by the efforts made by the Rajah to raise funds, and by the extraordinary activity which appeared to pervade the various departments of his government. For some time previously to these discoveries, it had been observed that no cordial feelings of friendship existed on the part of the Rajah towards the British government. That government felt bound to adhere to certain engagements made with parties previously dependents upon the Rajah of Berar, and to continue to extend to them its protection, although in some instances the date of the treaties was subsequent to that of the peace with their former chief. Reparation was offered to the Rajah; but though he sullenly accepted the list tendered to him of his alienated dependents, he refused to accept of the reparation, or to enter into any additional engagements, though attended with advantage to himself. The Rajah, indeed, eventually expressed himself satisfied that the British government had acted correctly; but it was evident that he had experienced a degree of disappointment which must long preclude any implicit reliance on his friendship. At length a military force was put in motion, which marched nearly five miles from Nagpore, in the direction of Hosheingabad; while military preparations were in progress in Ruttenpore, for the alleged purpose of reducing some refractory zemindars, but the extent of which seemed disproportioned to the object. In other quarters similar preparations were made under similar pretences. In the meantime a very suspicious correspondence was

CHAP. XX. carried on between the Rajah of Berar and Ameer Khan. According to the Rajah's ministers, the objects of the latter were to deter the Rajah from proceeding against the Nabob of Bhopal, and to obtain a sum of money. The British resident was of opinion that his purpose was to prevail on the Rajah to join in a combination against the English. The intercourse of native princes is surrounded with so much mystery, that it is almost always difficult to ascertain its precise object. There was undoubtedly sufficient cause for the distrust felt by the British authorities in this case, but the course of circumstances seemed to countenance the statement of the Rajah, as Ameer Khan actually invaded his territories and committed various excesses.

While the intentions of the Rajah of Berar were thus doubtful, the state of affairs at Scindia's camp continued to indicate the hostile feelings of that chieftain. The British resident, Mr. Webbe, died soon after the advance from Borhampore. Colonel Close was instructed to proceed from Poona, to assume the charge vacated by the death of Mr. Webbe, the duties of which were in the interval performed by Mr. Jenkins.\* Scindia, leaving Hoshingabad in his rear, had now advanced into the territories of the Rajah of Berar, and Mr. Jenkins

\* It appears probable that, but for his youth and position in the service, Mr. Jenkins would have been appointed to succeed Mr. Webbe. His brilliant career in the College of Fort William had been followed by the display of a degree of aptitude for public business which, but for the circumstances above referred to, would have well justified the appointment.

felt bound to demand an explanation of this movement, as well as of the intercourse known to have taken place between Scindia and the Rajah. After various expedients for procrastination, Scindia appointed a day to receive the acting resident, when, in answer to the latter point of inquiry, he declared that the Rajah of Berar had applied to him to assist him in recovering Hosheingabad and another fortress from the Nabob of Bhopal, but that he had not answered the application, and did not intend to interfere in the prosecution of an object in which he had no interest. To the former inquiry, and to others, as to the fact of his having ordered his troops in Malwa to quit that possession and join the army under his personal command, as to his having required his Pindarries also to join him, and as to the destination of his march, he answered that he had chosen the route which he was pursuing because of the scarcity of grain in the direct route to Oujein; that he was marching through the territories of the Rajah of Berar, for the purpose of crossing the Nerbudda at a ford which would enable him to proceed to Saugur, and that he had withdrawn his troops from Malwa for the purpose of assembling his army in a plentiful country. Having given this explanation of his conduct, Scindia concluded, as usual with Mahratta princes under such circumstances, by assurances of his faithful adherence to the obligation of his engagements with the British government.

About the time when these explanations and

CHAP. XX. — these assurances were afforded, the British agent in Bundelcund intercepted a letter addressed by Ambajee Ingolia to a petty rajah dependent on the Peishwa, stating that Scindia and the Rajah of Berar had combined against the British power; that the former with his army was on his march to join Ameer Khan; that when the junction should be effected, Scindia was to direct his course towards Calpee, on the Jumna, while the Rajah of Berar should invade Bengal; and that Ambajee had dispatched a force into the territory of the Rana of Gohud for the purpose of recovering possession of it. The immediate object of the letter was to induce the person to whom it was addressed to unite his force with the troops sent by Ambajee into Gohud. It was soon ascertained that one portion at least of the intelligence transmitted by Ambajee was true. A considerable body of troops belonging to that personage had actually invaded Gohud, and laid siege to a fort at a short distance from Gwalior. This was followed by the attack and defeat of a body of the Rana of Gohud's troops. Thus was furnished new ground of remonstrance with Scindia, and the acting resident at his camp received instructions adapted to the occasion.

Before their arrival, Scindia, who had been pursuing his march along the north bank of the Nerbudda, intimated that he held from the Peishwa an unliquidated assignment upon Saugur, and expressed an intention of realizing the amount. Mr. Jenkins strenuously opposed the execution of this

project, which he declared would be regarded as an act of hostility against the Peishwa. He demanded that the design should be abandoned, and that Scindia's profligate minister, Shirzee Rao, should be dismissed; and, on failure of compliance with these demands, intimated that his departure from Scindia's camp would become necessary. Scindia affected to comply in both instances; but Shirzee Rao was not dismissed, and his master continued to march towards the town of Saugur. The depredations committed by Scindia's troops in the country bearing that name again called forth remonstrance from Mr. Jenkins, and a renewal of his demand for permission to depart. In consequence he received a visit from a servant of Scindia, who alleged, in extenuation of the offensive conduct of his chief, that disappointment at not receiving the pecuniary aid expected from the English had led him to Saugur. Mr. Jenkins, in reply, insisted on the point previously urged, that the plunder of the country by Scindia's Pindarries constituted an act of direct hostility against an ally of the British government; and recapitulated the grounds of his repeated remonstrances, shewing that, instead of going to Oujein, as was necessary for the benefit of the cause of the allies, Scindia had sacrificed the interests of that cause by proceeding in an opposite direction; and that, although the want of funds for the pay of his troops was the constant subject of complaint, the numbers of his troops continued to be augmented. The acting resident concluded his representation by promising that,

CHAP. XX. if Scindia would immediately proceed in the direction of Oujein, and would in other respects regulate his conduct according to his professions, he would continue to attend his court. The meeting at which the above communication was made took place on the 1st of January, 1805. On the 6th Scindia advanced to Saugur, where he was joined by nine battalions of his infantry and sixty-five guns. From the 7th to the 9th the army of Scindia was employed in investing the fort of Saugur, for the purpose of realizing the amount of his pretended claim; and in consequence he was informed that the British representative would march on the following morning, and required passports. To this intimation and demand it was answered that an agent from Scindia should wait upon the resident, and that all points should be satisfactorily arranged. But the resident having repeated his application, the conciliatory tone was exchanged for that of arrogance and defiance. It was signified that Ambajee Inglia was expected to arrive in the space of eight days, and that on his arrival it would be determined whether Scindia should go to Oujein or the British representative receive his dismissal. This message resembled a former communication from Scindia to a British agent, that the result of an approaching interview would decide whether it should be peace or war; and evinced that the lesson which Scindia had received had not sufficed to eradicate the arrogance which had then led him to defy the power of the English government. On

receiving it, Mr. Jenkins immediately struck his tents and prepared for departure. Scindia then thought that he had gone too far, and representations were made to the resident which induced him to postpone his march. He was solemnly assured that on the 16th Scindia would march for Oujein, and would thenceforward act in every respect in accordance with the advice of the British functionaries. The delay of six days was required in consequence of the death of a member of the chieftain's family; and the consent of the acting resident was secured by information conveyed to him, to the effect that the arrival of Ambajee would probably lead to the expulsion of Shirzee Rao. Mr. Jenkins was not then aware of the invasion of Gohud by Ambajee; and according to general opinion, that personage was adverse to the renewal of hostilities with the British government.

On the evening preceding the day on which the march, in conformity with the last arrangement, was to commence, Scindia applied for a further delay of two days, accompanying the application with a solemn promise of then prosecuting the march to Oujein without a halt. With some reluctance the resident assented; and on the 18th of January the chief actually commenced his march. It was observable, however, that only a small part of his army accompanied him; the larger portion, with the guns, continued to occupy their position in the vicinity of Saugur. Not less observable was the care which his highness manifested for those of

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CHAP. XX. his troops who were put in motion. Their spirits were not broken nor their efficiency impaired by a march of harassing length. They received orders to pitch their tents at the end of three miles; and the resident was informed that it was the intention of the single-minded Mahratta chief to halt on the spot for four days. The British officer had recourse to a duty which repetition must have rendered familiar. He remonstrated; and was answered that, in conformity with the pledge that had been given, Scindia had marched at the time specified; but that, within thirteen days after the death of a member of his family, it was inconsistent with established custom to quit the spot where the calamity had taken place. He declared, however, that at the end of the four days which remained to complete the required period of mourning he would positively proceed to Oujein. What degree of credit the British resident gave to this promise may readily be conceived; but not being desirous to precipitate war, he acquiesced in the proposed arrangement.

Before the expiration of the period of halting Mr. Jenkins became officially acquainted with the incursion of Ambajee Ingolia into Gohud. He thereupon, in conformity with instructions from the governor-general, addressed a memorial to Scindia, setting forth the fact of the hostile incursion, with a copy of Ambajee's letter to the Peishwa's tributary; calling for proof that Ambajee's assertion that Scindia, the Rajah of Berar, Ameer Khan, and himself were combined against the British govern-

ment was unfounded, and that Scindia had no CHAP. XX.  
concern in the proceedings of Ambajee; and demanding the immediate issue of an order directing that person to withdraw his troops from Gohud, together with a formal declaration of Scindia's entire concurrence in the measures that might be necessary for his punishment. The memorial, which was accompanied by a verbal message suggesting the immediate transmission of proper communications to the governor-general and to Ambajee, not producing any satisfactory result, strong remonstrance followed, accompanied by an intimation that, in the event of Scindia marching on the following morning in the direction of Oujein, the resident might be induced to remain in the camp, according to the orders of the governor-general; but the intimation of this act of forbearance was accompanied by very significant warnings, as to the consequences to be apprehended from the hostile and treacherous courses pursued by the chief and his dependents. Fresh attempts to lull the suspicions of the resident, and to induce him to consent to further delay, followed; but no satisfactory steps being taken, the resident again demanded passports. His demand received an insolent answer; and on the 23rd January he departed without them, and marched fourteen miles. This was a proceeding for which Scindia was not prepared, and it excited some dismay. Two persons were immediately dispatched to overtake the British officer, and, if possible, prevail upon him to forego his intention. Mr. Jenkins refused to listen to their

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entreaties until assured by them that they were authorized to pledge Scindia's name for the performance of any conditions which might be necessary to procure the resident's return. He then proposed the following: that on the day after his return to the camp Scindia should seriously enter upon his long promised and long deferred march to Oujein, and proceed thither without any further halts, except at the necessary and usual intervals; that he should without delay act in conformity with the resident's advice in regard to Ambajee, and also disavow in a letter to the governor-general the acts of that person, and of another who had appeared in the character of Scindia's agent at Hyderabad, where, by exaggerating the successes of Holkar and announcing an extended alliance against the British government, to which Scindia and the Rajah of Berar were to be parties, he had endeavoured to promote the objects which such an alliance would be intended to advance. The recal of this person was required to be effected through a letter from Scindia to be delivered to Mr. Jenkins, and by him forwarded to the British resident at Hyderabad. The messengers agreed in the most formal manner to the prescribed conditions, and Mr. Jenkins returned to Scindia's camp on the morning of the day after he had quitted it.

The experience of a few hours sufficed to test Scindia's sincerity. On the evening of Mr. Jenkins's return, he learned that Scindia intended to halt on the following day. This being a direct violation of

one of the conditions of the resident's return, he had only to choose between again quitting the camp or remaining a monument of the degradation of the government which he represented. He did not hesitate in taking the former course, but had proceeded only a short distance when he was again called back by a message from Scindia, expressing a desire to receive a visit from him. He accordingly directed his baggage to remain at a grove in the vicinity of Scindia's regular brigade, and proceeded with Lieutenant Stuart, the officer commanding his escort, to the tent of the vacillating and treacherous chief. Some idle attempts were made by Scindia to excuse his conduct, and these being disposed of, he expressed himself ready to comply immediately with the resident's request as to Ambajee, and to recommence his march on the following morning. Mr. Jenkins was requested to retire to another tent with some Mahratta officers, to prepare the letters; and some progress had been made, when it was announced that Scindia's devotions had been interrupted by the arrival of the British resident—that he was now anxious to resume them—that the letters, when completed, should be sent for the resident's inspection, and that if their terms should not entirely accord with his wishes, he could return to the chieftain's tent in the evening and suggest the required alterations. On the faith of this arrangement Mr. Jenkins dispatched orders recalling his baggage. The baggage, however, before the arrival of the orders, had passed out of the hands of those left in

CHAP. XX. charge of it. The British camp had been attacked by the entire body of Pindarries retained by Scindia, and plundered of every article of value. The escort in defending it had suffered severely, and among the wounded were the lieutenant in command and the surgeon attached to the residency. An attempt to plunder the British camp had been made some weeks before with partial success. In this second instance the success was complete. The loss of property, though productive of the most serious inconvenience to the resident and his attendants, was not the worst result of the outrage which had been perpetrated. The circumstances of the residency deprived it of all outward claims to respect, and the spirit prevailing in Scindia's camp was not such as to supply the want of them. Mr. Jenkins was naturally and justly anxious to withdraw from a situation where his office could no longer command even decent regard, and he requested permission to retire to some place of safety, where he might avail himself of the first opportunity that should offer of proceeding to a British camp. Scindia in reply expressed great concern at what had happened, but declined to comply with the wish of the resident to quit the camp. He accordingly remained, and the consequent position of the British residency is thus described by himself:—"Under the operation of the late events the British residency is become a degraded spectacle to a camp by which it was formerly held in the utmost veneration and respect. Our equipage is reduced to a single tent, which

occupies a small corner of Scindia's encampment; and in this situation we are exposed to the derision of the plunderers, who triumph in the protection of a nefarious government, under the countenance of which they presume to insult us with the proffer for sale of our plundered effects. Exposed to these insults and to the entire neglect of the government, which does not think it necessary even to profess regret for what has passed,\* the escort of the residency deprived of its arms and accoutrements, and disabled by the loss of about fifty men killed and wounded, while so far from being protected we have been openly attacked by Scindia's army, you will in some measure conceive the irksomeness of our situation."†

In this miserable condition did the British residency accompany the march of Scindia, who left the vicinity of Saugur on the 24th of February, leaving there, however, some battalions under an officer named Baptiste, of French origin but native birth, to realize the contribution which it had been the pleasure of the Mahratta chief to exact. Mr. Jenkins, feeling that under its present circumstances the British residency could command no respect, and desirous of receiving the instructions of the governor-general for the guidance of his future conduct, wished to decline any political intercourse with

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\* Scindia personally expressed regret, but officially none was expressed.

† Letter from Mr. Jenkins to Colonel Close, 10th February, 1805.

CHAP. XX. Scindia or his servants; but the earnest request of the chief induced the resident to consent to receive a visit from him. On that occasion Scindia displayed a combination of hypocrisy and audacity worthy of the race to which he belonged. He endeavoured to justify the general conduct of his government in regard to his engagements with the English, and to remove from the resident's mind the impression, which he most justly concluded must find place there, that the outrage perpetrated on the British camp had not been committed without his approbation or cognizance. It was, he alleged, to be attributed entirely to the Pindarries, over whom he had no control. He expressed, too, a hope that the misfortune would not interrupt the friendship subsisting between the two states. The resident made little answer, conceiving this course the most accordant with the due maintenance of the dignity of his office and government. Of the motives which actuate a Mahratta it is at all times difficult to judge; but as Scindia had before this period held language widely different in its character, and had addressed to the governor-general a letter framed in a tone far from conciliatory, the expression of a desire for the preservation of amity with a state whose representative had so recently been exposed to insult and violence, must be regarded as the effect of some temporary cause, probably of a belief in the eventual success of the British arms. The weakness of Scindia's character, combined with his intense hatred of the

English and his participation in the duplicity which is always an element in the moral constitution of a Mahratta, produced great fluctuations in his feelings and deportment. The history of the letter to the governor-general above noticed is remarkable. The letter bore the date of the 18th of October. It was forwarded by two messengers on foot to a person residing at Benares, who for many years had held the nominal appointment of vakeel, first to the predecessor of Dowlut Rao Scindia, and subsequently to himself. The vakeel was to proceed with the letter to Calcutta, in order to deliver it in person; but he did not report his arrival in that city till the 18th of February, exactly four months after the date of the letter. It has been questioned whether Scindia knew any thing of this letter, and whether its preparation and transmission were not altogether the acts of his ministers. But this is a point of little importance—by whomsoever it might be framed, by whomsoever forwarded, it is extraordinary that it should have been four months on its journey to Calcutta. The only possible solution of the difficulty is to be found in the supposition that the letter was written under the influence of the feelings excited by the successes of Holkar and the disasters of Colonel Monson—that subsequent events gave rise to different feelings and expectations, which suggested the prudence of keeping it back, and that the ultimate determination to revert to the original intention of the writer, by causing it to be delivered at its destination, was prompted by the reverses of

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CHAP. XX. the English before Bhurtpore.\* Another extraordinary fact connected with this proceeding is, that it was transmitted without the knowledge of the British resident with Scindia, whose duty it was to forward to his government any representation which he might receive from that to which he was deputed, and who, it could not be doubted, was ready faithfully to discharge this trust.

The letter, after an ordinary compliment, adverted to the relations subsisting between Scindia and the Company's government, and thence proceeded to complain of the neglect of the latter to afford to the chief pecuniary assistance. The next subject was one which would perhaps have been avoided by negotiators of any other race than that of the Mahrattas. It arose out of the former, and presented a curious version of the circumstances under which Bappoogee Scindia passed over to the enemy; a result which was attributed to the want of funds. It was alleged that on an application being made by Bappoogee to Colonel Monson for money to pay his troops, the British commander answered that he could advance none, and referred the applicant to General Lake. This was something more than mere misrepresentation—it was a positive falsehood; for Colonel Monson had advanced to Bappoogee a considerable sum. Bap-

\* This explanation was originally suggested by Mr. H. H. Wilson, Boden Professor of Sanscrit in the University of Oxford. He supposes that the vakeel performed his journey from Benares to Calcutta very leisurely, in order to take advantage of the turn of events, in whatever direction it might be.

poojee, however, it was represented, being, for want of the required assistance, unable to sustain his troops, was obliged to dispatch an officer named Suddasheo Rao, with a body of horse and foot, in search of provisions; himself, with three thousand men, remaining with Colonel Monson, in which situation, according to Scindia's statement, they exerted themselves most meritoriously. The succeeding part of the narrative was a tissue of untruths and misrepresentations, ending with a statement of the reasons which led Bappoojee to join Holkar, differing but little from that which was given to the British resident. After the enumeration of his pecuniary grievances, Scindia proceeded to the statement of other grounds of complaint. The first related to a question which had been settled professedly to the satisfaction, and certainly with the acquiescence, of Scindia's ministers—the transfer of Gohud and Gwalior. There were seven more. The name of the Rajah of Jodepore, it was said, had been improperly inserted in the list of chieftains to whom the provisions of the ninth article of the treaty applied; the payment of certain pensions as stipulated was represented to be irregular; delay in delivering to Scindia some districts to which he was entitled was complained of; a similar complaint was preferred as to collections from other districts; the maharajah had been prevented, as he alleged, from placing in specified countries a sufficient number of troops for their protection, in consequence of which they had be-

CHAP. XX. — come a scene of devastation; the jaghires in Hindostan, covenanted to be returned to Scindia, were, he urged, still retained; and, lastly, the obligation incurred by the Company under the second treaty, to protect Scindia's territories in the same manner as their own, was stated to be disregarded. These complaints were interspersed with abundant abuse of the British resident, Mr. Webbe. The conclusion was peculiarly edifying, from the high moral tone which characterizes it, and the beautiful exposition of the obligations of friendship which it affords. On such a subject a Mahratta may well be expected to be eloquent, and Scindia did not discredit either his theme or his country. "Where," said he, "friendship has been established by treaties and engagements between princes and chiefs of high rank and power, it is incumbent on both parties to observe it on all occasions, and they consider the injuries and losses of friends and allies to be their own; and, in the same manner, the strength and power of friends and allies to be their own strength and power. My continuance during so long a period of time in the vicinity of Borhampore has been owing entirely to my expectation, founded on the union of the two states, of aid in all my affairs on the part of your excellency. As Mr. Webbe, who resides with me on the part of your excellency, practises delay and evasion in every point,\* and avoids the advance of

\* This imputation on the character of Mr. Webbe ought not to pass without notice, even when coming from a Mahratta. Among the qualities which all contemporary report ascribes to

money in the form of pecuniary aid, of a loan, or on account of that which is clearly and justly due by the conditions of treaty, I have deemed it necessary to communicate all circumstances to your excellency. My army having reached the banks of the Nerbudda by successive marches, is beginning to cross. I shall now remain in expectation of an answer. Your excellency is endowed with great wisdom and foresight, and is unequalled in the virtues of fulfilling the obligations of engagements and of friendship. I therefore request your excellency to take into your deliberate consideration all that I have written, and adopt such measures as may most speedily both terminate the contest with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and fulfil the obligations of the treaties subsisting between us, and strengthen in the most perfect degree and perpetuate the foundations of union and alliance between the two states. Let your excellency further be pleased to consider where is the advantage of suffering that which has been taken from friends to fall into the hands of enemies: undoubtedly your excellency's provident wisdom and correct understanding will never approve such a thing, since the power and strength of one friend must be considered to be the power and strength of another, and the weakness and defective resources of the one also those of the

Mr. Webbe, honesty and straightforwardness stand foremost. To multiply testimonies is unnecessary, when it is added that his moral as well as his intellectual qualifications are attested both by the Marquis Wellesley and the Duke of Wellington.

CHAP. XX. other. If I acquire strength by territory and money, that strength (as the consequence of our union) becomes in truth the strength of the Company also. Having maturely weighed and considered all these points, let your excellency be pleased to favour me with a speedy and favourable answer. If by the time of my arrival at Malwa a full and detailed answer to all that I have written arrives, it will be extremely proper and advisable."

Complaints similar to those contained in Scindia's letter had been addressed by some agents of that chief to Colonel Close at Nagpore, to which place he had proceeded on his way to undertake the duties of resident at Scindia's camp, but on learning the events which had occurred, had thought it expedient to wait for further instructions from his government. These, when received, directed him to proceed to assume the duties to the discharge of which he stood appointed, and to demand reparation for the outrage which had been committed on the British residency. A copy of these instructions being furnished to Mr. Jenkins, that gentleman immediately, in accordance with their spirit, re-assumed the functions which had since the attack on his camp been permitted to remain dormant.

The complaints embodied in the letter of Scindia, together with the communications to Colonel Close, received from the governor-general an elaborate reply. After adverting to the date of Scindia's letter, to the extraordinary delay which had taken place in delivering it, and to the aspersions cast by Scindia

on the character of Mr. Webbe, the governor-general proceeded to expose the trickery and injustice of reviving the claim to Gohud and Gwalior, after repeated recognitions of the acts of the British government with respect to those possessions. Scindia was reminded of the various acts by which he was pledged not to disturb the arrangement which had been made, and was called upon once more, by a formal declaration in writing, to renounce his claim. This would have added something to the evidence previously existing on the subject, but it cannot be supposed that it would have operated in the slightest degree to prevent the revival of the claim whenever it might suit the purpose or the caprice of this unstable chief to assert it. The case of the Rajah of Jodepore was divested of all difficulty. He had refused to abide by the engagement which had been made; his name in consequence was directed to be erased from the list presented to Scindia, but by some error or accident this had been omitted. The payment of the pensions, it was shewn, had not only been strictly regular, but that the prescribed period had been anticipated. In answer to Scindia's complaints of the non-surrender of the pergunnas to which he had a claim, it was stated, that no person duly authorized had ever been sent to take charge of them. It was very properly added that, with reference to the operations of the war with Holkar, it had become inexpedient at that period to give them up; but that they would be surrendered at the termina-

CHAP. XX. tion of hostilities with the last-named chief, or rented by the English, as Scindia might choose. Payment of the collections from those pergunnas, Scindia was informed, would be regularly made to his officers until the delivery of the districts. With regard to other collections which Scindia claimed, the governor-general professed never before to have heard of the claim; but intimated that an investigation should take place, and that when the accounts were adjusted, payment should be made of whatever might be found due. To the charge of the British having abandoned to devastation part of Scindia's territories, the governor-general replied, that the British were not bound to suppress internal disturbances, or to protect the country against robbers; but that, notwithstanding, directions should be given for the preservation of order. The relinquishment of the jaghires in Hindostan, it was stated, would take place forthwith, on a proper application to the commander-in-chief; and the jaghiredars would receive from the British government whatever that government had received on account of the jaghire lands since the treaty of peace.\* In reply to the last

\* Orders for the release of the jaghires were issued to the civil officers in whose jurisdiction they were situated, by the commander-in-chief, immediately on sunnuds granted by Colonel Malcolm being presented by the agents of the jaghiredars. Some villages, forming part of one jaghire, being held by a relative of the Emperor, it was deemed undesirable to dispossess him, and an equivalent was offered to the jaghiredar; an arrangement for which Colonel Malcolm had already provided in his discussions with Scindia's ministers.

head of charge, that the British had not protected Scindia's territory from invasion, but had permitted Holkar and Ameer Khan to ravage and plunder within it, it was observed, that the obligation of a defensive alliance was mutual, and that the British might with equal justice complain of Scindia for not preventing the incursions of the enemy into the Company's territories. "An appeal to the evidence of facts, however," continued the governor-general, "will manifest the degree in which either state has fulfilled the obligations of the defensive alliance. By the valour, activity, and skill of the British armies, Jeswunt Rao Holkar has been deprived of nearly all his territorial possessions, a part of which, including the capital city of Indore, was delivered over to your highness's officers. The whole of his force has been repeatedly defeated and nearly destroyed, with the loss of all his artillery; and he has been deprived of every resource but that which he derives from the feeble and precarious aid of the Rajah of Bhurtpore. Has your highness," it was then properly asked, "according to the provisions of the treaty, contributed in any degree to these victories? On the contrary, has not the conduct of your highness and of your officers aided the cause of the enemy against the power by which those victories have been achieved, and with which your highness was pledged to co-operate?" After some remarks on various parts of the conduct of Scindia during the war, his more recent proceedings were thus noticed. "On every occasion when the

CHAP. XX. — resident urged your highness to proceed to Oujein for the purpose of restoring the vigour of your government, of reviving the efficiency of your declining resources, and of co-operating with the British troops in the prosecution of the war, your highness uniformly asserted your inability to proceed for want of funds to pay your troops; and in your highness's letter you have ascribed your detention at Borhampore to the same cause. Your highness, however, stated in the same letter, that you had been enabled by loans to provide necessaries for your march, and for collecting your troops; that you had accordingly marched from Borhampore; that you had written to all the officers of your troops to join you from every quarter; and that it was your intention to raise new troops." On the foundation of the facts referred to in this passage the governor-general raises the following conclusion, and addresses the exhortation which succeeds. "It is evident, therefore, that your highness never intended to comply with the suggestion of the resident on the subject of your return to Oujein; for your highness assigned the deficiency of your funds as the only cause which prevented your return to Oujein in conformity with the resident's advice; and when your highness, according to your own declaration, had obtained funds, you marched in a different direction, and afforded to the resident no explanation of the nature of your designs. Under these circumstances, it is evident that your highness never entertained the design of proceeding to Oujein, or of co-operating with the Bri-

tish troops in the prosecution of the war. With what degree of justice, therefore, can your highness complain of the conduct of the British government in withholding the pecuniary aid which you solicited, until adequate security had been obtained for the due application of those funds to the common cause of the allies, instead of perverting the aid furnished by the allies to the cause of the enemy? Your highness," the governor-general continues, "has stated in your letter, that it was your determined resolution, after having collected a numerous army consisting both of old troops and new levies, to proceed to chastise the enemy; and your highness adds, 'how can I be content to see a territory which for a long time has been in my possession, and in the conquest of which crores of rupees have been expended, and great battles have been fought, in the possession of another?'—and that 'it is no difficult matter to wrest the territory from the hands of the enemy.' I am unable to comprehend your highness's meaning in the passage above quoted. The enemy has not at any stage of the war been able to effect the conquest of a single district, and wherever the British troops have approached, the enemy has sought his safety in a precipitate flight; and although, subsequently to the date of your highness's letter, you have received constant reports of the repeated defeats of the enemy by the British troops, your highness has continued to augment your forces and to advance into Hindostan. These measures, therefore, must be ascribed to objects entirely different from those

CHAP. XX. — which your highness has declared.” This intimation that Scindia’s views were perceived was succeeded by a summing up of that chieftain’s offences against the British government, under thirteen heads. The enumeration exhibits the leading points of the case so completely, and, withal, so briefly, that it will be advisable to quote it at length rather than to give an abridgement. “First: After your highness’s repeated and solemn assurances to the resident of your intention to return to your capital, for the purpose of co-operating with the British government in the prosecution of the war, your highness, without affording an explanation to the resident, directed your march towards the territory of Bhopal, in positive violation of your personal promise, repeatedly made to the resident. Secondly: Notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of the resident on the impropriety of permitting the continuance of the enemy’s vakeel in your highness’s camp, that vakeel was permitted to remain and to accompany your march; and, with your highness’s knowledge, the person to whose charge you committed the executive administration of your affairs\* maintained a constant and clandestine intercourse with that vakeel of the enemy. Thirdly: The officers of your highness’s government at Oujein, instead of joining Colonel Murray with any part of the troops stationed at that capital, or affording to Colonel Murray any aid whatever in his preparations for the field, counteracted the measures of that officer, and opposed

\* Shirzee Rao.

every degree of difficulty to his exertions in completing the equipment of the army under his command. Fourthly: Two of your highness's military commanders,\* with the troops under their command, who were appointed to co-operate with the British force in Hindostan, deserted to the enemy, and have acted with the enemy during the whole war. Fifthly: Your highness has openly justified the conduct of those officers in deserting to the enemy, on the plea that the British commander refused to advance money for the pay of the troops, which your highness was bound by treaty to furnish at your own charge; thereby maintaining a principle inconsistent with the spirit of the treaties of peace, and of defensive alliance.† Sixthly: Your highness has withdrawn your troops from those districts which had been conquered from the enemy by the British forces, and surrendered to your highness's officers; thereby restoring to the enemy a part of his resources of which he had been deprived by the exertions of the British troops, and of which the benefit had been exclusively transferred to your highness. Seventhly: Your highness has conducted a secret negotiation with the Rajah of Berar, without affording to the British resident any explanation of the nature and object of it; thereby violating an express stipulation of the treaty of defensive alliance. Eighthly: Your highness has violated the territory of his high-

\* Bappoogee Scindia and Sudasheo Rao.

† The alleged fact moreover was false, Colonel Monson having advanced money to Bappoogee Scindia.

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ness the Peishwa, the ally of the British government, by invading and plundering the district of Saugur, by destroying the city and besieging the fort, and by exacting a contribution from that place by force of arms. Ninthly: Notwithstanding your highness's repeated and most solemn assurances to the British representative of your intention to proceed to the capital of your dominions, your highness has marched with a large army to Narwa, on the frontier of the territory of an ally of the British government. Tenthly: Your highness has continued to augment your army by collecting your troops from all quarters, by new levies, and by the accession of a numerous train of artillery, although your highness professed an utter inability to supply funds for the payment of your army previously to its augmentation, and although the declared object of those measures had ceased to exist; thereby justifying a suspicion that your highness's views were directed rather against the British government or its allies than against the common enemy. Eleventhly: Your highness has suffered the late flagrant outrage against the person and property of the British representative and his suite, committed by persons in your highness's service, and within the limits of your highness's camp, to pass unnoticed and unatoned, without any endeavours to discover and punish the offenders, and without any effectual measures for recovering the plundered property, or any declared intention of repaying the amount; without offering a public apology, or addressing to me any excuse to pal-

liate an outrage so atrocious against the sacred character of the representative of the British government residing at your highness's court; and without any endeavour to alleviate the personal distress of the British representative, either by contributing to his accommodation or by any acts of kindness or hospitality. Twelfthly: Your highness has revived your claim to the districts of Gohud and Gwalior, alienated from your highness's dominion by the operation of an article of the treaty of peace—after a minute and deliberate discussion upon that subject with your highness's government; and after the most solemn and public renunciation of that claim on the part of your highness in presence of the British resident at your highness's court; and after having publicly accepted and confirmed the list of treaties, by one of which this alienation was declared. Thirteenthly: The general conduct of your highness's government, and especially the augmentation of your highness's force and your march to Narwa, have encouraged the enemy to expect your highness's support, of which expectation the enemy has made a public boast; and a general opinion exists in Hindostan and the Deccan, that your highness has resolved to unite your forces with the remnant of the enemy's power in a contest against the British government, your friend and ally." This was a heavy array of offences; but it was not, as the culprit might reasonably have apprehended, the prelude to a declaration that the day of repentance was past, and that the perfidy of the transgressor was about to be visited with con-

CHAP. XX. — dign punishment. Notwithstanding all that had occurred, Scindia was assured that the British government were solicitous to maintain with him the relations of amity, and to respect the provisions of the treaties of peace and defensive alliance, provided he should adopt a course of proceeding accordant with those engagements.

So strong indeed was the desire entertained by the British government for the preservation of peace, and so earnest the wish that Scindia should be satisfied on this point, that in contemplation of the possibility of the British representative being compelled to withdraw by the refusal of Scindia to afford any satisfaction for the attack on the British camp, he was instructed to state that his departure, though rendered necessary by the conduct of Scindia, had no connection with any hostile designs towards that chief on the part of the British government, which would continue disposed to peace so long as Scindia should abstain from any act of direct aggression against the Company or their allies.

But Scindia was actuated by very different feelings. His court had for some time appeared to be occupied by some matter of importance. At length the ladies of his family and his heavy baggage were sent out of camp to be conveyed to some place of safety, and it was obvious that some extraordinary movement was about to take place. In an interview afforded by the acting British resident to one of  
A. D. 1805. Scindia's ministers, on the 23rd of March, the secret was revealed. Scindia's agent stated that his master

had viewed with sorrow and regret the continued length of the war between Holkar and the English, and (being a person of singular sensibility) the consequent effusion of blood. His humanity was of too active a nature to be contented with merely lamenting these calamities; he had a plan for putting an end to them—this was by marching directly to Bhurtpore for the purpose of offering his mediation to restore the blessings of peace. The purport of the minister's visit, it was explained, was, therefore, to request that the British resident would write to the different officers in command of British detachments in the neighbourhood of Gwalior, and other places in the direction of Scindia's proposed march, to inform them of that chieftain's pacific intentions, and to prevent his being molested by the troops stationed at the ghauts on his route. Mr. Jenkins replied, that he was entirely unacquainted with the arrangements made by the governor-general and the commander-in-chief for the protection of the countries to which allusion had been made, and that it was impossible for him to comply with the request made on behalf of Scindia, as the officers in command of the British troops received their orders from the commander-in-chief, and were in no respect under the resident's authority. He added, with becoming spirit, with reference to the proposed mediation, that so long as Scindia continued in alliance with the British power the utmost attention would be paid to his interests as well as to those of all other allies, but that the British government neither re-

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quired nor admitted the arbitration of any state whatever. Scindia, it will be recollected, had professed to regard Holkar as an enemy—had denied that the vakeel of that chief remained with his consent or knowledge within his camp—had complained of the British government for not adequately protecting his dominions against Holkar, and of their withholding the pecuniary assistance which was required to enable him to take the field effectually against the common enemy. The answer of Scindia's minister to Mr. Jenkins's denial of the maharajah's right to arbitrate between the British government and Holkar was, that his master had received repeated solicitations to undertake the office both from Holkar and the Rajah of Bhurtpore; thus, with genuine Mahratta audacity, avowing a correspondence which had been repeatedly disclaimed. On the following day Mr. Jenkins received another visit from Scindia's agent, when further illustrations of the duplicity of Scindia's court were afforded. The minister denied that the family of Scindia had departed, or that the heavy baggage had been sent away with any view to rapidity of march, but he admitted (why, is not very apparent) that Scindia's minister had till a very recent period been inimical to the British government, though now it was asserted he had become sensible of his folly. There was, indeed, no doubt that the first part of this statement was true—that Scindia's minister, Shirzee Rao, had entertained the most inveterate feelings of hatred towards the British government, and had

anxiously watched the arrival of a fitting opportunity for gratifying those feelings; but of widely different character were the professions made by Scindia and his servants to the British authorities. These avowed friendship, while the actions of those who made them spoke only hostility. The change which it was alleged had passed over Shirzee Rao was as sudden as it was marvellous, and a most extraordinary manifestation of its effect was the projected march to Bhurtpore.

Four days before the communication of Scindia's intention to Mr. Jenkins, one of Scindia's servants had been admitted to an interview with Colonel Close at Nagpore. He had nothing to shew that he was accredited by the Mahratta chief, but he was a person of high rank and claimed to be accredited. This person did not affect to conceal the alienation of Scindia's feelings from the English, nor the views under which he had moved in opposition to the recommendation of the British resident. He asked whether it was not perceived that Scindia was offended when he marched to the northward; and on Colonel Close answering to the effect that it could not be supposed that Scindia would act in opposition to justice and good faith, an attendant upon Scindia's alleged agent asked, if it were not supposed that Scindia moved to the northward in consequence of being offended, to what motive was that step ascribed? These avowals that Scindia's movements were influenced by designs which he concealed from the British resident contrast strikingly with his

CHAP. XX. — often repeated expressions of a desire to comply with the advice of that functionary, his declarations of continued attachment to the British cause, and his professions of anxiety to fulfil his engagements and maintain unimpaired his alliance with the British government.

The governor-general was no sooner apprized of the communications made to Mr. Jenkins and Colonel Close, than, with his characteristic energy, he took measures for frustrating the meditated designs of Scindia. Instructions were forwarded to the commander-in-chief, directing him to reject peremptorily all demands on the part of Scindia which might be at variance with the treaty of peace, to repel any act of hostility from Scindia with promptitude and effect, and to provide, in the event of war, for the safety of Mr. Jenkins and the British residency. Other parts of the instructions referred to the contingency of war being followed by negotiation; and it was distinctly laid down, that Scindia was not to be permitted to treat for Holkar, nor Holkar for Scindia. These orders were explained and enforced by others forwarded a few days afterwards. While provision was thus made for frustrating the hostile designs of Scindia in the north, the south was not neglected. Impressed with a sense of the advantages resulting from the system adopted in the previous war with the confederated Mahratta chieftains, of entrusting very general and extensive powers, both political and military, to the hands of a single local authority, the governor-

general resolved to invest Colonel Close with the same powers which had formerly been exercised by General Wellesley in the Deccan, with the exception of the control of the military commander in Guzerat. On the return of General Wellesley from Calcutta to Madras, it appears to have been for some time doubtful whether he would resume his station in the Deccan or not. It was ultimately determined in the negative; General, now, by the well-merited grace of his sovereign, Sir Arthur, Wellesley, being of opinion that his services were no longer necessary; being anxious, with regard to the state of his health, as well as to his professional prospects, to proceed to Europe; thinking also that his presence there might enable him to dispel some misapprehensions with regard to the policy lately pursued in India, and being moreover dissatisfied with the authorities at home.\* It is satisfactory to

\* His dissatisfaction was not confined to the East-India Company, but appears, from some intimations in the Wellington Despatches, to have extended to the highest military authority. But Sir Arthur Wellesley had learned to subject his feelings to his duty, and an apparent slight put upon him after his return only seemed to draw forth more conspicuously some of the meritorious traits of his character. The following statement is given by Colonel Gurwood, the editor of the Wellington Despatches:—“An expedition had been fitted out in the autumn of 1805, to proceed to Hanover, under the command of Lord Cathcart; and Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, soon after his return to England from India, was appointed to the command of a brigade in it. But the consequences of the battle of Austerlitz rendered it prudent to recall this force, and the troops composing it were placed on the coast for future operations, or for the defence of the country against threatened invasion.” To this narrative Colonel

CHAP. XX. relate that the greatest commander of modern times was not permitted to quit the scene of his early glories without testimonies warm and abundant to his eminent services. Soldiers and civilians, Europeans and natives, vied in rendering him honour.

Colonel Close, under the powers assigned to him, was to take the command of the main army in the Deccan. In furtherance of the views of the governor-general, Colonel Wallace, commanding the subsidiary force at Poona, and Colonel Haliburton,

Gurwood appends the following note:—"There is no situation and there are no circumstances in which an officer of the army may be placed, that will not in some manner or other be stamped with the superior principles of the thorough soldier. An intimate friend having remarked in familiar terms to Sir Arthur Wellesley, when at Hastings, how he, having commanded armies of forty thousand men in the field—having received the thanks of parliament for his victories—and having been made Knight of the Bath, could submit to be reduced to the command of a brigade of infantry? 'For this plain reason,' was the answer; 'I am *nimmukwallah*, as we say in the East; that is, I have ate of the King's salt, and therefore I conceive it to be my duty to serve with unhesitating zeal and cheerfulness when and wherever the King's government may think proper to employ me.' This maxim has the more force, from there being officers in the army who, unfortunately for them, having declined subordinate employ from flattering themselves with superior pretensions, have repented their decision during their professional lives; and it is for this reason that the compiler has presumed to draw the attention of those who may hereafter be placed in similar circumstances to the great military principle, as well as to the example of the Duke of Wellington."

Military officers exact necessarily and justly from those they command implicit and ready obedience. It is strange that they should ever forget that the duty which they require from those beneath them is equally due from themselves to those who have a right to command their services.

commanding that at Hyderabad, were ordered to occupy with their troops the positions most favourable for the seizure, if necessary, of Scindia's possessions south of the Nerbudda; but these officers were not to commence operations against Scindia without express orders, except in the event of intelligence reaching them of the actual commencement of hostilities in Hindostan. In Guzerat it was necessary to provide considerable reinforcements, the number of troops in that province having been greatly reduced by the detachment of the force which originally marched under Colonel Murray to Oujein, and subsequently, under General Jones, joined the army of Hindostan. To supply the deficiency thus occasioned, the government of Bombay were instructed to dispatch to Guzerat as soon as practicable, and by the safest and most expeditious route, a corps consisting of at least four companies of European infantry, a company of European artillery, and one battalion of sepoy, with a due proportion of camp equipage, artillery, pioneers, lascars, and every necessary equipment to enable the corps to be employed on field service the moment it should reach Guzerat. Colonel Woodington, the officer commanding in the province, was to be instructed to place the corps under him in an efficient state of equipment, and to lay up, at convenient places on the frontier, supplies of grain and stores. Thus reinforced, it was expected that Colonel Woodington would be able, not only to defend Guzerat from invasion, but to attack with success

CHAP. XX. the forts and possessions of Scindia in that province, should war ensue.

Soon after the issue of these several instructions a letter was received from the acting resident at Scindia's camp, which seemed to indicate more pacific feelings on the part of Scindia than had been contemplated. The resident had held communications with the chief and his ministers, which had produced a satisfactory letter to the governor-general in reply to the demand for reparation on account of the outrage upon the residency, a multiplicity of assurances of friendly intentions, and a promise that Scindia should halt upon the Chumbul until the arrival of Colonel Close.\* The promise was kept with Mahratta strictness. Scindia retired to Subdulgur; but on the 7th of April Ameer Khan left Bhurtpore with the avowed intention of joining Scindia; and on the same day Shirzee Rao, with a large body of Pindarries and a considerable part of Scindia's cavalry, marched towards Bhurtpore. Previously to his departure one of Scindia's ministers waited on Mr. Jenkins to announce the intended movement, and to explain that it had reference to the proposed mediation. The resident demanded an audience of Scindia himself, which was granted, and the chief gave the same explanation which had been offered by his minister. The statement was accompanied by strong professions of fidelity and

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\* The appointment of Colonel Close to the exercise of the chief political and military power in the Deccan had not then been made.

friendship, and by a repetition of a request formerly made, that Mr. Jenkins would write to the commander-in-chief to desire that hostilities with Holkar might be suspended. The object of dispatching Shirzee Rao to Bhurtpore was undoubtedly to prevent the Rajah from entering into a pacific arrangement with the British government; but the design was defeated. On the 11th the conditions of a treaty were finally determined upon; and on the 17th, as has been already related, the treaty was signed.

On arriving at Weir, a place about fifteen miles from Bhurtpore, Shirzee Rao addressed a letter to the commander-in-chief, intimating that, at the request of the British resident, Scindia had consented to wait at Subdulghur in expectation of Colonel Close's arrival. This was true; but it would be inconsistent with Mahratta custom to offer truth un-mixed with some alloy of falsehood; and the announcement of Scindia's position, and the cause of his occupying it, was associated with a representation that the British resident had expressed a desire that Scindia should interpose his mediation for obtaining peace; in consequence of which desire his highness had dispatched Shirzee Rao to Bhurtpore to negotiate. The commander-in-chief, in reply, stated, that peace having been established between the British government and the Rajah of Bhurtpore, the presence of Shirzee Rao at Bhurtpore was unnecessary; that he must not think of advancing, as

CHAP. XX. — such a proceeding might subvert the union subsisting between the Company and Scindia. On the following day, however, Shirzee Rao did, with a small party of horse, advance within a short distance of Bhurtpore, and transmitted to the Rajah a message, soliciting a personal conference. The Rajah declined granting the application, and Shirzee Rao returned to Weir without gaining any thing by his movement. At Weir he was joined by Holkar, with three or four thousand horse, and both proceeded towards the camp of Scindia at Subdulghur. Scindia had for some time maintained, through an agent of his own, a correspondence with the court of Holkar. Some of the letters of this agent to his employer, which fell into the hands of the English, fully confirmed all that was suspected of the views of Scindia, and of the degree of credit to be given to his expressions of fidelity and attachment. It is wearisome to find occasion for recurring so frequently to the task of exhibiting Mahratta chicanery and dissimulation, but it is necessary to the just understanding of the relative circumstances and position of the British government and the Mahratta chiefs. While Scindia was intriguing with Holkar, who was in a state of avowed war with the Company's government—while the former chief was advancing towards Bhurtpore in the hopes of striking a blow at the interests of his English ally, he was profuse in declarations of sincerity and good faith. Never were his professions more strong

than at this period ; and it may be added that never  
were they either more or less honest. CHAP. XX.

In consequence of the movement of Scindia to the northward, Colonel Martindell, who had been stationed in a position to enable him to secure the tranquillity of Bundelcund and to protect Gohud from invasion, advanced in the same direction, under orders from the commander-in-chief, carefully avoiding any violation of the possessions of either Scindia or his dependents ; and on the 8th of April he reached Hingorah, a position on the southern bank of the Chumbul, at a short distance from Dholepore. His proximity was distasteful to Scindia ; and on the 11th that chief requested that the British resident would prevent the approach of Colonel Martindell within twenty coss of his camp. Mr. Jenkins answered by expressing surprise that Scindia should feel any uneasiness in the presence of the British troops, under the continued assurances given that he considered himself standing in the closest relations of alliance with the British government. He remarked, that under the terms of the treaty the British troops were to act in concert with those of the maharajah ; and he reminded the chieftain that when Colonel Murray was stationed at Oujein no apprehension was expressed, but, on the contrary, Scindia was continually urgent for the assistance of the British troops for the protection of his country. If Scindia had no other view than that of maintaining his relation with the British government, what, the resident asked, was there to apprehend from the neigh- A. D. 1805.

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bourhood of the troops of his ally? He added, that Colonel Martindell was within the Company's territories, and that his advance had been rendered necessary by circumstances, more especially by the movement of the notorious Bappoogee Scindia in the direction of Scindia's camp, and the vicinity of considerable bodies of the troops of Holkar and Ameer Khan, in charge of the baggage of those chiefs. The pointed question put by the resident it was not easy for Mahratta ingenuity to answer; but Scindia urged, that if the Pindarries of his camp should happen to commit any excesses, or should enter into disputes with any of the inferior people of the British camp, the blame of such conduct might attach to the government. Mr. Jenkins answered that the known and exemplary discipline of the British troops should preclude any uneasiness respecting their conduct, and that Scindia's distrust of the inferior part of his own army only afforded a further proof of the necessity of Colonel Martindell's advance to the frontier, though nothing short of actual aggression would produce any hostile proceedings on the part of that officer. Scindia renewing his request that an application should be made to Colonel Martindell, to keep at a distance of twenty coss from the Mahratta's camp, the resident shrewdly suggested, that if the maharajah desired to maintain this distance between the two camps, it would be better that his highness should himself make a movement for the purpose. To this Scindia expressed himself averse, and (according to his own declaration)

his aversion had a most creditable origin, being founded on his promise to Mr. Jenkins to wait in the position which he now occupied for the arrival of Colonel Close—so sacred did Scindia deem a promise, even though the person to whom it was made was willing to relieve him from the obligation, to an extent which would enable him to effect a purpose which he professed to think important. Scindia at length expressed himself satisfied, and adverting to the presence of Bappoogee Scindia in the neighbourhood, intimated an intention of visiting him. The resident was silent till his opinion of the meditated visit was asked. He then referred to the maharajah's sense of propriety, to determine whether or not it was advisable to visit a man whose traitorous conduct had placed him in the position of an enemy to the British government. Scindia manifested his respect for that government, and his regard for the opinion of its representative, by paying his promised visit to Bappoogee Scindia on the same evening.

On the 14th of April the arrival of Ameer Khan was announced to the British representative, as a preparative to the public reception of the respectable freebooter and temporary associate of Holkar; and as it was necessary to devise a plausible pretext for receiving him, it was stated that Scindia supposed that Ameer Khan had been dispatched by Holkar with views corresponding with those which had led to the mission of Shirzee Rao from the camp of Scindia to Bhurtpore. Two days after- A. D. 1805.

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wards Scindia sent to congratulate the resident on the conclusion of peace between the British government and Bhurtpore. The person who was on this occasion the organ of Scindia's politeness took occasion to intimate that Holkar had resolved to renew his attack on the Company's territories, but had abandoned his intention at the persuasion of Shirzee Rao; that Holkar had consented to accept the mediation of Scindia, and, in company with Shirzee Rao, was on his way to Scindia's camp. On the following day he arrived with all his remaining force, and was immediately visited by Scindia and his principal officers. This ceremony was preceded by a very characteristic specimen of Mahratta duplicity and insolence. Scindia dispatched a message to Mr. Jenkins, intimating that he was surprised by the sudden arrival of Holkar; that he had desired that chief not to cross the Chumbul, but that the request having been disregarded, Scindia was compelled to visit him; and that it was his particular wish that the British representative should be present at the meeting. The resident answered by pointing out the extreme impropriety of the request, and observing that Scindia's intended visit was utterly inconsistent with the relations subsisting between him and the British government.

The resident, in regard to the duty which he owed to the government represented by him, did not, therefore, attend the auspicious interview between the two Mahratta chiefs, whose hereditary and personal quarrels were now suspended, to en-

able them to combine against a common object of hatred. But he was soon summoned to an interview, at which various attempts were made to prevail on him to believe that all that had occurred was occasioned by a sincere regard to promote the peace of India. The servants of Scindia descanted on this theme with their habitual fluency, till disconcerted by a remark thrown out by Mr. Jenkins, that since the approach of the troops of an ally within twenty coss had lately created so much uneasiness in the mind of Scindia, it could not fail to excite surprise to find the army of his highness encamped in union with that of the common enemy.

Holkar had not long occupied his proximate position to Scindia before he manifested his power by seizing the person of Ambajee Ingolia. This act was intended to extort a contribution, and it appears to have succeeded to the extent of obtaining a promise from Ambajee of the payment of fifty lacs. Ambajee was at this time in the service of Scindia, and apparently in his confidence; yet the chief did not interfere to protect his servant from plunder. His conduct in this respect seems to have decided, in the mind of the commander-in-chief, the question in what relation Scindia stood towards the British government; and he suggested that the British resident should take the earliest practicable opportunity of quitting Scindia's camp. On the 21st of April, the commander-in-chief being now relieved from anxiety with regard to Bhurtpore, quitted that place with the whole of the army under his personal

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CHAP. XX. — command, and marched in the direction where it was evident his services were about to be required. His previous success had been rewarded by a peerage, and he now bore the title of Lord Lake.

On his march Lord Lake received a letter from Scindia, referring to the treaty of peace concluded with him, and stating that ever since its conclusion the friendship between the two states had been progressively increasing. "The object of the treaty," said Scindia, "was to give peace to the country and quiet to its inhabitants; and with a view to this object, friendship was established between all the different chiefs and the British government. Jeswunt Rao Holkar alone remains to be settled with; and for the purpose of settling disputes between Holkar and the British government, and concluding a peace between them, I have marched from the city of Borhampore, and have arrived at Subdulghur;" he having formerly professed to be actuated by very different views. The letter then adverted to the war between the Company's government and the Rajah of Bhurtpore, and to the steps taken by him in regard to it—omitting, however, all notice of Scindia's endeavours to induce the Rajah to re-engage in war. But the alleged services of Scindia in restraining Holkar from ravaging the Company's territories were not forgotten; and the remainder of the letter was employed in commending its bearer to the British commander, as "a man of sense," and one enjoying Scindia's "confidence;" with recom-

mendations to negotiate with Holkar, and to abstain from molesting him. The answer of Lord Lake was such as became a British officer. It exposed the flimsy pretences under which Scindia sought to veil his enmity; apprized him that Mr. Jenkins had been instructed to withdraw from his camp; and intimated that the British government would consider Scindia responsible in his own person, in his family, his ministers, and his servants, for the safe and unmolested journey of its representative, with his attendants and property, to the nearest British camp.

Between the dispatch of Scindia's letter and the receipt of Lord Lake's answer Mr. Jenkins had, in compliance with previous instructions from the commander-in-chief, requested an audience of Scindia, for the purpose of formally demanding the retirement of the chieftain from the position which he occupied, and his separation from Holkar. Scindia appointed a time for receiving the British resident; and the latter, with a view to placing Scindia in a situation to afford a satisfactory answer, transmitted a memorial, embodying the principal facts which he intended to urge at the approaching audience. At the time appointed, however, Scindia neither afforded the promised interview, nor answered the memorial. Great confusion and no inconsiderable portion of alarm was now felt in Scindia's camp, from a report which prevailed that the British troops were in the vicinity; and on the morning of the 28th April the armies both of Scindia and

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It will be recollected that, on the approach of Scindia towards Bhurtpore, vigorous measures had been adopted for placing the British forces throughout India in a condition for carrying on the operations of war with effect. Under the orders issued for this purpose, Colonel Close had directed Colonel Haliburton, commanding the Hyderabad subsidiary force, to advance to Moolapore, there to be joined by the Poona subsidiary force under Colonel Wallace. At Fort St. George it was deemed advisable to assemble a considerable force in the ceded districts. A call was made upon the Dewan of Mysore to take the field with a body of the Rajah's troops, to which call he promptly responded; and a body of Silladar horse in the service of the Rajah was to join the British troops to be assembled at Bellary, in the ceded districts. At Bombay equal activity was displayed in complying with the orders of the governor-general for reinforcing Colonel Woodington in Guzerat. But the retreat of

Scindia and his Mahratta colleague from Subdulgur was assigned as a reason for modifying the instructions under which these arrangements had been made. The government of Fort St. George was directed to suspend its preparations, to distribute the army of the presidency in its usual stations, and to proceed immediately to withdraw from the Deccan all corps and establishments which might be extra to the field establishment of the subsidiary forces serving with the Peishwa and the Nizam. The extra battalions on the establishment of the presidency were also to be reduced, and every practicable diminution of expense effected. Colonel Close had commenced his return to Moolapore, to take the command of the army to be assembled there. On his way he received a copy of the instructions forwarded to Fort St. George, with orders to carry into effect such parts of them as might depend upon the exercise of his authority. The extraordinary military and political powers vested in him were at the same time withdrawn; and he was directed to return to Poona, to resume his duties as resident at the court of the Peishwa. Instructions similar in character were forwarded to Bombay, and on the authorities of this presidency the necessity of economy was urgently enforced. The troops in Guzerat were to be cantoned, in order to avoid the expense of field allowances; and no field expenses were to be incurred without the special sanction of the government of Bengal, except

CHAP. XX. under circumstances of urgent and uncontrollable necessity.

The pacific and economical policy now adopted was extended to the army of Lord Lake. Scindia and Holkar were to fly without disturbance and without alarm. The commander-in-chief was instructed not to pursue the retreating forces of the chiefs confederated against the British government, and who held in durance a considerable number of its subjects, but to direct his attention to the necessary arrangements for cantoning his troops. The Bombay army, under General Jones, was to proceed to Rampoorah, on its return to Guzerat; and all the irregular corps in the British service were to be reduced. At the time, however, when these orders were issued permanent tranquillity was not expected; for the probability of a renewal of hostilities at no distant period was distinctly noticed, and, as far as the prescribed reductions would admit, provided for.

The policy of allowing an open enemy and a treacherous ally to enjoy for a time immunity from retribution was not that which for some years had been pursued in India—it was not that which had raised the British power to the lofty position which it had attained. The change cannot fail to excite inquiry as to its cause. The answer is, that the policy now pursued was not the policy of the Marquis Wellesley. It was that of the home authorities; the result of that blind reverence for native princes,

whatever their character or deserts, which had so long prevailed in England, and of a fatuitous desire to save money under all circumstances, however indispensable its expenditure might be to the honour and interests of government. The subject has already been adverted to, and further notice is here unnecessary. It should be added, however, that the Marquis Wellesley's administration was approaching its conclusion. His successor was on the sea, commissioned to dispel, if possible, the remembrance of all the glories which had irradiated the brightest period of England's connection with India, and to surrender a large share of the solid advantages which had been gained; to throw back the country into the anarchy under which it had so long groaned, and to lay the foundation of future alarms, future wars, and future expenses of fearful amount. The governor-general felt that he could not expect to complete any large and extensive plan, similar to those upon which he had been accustomed to act, and, pressed by representations from home of a tone and character peculiarly annoying to a noble spirit, he resolved to suspend operations, leaving his successor in a condition to resume them if he should think proper, or if his instruction should permit such a course. Such is the explanation of the extraordinary change which has been related.

Scindia had fled with his companion Holkar. The British territories were not menaced; and though chastisement was deferred, it did not necessarily follow that it was altogether abandoned. But the

CHAP. XX. flying confederates had carried with them the British residency deputed to one of them, and the safety of the resident and his attendants was an object of interest. On transmitting to Scindia Lord Lake's reply to the chieftain's letter, Mr. Jenkins adverted to the instructions which he had received to withdraw, and requested to be informed of the arrangements which the maharajah might be pleased to make for the purpose of facilitating his departure. Scindia replied that, as his minister, Shirzee Rao, was absent, he could not return a decided answer, but that in the course of two or three days a reply to Lord Lake's letter would be prepared. The resident shortly afterwards renewed the application, expressing his dissatisfaction at being prevented from complying with the orders of the commander-in-chief, and intimating that the cause assigned for delay was inapplicable to the case, inasmuch as Lord Lake did not expect any answer to his letter, but would be justly surprised if the British representative at Scindia's court were not permitted to obey the orders of his own government. Mr. Jenkins further pointed out the propriety of his departure taking place with the sanction and under the protection of Scindia; that established usage, as well as the principles of justice and public faith, required that a person in his situation should be entirely free from restraint; and that a communication of Scindia's intentions was necessary to enable the resident to exculpate himself from the charge of a voluntary deviation from orders which he was bound to obey.

Nothing satisfactory followed this representation, but Mr. Jenkins was informed that a copy of the commander-in-chief's letter, together with the substance of Mr. Jenkins's messages on the subject of his departure, had been communicated to the minister, Shirzee Rao. To abate the resident's solicitude to withdraw, the Mahratta officers expatiated with much power on the dangers to which he would be exposed from the state of the country between Scindia's camp and the head-quarters of the British army. To these representations Mr. Jenkins had a ready answer—that whenever a day should be fixed for his departure, the commander-in-chief would dispatch a force to meet him, and that he should require a convoy of Scindia's cavalry merely to shew that he had the maharajah's protection, and not to repel any danger. This produced a representation that the advance of a British force was unnecessary, for that whenever the departure should take place, exclusively of about a thousand horse to be furnished in equal proportions by Scindia and Holkar, the British resident should receive the protection of any force of infantry and guns that he might desire, and that for his safe conduct to the head-quarters of the British army the maharajah would be fully responsible.

On the 10th of May the confederates recommenced their march in the direction of Kotah, without dismissing the British residency. Mr. Jenkins had previously suggested, with reference to the systematic evasion and delay which characterize the

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CHAP. XX. — proceedings of a Mahratta court, that the commander-in-chief should address a separate letter to Scindia, the object of which should be limited to the demand of safe conduct for the resident and the gentlemen of the residency to the British camp. Lord Lake acted on the suggestion—the letter was transmitted, and the application met with the same success which had attended former demands of the same description.\*

The confederated chiefs continued to move in a westerly direction towards Ajmeer. Their progress was marked by some extraordinary events: the first to be noticed demonstrates the power of Holkar in a manner not less decided than the seizure by that chief of Ambajee Ingolia. Baptiste, already mentioned as in the service of Scindia, had made himself obnoxious to the wrath of Holkar, and, it was said, meditated the seizure of that chieftain's person.

\* The letter of Lord Lake was characterized by soldierlike brevity and decision; had it been supported by his lordship's advance, it could scarcely have failed to produce the desired effect. The following is a translation of it:—"I have already written to your highness a reply to your letter, requesting that your highness would give safe conduct to Mr. Jenkins, and the other gentlemen attached to the residency at your highness's court, to the camp of the British army; but this has not hitherto taken place, and your highness appears disposed to delay and evade this requisition. Rao Gopaul Junnadur, whom you dispatched to me, has been desired to return from the middle of his way. Adverting to your highness's evasion and delay, I again write to your highness with the pen of friendship, to request that you will cause those gentlemen to reach me in safety; until which time I shall consider your highness and your adherents to be responsible for their lives and property, and for their protection from insult."

The spirit of vengeance thus roused in Holkar's breast found gratification in the apprehension of his enemy, who was immediately subjected to one of those barbarous inflictions of which native annals afford so many instances. The unhappy prisoner was deprived of sight. He did not long endure the misery of the privation, the outrage leading to his death. Thus did Holkar, the enemy of the British state, act towards a servant of Scindia, its pretended ally; and Scindia submitted.

A still more remarkable event followed, if any thing can be regarded as remarkable in a Mahratta court. Ambajee Ingolia having been subjected to the process of plunder, and the plunder having been secured, was released from the restraint imposed upon him for the purpose of drawing forth a contribution. This was not very remarkable. The object being attained, the means by which it was to be procured were discontinued as no longer necessary. But the liberation of Ambajee Ingolia was followed by extraordinary honour. He was received by Scindia with the highest degree of respect and attention, and the ceremony of his reception was regarded as an indication of his intended appointment to the charge of the executive authority in place of Shirzee Rao. Such instances of capricious change are, indeed, but ordinary events among the Mahrattas.\*

\* The character of this people has been illustrated in the progress of this work sufficiently, perhaps, to render unnecessary any endeavour to throw further light upon it. But it may not be uninteresting to see their character drawn by one of themselves.

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In the meantime the British residency remained virtually, though not apparently, in a state of impri-

Captain Sydenham, acting resident at Poona, in a letter dated the 27th of May, 1805, gives the following report of some remarks made by the Peishwa, called forth by the relative circumstances of some of the Mahratta states and the British government. "His highness," says Captain Sydenham, "addressed me nearly in the following terms, as far as my recollection serves me :—' Your paths and those of the Mahrattas are different ; your way is open and straight—theirs is crooked and concealed. When you have a friend you are friendly ; when you have an enemy you shew your enmity and destroy him ; but sometimes your enmity ends in friendship—their friendship always ends in enmity. I know you both ; I have tried you both ; and I speak from what I have felt. These men with turbans who were my servants sought my ruin ; you, who wear hats and are foreigners, saved me from destruction and gave me back my throne. While they were here I was insulted and oppressed ; now that you are here I am at repose and do as I please. They took from their master crores of rupees and still asked more ; you have spent crores of rupees for a friend and demand no return.' " Of the persons involved in the existing wars and intrigues, the Peishwa said—" ' Between Scindia and Holkar this is the difference—Scindia is a weak, foolish boy, who is himself incapable of government, and is led by the advice of others. If his servants advise well, he acts well ; if his servants advise ill, he acts ill ; great crimes are committed by his government, but he himself is faultless. Holkar is a bad man from his heart ; he loves disorder ; he hates repose. Whatever he does proceeds from himself ; he is a monster who must be destroyed. Shirzee Rao Ghatgay is almost worse than Holkar. While these men have power there cannot be repose ; though they should have only a hundred men, still they would excite disorder. These are the men who have brought Scindia into difficulties, and in the end will ruin him. Let Lord Wellesley extirpate the guardians, but let the child be preserved. The Company must give Scindia good counsellors, and must keep its army at Oujein ; all will then be quiet.' "

The traits of Mahratta character noticed in the former part of the above quotation are, it must be admitted, faithfully portrayed ;

sonment. The commander-in-chief again demanded their release; and ultimately the governor-general addressed a letter to Scindia, requiring their dismissal within fourteen days from the receipt of the letter. It was dated the 25th July. On the 30th the Marquis Wellesley signed his last despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors; and at six o'clock on the evening of that day, a salute from the battery announced that he was superseded in his high functions by the arrival of the Marquis Cornwallis.

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The policy pursued by the Marquis Wellesley has already been reviewed in reference to every important act of his government, excepting the Mahratta war. A few observations on this, and on the circumstances out of which it arose, are demanded, not so much by the difficulty of rightly deciding, as by the misrepresentations in which the subject was so long enshrouded. It was the misfortune of the Marquis Wellesley that, during the latter years of

but the sincerity of the painter is more than questionable. The Mahratta prince was himself probably displaying some of the more striking qualities of his countrymen. "Mahrattas wishing to be politic," says Captain Duff, "always disparage themselves, and in addressing a European nothing is more common than to speak of themselves as a treacherous, deceitful race of marauders, on whom no dependance should be placed. One unacquainted with their manners, or who has superficially observed them, would not readily suppose that they merely intend an indirect compliment, knowing how highly truth and plain dealing are estimated among us."—History of the Mahrattas, vol. iii. page 151.

Thus it appears that the Mahratta character is true to nothing but its own inherent depravity.

CHAP. XX. — his administration, he was never cordially supported from home; and those who should have afforded to him countenance and encouragement were but too often ready to join individuals who reviled a policy which they were unable to understand, or who from personal or party motives made that policy an object of attack. This observation does not apply peculiarly to the authority in direct communication with the governments in India. The conduct of the King's government on various occasions was not such as the governor-general had reason to expect or ought to have experienced.\* Time, however, the best vindicator of the truly great, has well performed his office with regard to the policy pursued by the Marquis Wellesley.

Those who have taken up their opinions from the statements of the marquis's enemies will feel astonishment at the assertion that his policy was essentially pacific. Yet such was the fact. His main object—that to which all his measures were directed, was to preserve the peace of India. After many probable causes of disturbance had been overcome, one calculated to excite constant and deep apprehensions remained in the Mahratta confederacy. The Marquis Wellesley sought to remove this by uniting the chief of the Mahratta association in a defensive

\* Lord Castlereagh, while President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, signalized himself by writing some diffuse notes upon Mahratta affairs, which will long be kept in memory, by the demolition which they received at the hands of the Duke of Wellington, then Major-General Wellesley. Both papers will be found in volume v. of the Wellesley Despatches.

alliance with the British government. But the Peishwa, very much in accordance with the custom of the Mahrattas, was in subjection to a chief nominally dependant upon him. It was not for the interest of that chief that such a connection should be formed, and in consequence repeated overtures from the British government were rejected or evaded. These overtures were not only in conformity with the general policy of the Marquis Wellesley, but they had reference to a particular object—the protection of the Nizam, on whom the Mahrattas made claims which, at any favourable opportunity, they were ready to assert by arms. They might have been defeated by the employment of a British force; but those most loud in denouncing the policy pursued in this instance will scarcely deny that it is better to prevent invasion than to have occasion to repel it.

The circumstances which led to the treaty of Bassein have been too recently noticed to need repetition. Those circumstances afforded the governor-general the opportunity so long sought, and previously so vainly, of bringing the Peishwa within the pale of British alliance. By the interference of the Company's government the Peishwa was restored to his dignity, and to more of actual power than he had been accustomed to enjoy. But he could not have maintained himself on the throne without the aid of the power that placed him there; and this of necessity gave to that power a high degree of influence at his court. The existence of

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— this influence could not fail to be displeasing to those with whose ambitious projects it interfered: to Scindia, who wished to keep the Peishwa in a state of pupilage to himself; to Holkar, who had a rival Peishwa under his protection, whom he intended to manage for his own benefit, in the manner which Scindia had practised with regard to Bajee Rao; to the Rajah of Berar, who assumed, in virtue of his affinity to the Rajah of Sattara, to exercise the chief executive power in the Mahratta state. In the feelings of these parties originated the wars which ensued; and it may be asked, did the Marquis Wellesley foresee the consequences of the treaty with the Peishwa? and if so, did he act wisely in risking them?

In regard to the first inquiry, he could not but foresee that to render the British influence predominant at Poona would be offensive to all who wished to exercise their own. This might be foreseen as certain. But that the malcontents should have recourse to arms, in the hope of winning back that which they had lost, or of obtaining that to which they aspired, could only be foreseen as possible. It did not follow that, because Scindia was discontented, he would engage in a contest in which he must almost have felt sure that he should be worsted; nor that the Rajah of Berar should take a similar course with similar prospects; nor that Holkar should persist in provoking a power which had the means of altogether crushing him; and the probability was not great that these parties,

with separate and hostile interests, should unite to dispossess the English of authority, the exercise of which would immediately become a source of disputes among themselves. Nor, in fact, did they ever so unite. While Scindia and the Rajah of Berar were in arms against the English, Holkar kept aloof. When Scindia and Holkar united, the Rajah of Berar, though not indisposed to join them, was deterred either by his fears or his jealousy from adopting such a course. When the treaty of Bassein was concluded, it must have been obvious to all persons acquainted with Mahratta affairs that some discontent would be excited among the inferior members of the confederacy; but whether or not that discontent would manifest itself in open acts of hostility, and if it should, at what precise period the manifestation would take place, could be reasonably predicted by no one. The Marquis Wellesley was not without hope that other members of the Mahratta confederacy might, like the Peishwa, be induced to accept of an English alliance; and the hope was not unwarranted. Few native states have entered into such alliances from pure friendship—the connection has for the most part been the offspring of convenience; and it was not improbable that other Mahratta chieftains might be anxious to secure to their own power that stability which British protection had given to the authority of the Peishwa. In the East, as elsewhere—perhaps far more than elsewhere—power begets power, and success conciliates followers. Even the lawless

CHAP. XX. spirit of a Mahratta bends before rising and progressive greatness.

If, however, the actual series of events that followed the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein could have been distinctly foreseen to be certain and inevitable consequences of the treaty, the policy of that treaty would remain unimpugned. The Mahrattas were dangerous neighbours—dangerous to the British government, dangerous to its ally the Nizam. Freebooters by profession, they would never fail to find occasion for invading any state or territory where even temporary advantage was likely to ensue. Wherever their influence extended—and its extent was nearly co-equal with that of India—there existed the elements of discord, waiting but the will of the most unprincipled of men to bring them into action. To hope for the maintenance of the peace of India while the Mahrattas were free from restraint was absurd. An opportunity offered for forming an alliance with their head, and thus obtaining the right and the power of enforcing, with regard to that prince at least, the laws and usages of civilized men. It was embraced; and the governor-general who, even in the full conviction that war would follow, should have suffered it to pass unimproved would have been guilty of a gross dereliction of duty. It becomes not the character of the British government to engage in an unjust war—as little is it becoming to decline a just and necessary one. The inferior Mahratta chiefs had no reasonable ground for dis-

content; and unreasonable dissatisfaction ought not to be permitted to stand in the way of great and beneficial measures.

The war, too, was not without obvious advantage—assuming the probability of conducting it with success—in the prospect which it afforded of reducing the French power, which, under the protection of Scindia, had grown to a size and strength formidable even to Scindia himself, and which, so long as it existed, would be a constant ground of alarm and danger to the British. The danger being past, it is easy to laugh at the fears formerly expressed with regard to French ascendancy in India, but at the time of the Marquis Wellesley's administration the fear was not chimerical. A plan had been suggested for the establishment of a widely spread French dominion, to be carried on in the name, and under the nominal authority, of the unfortunate emperor Shah Allum. The wreck of the Mahometan empire was to form the foundation of a new European one. The plan may be derided as extravagant; but those who feel inclined to take this view should previously reflect on the extraordinary career of both the French and English in India, more especially the latter, and on that of the former nation in Europe. The humble guise in which the English first appeared in India afforded no token of their future grandeur. Amid the early extravagancies of the French revolution it would have been difficult to gather indications of the approaching subjection of the continent of Europe to the

CHAP. XX. — people among whom those extravagancies were perpetrated.

The prejudice which determines that in all transactions with the native states of India England is in the wrong, has called forth two objections to the treaty of Bassein and its effects. The first is almost ludicrous. It has been argued—and by a man whose life was passed in high office\*—that as the Peishwa was but the head of a confederation, no treaty ought to have been concluded with him without the consent of the remaining members. Such an objection scarcely deserves an answer. The relations of the different members of the Mahratta confederacy were but nominal. No one respected them when any sufficient object was to be promoted by forgetting them. The Peishwa himself, supreme as he is sometimes represented, was, according to the fiction on which the confederacy was based, only a servant. His master, the Rajah of Sattara, he kept not only in dependance but under restraint; although at certain seasons he made show of offering tokens of homage, and on occasion of war never took the field without asking permission of the man whom he mocked by his affected allegiance. That which the Peishwa had effected with regard to his superior, other chiefs were desirous of pursuing with regard to him; and they sometimes succeeded. The Peishwa ruled his master, and Scindia for a

\* The late Marquis of Londondery, when Viscount Castlereagh and President of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India.

season ruled the Peishwa ; while the Rajah of Berar aspired to the authority nominally enjoyed by one and actually exercised by the other of these chiefs. The entire system was, practically, a series of usurpations, and to claim respect for the constitution of the Mahratta confederacy as described in words, as though it had a real existence, is the effect either of ignorance or of a wilful intention to mislead.

The second objection to be noticed is this—that the conduct of the British government in seeking to obtain influence over the Peishwa was but the same as that of Scindia, who had previously exercised that influence. The answer is, that the one party exercised for good purposes the power acquired, the other exercised it for evil purposes. Any attempt to represent the object of the contending parties as the same must fail. No one will pretend that Scindia had any other object than personal advantage. No one can fail to perceive that the governor-general could have no such object, and that his country gained nothing but an additional security for the safety of her own dominions, and for the maintenance ultimately, if not immediately, of general peace. In this latter object the Mahratta states had an interest not inferior to that of Great Britain. These chiefs did not, indeed, recognize it ; but this does not invalidate the position that such was the fact. Those who live by the practice of dishonest arts will be slow to admit that they would become happier as well as better men by turning to respectable modes of life ; but the truth is not disproved by their

CHAP. XX. — insensibility to it. So the Mahrattas, living by disturbance and plunder, might believe disturbance and plunder to be essential to their well-being; but it was not thus essential because their distorted moral views led them to believe it. The arts of industry and peace are far better instruments of prosperity and wealth than those of rapine; and he must be deeply imbued with the Anti-British prejudice in respect to India, who can think any wrong was inflicted upon the Mahrattas by attempting to bring them to an outward observance, if not to an inward conviction of the value of the laws of peace and honesty. The Mahrattas, from the commencement of their existence as a people, had been continually engaged in the occupation of plundering; yet they had accumulated no wealth. Ever appropriating to themselves the property of others, they were ever in want. The lessons of experience, however, were lost on these native freebooters, as they usually are on individual criminals; and lost they must be, not less, on him who can maintain even the possibility of the Mahrattas having been injured by the change which it was the tendency of British policy to introduce among them.

The sum of the argument that has been adduced is this: that the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein was expedient, and that it involved no violation of right or justice—that the consequences which actually followed could not have been certainly foreseen, though they might have been apprehended; but that, had they been foreseen, they ought to have been in-

curred. Passing on to the consideration of the actual results of the wars which ensued, we find, at the period at which we have arrived, Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, two of the most dangerous of the Mahratta chieftains, deprived of considerable power and dominion, and the latter, with his defeated colleague Holkar, in flight from the British arms; the French power annihilated; the emperor rescued from the hands of those who abused the possession of his person and nominal authority to their own purposes; a considerable number of minor states brought from under a dominion adverse to the British government and placed beneath its protection; the British territory not only extended, but strengthened and rendered more defensible; and the British government assuming that position to which the course of events had long impelled it, but from which the weakness of those by whom it had been conducted had kept it back—that of the great predominant power of India. The accomplishment of this object was reserved for the Marquis Wellesley. He saw what some of his predecessors could not or would not discern—that the British government could not, either with safety or with honour, occupy a secondary place among the states of India—that it must be first or nothing—and he had the vigour and the ability to act upon the perception.

The only rational objection ever taken to his administration is on the ground of its expense. But if the expense be viewed in connection with what was achieved, not merely of brilliant reputation, but

CHAP. XX. — of solid advantage, it will be found to be the cheapest administration that ever existed in India. Latterly the views of the governor-general were in some degree cramped by the repeated orders for retrenchment received from home, and to this circumstance, among others, it is to be ascribed that the perfidy of Scindia did not meet prompt and signal retribution.

It has been said that the policy of the Marquis Wellesley was essentially pacific, and such, in truth, it was. He sought to gather the states of India under the standard of the British government, by whom the balance was to be held, the peaceable protected, and the ill-disposed restrained. The system of subsidiary alliances did not originate with him, but he greatly extended its operation. On this system some observations have been made in a former part of this work, and though undoubtedly the system is open to objections, it is difficult to conceive by what other means, in the existing state of India, peace and order could be so effectually maintained. In one of his despatches, after stating the extent of the subsidiary forces supported in different states, the Marquis Wellesley observes:—"The position, extent, and equipment of this military force, combined with the privilege which the British government possesses of arbitrating differences and dissensions between the several states with which it is connected by the obligations of alliance, enables the British power to control the causes of that internal warfare which, during so long a term of years, has

desolated many of the most fertile provinces of India, has occasioned a constant and hazardous fluctuation of power among the native states, has encouraged a predatory and military spirit among the inhabitants, and formed an inexhaustible source for the supply of military adventurers prepared to join the standard of any turbulent chieftain for the purposes of ambition, plunder, or rebellion." It may be added, that the indirect effect of European principles and habits of thought, acting upon natives of influence and authority through the representatives of the British government, cannot fail to be beneficial, although the developement may be slow. "This empire," says Sir John Malcolm, speaking of that of Great Britain in India, "though raised by the operation of many and various causes, has been chiefly established, and must be constantly maintained, by the sword. But though we must continue to govern as conquerors, it is our duty to make our rule a benefit to mankind, and to carry among those whom we have subdued the blessings of peace, knowledge, and improvement in all the arts of civilized life; and at that stage which our power in India has attained, we shall probably find the accomplishment of such an object easier and more conducive to our authority than all the wars and contests in which a selfish and neutral policy can ever involve our neighbours." He adds—"There would hardly appear to be a greater or more noble object for the exercise of human wisdom, or one more worthy of all

CHAP. XX. — the attention of a great state, than that of establishing and maintaining, through the action of its influence and power, union and tranquillity over a considerable portion of the globe ; and of bringing to nations whom it found involved in continual discord and war, the blessings of harmony and peace.” These were the views avowed and acted upon by the Marquis Wellesley. On the suspension of hostilities with Scindia and the Rajah of Berar, he made the following observations in reply to a congratulatory address from the inhabitants of Calcutta :—“ In the termination of hostilities my solicitude has been directed to the important purpose of effecting a general pacification of India on principles of reciprocal justice and moderation. The power, reputation, and dignity of the British empire in India will derive additional security and lustre from the establishment of peace and good order among the native states. In the decline of intrinsic strength inferior states may, perhaps, have gained a temporary safety by fomenting the discord of contiguous powers. In any extremity such a policy is unwarrantable and disgraceful, nor can permanent repose be secured upon such precarious foundations in the actual condition of this empire. I am happy to declare that the concord of the established native states, the independence of their separate authorities, the internal peace of their respective dominions, and the tranquillity and happiness of their respective subjects, will tend to confirm and to fortify the

power and resources of the British government, and must constitute the most desirable objects of the British policy in India.”

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While the preceding pages were passing through the press, the hand of death removed beyond the reach of earthly praise or censure the great man whose policy they are designed to illustrate. He had survived the events in which he was the chief actor so long, that even during his life those events could be contemplated with that calm sobriety of judgment which distance only can ensure. He is now numbered with his predecessors, and the voice of public gratitude, tardily aroused, but powerfully exerted, falls upon an ear unconscious of its utterance.

The judgment of the author of this work upon the chief acts of the Marquis Wellesley's administration has been so freely and so frequently expressed in the course of the narrative, that it can scarcely be necessary to enter at large into any further discussion of those acts; and had the life of the revered statesman been longer spared, the volume would have ended with the words above quoted from himself. His death seems to call for a few remarks upon his character; and though it is a painful task to sit in judgment upon a mighty spirit which has scarcely left its earthly tenement, the author does not feel justified in declining it.

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— The unrivalled brilliancy of the Marquis Wellesley's administration has perhaps tended to obscure the rare qualities which led to its success. The first of those qualities was his extraordinary sagacity. He saw the true position of the British government in India—a vision withheld not only from his predecessors, but from his contemporaries. It is common to say of the great minds whose genius stands out in bold relief amid universal tameness, that they are beyond their age; and if ever this were true of living man, it is of the Marquis Wellesley. His mind was not led captive by words—it was not to be trammelled by conventional opinions. He neither gave credence to the prevailing cant of his time on the subject of India, nor affected to give credence to it; and this leads to the notice of another striking point of his character—the manly boldness with which he avowed and maintained opinions not lightly formed, and which he therefore felt were not lightly to be abandoned.

The vigour with which he carried into action the great plans which his genius suggested is scarcely less remarkable than his sagacity. When resolved to strike a blow at Mysore, he was met by difficulties which ordinary minds would have deemed insuperable. He determined that they should be overcome, and they were overcome. The same determination of purpose—the same unshrinking energy, are manifested in his transactions with Arcot, with Oude, with the Peishwa, and indeed in all the principal acts of his government. Like all truly

great men, he was not the slave of circumstances— CHAP. XX.  
he made circumstances promote his purposes.

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Eminent talents are a blessing or a curse alike to their possessor and to the world, according to the use made of them. Those of the Marquis Wellesley were invariably directed to the highest and best ends—the promotion of peace, of the interests of the two countries with which he was connected, with one by birth and with both by office—and to the happiness of mankind. He laid in India the foundations of peace and increasing prosperity, and if the superstructure were not completed in accordance with the original design, the crime rests on the heads of others.

It is not less remarkable than laudable that a mind so vigorous and determined should, in the exercise of almost boundless power, have been kept in constant subjection to the dictates of justice. That he thus withstood the temptations of his position is a proof of the possession of moral strength proportioned to his intellectual ability.

To his disinterestedness it is perhaps less necessary to advert, as the sordid vices are rarely associated with genius; but the unhappy example of some of his predecessors justifies some notice of his purity in this respect. They grasped at wealth, with little regard to the means by which it was to be acquired, or to the imputations which they might incur. He on one extraordinary occasion recoiled from the acceptance of a large sum tendered to him under circumstances which would, to most minds, have

CHAP. XX. appeared to justify its receipt, but which were not such as could satisfy the sensitive honour which ever governed him. The king, in the exercise of his prerogative of disposing of prize, had determined to allot to the governor-general a hundred thousand pounds from the fruits of the capture of Seringapatam; but the royal favour was declined, because he for whose benefit it was intended would not enrich himself at the expense of the brave men whose swords had won for his and their country so noble a conquest.

The same delicacy which led him to decline his Sovereign's bounty was manifested after his return to England, in his steady refusal to accept office, though repeatedly pressed upon him, so long as the malignant charges made against him were suspended over his head. He held that a man against whom such imputations were afloat ought not to have place in his Majesty's councils. When they fell to the ground, he readily returned to the service of his country.

In describing the characters of great men, the speck of human infirmity, which is to be found in all, should not be passed over. The Marquis Wellesley was ambitious; but his ambition sought gratification not in mere personal aggrandizement, but in connecting his own fame with that of the land to which he belonged, and of the government which he administered;—in the diffusion of sound and liberal knowledge, and the extension of the means of happiness among millions of men who knew

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